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Abstract
The PhD research is concerned with how EU procurement regulation impacts upon the
procurement process for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. The process followed
to award the contract and to set the terms of the agreement in the procurement of a PPP
project (invariably highly sophisticated arrangements) is crucial for value for money. Prior
to 2004 the process was regulated by EU legislation designed in the 1970s, which failed to
adequately cater for modem procurement methods, like PPPs. Thus new legislation in
2004 introduced a new procedure for these projects: competitive dialogue. However,
commentators have identified possible problems with competitive dialogue and there are
numerous legal grey areas.
The research examines the way in which the new legal framework for competitive
dialogue is applied to PPPs in the UK, and actors' perceptions of the framework. It seeks
to identify perceived positive aspects of competitive dialogue in facilitating best practice;
perceived problems, including any legal uncertainty and constraints on best practice;
strategies to conduct the process within the constraints; and the factors that influence
compliance and approach to legal risk.
The research adopts a socio-Iegal approach, combining analysis of the legal rules, with a
study of the literature on theories of regulation and enforcement, and qualitative
interviews with legal advisors, procurement officers, and policymakers.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Contextof the research
The PhD thesis examines the application in the UK of EU public procurement rules to
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), notably Privately Financed Infrastructure (PFI)
projects.
For the purposes of the thesis, the term "public procurement" refers to the process by
which the public sector (e.g. central and local government) acquires the goods, works and
services it needs. In view of its economic importance, national bias in the award of public
contracts is recognised as a potential barrier to intra-EU trade; the EU therefore regulates
public procurement to open markets to EU wide competition. This is primarily done by
requiring procuring authorities to follow set procedures that are based on principles of
transparency and fairness.
PPPs are often highly sophisticated arrangements, and the process, to select the winning
private sector consortium and set the terms of the agreement, is crucial if value for money
is to be achieved. Competitive dialogue was introduced in 2004 (public Sector Directive
2004/18/Eqt to provide an award procedure tailored to the needs of complex
procurement, such as complex PPP projects. Prior to this, contracts needed to be
awarded in accordance with procedures designed in the 1970s, which are intended for
more straightforward contracts.
The design of competitive dialogue was heavily influenced by UK procurement practice.
However, although closely mirroring what many regard to be best practice for the
IDirective 2004/181EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for the
award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts (Official Journal L /341/ /4.3010412004)
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procurement of complex PPP contracts, the legal rules are characterised by a high degree
of uncertainty, such that the extent to which past practice in the UK may continue under
competitive dialogue is not clear. Indeed, in certain key areas, such as the scope for
negotiations permitted following the identification of the winning tender, these uncertain
legal rules have the potential to impact heavily upon UK practice.
1.2 Aims and objectives
The research project aims to examine the way in which the legal framework for
competitive dialogue is applied to PPP projects in the UK, and perceptions of that
framework. The project will identify: perceived positive aspects of the framework in
facilitating best practice; perceived problems, including any legal uncertainty and
constraints on best practice; strategies to conduct the process within the constraints; and
the factors that influence compliance and approach to legal risk.
The project has two main objectives. The first is to provide information that will assist in
policymaking on PPP procurement procedures at both EU and national level. The way in
which the law is applied in practice, particularly where there is legal uncertainty, often has
an impact on the "law". Thus, the project, by identifying how competitive dialogue is
being used in the UK and the commercially sensible interpretations that practitioners are
adopting in areas of legal uncertainty, may be relevant for: (i) Developing official guidance
on the procedure. Current guidance at both national and EU level fails to address many
issues, including legal grey areas. The research will inform future guidance. (ii)
Developing a sound legal framework through judicial interpretation. (iii) Future
legislation. (iv) Informing individual procuring public authorities applying the rules. Since
the introduction of competitive dialogue, the UK has been one of the heaviest users of
the procedure; this, coupled with the fact that UK PPP experience is often used as a
model by other countries, means that the UK experience with competitive dialogue is of
13
broad interest. By providing information on influences on compliance the research could
also inform the EU's regulatory policy on procurement more generally.
The second objective is to enhance understanding of the way in which regulated persons
respond to legal rules that conflict with their legitimate needs, and to uncertainties in the
law, and the factors that influence this response. In this respect, the project enhances
understanding of EU law as a socio-political! economic phenomenon as well as a legal one
and will inform broader discourse on regulation and regulatory strategy.
1.3 Method and methodology
In order to effectively meet the aims and objectives set out in section two, the research
project, adopting a sodo-legal perspective on regulation, combined an analysis of the EU
rules on competitive dialogue (including UK implementation) with an empirical study of
the law in action.
The research began with an analysis of the legal framework on competitive dialogue, i.e. it
sought to establish the law on paper. In many areas it is not possible to say conclusively
what the law is, and the research sought to highlight these legal grey areas. In addition to
EU and UK legal texts, this stage of the research involved analysis of soft law (Le.non-
binding guidance issued by policymakers), which past research suggests is influential in
shaping UK procurement practice. This stage of the research also involved a review of
socio-legal Iiterature on regulatory compliance.
The next stage of the research project was an exploration of the practical application of
competitive dialogue. The legal analysis was followed by a qualitative empirical study. In
order to learn about the impact of the legal rules in practice, the author conducted a series
14
of semi-structured interviews with individuals involved in the practical application of the
legal rules on competitive dialogue.
1.4 Outline of the study
1.4.1 Introduction
This section will now provide an outline of the PhD thesis, introducing the main contents
of the forthcoming chapters in tum.
1.4.2 The EUregulation of Public-Private Partnership procurement
The research examines the impact of EU rules on UK PPP procurement. The law is fast
moving and can only be said to be accurate as of 01 October 2011.
As PPP is a broad term used to describe various different arrangements between the
public and private sector, chapter two of the thesis will serve to provide a picture of the
general landscape of PPP procurement in the UK. In this chapter different types of PPP
arrangement will be introduced: namely, contracting out, PFI (including concessions),
institutionalised PPP, and land development agreements. In view of its practical
significance, the chapter will pay particular attention to the development of PFI in the
UK, describing the main capital investment schemes that were operational at the time the
research was carried out and the qualitative interviews undertaken (such as Building
Schools for the Future and the National Health Service Local Improvement Finance
Trust schemes). The chapter will also detail relevant past and present policymaking
organisations with oversight responsibilities for PPP procurement in the UK (e.g. the
Office of Government Commerce, Infrastructure UK and Partnerships for Schools).
Building upon chapter two, subsequent chapters will describe and analyse the law to
which PPP procurement is subject. The EU regulates public procurement at two levels.
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Chapter three will discuss the first level of regulation: the general rules and principles of
the EU Treaties. The chapter will discuss the articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the EU (fFEU) most relevant to public procurement and also general principles, such as
transparency and equal treatment, which the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has held
to impose positive obligations on the public sector in procurement.
The second level of EU procurement regulation is in the form of EU harmonising
directives. Chapter four will discuss the requirements of the Public Sector Directive
2004,2which were transposed into UK law by the Public Contracts Regulations 20063 and
the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2006.4 This will include, inter alia, an
explanation of the scope of the Directive; the advertising requirement; the requirement
for technical specifications; the different procedures available; applicable time limits; the
rules on qualification and selection; and the rules on contract award.
The second part of chapter four will set out the enforcement system for breach of the
procurement rules. A challenge against a procurement rule breach may come from the
Commission (under Art.258 TFEU) or from the market (i.e. aggrieved bidders). The
market is seen as the primary means of enforcement; thus, the system of review and
remedies for procurement law breach are also regulated under the Public Sector Remedies
Directive 89/665 IEC. 5 The chapter will consider the requirements of the Remedies
Directive, which was recently updated and strengthened by Directive 2007/66/EC,6 and
the UK implementation of the Remedies Directive. Itwill be seen that, although in the
past it was rare for procurement challenges to reach the courts in the UK, in recent years
2 Directive 20041181EC, fn.l
3 Public Contracts Regulations (SI 2006, No.5) (31/0112006)
4 Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations (SSI2006, No.1) (31/0112006)
'Council Directive 89/66SIEEC of21 December 1989 on the coordination of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts (Official Journal L
395133,3011211989)
6 Directive 2007/66IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of II December 2007 amending Council Directives
89/66SlEEC and 921I3IEEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures concerning the award of public
contracts (Official Journal L 335131, 2011212007)
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the number of procurement disputes being heard by UK courts has steadily risen. The
research was therefore undertaken at a time when conditions were ideal for the research
interviews to provide a telling insight into regulatory compliance and the deterrent effect
of legal challenge on rule breaking, particularly in the context public sector organisations
(rather than private corporations which are the usual focus of the compliance literature).
These theories on regulatory compliance will be elaborated upon in chapter 9 (see below).
1.4.3 The legal rules on competitive dialogue
As will be explained, many UK PPP projects will be procured using the competitive
dialogue procedure. Chapters five-seven will provide an in depth analysis of the legal
rules on competitive dialogue. Chapter five will consider the background to competitive
dialogue, looking in particular at the reasons why in 2004 a new procurement procedure
was introduced. Chapters six and seven will explore in detail the legal rules on
competitive dialogue, highlighting legal grey areas.
Chapter six will analyse the grounds for using competitive dialogue. Competitive dialogue
can only be used in the case of "particularly complex contracts"; however, there is
considerable uncertainty surrounding this phrase and thus the scope of application of
competitive dialogue. The chapter will look at important legal grey areas such as whether
competitive dialogue is to be seen as a standard procedure or an exceptional procedure
that derogates from fundamental principles; the discretion individual procuring authorities
have to choose to procure under competitive dialogue; and the scope of technical
complexity and legal/ financial complexity. In view of the fact that prior to competitive
dialogue complex PPPs were commonly procured under the negotiated procedure in the
UK, the chapter will also consider the legal availability of the negotiated procedure, the
wording of the grounds for which were not varied by the Directive.
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The analysis of the procedural rules is presented in chapter seven, which will discuss them
in the same order as they are likely to be applied in practice, i.e. contract notice through to
the close of the dialogue stage and then on to contract close. In addition to the binding
law, chapter seven will draw upon relevant non-binding advice and guidance issued by
policymakers, which past research suggests plays an important role in shaping UK
procurement practice and steering UK procuring authorities towards particular legal
interpretations. It will be seen that the dialogue stage of competitive dialogue presents a
number of important legal grey areas, for example the use of final award criteria to reduce
bidder numbers during dialogue on the basis of incomplete bidder proposals.
A key legal change brought about by the introduction of competitive dialogue is that a
winning bidder must be identified following a final tender stage involving tenders
containing "all elements required and necessary for performance of the project". After
this there are strict limits placed upon any furthe~ work that may be undertaken with the
winning bidder. A narrow application of these legal provisions would on the face of it
require quite striking changes to UK practice. However, it will be seen that as with other
areas of competitive dialogue, the extent to which final tenders must be fully developed
before identification of the winning tender and the limited scope for working with the
winning tenderer is not clear.
1.4.4 Compliancewith regulation
Having considered the legal rules applicable to complex PPP procurement, in order to
fully understand procuring authority decision making chapter eight will consider the
literature on the factors that impact upon compliance with legal rules. The chapter will
begin by discussing the potential relevance of economic theories on compliance to the
public procurement rules. In theory, according to these economic models, compliance
becomes more likely where the risk of legal challenge and/or the severity of the
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punishment as a result of successful legal challenge are increased. The chapter will also
consider the shortcomings of these economic explanations along with other potential
reasons for non-compliance, such as unintentional non-compliance caused, for example,
by the complexity or ambiguity of legal rules.
1.4.5 Competitive dialogue in practice
Chapter 9 will present in detail the research methodology and method adopted for the
empirical study (see section three above). The analysis of the EU rules on competitive
dialogue identified and explored a number of legal grey areas. By going out into the field
of study, the author was able to learn about the views and experiences of those applying
the legal rules on the ground, and thus gain a more accurate picture of PPP procurement
practice in the UK than would have otherwise been the case.
The interview findings on the availability of competitive dialogue will be presented in
chapter 10. Itwill be seen that competitive dialogue is used heavily in the UK (in
comparison to other EU Member States, such as Germany), and as to be expected from
these general usage figures, the vast majority of interviewees favoured a flexible
interpretation of the grounds for its use. Interestingly and in addition to the pre-identified
legal grey areas, the interview data reveals that, rather than the decision on choice of
procedure being based solely on an analysis of the wording of the legal text, the practical
reality of decision-making at this stage entails a consideration of various factors other than
the binding law, such as a consideration of legal risk and statements in government
guidance.
Chapter 11 will set out the research findings on the first half of the competitive dialogue
procedure, looking at pre-procurement legal issues; issues surrounding the drawing up of
the OJEU notice; qualification and selection issues; equal treatment and confidentiality
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issues; and the conduct of dialogue. Itwill be seen that prior to the close of dialogue UK
practice under competitive dialogue very much resembles what many would recognise as
past practice under the negotiated procedure.
Chapter 12will present the research findings in relation to the second half of the
procedure, i.e. close of dialogue to contract signature. Here, at this key stage in the
procedure the interview data reflects the uncertainty of the law and the difficult balance
procuring authorities must seek to strike between sometimes competing procurement
objectives, e.g. legal compliance, cost minimisation, and value for money. In addition to
the interpretation and operation of the legal rules, the interview findings provide an
insight into the many different pressures procuring authorities are under and the factors
impacting upon decision making at this crucial stage.
1.4.6 Research findings on regulatory compliance
The findings in relation to regulatory compliance will be discussed in chapter 14.
Interview findings on perceptions of legal risk and the impact of legal risk on procuring
authority decision making will be presented. In addition to economic theories of
compliance, interview findings touching upon the role of soft law and other reasons
behind legally risky/non-compliant behaviour will be considered, such as public sector
proficiency in applying the rules.
1.5 Concluding remarks
The final chapter will draw all of the main findings of the research together. Itwill be
seen that, despite the UK's considerable experience, the legal rules and practical operation
of competitive dialogue remain highly uncertain. In many cases it is evident that
practitioners are seeking to interpret the legal rules in a commercially sensible, flexible
manner in line with the complex projects for which competitive dialogue is intended.
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Nevertheless, a perceived increase in levels of legal risk at key stages in competitive
dialogue procedures, such as the stages following the close of dialogue when bidders have
invested substantial resources, has led some to adopt or move towards increasingly
narrow interpretations of the law, which are sometimes perceived to stand in the way of
efficiency and value for money objectives.
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2 Public-Private Partnerships in the
United Kingdom
2.1 Introduction
The use of PPPs as a means of delivering public services and infrastructure is burgeoning
in popularity throughout the world and the UK experience is at the forefront of this
phenornenon.i In view of this increasing importance, it is essential that the EU rules allow
for the effective procurement of PPP projects.
The research examines UK procurement practice under competitive dialogue, which was
designed specifically to meet the needs of complex PPP contracts. There is no universally
recognised definition of PPP; however, for the purposes of the research a useful
definition is provided by the Commission on Public-Private Partnerships: "[PPP is] a risk-
sharing relationship between the public and private sectors based upon a shared aspiration
to bring about a desired public policy outcome'Y In the UK, common forms ofPPP
arrangement include:
• contracting out;
• Privately Financed Infrastructure (PFI) (including concessions);
• Institutionalised PPPs (IPPPs); and
• development agreements.
Chapter two will introduce the above types of PPP in tum. It will be seen that some are
inherently more complex than others and so have a stronger connection with competitive
7 See CD.Tvam" (ed.), Public-private partnerships: an international analysis -from a legal and economic perspective (2010)
available at www.unpcdc.org/medialI42722/ppp%2Qbook%5BI %5D,pdf (accessed 31110/20 II); Allen & Overy, Global guide /0
public-private partnerships (201 O,London); CBI, Going global: the world of public private partnerships (2oo7,London);
Broadbent & Laughlin, "Public private partnerships: an introduction" (2003) 16(3) Accounting. Audi/ing & Accountability Journal
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I Commission on Public-Private Partnerships, Building bet/er partnerships: the final report of the Commission on Public Private
Partnerships (2002, London, Institute for Public Policy Research), 40
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dialogue, which, aswill be seen in chapter six, can only be used to procure contracts that
are "particularly complex". A particular focus will be placed upon PFI, as such
procurement is highly sophisticated and complex.
Chapter two will serve only to describe PPP procurement in the UK; there will be no
comprehensive discussion of public procurement law. This will be left to subsequent
chapters.
2.2 Contracting out
Contracting out (outsourcing) is essentially where the public sector farms out services,
which would otherwise have been carried out in-house by civil servants, to the private
sector or other third parties." These services are commonly support functions, e.g.
cleaning of public buildings, maintenance, printing and publishing of government
documents, and the provision of professional advice on matters such as law, information
technology and management. It is, however, increasingly common in the UK for the
actual delivery of public services to be entrusted to private companies." For example, it is
reported that outsourcing has extended to a wide range of public services, including refuse
collection, school catering, public transport, social services, prison services and school
management. II
9 See Domberger &. Jenson, "Contracting out by the public sector: theory, evidence, prospects", (1997) Vol.13 (No.4) Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 67); and Sutcliffe, "Contracting out public services: UK policy v EC law", (1995) Anglo American
Low Review 337
10 P.Badcoe, "Public private partnerships in local government: the legal, financial and policy framework" (1999) 8 PPLR 279, 282
II ~ree~an &..Mi~ow, Govem"'.ent by c~ntract: outsourcing and American democracy (2009, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard
University) Cited ID S.Arrowsmlth. Public procurement regulation: an introduction (20 I0) available at
www.nottmgham.ac.ukLQJ!fiIdocumentsarchiyelasialjnkmaterials/publicwocurementreflUlatjonjntroduction.pdf (accessed
31110/2011),3
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2.3 The Privately Financed Infrastructure
2.3.1 Introduction
Under PFI, rather than a public authority procuring a supplier to construct infrastructure
and then making separate arrangements for on-going maintenance and operation, a
private sector partner will finance the build and then charge for providing associated
services (e.g. facilities management services) over a long contractual duration (typically
15-30 years)." A typical model for such contracts is the Design-Build-Finance-Operate
(DBFO) model; other models include the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOl) model and the
Build-Own-Operate (BOO) modeL In order to bid for and carry out a PFI contract, it is
usual for the private partner, a consortium of private sector suppliers (e.g. construction
firms and firms responsible for facilities management), to take the form of a special
purpose vehicle, a distinct legal entity set-up with the sole purpose of delivering the
project.
Under a PFI contract the private partner will receive its income in one of three ways:
from the public authority directly, from third party users of the infrastructure or services,
or through a mixture of public sector subsidies and charges imposed on third party users.
In cases where the income is derived from third party users, the PFI contract may be
classified as a concession. The key element of a concession is that the private partner is
remunerated for financing the construction of infrastructure or the establishment of
services by being given the right to exploit the infrastructure or services. A typical
example of a concession is where a contractor constructs a road and is paid for that
construction through tolls collected from road users. As will be seen in chapter four, the
12 See P.Badcoe (ed.), Public private partnerships and PFl (2010, London, Sweet & Maxwell); and de Lemon et al., "From
concessions to project finance and the private finance initiative" (2000) Journal of Project Finance 19
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classification of a contract as a concession is important for the purpose of legal regulation
of the procurement process.
2.3.2 Reasons for PFI
2.3.2.1 Themacroeconomic argument
The conventional procurement of a capital asset will involve the public sector providing
finance for the project at the outset. Here, the capital spending has a one off impact on
the public accounts when the investment occurs. This is not necessarily the case under
the accounting rules for PPI where it has been possible for certain PFI projects to be
structured so that they do not count as capital spending for the year in which the
investment is made. A common macroeconomic argument behind PPI is that private
finance can allow for greater investment by funding projects that would not have gone
ahead because of insufficient public funds.13
Off balance sheet PPI can be politically very attractive: it enables the public sector to meet
demands for improved public services, whilst keeping to economic targets." However, it
makes little long term economic sense to pursue private financing for capital projects just
because the project would otherwise be unaffordable (i.e, with no expected efficiency
savings or enhanced value for money), for instance, because private sector borrowing is
more expensive than government borrowing. PFI is only economically sensible where, on
a case by case basis, it can be demonstrated that the greater efficiencies generated by
private finance outweigh additional costs.
13 M.Spackman, "Public-private partnerships: lessons from the British approach" (2002) 26 Economic Systems 283, 288; T.Vllil&,
"How expensive are cost savings? On the economics of public-private partnerships" (2005) 10( I ) European Investment Bank
Papers94
14 House of Common Treasury Select Committee, Report: private finance initiative, (2011) available at
hltp:/I~.publications.parliament.uklpa/cm20 I0 I2Icmselect/cmtrcasy/l 14611 I4602.htm (accessed 0 1110120II); M.Finders,
"The politics of public-private partnerships"(2005) 7(2) British Journal of Politics and International Relations 543
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The UK government public position is that PFI should only be used over traditional
methods where it offers best value; nevertheless, a common criticism of PFI in the UK is
that it has been used in cases where it is not appropriate." The accounting treatment of
PFI is beyond the scope of this thesis; however the change from UK GAAP (risk transfer
test) to International Financial Reporting Standards (control test) (2009-2010) now means
that much PFI debt will be brought onto departmental accounts (though, not the national
accounts)." Also, HM Treasury recently in 2010 announced a change to the PFI credits
system, which may deter the inappropriate use of PFI. The change means that the
investment decision is to be made before the decision over funding arrangements.!7
2.3.2.2 Themicroeconomtc argument
In the right circumstances PFI can provide enhanced value for money and efficiency
savings in comparison to conventional procurement. Under the UK's private finance
initiative (see below) value for money, "the optimum combination of whole life cost and
quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the user's requirement"," is assessed on a case by
case basis by reference to a public sector comparator. A public sector comparator is a
cost and risk estimate of a conventionally financed project delivering the same outputs as
those of an intended PPI project, and is used as a comparison to a proposed PFI project
in order to demonstrate value for money. The calculations involved are highly complex,
depending upon many future unknowns and assumptions. The figures are therefore easily
manipulated and there can be pressure to do so if comparisons are made when in reality
funding constraints mean there is no conventional public sector alternative."
15 See for instance J.Quiggin, "Risk, PPPs and the public sector comparator" (2004) 14(2) Australian Society of Cenifted
Practicing Accountants 5 I; P.Robinson, "The private finance initiative: the real story" (2000) 10 Consumer Policy Review 82
"Heald & Georgiou, 'The substance of accounting for public-private partnerships" (20 II) 27(2) Financial Accountability &
Management 217
17 HM Treasury, Public-private partnerships -technical update number 2010, (2010, London)
IIwww.nao.O!"i.uk!scctorsltbjrd scctor/successful commissjonina/successful commissjonjng/elossary.WlxUY (accessed
31/10/2011)
19 House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, Private finance projects and off-balance sheet debt, (20 I0, I st Report of Session
2009-10); D.Heald, "Value for money tests and accounting treatment in PFI schemes" (2003) 16 Accounting, Auditing &
Accountability Joumal342
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There are a number of potential drivers of value for money under PFI.20 The primary
driver is risk transfer; that is to say, the transfer of risk (e.g. construction risks) to the party
best placed to shoulder and manage those risks. This is said to incentivise the supply of
cost effective and high quality services delivered on time. There are, however, question
marks over whether risks are truly transferred under PFI (the government cannot allow
essential public services to fail), and, where risk is transferred that is better managed by
the public sector, the private sector will demand premium payments to take on this risk.
In addition to risk transfer, many other microeconomic benefits of the PFI approach have
been put forward, mainly related to efficiency savings flowing from the private sector's
profit maximisation goal. For instance, according to HM Treasury, "compared to the
private sector ... the public sector can be less equipped to challenge inefficiency and out-
dated working practices, and to develop imaginative approaches to delivering public
services and managing state-owned assets"."
2.3.3 The development of PFI in the UK22
2.3.3.1 The Conservative Government (1990-1997)
The private finance initiative was launched in 1992 with the aim of increasing the role of
the private sector in the provision of public services, replacing the Ryrie Rules which had
previously governed the UK approach to PFI (1981-1989). Following a slow stan, a
Private Finance Panel was established to oversee implementation of the private finance
initiative, and a further boost was provided by the adoption of a "universal testing rule".
According to this rule, HM Treasury would not approve an investment project unless
private finance options had been fully explored.
20 Arthur Anderson and Enterprise LSE, Value/or money drivers in the private finance initiative, (2000); PricewaterhouseCoopers,
The value 0/ PFJ: hanging in the balance sheet? (2008, Public Sector Research Centre); Iossa& Martimort, The simple micro-
economics of public-private partnerships (2009, Brunei University)
21 HM Treasury, Public-private partnerships: the government's approach, (2000, London), II
22 See G.Allen. Private finance initiative, (2001, House of Common Research PaperOI/117); M.Sawyer, "The private finance
initiative: the UK experience" (2005) Procurement and Financing 0/ Motorways in Europe 231
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In 1996, the Public Private Partnerships Programme (4Ps) was set up in England and
Wales to encourage the growth of PPPs, particularly PFI, in local government. The
organisation 4Ps was in 2009 absorbed into a new joint venture between the Local
Government Organisation and Partnerships UK (see below) called Local Partnerships.
Local Partnerships has been highly active in the area PFI procurement practice, publishing
guidance on procurement procedures and standardised documentation.f These
documents will be drawn upon in the discussion of the legal rules on competitive
dialogue.
2.3.3.2 The Labour Government (1997-2001, 2001-2005 and 2005-2010)
The Labour Government came to power in 1997 determined to invest in public
infrastructure and services. The private finance initiative (rebranded under Labour as
Public-Private Partnerships) would "become a cornerstone for the Government's
modernisation programme of public services't." Over the course of the Labour
Government, the private finance initiative was expanded into new areas and government
publications consistently reaffirmed the commitment to PF!. 25
Within a week of Labour taking office, universal testing was abandoned with immediate
effect. A review of the private finance initiative was also conducted, with the first Bates
report (1997) making 29 streamlining and improvement recommendations. As a
consequence, the Treasury Taskforce was created, replacing the Private Finance Panel.
The Taskforce, created within HM Treasury, consisted of a policy arm, staffed by public
sector employees, and a projects arm, staffed by individuals from the private sector.
Through the Taskforce the Government published policy and guidance documents on
2] See www.locaiparlnershjps.QIg.uk/ (accessed 31/1012011)
24 HM Treasury (2000), fn.21, 4
2' See for example HM Treasury, Infrastructure procurement: delivering long-term value (2008); HM Treasury, PFI:
strengthening long-term values (2006); HM Treasury, PFI: meeting the investment challenge (2003); and HM Treasury (2000),
fn.21
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PFI procurement. In addition, in 1999 the Taskforce published the Standardisation of
PFI Contracts (SoPC) on standardising and understanding PFI contractual terms. The
latest version of the document (version four) was published in March 2007 (SOPC4).26
The second Bates Report, published in July 1999, concluded that centralised project
support remained necessary, but that the projects arm of the Treasury Taskforce should
be replaced. The recommendation resulted in the creation of Partnerships UK (itself a
PPP). Partnerships UK had an arm's length relationship with HM Treasury, operational
independence and 51% of its equity was owned by the private sector.
The Office of Government Commerce (OGC) was established in April 2000, absorbing
the policy arm of the Treasury Taskforce. The OGC was an independent office of HM
Treasury, established to help the Government deliver best value from its spending. The
OGC was the lead government agency in the negotiations over 2004 amendments to EU
public procurement regulation, and was responsible for domestic implementation of the
EU rules (e.g. the drafting of legislation for England, Wales and Northern Ireland
implementing EU law, and publishing non-binding guidance on how the legislation is to
be interpreted). In addition, the OGC had the lead role in developing procurement skills
across the public sector, and coordinated responses in infraction cases against the UK.
Significant PFI investment schemes instituted under the Labour Government in England
include Building Schools for the Future (BSF), which aimed to rebuild or renew every
secondary school in England; and National Health Service Local Improvement Finance
Trusts (LIFI), relating to investment in primary care and community-based facilities and
services. Commencing in 2005/2006, there were 15 waves ofBSF investment, in which
2~ttp;/Iwww.hm·treasury.gQy.uk!pppstandardisedcontracts.htm (accessed 31110/2011)
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over 700 schools received investment." On 5July 2010 the BSF programme was
terrninated/" LIFT investment has also been carried out in waves: six first wave schemes
(February 2001); 12 second wave schemes (February 2002); 24 third wave schemes
(August 2002); and five fourth wave schemes (December 2004).
The LIFT and BSF programmes operated at both a national and local level. For instance,
at a national level, Partnerships for Schools (BSp) and Community Health Partnerships
(LIFI) managed the delivery of the programmes. At a local level, investment was carried
out through a joint venture, a Local Education Partnership (BSp) or a LIFt Company
(LIFI), between relevant local authorities, the private sector and Partnerships for Schools
or Community health Partnerships (whichever the case may be).29These joint ventures
enter into long term strategic partnership agreements with the procuring authority to
deliver an area's BSF or LIFt programme, which may consist of PFI and conventionally
financed design and build infrastructure.
Under the Scotland Act 1998,30Government of Wales Act 199831 and Northern Ireland
Act 199832 a range of legislative powers were devolved from the UK Parliament to
national parliaments or assemblies in Scotland (the Scottish Parliament), Wales (the
National Assembly for Wales) and Northern Ireland (the Northern Ireland Assembly).
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have different forms of devolution; however
PPP policy is a devolved matter.
In Scotland, the Scottish Finance Directorate is responsible for PPP policy. In addition,
the Scottish Futures Trust was established in 2008; it is an independent company owned
17 See www.partnershjpsforschools.OIi.ukl (accessed 31 II 0120 II)
2Ibtt,p:lleducatioo.!Wv.uk/jntbenews/jnthenewslaOO6I486/OYerhaul-to-enlllaruls-school-buildinil-prommme (accessed 31 II 0/20 II)
29 Deloitte, BUildingflexibility.' new delivery models for public infrastructure projects (2006, London)
30 C,46
31 C.38
32 C,47
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by the Scottish Government responsible for improving value for money in public
infrastructure investment. PPP policy in Wales is the responsibility of the Strategic
Planning, Finance and Performance Directorate. In Northern Ireland the development
and coordination of PPP policy rests with the Office of the First Minister and Deputy
First Minister, in conjunction with the Department of Finance and Personnel. Also, the
Strategic Investment Board Limited supports the Northern Ireland executive and
government departments in delivering the Northern Ireland investment strategy.33
Responsibility for the implementation of EU law on public procurement (the most
important source of public procurement law in the UK) is only a devolved matter in
Scotland. The work of the Scottish Government is carried out by a number of
Directorates. The Scottish Procurement Directorate is responsible for developing,
advising and implementing procurement policy for the public sector in Scotland.
Due to the widespread lack of availability of suitable debt finance at the height of the
financial crisis, in March 2009 the HM Treasury Infrastructure Finance Unit (now part of
Infrastructure UK, see below) was established." Essentially, the objective of the Treasury
Infrastructure Finance Unit was to step in to provide lending for PFI deals on the same
terms as commercial lenders to ensure that infrastructure projects make it to financial
close. In April2009 the Treasury Infrastructure Finance Unit stepped in to provide a
£120 million loan on the Greater Manchester Waste Disposal PFI.
33 See bnp:lIwww.bm-tteasury.vov.uk/juk deyolYed administrations,htro (accessed 01/1012011)
34 HM Treasury. Treasury lending to PF! projects and the Treasury's Infrastructure Finance Unit, (Letter, S May 2009) (Charles
Lloyd, Head of Public-Private Partnerships)
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2.3.3.3 The Conservative-Libera! Democrat Coalition Government (2010-
Present)
The Coalition Government came to power committed to tackling the UK's budget deficit.
The central role of PFI in UK capital investment is continued under the present Coalition
Government despite mounting criticism. It is reported that over 900 PFI projects have
achieved financial close," and in recent years PFI has accounted for 10-15% of total
investment in public services.i" PPI has been used to deliver a diverse range of projects in
a variety of sectors, including, for example, defence (e.g. barracks), education (e.g.
schools), health (e.g. hospitals), justice and custodial (e.g. courts and prisons), local
community (e.g. leisure centres, libraries, and housing), waste (e.g. recycling centres) and
ICT. According to HM Treasury in 2010, "[t]he Government has confirmed it remains
committed to Public Private Partnerships (PPP), including those delivered via [PFI], and
that such arrangements will continue to play an important role in delivering Britain's
future infrastructure"." It is clear therefore that the question of whether there are suitable
procurement processes for such complex projects as PPI remains important."
InJune 2010 it was announced that responsibility for the OGC (as well as the public
sector procurement agency, Buying Solutions) would move from HM Treasury to Cabinet
Office where it will form part of a new Efficiency and Reform Group (ERG).39
Partnerships UK is to be dissolved, with Infrastructure UK taking on most of its
responsibilities. Infrastructure UK was set up in 2009 within HM Treasury. The remit of
Infrastructure UK is to provide a stronger focus on the UK's long-term infrastructure
3' www,partDersbipsuk,om,uk/ (accessed 30106/2011)
36HM Treasury (March 2008); HM Treasury (March 2006); and HM Treasury (July 2003). fo,2S
37 HM Treasury (20 10). fo,I7
31 CBI. Building on success: the way forward for PFI. (London. 2007); National Audit Office. Improving the PFltendering
process. (2007)
39 htm;/!www,cabinetoffice,goy,uklnewslwbjtchall-sbakc-driye-efficiency (accessed 31110/2011)
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priorities and meet the challenge of facilitating significant private sector investment over
the longer term.
2.4 , Institutionalised PPPs
The Commission makes the following distinction:
• purely contractual PPPs; and
• IPPPs.40
The former, refers to a situation where the relationship between the public and private
sector is based solely on contractual links. For instance, a typical PFI contract would be a
contractual PPP. The latter involves the cooperation between the public and private
sector within a distinct mixed-capital entity which performs public contracts or
concessions. A company set up and jointly owned by the public sector and private sector
(i.e. a joint venture company) would be an IPPP, as would be a situation where shares in
an existing public sector entity are transferred to the private sector." IPPPs will usually be
established where the public and private partners have complimentary objectives.
Although considered under the discussion of PFI, the investment schemes, BSF and
UFf (see above), are strategic partnerships arrangements that involve the establishment
of a mixed capital legal entity to carry out education/health projects in an area.
As with PFI and contracting out, the procurement of most IPPPs will be mandated under
EU procurement rules to follow set procedures, which must be suitable for their effective
procurement.
40 European Commission, Green paper on public-private partnerships and Community law on public contracts and concessions,
(2004, Brussels) (COM(2004) 327 final), p.8, para.20
41 See PartnershipsUK, A guidance note for public sector bodies forming joint venture companies with the private sector, (200 1)
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2.5 Landdevelopment agreements
Development agreements are invariably very sophisticated arrangements commonly
employed by local government in the UK to redevelop or regenerate areas, such as
brownfield sites. These agreements will tend to involve the public sector authority
transferring land to a developer for it to develop an area subject to any conditions the
authority concerned may wish to impose, for example that the new development must
contain a supermarket or car park.
The application of EU procurement law to development agreements is problernatic.f A
simple sale of land is not a "public works contract" for the purposes of the EU public
procurement directives. It is difficult to describe a public sector authority's activities as
"purchasing" when in a typical development agreement the authority will sell land to the
private sector developer and when complete some or all of the developed land may
remain with the developer. Indeed, in many development agreements the obligation upon
the developer to develop the land may be ancillary to the main object of the contract,
disposal of the land. Nevertheless, many forms of these complex arrangements will be
required to be procured under the rules of the EU procurement directives and it is
important that the rules allow for effective procurement.
2.6 Concluding remarks
The chapter has introduced the concept of PPP and some of the main types of PPP
found in the UK. It can be seen that in many situations these are inherently highly
sophisticated arrangements, As will be seen in the following chapters, prior to 2004 the
EU required many of these complex deals to be procured under an outdated framework
designed for relatively straightforward transactions. The competitive dialogue procedure,
42 See Case C-220/0S, Jean Auroux and Others v. Commune de Roanne [2007] ECR 1-385;Case C-4S1/08, Helmut MiJller GmbH
v. Bundesanstalt fur lmmobilienaujgaben (2010/C 134/10); and Procurement Lawyers' Association, EU public procurement and
land development agreements after the ECJ',sJudgment in Jean Auroux v Commune de Roanne (C-220105J,(2009) available at
www·procurementlawyers.org!(accessed 01/10/201 1)
34
the subject of the PhD thesis, was introduced in 2004 to modernise EU procurement law,
providing a procurement procedure tailor made to the needs of the types of complex
arrangements described in chapter two.
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3 EUregulation of public procurement
3.1 Introduction
The UK has been a member of the EU since 1973. The free movement of goods and
services between EU member states is a primary policy objective of the EU, and the
reason behind EU regulation of Member States' procurement. The EU regulates public
procurement in order to open Member States' markets in public contracts to EU-wide
competition. EU public procurement law applies to the PPP arrangements outlined in
chapter two.
Member States' procurement is subject to two levels of EU regulation. Chapter three will
discuss the first level of EU public procurement regulation: regulation under the TFEU
and regulation flowing from fundamental principles of EU law. The second level of
regulation, in the form of EU harmonising directives, will be looked at in chapter four.
3.2 Regulation under the Treaty
The TFEU does not mention public procurement explicitly; however, it is well established
that public contracts in the EU (unless excluded) must be awarded in compliance with the
general rules and principles of the Treaty. This is even the case for those public contracts
subject to more detailed regulation under the procurement directives (see chapter four),
although the Treaty rules are in practice most relevant to procurements outside the scope
of the directives where it is the only source of EU regulation. In this section the TFEU
obligations most relevant to public procurement will be set out.
3.2.1 Article 34
Article 34 TFEU seeks to ensure that goods can move throughout the EU without
restriction. It prohibits between Member States quantitative restrictions on imports (such
36
as quotas or bans) and measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions
(MEEs).
In the context of public procurement, Art.34 TFEU applies to national measures that
affect the domestic market as a whole and also measures that refer to the government
contracts market." In addition, Art.34 applies to restrictions on products supplied or to
be used under any type of public contract, be it a supply contract, a contract for works or
for non-construction services."
The application of Art.34 to individual procurement decisions has yet to be specifically
addressed by the CJEU. The use of the term "measures", which in general only
encompasses general laws and practices," may suggest that the Art.34 is not intended for
such decisions"; however, this does not appear to be the approach of the CJEU, which
has consistently applied Art.34 to individual procurement decisions."
The CJEU defined MEEs in Case 8/74, Da.rsonville~8 as encompassing "all trading rules
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually
or potentially, intra-Community trade"." The scope of the formulation in Dassonville is
wide. The Dassonville formulation is only concerned with the restrictive effects of a
measure on inter-state trade, catching overt discrimination.f covert discrimination'" and
certain non-discriminatory rules that nonetheless hinder or restrict cross border trade. 52
43 Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions,
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009), 57
44 Case 45/87, Commission v. Ireland ("Dundalk") [1988] ECR 4929
~ Case 21/84, Commission v. France [1985] ECR 1356
46 S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, 2nd ed, (Sweet &Maxwell, London, 2005), at 4.5-4.6
47 See Case C-3/88, Commission v.ltaly, ('Re Data Processing') [1989] ECR 4035; Case C-243/89. Commission v. Denmark
('Storebaelt') [1993] ECR 1-3353; Case C-359/93, Commission v. Netherlands ('UNIX') [1995] ECR 1-157; Case 59/00, Bent
Mousten Vestergaard v. Spottrup Boligselskab (,Bent Mousten ') [200 1] ECR 1-9505; Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH
and Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG (,Telaustria ') [2000] ECR 1-10745
48 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonvllle [1974] ECR 837
49 Ibid, 852
50 See Case 263/85, Commission v.ltaly [1991] ECR 1-2457; Storebaelt, fn.47; Case C-21/88, Du Pont de Nemours Italiano SpA
v. Unita Sanitaria Locale No 2 Di Carrara ('Du Pont de Nemours ') [1990] ECR 1-889
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In Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, KeckSJ the CJEU placed limits upon the scope of
MEE, restricting the extent to which non-discriminatory measures would fall within
Dassonville and require justification (see below). Here, the Court distinguished between
measures concerned with the characteristics of products (e.g. measures concerning shape,
size, weight, composition, presentation identification or putting up), which fall within the
scope of Dassonville, and selling arrangements. According to the CJEU, measures
restricting or prohibiting selling arrangements are deemed not to interfere with market
access, but only if two conditions are met: (1) the measure must apply to all affected
traders operating within the national territory; and (2) the measure must affect in the same
manner - in law and in fact - the marketing of domestic products and of those from
other Member States. For numerous reasons many regard the Keckdecision as
unsarisfactory"; for instance, because certain selling arrangements (e.g. restrictions on
advertising) can restrict market access more than product requirements. There are,
however, signs that the CJEU tends to focuses upon whether selling arrangements are
likely to have a disproportionate impact on imported products (instead of
discrimination)."
Measures within the scope of Art.34 TFEU can be saved if justifiable on exhaustive
grounds in Art.36 TFEU. Furthermore, pursuant to Case 120/78, Cassis de Djon,56
indistinctly applicable measures (measures that do not overtly discriminate) will not be
held to breach Art.34 TFEU if they are necessary to satisfy certain mandatory
,. See Dundalk, fiI.44
'2 See UNIX, fiI,47
'3 Cases C-267/91 and C-268/9I, Keck & Methouard [1993] ECR 1-6097
54 See C-412/93, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 24 November 1994. Societe d'lmportatlon Edouard Leclerc-
Siplec v. TFI Publiclte SA and M6 Publicite SA
" Joined Cases C-34/95, C-35/95 and C-36/95, Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. De Agostini (Svenska) FlJrlag AB and
Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. rv-Shop I Sverlge AB [1997] ECR 1-3843; Case C-405/98, Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v.
Gourmet International Products AB (GIP) [2001] ECR 1-1795; Case C-32210 I, Deutscher Apothekerverbasd e Vv. 0800
DocMo"/s NV and Jacques Waterval [2003] ECR 1-14887; Case C-254/98, Schutzverband gegen unlauteren Weubewerb v. TK-
Heimdienst Sass GmbH [2000] ECR 1-15 I; and Case C-71/02, Herbert Kamer Industrle-Auktionen GmbH v. Troostwijk GmbH
FOO4] ECR 1-3025
6 Case 120178, Rewe-Zentrale v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (,Cassis de Dijon J [1979] ECR 649
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requirements. For a measure to be justified under either exception it must be
proportionate.
The application of the above rules to certain procurement decisions will mean that many
will be categorised as hindrances to trade under Dassonulle and will require justification.
Arrowsmith & Kunzlik put forward a strong argument based upon the need to avoid a
disproportionate burden on the courts, to ensure commercial certainty, and to achieve a
suitable balance between trade considerations and national sovereignty, to suggest this
should not be the case in relation to some procurement measures ("excluded buying
decisions''), which, even though they involve a greater burden for imports, are not
hindrances to trade (such as, provided there is no protectionist motivation, initial
decisions on whether to go ahead with an activity; decisions on what exactly to purchase
to meet a requirement; substantive decisions concerning the features of products; and
decisions on the commercial terms on which those products are supplied), and non-
discriminatory buying decisions. 57 The extent to which the CJEU agree with these
arguments is not clear.
3.2.2 Article 49 and Article 56
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU provide for the freedom of establishment and the freedom to
provide services. Article 49 TFEU acts to prohibit government measures that hinder
individuals and companies from setting up in business in other Member States or which
hinder their activities once they are established. When a business is established in a
Member State and seeks to provide services in another Member State without being
installed there this constitutes the "provision of services" (see Art.57 TFEU), the
restriction of which is prohibited under Art.56 TFEU. Articles 49 and 56 TFEU protect
57 Arrowsmith & Kunzlik (2010), fh.43, 61-67 and 69.72
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against measures hindering access to government contracts that discriminate direcrly,"
indirectly" and also certain non-discriminatory measures. Articles 52 and 62 TFEU
provide for express derogations from Arts.49 and 56 TFEU similar to the derogations
from Art.34 TFEU in Art.36 TFEU.
3.2.3 Other relevant TFEUarticles
Other TFEU articles relevant to public procurement include Art.18 TFEU, which sets
forth a general prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of nationality; Arts.101,
102, 106 and 107 TFEU, which concern rules on anti-competitive practices and state aid;
and Art.346, which provides Members States with an exemption from the Treaty's free
movement and competition provisions in the field of defence procurement (i.e. related to
the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material).
3.3 Fundamental principles
3.3.1 Introduction
In addition to the rules of the TFEU there are general principles of law recognised and
applied by the CJEU which impose positive obligations upon procuring authorities: the
transparency principle and the equal treatment principle (i.e. non-discrimination
irrespective of nationality). Principles of transparency and equal treatment have long been
recognised as underlying procurement under the directivesf: however, it is not until
recently that the CJEU has found such principles to apply to procurements outside the
directives.
'ICase C-360/89, Commission v. Italy [19921 ECR 1-3401
59 Re Data Processing. fn.47; and Storebaelt, fn.47
60 See Storebaelt, fn.47; Case C-87/94, Commission v.Belgium ("Walloon Buses") [19961 ECR 1-2043
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3.3.2 Transparency
Case C-324/98, Telallstrii' concerned a contract for a service concession (see chapter
two), a type of contract specifically excluded from regulation under the procurement
directives. The CJEU held that the Treaty principle of non-discrimination implies an
obligation of transparency entailing "a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the
services market to be opened up to competition and the impartiality of the procurement
process to be reviewed'l.f It was left to the referring national court to decide whether
there had been compliance with the obligation in that case. The Telausttia ruling has been
endorsed by later cases."
The CJEU has said little about the precise content of the transparency obligation. In his
Opinion in Telaustria; Advocate General Fennelly considered that substantive compliance
with the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality requires that the award
of concessions respect a minimum degree of publicity and transparency." In his opinion,
however, publicity should not necessarily be equated with publication, and does not
require the awarding authority to apply by analogy the provisions of the most relevant of
the EU procuremen~ directive." In Case C-231/03, Coname the CJEU ruled it was for
national courts to decide whether the award of the concession complied with transparency
requirements." According to the Court, although not necessarily implying an obligation to
hold an invitation to tender, the transparency requirements are, in particular, such as to
ensure that an undertaking located in another Member State to that of the procuring
authority can have access to appropriate information regarding that concession before it is
61 Telaustria. m.47
62 Ibid, paras.61 and 62
63 See Case C-231/03. Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v. Comune di Cingia de' Botti, [2005] ECR I-72S7; Case C-4SS/03,
Parking Brixen GmbH v. Gemeinde Brixen and Stadtwerke Brixen AG, [2005] ECR I-S5S5; Case C-260/04, Commission of the
European Communities v. Italian Republic, [2007] ECR I-70S3
64 Case C-324/9S, Opinion ofMr Advocate General Fennelly delivered on IS May 2000. Telaustria Ver/ogs GmbH and
Telefonadress GmbH v. Telekom Austria AG [2000] ECR 1-10745
65 Ibid, para.43
66 Coname, m.63
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awarded, so that, if that undertaking had so wished, it would have been in a position to
express its interest in obtaining that concession."
The 2000 Interpretative Communication along with a 2006 Interpretative Communication
on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the
provisions of the Public Procurement Directives (addressed to contracts below the
financial thresholds and Part B service, not concession arrangements) shed light on the
Commission's understanding of the obligations under the principle of transparency," In
addition to the advertising requirement the Commission argues that a competitive process
may be necessary. A particular procedure is not suggested, but the Commission make
dear it must be fair and impartial." All of the following are highlighted as important:
non-discriminatory description of the subject matter of the contract; equal access for
economic operators from all Member States; mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates
and other evidence of formal qualifications; appropriate time-limits; and a transparent and
objective approach."
The approach of the CJEU to concessions may be understandable in light of the
seemingly arbitrary distinctions in ED law between public works and services contracts,
public works concessions and public services concessions. Concessions are often high
value arrangements of long durations, and, as such, are potentially of significant cross
border interest. In view of the ED free market objective, it makes little economic sense
67 Ibid, para.21
61 European Commission, Interpretative communication on concessions under Community law (2000,Brussels) (2000/C 121/02);
European Commission, Interpretative communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or notfully subject
to the provisions of the public procurement directives, (2006,Brussels) (2006/C 179/02)
69 Ibid, at 2.1
70 Ibid
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applying different requirements to contracts just because they involve exploitation of third
party users."
Unlike concessions, contracts falling below the financial thresholds in the procurement
directives and contracts for non-priority services (see chapter four) are generally
recognised as not significant enough to attract the interest of suppliers in other Member
States. Hence, as it would be unnecessary and disproportionate to do so, such contracts
are not subject to the detailed rules of the procurement directives. The extent to which
the transparency requirement extends beyond services concessions to below threshold
and non-priority services contracts is not clear. However, CJEU case law suggests a
transparency obligation may apply to these contracts, but only where they are of sufficient
cross-border interest."
3.3.3 Equal Treatment
The CJEU in Case C-2I/03, Fabricom,73 in the context of equal treatment under the
procurement directives, has defined equal treatment as requiring that "comparable
si~ations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not be treated
in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified"." In Case C-458/03,
Parking Brixen, a case concerning a service concession, the CJEU found there to be a
principle of equal treatment under the Treaty, which results in positive obligations being
placed upon authorities in procurement. According to the CJEU, Arts,49 and 56 TFEU,
along with the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality (Art.18
TFEU) are specific examples of a broader principle of non-discrimination that applies
71 See S.Arrowsmith, "Public private partnerships and the European procurement rules: EU policies in conflict?" (2000) 37(3)
Common Markel Law Review 709, 714
72 Case C-507/03, Commission v. Jreland[2007] ECR 1-09777; Joined Cases C-147/06 and C-148/06, SECAPv. Comune di
Torino (2008) 2 CMLR 56
73 Joined Cases C-21/03 and C-34/03, Fabricom 5if v. Etat Beige [2005] ECR 1-01559
74 Ibid, 27
43
irrespective of nationality. An obligation of transparency was said to flow from equal
treatment to ensure compliance with the principle.
The C]EU approach to the development of an equal treatment principle applying to
procurements not governed by the EU procurement directives has attracted much
criticism, particularly due to the lack of authority for such a general principle.7s It is noted
that by recognising the existence of such a principle the CJEU has extended the scope for
judicial review of procurements outside the directives, thus making itself more powerful.
Arrowsmith & Kunzlik point out that "any measures affecting suppliers differently - for
example, on qualifications, award criteria, time limits or procedures used - could be
examined to see if they involve different treatment of suppliers in a 'comparable' position
and, if so, whether they can be justified, even though the framework provided by the
directives within which an obligation of equal treatment might be fleshed out and
understood will be absent".76Arrowsmith & Kunzlik also note that a principle of equal
treatment, embracing both discriminatory and non-discriminatory measures, threatens to
render Keck (see above) redundant in relation to the permissibility of procurement
measure under the TFEU.77
3.4 Concluding remarks
Chapter three has served to explain the first level of regulation to which PPPs in the UK
are subject, i.e. regulation under the TFEU and fundamental principles of EU law.
Although lacking detail, regulation outside the procurement directives appears to be
becoming more onerous with the development of transparency and equal treatment. The
uncertainty over the precise implications of these principles may well be impacting upon
1! See Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 4.12; Hordijk & Meulenbelt, "A bridge too far: why the European Commission's attempts to
construct an obligation to tender outside the scope of the public procurement directives should be dismissed" (2005) 14 PPLR 123;
A.Brown, "Seeing through transparency: the requirement to advertise public contracts and concessions under the EC Treaty"
(2007) 16 PPLR 1; D.McGowan, ''Clarity at last? low value contracts and transparency obligations" (2007) 16 PPLR 274
16 Arrowsmith & Kunzlik (2010), n.43, 87
11lbid
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UK PPP procurement practice, i.e. contracts outside the scope of the directives (e.g. high
value concession arrangements).
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4 EUprocurement directives and UK
transposition
4.1 Introduction
Itwas recognised early on in the EU market integration process that public procurement
needed specific regulatory attention, and so, since the 1970s, procurement has been
regulated by a series of increasingly detailed harmonising directives. These directives
require procuring authorities in Member States to follow contract award procedures based
upon principles of transparency and fairness.
The framework of directives governing public procurement in the EU was revamped in
2004. There are currently two directives in force governing the award of major public
contracts: the Utilities Directive 2004/17/EC78 and the Public Sector Directive
2004/18/EC9 ("the Directive''). Both directives have been backed up with directives on
review and remedies, the Utilities Remedies Directive" and the Public Sector Remedies
DirectiveS! ("the Remedies Directive''). The primary focus of chapter four will be to
outline the requirements of the Directive and Remedies Directive.
The PhD thesis is limited to a consideration of the public sector regime only. The
research primarily intends to explore the operation of competitive dialogue. There is no
provision for competitive dialogue under the Utilities Directive.
71 Directive 2004/17IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement
~rocedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (Official Journal Ll3411. 3010412004)
Directive 2004/18IEC, fit.I
80 Council Directive 92/ 13IEEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to
the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and
telecommunications sectors (Official Journal L76/14. 2310311992)
II Council Directive 89/66S/EEC, fit.S
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4.2 The EUDirective and UKtransposition
4.2.1 Introduction
Directives need to be transposed into domestic law by Member States (Art.288 TFEU).
Although Member States have some discretion over the form and method of
transposition, the intended result of a directive must be ensured. The flexibility Member
States had when implementing the Directive, however, was limited. Whilst early public
sector procurement directives were essentially framework in character, the Directive is a
detailed set of complex rules.82
Member States were given two years to implement the Directive. In England, Wales and
Northern Ireland the Directive is implemented by way of the Public Contracts
Regulations 200683 ("the Regulations''), which entered into force on January 31 2006, the
deadline for implementation. There are separate regulations implementing the Directive
in Scotland (see section 2.2).
4.2.2 The UKapproach to public procurement regulation
UK regulations are legally enforceable rules; however, the UK did not regulate public
procurement in such a way until relatively recently." Prior to 1991, non-binding guidance
was used to achieve procurement objectives (e.g. value for money). In accordance with
this approach, early procurement directives were implemented in the UK by way of
administrative circulars, which simply instructed authorities to comply with the
directives." The approach, to a certain extent, continues today whereby non-binding
government guidance supplements the legislative rules.
12 S. Arrowsmith, "The past and future evolution ofEC procurement law: from framework to common code?", (2oo5"()6) 35
Public Contracts Law Journa/337
13 Public Contracts Regulations, th.3
14 See S. Arrowsmith, "Implementation of the new EC procurement directives and the Alcatel ruling in England and Wales and
Northern Ireland: a review of new legislation and guidance", (2006) 3 PPLR 86I' Ibid. 89
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The OGC (chapter two) (2000 - 2010) published numerous guidance notes on the
application of EU public procurement law; these tend to focus on areas where the
operation of the legal rules may be causing concern in practice, such as innovative aspects
of the rules (like competitive dialogue).
The Regulations do little more than replicate the text of the Directive. The advantage of
this approach to transposition is that it avoids the risk of incorrect transposition and also
means the UK can easily adopt CJEU rulings.86 However, the Directive is not drafted with
precision; its wording is the result of intergovernmental negotiations and compromise,
and thus characterised by a high degree of uncertainty. The courts of the UK would
normally be relied upon to resolve legal grey areas; however, for a multitude of reasons
(see chapter eight), surprisingly few procurement disputes make their way to the UK
courts. Because of this lack of judicial clarification, non-binding government guidance
has been seen to playa key role in assisting authorities in making sense of the EU
procurement rules, steering them to particular interpretations, and giving them confidence
to adopt particular interpretations in areas of uncertainty (see chapter eight)."
4.2.3 Scotland
The Scottish Government has power to adopt regulations to implement EU obligations.88
Whilst the OGC was responsible for negotiating the Directive, the Scottish Government
consulted separately on implementation. The Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations
200689 give effect in Scots law to the Directive. The Scottish Regulations essentially
mirror the wording of the Directive, and, apart from slight variations, the two sets of UK
regulations are identical. There are two key differences. Firstly, the Scottish Regulations
expressly recognise that contracts outside the Directive may still need to be advertised
86 Ibid, 90
17 Ibid, 88
II Fn.30, S.S3
19 Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations, fiI.4
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(Reg.8(21)) (chapter three). Secondly, the courts inwhich procurement disputes may be
heard are different (see below). The ordering of the provisions in the two sets of
regulations corresponds exactly; therefore, from this point onwards, references to "the
Regulations" are to be read as references to both regulations.
4.3 The Directive and Regulations
4.3.1 Background
The first ED procurement directive, Directive 71/305/EEC,90 relating to works contracts,
was introduced in 1971. This was followed by a directive on supply contracts, Directive
77/62/EEC.91 These directives were both later replaced by two new directives on
supplies, Directive 93/36/EC,92 and works, Directive 93/37/EC,93 and Directive
92/50/EEC4 was also introduced around this period, extending coverage to certain non-
construction services. The directives were all later amended by Directive 97/52/EC,95 as
a result of conclusion of the wro Agreement on Government Procurement, and also
Directive 2001 /78/EC,96 which concerned the use of standard forms for contract adverts.
The current 2004 directives are the result of a 1996 Commission green paper," which
highlighted the need for simplification and modernisation of the rules. In early 2011 the
Commission published a green paper to consult on further modernisation of the ED
90 Council Directive 71/30SlEEC of26 July 1971 concerning the co-ordination of procedures for the award of public works
contracts (OJ 197/ LJ85/5); amended by Council Directive 89/4401EEC of 18 July 1989 amending Directive 71/30SlEEC
concerning coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts (OJ /989 L1/0//)
91 Council Directive 77/62IEEC of 21 December 1976 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (OJ /977
L/3//) amended by Council Directive 80n67IEEC of 22 July 1980 adapting and supplementing in respect of certain contracting
authorities Directive 77/62/EEC coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (OJ /980 L2 l 5//) and Council
Directive 88/29SIEEC of22 March 1988 amending Directive 77/621EEC relating to the coordination of procedures on the award
of public supply contracts and repealing certain provisions of Directive 80n67IEEC (OJ 1988 L/27//)
92 Council Directive 93/36IEEC of 14 June 1993 coordinating procedures for the award of public supply contracts (OJ /993
LJ99//)
93 Council Directive 93/37IEEC of 14 June 1993 concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public works
contracts (OJ /993 LJ99/54)
94 Council Directive 921S0IEEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service
contracts (OJ /992 L209//)
~ European Parliament and Council Directive 97/S2lEC of 13 October 1997 amending Directives 921S0IEEC, 93/361EEC and
93/37IEEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts. public supply contracts and public
works contracts respectively (OJ /997 L328//)
96 Commission Directive 2001178IEC of 13 September 2001 amending Annex IV to Council Directive 93/361EEC, Annexes IV, V
and VI to Council Directive 93/37IEEC, Annexes III and IV to Council Directive 92/S01EEC, as amended by Directive 971S2lEC,
and Annexes XII to XV, XVII and XVIII to Council Directive 93/38IEEC, as amended by Directive 98141EC (Directive on the use
of standard fonns in the publicatioa of public contract notices) (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ 2001 L185/J)
97European Commission, Green paper: public procurement in the European Union: exploring the wayforward. (Brussels, 1996)
(COM(96) S83)
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procurement rules.98 The consultation closed in Apri12011 and proposals for new
legislation are expected imminently.
4.3.2 General principles
The Directive endorses past case law of the CjEU, explicitly recognising the general
principles of equal treatment," non-discrimination, and transparency tOO (Art.2/Reg.4(3».
The principles were introduced in chapter three, and apply to all aspects of the
procurement process. tOt The principles have played an important role in the development
of EU procurement law, steering the CJEU's interpretation of the directives.t02 The
principles are therefore particularly pertinent to a discussion of competitive dialogue, as
they are likely to impact upon any CJEU interpretation of legal grey areas.
4.3.3 Scope
4.3.3.1 Introduction
The Directive/Regulations apply if a contract is awarded by a "contracting authority", is a
"public contract", meets certain financial thresholds, and is not excluded. Many PPP
procurements (particularly due to their invariably high value) will be regulated under the
Directive/Regulations.
4.3.3.2 A contracting authority
A "contracting authority" refers to central government, regional or local authorities,
bodies governed by public law, or associations formed by such bodies (Art.l (9)/Reg.3). A
body governed by public law is defined in Art.l (9) and in the UK covers organisations
such as quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (QUANGOs).
98 European Commission, Green paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy towards a more efficient European
procurement market, (Brussels, 2011) (COM(2011) 15 final)
99 Fabricom, th.73, para.27
100 See Arrowsmith (2005), th.46, 7.12
101 See Case C-16198, Commission v. France, [2000] ECR 1-8315, para.103-109
102 See Case C-92100, Hospitallngenieure Krankenhaustechnik Planungs-GmbH (HI) v. Stadt Wien, [2002] ECR 1-5553, para.42;
and Case C-244/02, Kauppatalo Hansel Oy v. Imatran Kaupunki, [2003] ECR 1-12139, para.31.
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4.3.3.3 Regulated contracts
A public contract is a contract "for pecuniary interest concluded in writing between one
or more economic operators and one or more contracting authorities and having as their
object the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services ..."
(Art.1 (2)(a)/Reg.2(1». A public contract may be for works (Art.1 (2)(b)/Reg.2(1»;
supplies (Art.1 (2)(c)/Reg.2(1 »; or services (Art.1 (2)(d)/Reg.2(1 ». The
Directive/Regulations also define public works concessions (Art.1(3)/Reg.(1» and public
services concessions (Art.1(4)/Reg.2(1», the distinguishing feature from a works or
services contract being that consideration consists in the right to exploit works or
services. The line between PPPs classified as public works and services contracts and
PPPs classified as concessions is not clearly drawn.l'"
4.3.3.4 Financial thresholds
The Directive/Regulations only apply to contracts with an estimated value above defined
financial thresholds (Art.7/Reg.8). These higher value contracts are seen to have the most
potential to act as barriers to intra-Elf trade. Presently,'?' the threshold for supplies and
services is £101,323 (£125,000) for central government and £156,442 (£193,000) for other
authorities. The threshold for works contracts is £3,927,260 (£4,485,000). There are rules
prohibiting circumvention of the Directive/Regulations by, for example, manipulating the
value of contracts so that it falls below threshold (Art.9/Reg.8).
4.3.3.5 Excludedcontracts
There are a number of specific exclusions. In particular, these include public services
concessions (Art.17/Reg.6) and utilities contracts (Art.12/Reg.6). Also, certain contracts,
10] See European Commission (20040). tn.68; and Arrowsmith (2000). tn.71. 716-718
104 Commission Regulation No.1177 /2009 of 30 November 2009 amending Directives 2004/17IEC. 2004/ISIEC and 2009/SIIEC
of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the procedures for the award of
contracts (OJ 2009
L314/64)
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such as those for works concessions (Art.S6/Reg.36) and non-priority services
(Art.21/Reg.6) are only pardy regulated under the Directive/Regulations. In addition, the
CJEU has held that internal arrangements within contracting authorities are not regulated
under the Directive.l'"
4.3.4 Information requirements
The usual starting point for the award of contracts under the Directive/Regulations is
publication of a notice describing the contract to be awarded in the Official Journal of the
EU (OJEU) (Art.3S(2)/Reg.1S(2), 16(2), 17(3) and 18(4). This notifies suppliers
throughout the EU of the contract, providing them with sufficient information to
determine whether or not the contract is of interest. The notice must be drawn up in
accordance with the specified format (Art.36/Reg.42). OJEU publication must occur
within 12 days from being sent by the authority (five when sent electronically) (Art.36(3)).
Authorities are prohibited from advertising at national level before the date on which the
notice is sent for publication (Art.36(S)/ Reg.42(4»).
In addition to a contract notice, authorities may choose to publish a Prior Information
Notice (PIN), which is a notice of their contemplated purchases for the coming year
(Art.3S(1)/Reg.11).
Further information requirements include a requirement to notify suppliers of exclusion
(Reg.29A) and following contract award or conclusion, authorities must have a contract
award notice published (Art.43/Reg.31).
105 Case C-I07/98, Teckal Sri v. Comune di Viano and Azienda Gas-Aequo Consorziale (AGAC) di Reggio Emilia, [1999] ECR 1-
8121
52
The UK's Freedom of Information Act 2000106 may also be used to obtain information
from contracting authorities (S.l(l)). Authorities (S.3) must reply promptly to a request
under the Act and not later than 20 working days following receipt. There are numerous
exemptions under the Act, such as for confidential (S.41) and commercially sensitive
information (S.43) (see chapter seven).
4.3.5 Technical specifications
The specifications are a detailed description of a contracting authority's requirements.
These usually take the form of a written document, which forms the basis for tenders.
The Directive/Regulations control the content of specifications to ensure they operate to
afford equal access for bidders and do not act as trade barriers (Art.23/Reg.9). A
thorough explanation of the requirement for specifications is not necessary because, as
will be explained, the procedural rules on competitive dialogue (the primary focus of the
thesis) do not at any point require technical specifications (see chapter seven).
It is possible for a contracting authority to accept a tender not in line with the
specifications (i.e. a variant). However, such bids are not permitted where a contract is
awarded on the basis of lowest price (see below). Authorities must expressly authorise
variants in the contract notice, along with stating the minimum requirements variants
must meet (Art24/Reg.l0).
4.3.6 Award procedures and time limits
The Directive/Regulations stipulate that public contracts must be awarded in accordance
with one of the following procedures: the open procedure, the restricted procedure,
competitive dialogue, the negotiated procedure, and the negotiated procedure without a
contract notice (Art.28/Reg.12). As a general rule, contracts must be awarded under the
I06C.36
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open or restricted procedures; these are freely available. The other procedures can only
be used in limited circumstances.
The open procedure is a one stage procedure, in which all qualifying suppliers may tender
for the contract. In an open procedure the authority must allow a minimum of 52 days
from dispatching the contract notice for the deadline for receipt of tenders
(Art.38(2)/Reg.15(3». If there has been a PIN the time limit may be shortened
(Art.38(4)/Reg.15(7).
The restricted procedure is a two stage process: the contracting authority may limit the
number of qualifying suppliers (a minimum of five) that go on to tender for the contract.
In a restricted procedure suppliers must be given no less than 37 days in which to request
to participate (Art.38(3)/Reg.16(3», and a minimum of 40 days from invitation to tender
for receipt oftenders (Art.38(3)/Reg.16(16». Again, a PIN will enable an authority to
shorten the 40 day time limit (Art.38(4)/Reg.16(18».
The open and restricted procedures are most suited to straightforward procurements
where an authority is able to specify at the outset precisely what it wants. Tenders must
be submitted in line with a technical specification (see above) drawn up at the outset, and
there is generally seen to be very little scope for negotiations.107
A detailed analysis of the procedural rules of competitive dialogue will be provided in
chapters five, six and seven; however, briefly, the procedure was introduced in 2004 to
provide a more suitable procurement process for complex contracts, such as PPPs.
Essentially, it combines the transparency and structure of the restricted procedure, e.g.
107 S. Arrowsmith. "The problem of discussions with renderers under the EC procurement directives: the current law and the case
for reform" (1998) 3 PPLR 6S
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there is a requirement for a formal final tender stage involving relatively complete final
tenders (Art.29(6) /Reg.18(2S», with some of the flexibility of the negotiated procedure,
e.g. an authority may select a minimum of three suppliers to dialogue with on all aspects
of the contract (Art.29(3)/Reg.18(21».
The negotiated procedure, other than the requirement for a contract notice, is a relatively
unstructured two stage process, inwhich a minimum of three suppliers may be invited to
negotiate with the authority. There is no express requirement for a final tender stage to
select a winner.
In a competitive dialogue and negotiated procedure suppliers must be given at least 37
days to request to participate (Art.38(3)/Reg.17(S) and 18(7). Article 38(1) emphasises
that in setting time limits authorities should bear inmind the complexity of the contract,
particularly relevant for competitive dialogue which is to be used only for "particularly
complex contracts". It should be noted that Partnerships for Schools advise upon a time
limit of 52 days for requests to participate. lOS There is no minimum time limit stipulated
for receipt of tenders.
All of the minimum time periods mentioned in this section may be shortened where
electronic communication is used (Art.38/Reg.15(5), 15(6), 16(5), 16(19), 17(7) and 18(9».
There is also an accelerated procedure for cases of extreme urgency (Art.38(8)/Reg.16(6)
and 17(8». This is expressly stated as applicable to restricted and negotiated procedures.
In 2008 the Commission recognised that the exceptional financial situation at the time
101 PfS, BSF guidance note on how to conduct a competitive dialogue procedure, (2006) available at
www.partnershipsforschools.org.ukllibraryIBSF-archiveIBSF-guidance-documents.html(accessed 31II 0/20 II), section 12
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could justify an accelerated procedure for "major public projects't.!" Although initially
only applicable for 2009-2010, the guidance was extended until the end of 2011. 110 In its
statement the Commission refers to the accelerated procedure in generic terms and then
more specifically in relation to the restricted procedure; it is not made clear whether the
approach could be applied to negotiated procedures or competitive dialogues.
The negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice is an exceptional
procedure, confined to rare situations (such as extreme urgency and where there is only
one possible bidder) (Art.31/Reg.14).
4.3.7 Qualification and selection
The Directive/Regulations provide for mandatory and discretionary disqualification of
suppliers. Disqualification is mandatory for suppliers that have been the subject of a
conviction by final judgment of participation in a criminal organisation, corruption and
bribery, fraud, and/or money laundering (ArtA5(1)/Reg.23(1) and (2)). Contracting
authorities may choose whether or not to set qualification standards in relation to the
personal situation of suppliers (ArtA5(2)/Reg.23(4)); the suitability of suppliers to pursue
professional activity (ArtA6/Reg.23(4)G)); the economic and financial standing of
suppliers (ArtA7/Reg.24); and the technical and/or professional ability of suppliers
(ArtA8/Reg.25).11I In general authorities can only exclude on these groundsl12; however,
exclusions may be necessary to ensure equal treatrnent.!"
109 European Commission. Public procurement,' Commission recognises need for accelerated procurement procedure. (Brussels.
200S) (IP/OS/2040); and OGC, Procurement policy note - use of the accelerated restricted procedure. (2009. London. Information
Note 1/09)
110 OGC. Procurement policy note - use of the accelerated restricted procedure in 201 I. (2011. London. Information Note 01/11 )
III See Joined Cases 27-29/S6. S.A. Construction et Enterprises lndustrielles (CEI) and others v. Societe Co-operative
"Association Intercommunales purles Autoroutes des Ardennes" (CEI and Bellini) [19S7] ECR 3347. paras.26-2S; and Case
31/S7. Gebroeders Beentjes BVv. Netherlands [19SS] ECR 463S. para.17
112 Joined Cases C-226/04 and C-22S/04. La Cascina Soc. Coop. Arl., Zilch Sri v. Ministero della Difesa & Ministero
dell'Economia e delle Finanze, Pedrus Serviceet al (la Cascina) [2006] ECR 1-1347. para.21; and Case C-213/07. Michaniki AE
v. Ethniko Symvoulio Radiotileorasis and Ypourgos Epikratelas [2009] All ER (D) 226 (Jan)
113 F 'abricom, fn.73; S.Treumer, "The discretionary powers of contracting entities - towards a flexible approach in the recent case
law of the court of justice?" (2006) IS PPLR 71
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Any short-listing in order to limit the number of qualifying suppliers further before
inviting suppliers to tender, negotiate or dialogue (Art.44(3)/Reg.16(9), 17(11) and 18(12))
must be done by reference to the economic and financial standing and technical and/or
professional ability demanded by the contracting authority.!"
The contract notice must note any qualification and selection requirements
(Art.44(2)/Reg.2S(S)). These do not need to involve weightings (see recital40); however,
in accordance with the principle of transparency, the CJEU ruled in Case C-470/99,
Universale-Bau11S that when an authority has defined selection criteria weightings in advance
then the criteria and weightings must be disclosed.l"
4.3.8 Contractaward
4.3.8.1 Introduction
A contracting authority may choose to award a contract on the basis of lowest priced
tender or most economically advantageous tender (MEAl) (Art.53/Reg.30). Where
competitive dialogue is used the contract must be awarded under the MEAT head
(Art.29(7)/Reg.18(27)). If an award is made on the basis of the MEAT, an authority may
consider various criteria (e.g. quality, price, technical merit, aesthetic and functional
characteristics, environmental characteristics, running costs, cost effectiveness, after-sales
service and technical assistance, delivery date and delivery period or period of completion)
(Art.53(1) (a)/Reg.30(2)). This is subject to the proviso that criteria used to evaluate the
MEAT must be linked to the subject matter of the contract.
114 Beemjes, fn.Ll l (particularly paras. I 5 and 16)
115 Case C-470199, Universale-Bau v. EBS, [2002) ECR 1-11617
116 Ibid; and Aquatron Marine v Strathclyde Fire Board [2007] CSOH 185
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4.3.8.2 MEATcriteria
The list of criteria for assessing the MEAT is not exhaustive and authorities have
considerable freedom regarding the nature of permissible criteria. The recent CJEU
judgment of Case C-532/06, Uanakipl highlighted the distinction between selection
criteria, used to assess the suitability of tenderers, and award criteria, used to evaluate the
tender itself.ttS Here, award criteria, relating to the tenderer's proven experience;
manpower and equipment; and ability to complete the project by the deadline, together
with the firm's commitments and professional potential, were held illegitimate because
they focused upon the characteristics of tenderers rather than upon the relative merits of
th d 119U kt· h . . I . ith I t20 d 'te ten ers. ana s, owever, IS not entire y consistent WI past case aw an 1
remains legally grey the extent to which considerations relevant to selection may be used
as award criteria where the aim is to compare the actual quality of performance between
bidders, e.g. rather than assessing adequate experience (i.e. selection criteria) looking at
comparative experience. t2t
4.3.8.3 Disclosure
The contract notice must specify whether the award is on the basis of lowest priced
tender or MEAT. If the evaluation is under the MEAT head, the contract notice,
contract documents or descriptive documents must specify the award criteria and
weightings or range of weightings for each criterion (Art.S3(2)/Reg.30). If it is not
possible to indicate criteria weightings in advance, they should be listed in descending
order of importance (Art.S3(2)/Reg.30(S)).
117 Case C-532106, Emm. G. Lianokis AG v. Dimos Alexandroupolis [2008] ECR 1-0025 I
IIILightways (Contractors) Limlted v. North Ayrshire Council [2008] CSOH 91
119 See also Case T-4/0l, Renco SpA v Council (Case T-4/01) [2003] ECR 11-00171; Joined Cases C-C-462103 and C-463/03,
Strabag v (Jste"eichische Bundesbahnen [2005] ECR 1-5397; Case C-31 5/0 I,Gesellschaftfilr Abfallentsorgungs-Technik (GAT)
v Osterreichsche Autobahnen und Schnellstrassen AG [2003] ECR 1-635 I
120 See Renco, fh, I19
121 See T.Kotsonis, "The nature of award criteria and the subsequent stipulation ofweightings and sub-criteria: Lianakis v. Dimos
Alexandroupolis (C-532106)" (2008) 17 PPLR 128; P.Lee, "Implications of the Lianakis decision" (20 I0) 19 PPLR 47;
S.Treumcr, "The distinction between selection and award criteria in EC public procurement law - a rule without exception?"
(2009) 18 PPLR 103
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In order to evaluate tenders, authorities may divide award criterion into more detailed
sub-criteria, which may in tum be broken down into sub-sub-criteria and even further
sub-divisions.P' The CJED has held that "potential tenderers should be aware of all the
elements to be taken into account by the contracting authority in identifying the
economically most advantageous offer, and, their relative importance, when they prepare
their tenders".I23According to the CJEU, an authority cannot apply weighting rules or
sub-criteria which it has not previously brought to the tenderers' attention. However, in
relation to sub-criteria weightings, the CJEU has noted that authorities may be not need
to disclose these in advance. This is provided it (i) does not alter the criteria for the award
of the contract; (ii) does not contain elements which, if they had been known at the time
the tenders were prepared, could have affected preparation; (iii) was not adopted on the
basis of matters likely to give rise to discrimination against one of the tenderers.124125
A further area of uncertainty concerns changes to published award criteria prior to
submission of tenders, an issue the CJEU avoided in Walloon Buses.'26 The CJEU stated
that changes were not possible in Case C-448/01, EVN and Wienstrom vAuslria127;
however, this case concerned changes to award criteria after tenders had been submitted
without any notification to bidders.
122 Lightways, fu.118
123 Lianakis, fu.117, para.36
124 Case C-331/04, ATI EAC SrI e Viaggi di MaioSnc vACTV Venezia SpA [2005] ECR 1-10109, para.43
125 See also Letting International Ltd v. Newham LBC [2008J EWHC 1583 (QB); Mclaughlin & Harvey Ltd v. Department of
Finance & Personnel [2008] NIQB 25; Morrison Facilities Services Ltd v. Norwich City Council [20 I0] EWHC 487 (Ch); J
Varney & Sons Waste Management Ltd v. Hertfordshire CC [2010] EWHC 1404 (QB); Case C-19/00, SIAC Construction Ltd v.
County Council of the County of Mayo [2001] ECR 1-07725; Mears Ltd v Leeds City Council (No.2) [2011] EWHC 1031 (TCC);
ALSTOM Transport v Eurostar International Ltd[2010] EWHC 2747
126 Walloon Buses. fu.60
127 Case C-448/01, EVN and Wienstrom v. Austria [2003] ECR 1-14527
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4.4 Review and remedies
4.4.1 Introduction
The remainder of chapter four will outline the measures adopted by the EU and UK in
order to encourage compliance with the above procedural rules (see chapter eight). The
enforcement of EU procurement law is conducted at two levels: EU and national.
4.4.2 EUlevel enforcement
The Commission may enforce EU public procurement law under Art.258 TFEU, for
example, as a result of its general monitoring or following an aggrieved bidder complaint.
Here, proceedings are brought before the CJEU against the Member State, not individual
contracting authorities. The CJEU has the power to award interim remedies (Art.279
TFEU). If the CJEU finds a State to be in violation, there are no immediate sanctions;
however, the State must take "necessary measures to comply" (Art.260 TFEU). If the
Member State fails to take "necessary measures" it may face sanctions under Art.260
TFEU.128Following Case C-503/04, Commission v. Germany,129 it is evident that the CJEU
can in certain circumstances (which have not been made clear) require Member States to
ensure a concluded contract is set aside.!" The Commission cannot be forced to act under
Art.258 TFEU,131and, in view of its limited resources, it has stated that it will only act in
cases of systematic and significant breaches.l"
In addition, the Remedies Directive contains a corrective mechanism (Art.3), enabling the
Commission to intervene where prior to contract conclusion it considers there to have
128 See, for example, Case C-70/06, Commission v. Portugal, [2008] ECR I-I
129 Case C-503/04, Commission v. Germany [2007] ECR 1-6153
130 See further Case C·328/96, Commission v. Republic of Austria (Sankt Poelten Administrative Centre Case) [1999] ECR 1-7479;
and Joined Cases C-20/01 and C-28/01, Commission v. Germany [2003] ECR 1-3609 (confirmed in Case C-12S/03, Commission v.
Germany [2004] ECR 1-4771)
III T-126/95, Dunmez v. Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR 11-2863
112 See European Commission, The rules governing the procedure in the award of public procurement contracts. (Brussels,2000)
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been a "serious infringement" of the procurement rules. The Commission rarely uses
this, preferring the Art.258 TFEU process.l"
Also, Member States may bring other Member States before the CJEU for breach of the
EU procurement rules under Art.259 TFEU. In practice, however, Member States rely
upon Commission enforcement under Art.258.
4.4.3 The Remedies Directive
4.4.3.1 Introduction
The procedural rules of the Directive are backed up by the Remedies Directive, which
seeks to strengthen domestic review and remedies systems by requiring certain minimum
standards. Recently, the Remedies Directive was amended by Directive 2007/66/EC.!34
These amendments were incorporated into UK law on 20 December 2009.135 Relevant
amendments will be highlighted below as the requirements of the Remedies Directive are
explained; however, at the time of the research interviews the full impact of the
amendments had yet to be felt.
4.4.3.2 Effectiveness
The Remedies Directive is underpinned by a key principle of effectiveness, which sits
behind many court rulings in this area. Member States must ensure that decisions taken
by authorities under the Directive "may be reviewed effectivelY and, in particular, as rapidly
as possible" (Art.1 (1)).
4.4.3.3 Standing
Implementing Art.1(3), Regulation 47(6) gives standing to any "economic operator"
which suffers, or risks suffering, loss or damage, as a result of a breach of the Regulations.
J33 A.Delsaux, "The role of the Commission in enforcing EC public procurement rules" [2004] 13 PPLR 130,134
134 Directive 2oo7/66/EC, fh.6
135 Public Contracts (Amendment) Regulations 2009 (2000 No.2992)
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In the UK the Regulation's review and remedies system is not extended to contracts
outside the scope of the Directive/Regulations.
4.4.3.4 Procedure
Challenges against violations of the Directives/Regulations in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland can be brought in the High Court, and, in Scotland, challenges can be
brought in the Court of Session, Sheriff Court or the High Court (Reg.47(6».
Before initiating proceedings, there is a requirement for complainants to notify authorities
of an alleged breach and the intention to seek review (Reg.47(7».t36There is no
requirement in the UK for review to be sought from the authority concerned before
taking court action (Art.1 (5».
The CJEU has accepted that challenge limitation periods are permitted.F" Following Case
C-406/08, Uniplex'J8 and amendments which took effect from 01 October 2011,139the
Regulations read, "proceedings must be started within 30 days beginning with the date
when the economic operator first knew or ought to have known that the grounds for
starting proceedings had arisen" (Reg.47D(2». The Court will have a discretion to extend
the limitation period up to a maximum of three months (Reg.47D(3». Prior to
amendment, proceedings needed to be started "promptly and in any event within three
months from the date when grounds for the bringing of the proceedings first arose unless
the Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period ...". The research
was carried out prior to the Uniplex amendment, when there was some uncertainty over
when the grounds for bringing proceedings (the trigger for the time limit) could be said to
have occurred. Case law had suggested that the three month time limit begins to run
136 See Luck (Ila GLuck Arboricultural & Horticultural) v. Tower Hamlets LBC QBD [2003] EWCA Civ 52
137 See Universale-Bau, m.11 5; and Case C-327/oo, Samex v. Unlla Socio Sanitaria Locale n.42 Pavia [2003] ECR 1-1877
118 Case C-406/08, Uniplex (UK) Lid v NHS Business Services Authority [20 I0] ECR 1-0000
119 Public Procurement (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2011 (2011, No.2053)
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regardless of knowledgel'''; however, despite the wording of the Regulations, this was no
longer tenable after the CJEU ruled against the approach in Uniplex. Thus, in recent years
the domestic courts have moved away from the traditional position.l" Past case law on
the courts' discretion to extent the time limit is likely to remain relevant.l"
4.4.3.5 Remedies
4.4.3.5.1 General
As required by the Remedies Directive (Art.2(1), the Regulations make available three
types of remedy: interim measures, set aside orders, and damages (Reg.47(8». The UK
has taken the option (Art.2(7» to limit the remedies available for concluded contracts to
damages only (Reg.47(9»);however, this is provided the grounds for ineffectiveness, a new
remedy introduced by the 2009 amendments, are not met (see below).
4.4.3.5.2 Interim measures
Interim measures refer to orders before full court hearing; the most relevant from a UK
procurement perspective are interim injunctions, which operate to prevent the defendant
taking certain actions (e.g. concluding the contract) before final trial.
Interim injunctions are a discretionary remedy, with guidelines as to how the discretion is
to be exercised developed through case law.143The following considerations are relevant
to the decision whether or not to grant an injunction:
(a) the strength of the applicant's case;144145
140 See Keymed (Medical & Industrial Equipment) Limited v. Forest Healthcare NHS Trust [1998] Eu LR 71; Matra
Communications S.A.S. v. Home OjJice [ 1991] I WLR 1646; Jobsin Co UK Pic (tla Internet Recruitment Soluttons) v. Department
of Health [2002] I CMLR 44
141 Henry Bros (Magherafelt) Ltd v Department of Educationfor Northern Ireland [2008] NIQB 105; Mears, fh.12S; Silo UK Lid
v Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority[201 Ii EWCA Civ 156
142 See, for example, Keymed, fh.140; and Jobsin, fh.140
143 American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396 at 407G; and, see also, Laddie J in Series 5 Software v. Clarke [1996] 1
All ER 853 at 865
144 See, for example, De La Rue International Ltd v. Scottish Power Pic 2000 G.W.O. 34-1325
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(b) the adequacy of damages as a remedy for either sidei'"
(c) the applicant's undertaking in damagesi'"
(d) the balance of convenience.'" and
(e) any special factors.!"
In the context of public procurement, the UK courts have varied in the extent to which
they have taken account of the EU effectiveness principle, with there being a
disagreement over whether or not the principle required modifications to the above
id li 150gut e nes.
A new requirement for automatic suspension following commencement of legal challenge
where the contract has not been entered into (Art.1(5)/Reg.47G), will mean that many
interim hearings in the field of procurement will concern whether or not a suspension is
to be continued (Reg.47H). It appears that the case law above is relevant to the
decision.l"
4.4.3.5.3 Set aside and amendment orders
According to Reg.47(8)(b) (Art.2(1)(b», a court may order that a decision or action in
violation of the Regulations be set aside (i.e. it will have no legal effect) or may order a
contracting authority to amend any document. This remedy is not available where a
contact has been concluded (Reg.47(9». As with interim measures, these orders are
14~ See also Case C-424/01. cs Communications & Systems Austria GmbH v Allgemeine Unfallverslcherungsanstalt [2003] ECR
1-03249
146 See Burroughs Machines Ltd v. Oxford Area Health Authority [1983] ECC 434
147 See Partenaire Ltd v Department of Finance and Personnel [2007] NIQB 100 at 2S; McLaughlin, fu.12S. at II; and also the
arguments of the parties before the Court of Appeal in Letting International. fu.12S
148 See Burroughs. fu.146; Clyde Solway Consortium v. Scottish Ministers 200 I SC SS3; Partenaire, fu.147; De Vllbtss Medequip
Ltd v. NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency [200S] EWHC 17S7; Letting International. fu.12S; Henry Brothers. fu.141; Lightways,
fu.118; BFS v. Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWHC IS 13
149 See Burroughs. Ibid
150 See, for instance. Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Limited v The Corporate Officer of The House of Commons 67 Con LR I;
BFS, fu.148; Partenaire, fu.147. Henry Brothers. fu.141. Lion Apparel Systems v. Firebuy [2007] EWHC 2179; Letting
International, fu.12S; Mclaughlin. fu.12S; Lightways. fn.IIS
'" See Indigo Services (UK) v. Colchester Institute Corporation [2010] EWHC 3237 (QB); Exel Europe Ltd v. University
Hospitals Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust [2010] EWHC 3332 (TCC)
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discretionary, subject to the general requirement that the remedies system is effective.lf
In deciding whether or not to grant a set aside order the court will take into account
similar considerations as those relevant to the decision to grant an interim injunction.l"
4.4.3.5.4 Damages
Damages are available regardless of whether or not the contract has been entered into
(Art.2(1) (c)/Reg.47(9)). Apart from the principle that damages must be effective, it has
been left for the courts to determine the availability and measure of damages. The CJEU
has confirmed that an authority does not need to be at fault for damages liability.l54
A breach of the Regulations is a tort. Thus, the aim of damages is to put the claimant in
the position it would have been in had the tort not been committed. Hermon'" is a
leading English authority on the calculation of damages. The judgement considered two
possible methods for calculating damages: the "loss of chance" rule/56 and the usual
"balance of probabilities" approach. Under the balance of probabilities approach only the
full amoun~ of any loss may be recoverable; however, with the loss of chance rule, the
courts will assess the likelihood of the claimant realising a benefit which the breach has
deprived it off (e.g. the loss of the contract) and then award damages that reflect the
likelihood. The Ham/on decision appears to advocate a hybrid approach.l" Itwas
accepted that full damages for lost profits were recoverable where the claimant can show
that it would have won the disputed contract. However, where it is not "almost certain"
that the claimant would have won, the loss of chance rule should be applied. This would
mean that if the claimant had only a 70% chance of success it would be able to recover
152 Case C-225197, Commission v. France Republic [1999] ECR 1-3011.
153 See Severn Trent Pic v. DwrCymru Cy'/yngedig (Welsh Water Ltd) [2001] CLC 107
154 Case C-275103, Commission v Portugal (14 October 2004) (not published in the ECR)
I" Harmon, rn.150
156 See Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786; Allied Maples Group v. Simmonds & Simmonds [1995] 1 WLR 1602
157 S.Arrowsmith, "EC procurement rules in the UK courts: an analysis of the Harmon case" (2000) 9 PPLR 120
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only 70% of the lost profits. ISS In addition, the claimant was entitled to recover bid costs
because it had a "real and substantive chance" of being awarded the contract.
4.4.3.5.5 Ineffectiveness
The 2009 amendments introduced a new sanction of "ineffectiveness" (Art.2d/Reg.47E).
In the UK ineffectiveness means a contract is prospectively (not retrospectively)
ineffective from the time of the declaration (Reg.47M). The limitation period for an
ineffectiveness claim is 30 days for advertised contracts; otherwise it is six months
(Art.2f/Reg.4 7E).
There are three grounds for ineffectiveness. The first is where there has been an unlawful
failure to advertise (Reg.47K(2». Here, ineffectiveness can be avoided where a
transparency notice is published and the authority waits 10 days before concluding the
contract. The second ground is where there has been a failure to comply with the
standstill or automatic suspension rules (Reg.47K(S». These breaches need to have
deprived the claimant of the possibility to pursue pre-contractual remedies for
ineffectiveness to apply, and must be coupled with other procedural infringements. The
third ground is where there has been a breach of the rules relating to dynamic purchasing
systems or framework agreements (Reg.47K(6». The court may refuse to grant
ineffectiveness under any of these grounds where overriding reasons relating to the
general interest require that this does not happen (Art.2d(3)/Reg.47L). In situations
where ineffectiveness is not granted there are alternative penalties (e.g. fines or orders
shortening the contract) (Art.2e/Reg.47N).
4.4.3.5.6 AIcateI standstill and information requirements
A 2007 amendment to the Remedies Directive requires that authorities be obliged to
inform losing bidders of the decision to award (including a summary of relevant reasons
us See also Aquatron, fu.116
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and a precise statement of the exact standstill period applicable) and observe a 10day (15
where electronic communication is not used) standstill period before concluding the
contract (Art.2a). The amendment endorses the ruling in Case C-81/98, Alcatel,1J9 and is
intended to give unsuccessful bidders the time and opportunity to challenge the award
decision based on relevant information whilst interim measures and set aside orders are
still available.
The Regulations already contained information and standstill requirements (Reg.32);
however, 2009 amendments have strengthened these requirements (Reg.32 and 32A).
Prior to amendment, Reg.32 required the contract award notice to include the award
criteria, the score obtained by the losing tenderer to which the notice was addressed and
the score of the winning bidder (where practicable), and the name of the winning bidder.
The losing tenderer then had two working days to request the reasons why it had been
unsuccessful, and to find out the characteristics and relative advantages of the winning
bid. This aspect of the rules has now been removed, as an award notice must now
provide tenderers with (in addition to information previously required) the reasons for the
award decision including the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful
tender, and must specify the operation of the standstill period (Reg.32(2)). 2011
amendments to the Regulations clarify that the above notice only needs to be sent to
bidders who submitted a bid or tender and who have not been definitely excluded prior to
the final award decision, e.g. bidder who have not been excluded, notified of the exclusion
and the time limit for bring proceedings has expiredt60; nevertheless, a similar notice must
be sent to candidates (e.g. bidders that were eliminated or withdrew before the final
tender stage). This notice does not need to set out the relative advantages of the winning
bid (Reg.32(2A)).
159 Case C'81198, Alcatel Austria v. BundeministeriumjiJr Wissenschoft und Verkehr [1999] ECR 1-7671; see also Case C-2I 2/02,
Commission v. Austria [2004] All ER (D) 279 (Jun)
160 20 II Amendment Regulations, th.139
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4.5 Concluding remarks
The first part of chapter four provided an overview of key procedural requirements of the
Directive and Regulations. In particular, the chapter introduced the procedures
authorities must follow when awarding contracts, and requirements such as contract
advertising and the criteria that may be used for qualification, selection and award. In the
second part of the chapter the rules on procurement review and remedies were
introduced. This is an area that has been recently strengthened with the introduction of
standstill, ineffectiveness and automatic suspensions.
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5 Competitive Dialogue
5.1 Introduction
The need for a new contract award procedure arose in the run up to the 2004 Directive,
as existing procedures, which have lasted relatively unchanged since their design in the
1970s, were considered outdated and not suitable for modem procurement methods, such
as PPPs. As briefly explained in chapter four, competitive dialogue was introduced in
2004 to supplement the existing set of procedures and provide a procurement process
tailor made to the needs of complex contracts. Chapter five will provide an introduction
to competitive dialogue, setting out the legal background and then moving on to provide
an outline of the process. As mentioned in chapter four, soft law often plays a key role in
UK procurement regulation. Chapter five will conclude by setting out the government
guidance on competitive dialogue.
5.2 The need for a new procedure
5.2.1 Introduction
As discussed in the preceding chapter, before the introduction of competitive dialogue in
the UK contracting authorities were required as a general rule to award contracts under
the open or restricted procedures. These procedures are highly structured and
transparent, which makes them ideal for straightforward procurements; however, for
reasons that will be explained, these procedures are not suitable for complex
procurements, such as PPPs.
5.2.2 Scope for dialogue
The open and restricted procedures provide minimal scope for procuring authorities to
collaborate with the private sector in order to develop a proposed project. As was seen in
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chapter four, an authority must specify its requirements precisely in technical
specifications at the outset, which enables tenderers to submit complete, fully cos ted
tenders. There are strict rules restricting discussions and negotiations between procuring
authority and supplier.!" In contrast, in the private sector extensive contractual
discussions and negotiations are commonplace, as it is through such dialogue that
purchasers are able to obtain the most economically efficient outcome and maximise
profits.162 This is because suppliers will generally have more information about, for
instance, the products, the means of supply and the market than purchasers (particularly
so in relation to complex contracts). Discussions and negotiations with suppliers help
h . i:' 163purchasers overcome sue an mtormation asymmetry.
In complex PPP procurement, although authorities may be able to state desired overall
outcomes, such projects are often so complex with many variables and uncertainties (e.g.
how can desired outcomes to be delivered in practice? what risks will the private sector
be prepared to accept? how precisely will the project be financed?) that an authority will
not be in a position at the outset to identify the detailed solution best able to meet its
needs to the degree required to enable tenderers to submit meaningful renders.!"
Nevertheless, under the EU procurement rules negotiations between authorities and
suppliers tend to be viewed with scepticism, due to a perception that such dialogue lacks
transparency; for example, negotiations may be seen to allow more scope for authorities
to abuse discretion and provide greater possibility for authorities to pass on confidential
information.
1:1 See Arrowsmith (1998), m.107
I 2 See Chong.et al., Auction versus negotiation inpublic procurement: lookingfor empirical evidence, (June 2009) available at
bttp;~!'.archlves-ouYertes.fr/haI-OOSI2813/en/ (accessed 31/10/2011); Bajari et al., Auctions versus negotiations in procurement:
an empirical analysis (2003, Cambridge, Mass, National Bureau of Economic Research)
163 See P.Trepte, ''Transparency requirements" in Nielsen & Treumer (eds.) The New EU Public Procurement Directive, (2005,
~~"~~ ,
164 See 4Ps, Amap of the PFI process: using competitive dialogue. (2006) available at WWW.localpartnershjps.org.uk (accessed
31110/2011)
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In addition to the objective of compliance with EU procurement law obligations,
contracting authorities are likely to be pursuing separate policy objectives, such as running
procurements that maximise value for public money. Whilst restrictions on dialogue may
not obstruct value for money in simple procurements, in complex procurements they may
result in procurement policy goals conflicting. An authority may be faced with the
decision whether to comply with the strict letter of the law or to adopt a more flexible
approach in order to maximise value for money.l" With this in mind, Trepte argues that
in certain situations the priority of the EU procurement rules of imposing obligations on
authorities designed to prevent actions which might harm the creation of a single EU
procurement market, is accomplished at the expense of a positive framework through
which optimum procurement results and value for money can be achieved.l"
5.2.3 Bidder numbers
In addition to compliance and value for money objectives, contracting authorities are also
likely to be concerned to run efficient procurements that minimise costs. Again, in this
regard, the open and restricted procedures are often unsuitable for many complex
procurements like complex PPP because of the invariably high costs for bidders of
preparing bids (potentially running into the £millions) and the high costs for the authority
in administering the procurement. In complex PPP procurement it may not be in the
interests of bidders or authorities to invite a minimum of five firms to tender (required
under the restricted procedure) as this would likely be too costly in administrative,
financial and commercial terms for all parties involved.167
165 See S.Arrowsmith, "National and international perspectives on the regulation of public procurement: hannony or conflict?" in
Arrowsmith & Davies (eds.) Public Procurement: Global Revolution (1998, K1uwer Law International), 23; Arrowsmith (1998),
fo.107; K.KrIlger, "Ban-on-negotiations in tender procedures: undermining best value for money?" (2004) 4(3) Journal of Public
Pro~rement 397; and K.KrIlger, "The scope for post-tender negotiations in international tendering procedures" in Arrowsmith &
~vles (eds.) Pub~icProcurement: Global Revolution (1998, K1uwer Law International), 181-198
167 P.Trepte, Pu~flc procurement in the EU: a practitioner's guide (2007, Oxford University Press, Oxford), 7.81
~ PfS, Guidance note on classification of the contract and choice ofprocedure under the EUprocurement rulesfor the
Buildtng Schoolsfor the Future Programme (2006, London), section 16.1
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Maintaining a wide field of bidders throughout a PPP procurement process also runs the
risk of deterring competition.l" Because of the great time and expense required to prepare
bids, bidders are unlikely to be willing to commit fully to a procurement process unless
they are one of a small group and thus have a realistic opportunity of success. There is a
risk that bidders will drop out if they are still, for instance, only one of five when they are
required to incur the substantial costs needed to put together a tender in a PPP
procurement. Use, therefore, of the competitive open or restricted procedures to procure
a complex PPP deal may actually result in a lack of competition (potentially impacting
upon value for money).
Also, the open and restricted procedures fail to provide an option permitting authorities
to reduce the number of bidders further following qualification and selection. This can be
desirable in complex PPP procurement because, as a procurement progresses and bidders
are deselected, remaining bidders are encouraged and more able to justify concentrating
their resources into developing their proposal and attuning it to the authorities
requirernents.l'" Indeed, it is noted that the commercial reality of complex PPP
procurement is such that a bidder and debt funders will only be prepared to commit the
substantial resources required to bring a project to commercial and financial close after
that bidder has been selected as the preferred bidder (i.e. when there is only one bidder
left in the running).170
5.2.4 The pragmatic UKapproach
Due to the lack of commercial suitability of the open and restricted procedures for many
PPP procurements, empirical research by Braun evidences the development of a common
161lbid
169 R.Boyle, "Critique of the Commission's proposal for a new Directive on the Co-ordination of Procedures for Public Contracts
~~M (2000) 275 Final, as updated by discussions in the working group" (2001) 3 PPLR NA65, NA67
A.B~wn, "The impact of the new Procurement Directive on large public infrastructure projects: competitive dialogue or better
the devil you know?"(2004) 4 PPLR 160, 166
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UK practice, encouraged by central government,m whereby the more flexible negotiated
procedure would be used for the procurement of PFI projects. According to Braun,
practice was for PFI projects to be classified as services so that the use of the negotiated
procedure could be justified on either the ground that the nature of the services to be
provided, or the risks attaching thereto, are such as not to permit prior overall pricing
(public Services Contracts Regulations 1993, Reg.10(2)(b)) (the "overall pricing" ground);
or the ground that the nature of the services to be provided is such that specifications
cannot be drawn up with sufficient precision to permit the award of the contract using the
open or restricted procedure (public Services Contracts Regulations 1993, Reg.10(2) (c))
(the "no specifications" ground).172
As explained in chapter four, the negotiated procedure is a relatively unstructured
procedure, and, according to Arrowsmith, was the preferred procedure for UK authorities
awarding PFI contracts because, in particular, it provides scope for an iterative process in
which "the ideas and capabilities of bidders and the authority's preferences can be tailored
to produce the optimum outcome, without excessive procedural costs".173Under the
negotiated procedure it was common for authorities procuring PFI contracts to invite a
limited number of qualifying suppliers (three-five) to submit outline proposals and then
reduce bidder numbers based on these proposals, inviting often as few as two or three
bidders to submit more detailed offers upon which a bidder with the most economically
advantageous tender would be identified ("the preferred bidder,,).174In order to minimise
costs and ensure only one bidder needed to incur the substantial cost of finalising the
deal, it appears there was considerable pressure upon contracting authorities to appoint a
171 ST'ee reasury Taskforce, Technical Note No.2: How tofollow EC procurement procedure and advertise in the OJEC, (1998,
London)
172 ~.B~un, Thep~actical impact of EU public procurement law on PF/ procurement practice in the United Kingdom, (2001,
University of'Nottingham) (PhD thesis), 178-184; P.Braun, "Strict compliance versus commercial reality: the practical application
?,~EC procu~ent law to the UK's Private Finance Initiative" (2003) 9(5) European Law Journal 575
Arrowsmith (2000), th.71 722
174 Ibid '
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preferred bidder at an early point in the process.!" Although commercially sensible, the
practice was seen by some as problematical as often substantial negotiations would take
place with the preferred bidder when competitive tension was minimal.l"
The precise scope of the "no specifications" and "overall pricing" grounds for using the
negotiated procedure is not certain. According to Brown, there was little legal risk in
practice of using the procedure for PFI, as most bidders accepted the need for
flexibility'"; however, reliance on the above two grounds was contested in a judicial
review action in the High COUrt.178Here, it was held that the authority concerned was
"plainly entitled" to use the negotiated procedure, but there was no meaningful
discussion of the scope of the "overall pricing" and "no specifications" grounds.
In 2000 the Commission issued a reasoned opinion to the UK in relation to a negotiated
procedure for the Westminster City Council Pimlico Schools PFI.179 The Commission
reached the conclusion that the conditions for use of the negotiated procedure on the
"overall pricing" ground were not present. According to the Commission the negotiated
procedure is a derogation from fundamental procurement law principles that is only to be
used in exceptional circumstances.
5.3 The competitive dialogue procedure
Early signs of Commission recognition of the need for competitive dialogue appear in the
1996 Green Paper, Exploring the W try Forward.l80 The Green Paper recognised concerns
that the legal framework was inhibiting private sector involvement in relation to the EU
175 See Treasury Taskforce, Technical note 00.4: how to appoint and work with a preferred bidder, (1999, London)
176 Arrowsmith (2000), ro.71, 732
177 Brown (2004), fu.170, 164
~I R. (On.the Application ofKathro) v Rhondda Cynon TajJCounty Borough Council (lOOl] Env LR IS; see also S.Arrowsmith,
Application of the UK procurement regulations to PFI contracts: new case law" (2002) 3 PPLR NA84
179E C' .ur~an .ommlsslon, Reasoned Opinion: addressed to the United Kingdom pursuant to Article 116 of the EC Treaty.
concerning failure to fulfil its obligations under Directive 93/37/EEC. and in particular Article 7(1)(c) thereof, (2000, Brussels)
(C2OOO 1972 Final)
180 Commission (1996), fu.97
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policy of promoting Trans-European Networks.lsl One of the problems, according to the
Green Paper, was that the private sector was reluctant to engage in pre-tender discussions
without the assurance that it would not be excluded from the subsequent tendering
procedure due to fear of infringing the equal treatment principle.ls2
Industry responses to the Green Paper made the Commission fully aware that these
problems were not limited to the procurement of Trans-European Networks. In its 1998
Communication the Commission stated: " ... especially in the case of particularly complex
contracts in areas that are constantly changing, such as high technology, purchasers are
well aware of their needs but do not know in advance what is the best technical solution
for satisfying those needs. Discussion of the contract and dialogue between purchasers
and suppliers are therefore necessary in such cases. But the standard procedures laid down
by the 'traditional' directives leave very little scope for discussion during the award of
contracts and are therefore regarded as lacking in flexibility in situations of this type".183
What would eventually become competitive dialogue was initially presented in the
Commission's 2000 proposal'" as an additional ground for using the negotiated
procedure. ISS Commentators were quite critical of the provision, with Arrowsmith
describing it as "the very worst kind of drafting" .186The provision was regarded as too
restrictive; for example, the scope of the provision was narrow and the purpose of the
dialogue phase had to be used solely to discuss and define the means best suited to
meeting the needs of the contracting authority.
181 Ibid, para.S.20
182 Ibid, para.S.23
183 European Commission, Communication from the Commission: public procurement in the European Union, (1998, Brussels)
(COM(I998) 143 Final)
184 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of
procedures for the award of public supply contracts, public service contracts and public works contracts, (2000, Brussels) (COM
(2000) 275 Final)
185 A rdiceo mg to Trepte (fn.I66, 7.79) this uncertain conception may well be at the root of uncertainty over competitive dialogue's
scope of application.
186 S.Arrowsmith, "The European Commission's proposal for new directives on public and utilities procurement" (2000) 6 PPLR
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75
Negotiations leading to the adoption of the Directive eventually resulted in the creation of
a new procedure, competitive dialogue. The Directive describes competitive dialogue as
"a flexible procedure ... which preserves not only competition between economic
operators but also the need for contracting authorities to discuss all aspects of the
contract with each candidate" (Recital 31).
The new procedure is intended to closely correspond to best procurement practice for the
award of particularly complex contracts, such as "the implementation of important
integrated transport infrastructure projects, large computer networks or projects involving
complex and structured financing the financial and legal make-up of which cannot be
defined in advance" (Recital 31). According to the OGe, "lobbying by UK stakeholders,
both public and private sector, helped to ensure that the final text fitted better with UK
PF! practice. The end result is a structured negotiated procedure, which is similar in
many ways to the existing practice of letting PF! contracts".187The legal rules on
competitive dialogue will be described in detail in chapters six and seven.
Although similar to pre-2006 UK PF! procurement practice, commentators have
questioned whether competitive dialogue goes far enough to provide authorities with
sufficient flexibility to maximise value for money in complex procurements.l" During
negotiations for the Directive the UK had sought to argue that, rather than a creating a
new procedure, the scope of application of the negotiated procedure should simply be
widened with no regulation of the negotiations being necessary. According to Trepte, " ...
competitive dialogue ..., at least as originally conceived, offered some hope of
improvement but what started out as a procedure which resembled the well-known two
117 OGC, Competitive dialogue procedure: OGC guidance on the competitive dialogue procedure in the new procurement
regulations. (2006, London), 1.2
188 See Trepte (2007), fh.I66, 7.80
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stage procedure of other international procurement systems, has to a large extent been
shorn of its utility ...".189
5.4 Soft law
A considerable amount of guidance has been published on competitive dialogue. The
Commission has set out its interpretation of the legal rules in an explanatory note
published in 2005.190 The explanatory note provides guidance on some of the contentious
issues, such as the field of application of competitive dialogue, the conduct of the
dialogue stage, the requirement for complete final tenders, and the scope for negotiation
following close of dialogue. Although lacking official status, the explanatory note may be
relevant in relation to Commission enforcement of the law.
Upon the introduction of competitive dialogue in the UK the OGC published Competitive
Dialogue Procedure: aGC guidance on competitive dialogue procedure in the new Procurement
Regulations Oanuary 2006).191 The document is relatively brief and concerns itself with few
contentious issues; however, unlike previous guidance which had endorsed a more flexible
view of the legal rules than that of the Commission, the 2006 guidance is very much in
line with the Commission's explanatory note. Despite previously encouraging the use of
the negotiated procedure for PPI procurement, the January 2006 guidance makes it clear
that recourse to the negotiated procedure for PFI is in most situations no longer possible:
" ... the negotiated procedure should only be used in very exceptional circumstances".
Due to uncertainty about the practical operation of competitive dialogue, the OGC
supplemented the January 2006 guidance with a July 2006 information note to provide
some practical guidance and invite input f~r the development of further guidance.l"
119 Trepte (2005), fit.163, 63
190 European Commission, Explanatory note _ competitive dialogue _ classic directive, (2005, Brussels) (CCI200SI04_rev I of
5.10.200S)
191 OGC (2006), fit.IS7
192 OGC, Procurement policy: information note 04/06 _ 31 July 2006: practical guidance on the use of competitive dialogue.
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In 2008 the OGe and HM Treasury published more comprehensive guidance, Competitive
Dialogue in 2008: aGc/ HMI' joint guidance on using theprocedure.193 The guidance is based on
discussions with authorities, practitioners, bidders and advisers, and attempts to provide a
practical insight into the operation of the procedure. The 2008 guidance, however,
recognises its own limitations: "[the advice] is generic and cannot hope to cover all
possible scenarios for every conceivable complex procurement ...".194 In addition, the
OGe has published case studies of experiences with competitive dialogue and lessons
learned.!" The OGe tends to shy away from definitive advice on key issues, limiting itself
to explaining the law and to clarifying issues on which there is some degree of consensus.
As reasons for this, Arrowsmith highlights the difficulty of predicting future eJEU
interpretations and the danger that explicit guidance could in some cases threaten the very
. that i k 196practices at It see s to promote.
There is also sector specific guidance issued on competitive dialogue by, for example,
Partnerships for Schools, the Department of Health and 4PS.197
In November 2010 HM Treasury published its findings from a review of competitive
dialogue, aiming to consider how competitive dialogue is being used, illuminate areas of
concern and make recommendations for ongoing and future procurernents.l'" The HM
Treasury review brings together 18 months of research involving surveys and roundtable
discussions with stakeholders. This was followed in 2011 by publication of the findings
193 OGC and HM Treasury, Competitive dialogue in 2008: OGCIHMr joint guidance on using the procedure, (2008, London)
194Ibid, 1.7
195 OGC, Competitive dialogue case study: BBC digital switchover help scheme, (2009, London); OGC, Olympic Delivery
Authority: delivery partner procurement using competitive dialogue: a lessons learned study (2007, London); OGC, Competitive
dialogue case study: Q bidder's perspective, (2009, London)
196 Arrowsmith (2006), fu.84 89
197 '
PfS (2006), fu.1 08; Department of Health, The Private Finance Initiative: how to conduct a competitive dialogue procedure,
(consul~tion dra~) (2006, London); 4Ps (2006), fu.I64; 4Ps, The competitive dialogue process, (2007, London); 4Ps, A new
f~aPter m procurmg large and complex projects, (2006, London)
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from the Efficiency and Reform Group's study into waste and inefficiency in central
.. dial 199government competitive ogue procurement.
S.S The use of competitive dialogue across the EU
de Mars & Craven conducted an analysis of the use of competitive dialogue in several
Member States, including the UK, based upon a study of OJEU notices published
between 01 January 2006 and 31 December 2009.200 The UK, with 1,380 competitive
dialogue contract notices for the relevant period, was noted to be one of the heaviest
users of competitive dialogue. The figure dwarfs the usage figures for Germany (131), the
Netherlands (87), Ireland (80), Spain (30), Belgium (24) and Portugal (two).
The above research also looked at the types of authority using competitive dialogue,
which in the UK was found to be mainly local government (37%) (such as county
councils and city councils). Contracting authorities in the health sector (19%) and central
government (12%) were noted as other key procurers using the procedure. In terms of
the subject area of contract notices, the majority were classified as infrastructure (27%),
ICT (25%) and other (21%) categories. In addition, the UK showed the most frequent
use of private finance procurement with competitive dialogue from the member states
examined. 467 contract notices (34%) were found to refer to projects that potentially
involved some element of private finance.
S.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has sought to establish the background to the legal rules on competitive
dialogue, looking in particular at the previous inadequacies of PPP procurement under the
EU rules and how the introduction of competitive dialogue seeks to remedy these
199 Cabinet Office, Lean procurement project diagnosticflndings, (2010, London); Cabinet Office, Accelerating government
f~ocuremen', (20 II, London)
de M~ & ~raven, "An analysis of use of the competitive dialogue procedure in the EU" in Arrowsmith & Treumer (eds.),
Competitive dialogue in EUprocurement (forthcoming, Cambridge University Press)
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inadequacies. Chapters six and seven will build upon this chapter providing a detailed
analysis of the legal rules.
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6 Grounds for using competitive
dialogue
6.1 Introduction
Competitive dialogue is not freely available. Chapter sixwill look at the legal rules
governing the availability of competitive dialogue. Itwill be seen there is a high degree of
uncertainty surrounding a number of availability issues. There is the potential for a broad
interpretation, whereby the procedure can be used not only for complex PPP-type deals
but also for projects that might previously have been awkwardly procured under a
restricted procedure, and a narrow interpretation, whereby the procedure's availability is
similar to that of the negotiated procedure. In particular, chapter sixwill touch upon the
approach to interpretation, the scope of the phrase "particularly complex contract", and
the relationship between competitive dialogue and the negotiated procedure.
6.2 Interpretation of the legal rules
The legal rules fail to make clear whether competitive dialogue is to be regarded as a
standard procedure, like the open and restricted procedures, or whether it is an
exceptional procedure that derogates from fundamental principles.?" This issue is
important, as it impacts upon the interpretation of competitive dialogue and therefore its
availability. For example, the negotiated procedure without a contract notice is an
exceptional procedure. The CJEU has emphasised that the derogations for its use are to
be construed narrowly and that the burden is with the authority to establish that the
decision to use the procedure was legitimate.102
:~ Arrowsmith (2005), 1h.46, 10.3
Cas~ 1.99/85, Commission v.Italy [1987] ECR 1039; Case 328/92, Commission v. Spain [1994] ECR 1-1-1569; Case C-S7/94,
Commtssto« v. Italy [1995] ECR 1-1249; CascC-318/94, Commission v. Germany [1996] ECR 1-1949
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It remains unclear whether the negotiated procedure is exceptional or not. Although the
Commission appears to regard the negotiated procedure as exceptional.i" there are a
number of counter arguments to this. As argued by Arrowsmith, the negotiated
procedure provides a much higher degree of transparency than the negotiated procedure
without a notice (i.e. advertising requirements, disclosure of award criteria etc.); thus, in
the opinion of Arrowsmith, the negotiated procedure "is not truly a derogation from ...
general principles, but merely a modified application of those principles, that takes
account of the special features of some procurements'V'" The same can be said of
competitive dialogue.
Competitive dialogue, as originally proposed by the Commission, was expressly a standard
procedure.205 However, by the time the procedure came to be adopted, limitations were
placed upon its availability. The mere fact of this appears to have led many to conclude
that, however unsatisfactory, competitive dialogue is an exceptional procedure.i" Contrary
to this position, however, some favour the view that competitive dialogue is not to be
regarded as exceptional.f" According to Arrowsmith, even if the negotiated procedure is
exceptional it does not follow that competitive dialogue must be. Competitive dialogue is
even more structured and transparent than the negotiated procedure. It is argued that the
wording of the Directive supports this interpretation. In Art.28, which introduces all of
the procedures, competitive dialogue is presented on its own whereas the two negotiated
procedures are grouped together.f" Also, the procedural rules on competitive dialogue
(Art.29) are separated from the procedural rules of the negotiated procedures (Art.3D and
31).
20] See, for example, the Pimlico Schools Opinion (2000), m.179
21M Arrowsmith (2005), m.46, 8.3
2M Commission (1998), m.l83
206 See C.Bovis, "The competitive dialogue as a procurement process of Public Private Partnerships" (2006) I European Public
Private Partnership Law Review 14; Brown (2004), m.170, 170; and S.Treumer, "Competitive dialogue" (2004) 4 PPLR 178, 179;
see also P.Telles, "Competitive dialogue in Portugal" (2010) I PPLR I
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6.3 The availability of competitive dialogue
6.3.1 Introduction
Article 29(1)/Regulation 18(2» provides:
in the case ofparticularlY complex contracts ... where contracting authorities consider that the use
of the open and restricted procedure will not allow for the award of the contract, the latter may
make use of the competitive dialogue ..•
The wording of Art.29(1)/Reg.18(2) appears to suggest that there are two central
conditions for using competitive dialogue: (1) the contracting authority must consider that
the use of the open and restricted procedure will not allow for the award of the contract;
and (2) the contract must be "particularly complex". However, the need for the first
condition is not clearly apparent. This is because the use of competitive dialogue appears
to hinge entirely upon the existence of a particularly complex contract. If a contract
meets the definition of particularly complex then for this very reason the open and
restricted procedures will invariably not allow for the award of the contract and hence
competitive dialogue is available. If the open and restricted procedures will not allow for
the award of the contract but the contract fails to meet the definition of particularly
complex contract then competitive dialogue is not available. Nevertheless, there are
several reasons why open and restricted procedures may not allow for the award of a
contract; these include the requirement for at least five tenderers, the need to draw up
technical specifications at the outset, and the limited scope for discussions and
negotiations (see chapter five).
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UK guidance emphasises the need for authorities to document the reasons behind the
decision to procure under competitive dialogue.209 These reasons must be included in the
contract award notice (Art.43/Reg.31).
6.3.2 Particularly complex contract
6.3.2.1 Introduction
A definition of "particularly complex contract" is provided in Art.l (11)(c)/Reg.18(1), with
further guidance in the Directive's recitals (Recital31). A contract is particularly complex
where:
the contracting authorities:
are not oijectivefy able to define the technical means in accordance with [the Directive's
rules on technical specificationsJ, capable of satisfying their needs and objectives, and/or
are not oijectivefy able to specify the legal and/ orfinancial make-up of a project
(Art1 (11)(c) / Reg.fS(1)).
The above definition is central to question of whether or not competitive dialogue can be
used; however, it gives rise to two key questions. Firstly, how much discretion does a
contracting authority have in deciding whether or not to use competitive dialogue? The
second question concerns the scope of the phrases "technical means" (technical
complexity) and "legal and or financial make-up of a project" (legal/financial complexity).
Some further guidance is provided by Recital 31:
209 OGCIHMT (2008), fh.193, 5.1.5
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Contracting authorities ..• mqy, without this being due to anyfault on their part, find it
objectivelYimpossible to define the means of satisfying their needs or of assessing what the market
in the wqy of technical solutions and/ orfinancial/ legal solutions. This situation mqy arise in
particular with the implementation of important infrastructure projects, large computer networks
orprojects involving complex and structuredfinancing andfinancial and legal make-up which
cannot be defined in advance.
Recital 31 is not a legal rule and not part of the Regulations; however, the recital does
have interpretative value. The recital does not appear to add a great deal to the definition
of complex contract; however, for some, it adds further uncertainty, particularly the
reference to the seemingly higher standard of objective impossibility.i'"
As explained by Treumer, the wording of Recital 31 gives the impression that there were
difficulties agreeing the specific wording of Art.29211; that is, the inconsistencies between
the two provisions may be the result of political compromise. For instance, the wording
"objectively impossible" may not have been acceptable for certain Member States. Thus,
in order to appease those in favour of the wording it was maintained, hut placed in the
preamble to keep its opponents content because of its reduced legal value. In this
situation a resolution to the uncertainty caused by the compromise is purposively left for
practitioners and the courts to resolve.i"
Recital31 gives examples of types of contracts that may be particularly complex (see
above). These are, however, merely examples; the circumstances for using competitive
~:; See Brown (2004), fh.170, 171; and S.Treurner, "The field of application of competitive dialogue" (2006) 6 PPLR 307, 313
Treumer (2006), ibid, 308
212lbid
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dialogue mayor may not exist in relation to such contracts or similar contracts.i" The list
of examples has attracted some criticism, for instance because the examples are not
helpful in determining what other contracts might also be cornplex.i" Also, the list is said
to be confusing. For instance, why are "important" integrated transport infrastructure
projects to be considered more complex (if this is the case) than less important versions
f h . 215o sue proJects.
6.3.2.2 Contracting authority discretion
Article 29(1)/Regulation 18(2) gives the impression that authorities have a wide discretion
in deciding whether or not to use competitive dialogue; i.e. it is phrased, "". where
contracting authorities consider .:". This suggests that the assessment of competitive
dialogue's availability will come down to a subjective test. An alternative interpretation is
that even where there is a complex project, an authority must still consider whether it is
appropriate to use the open or restricted procedure.i"
The wording of Art.1(11)(c)/Reg.18(2) conflicts with the wording of Art.29(1)/Reg.18(1),
as an objective assessment is referred to. The margin of discretion afforded to authorities
apparent from the wording of Art.29(1)/Reg.18(2) is thus significantly curtailed. On the
basis of the wording in Art.1(11)(c)/Reg.18(2) it is suggested that the question of
availability would come down to a consideration of whether the contract would be
complex in the eyes of a reasonably diligent authority.i"
The Directive's preamble may guide a court in interpretation. Recital 31 speaks of
objective impossibility (a potentially higher threshold) and notes that an authority will not
213 Arrowsmith (2005), fil.46, 10.4
214 A. Rubach-Larsen, "Competitive Dialogue" in Nielsen & Treumer (eds), The New EU Public Procurement Directives (2005,
Djof, Copenhagen), 70
m Ibid
216 Arrowsmith 2005, fn.46, 10.6
217 See Brown (2004), fn.l70, 171
86
be able to use competitive dialogue where the reason for the complexity is down to fault
on its part. This suggests that competitive dialogue is not available merely because the
authority lacks ordinary expertise; however, the extent of any non-fault requirement is not
clear. For example, are authorities under a positive obligation to take reasonable steps to
make up for any of their technical, legal or financial shortcorningss""
A further insight into some of the thinking behind the complexity definition comes from
previous incarnations of the text. According to the Commission's original proposal:
The complexity must be established and able to be oijectivelYjustified • .. This does not concern
suijective impossibility, i.e. due to deficiencies on the part of the contracting authonty itsef. The
authority mf!Y not simplY ajJi1711 that it is unable 10 provide a definition or an evaluation. On
the contrary, tbe contracting aUlhority musl prove Ihallhis is oijectivelY impossible, given the
nalure of tbe specijic contract. Depending on the case this might mean thaI the contracting
aUlhority would be required 10 prove that there are no precedents for the project, or that
disproportionate time or money would be required to acquire the necessary knowledge.219
Itmust be emphasised that the strict formulation above was not accepted, and would
likely have rendered competitive dialogue worthless in view of the fact the negotiated
procedure would also be available for contracts meeting the high threshold. According to
the proposal, authorities would not only have to show that they are not at fault but would
also have to demonstrate that all relevant positive proportionate action was taken in order
to make up for their shortcomings. To require an authority to demonstrate that there are
no precedents for a project would prohibit the use of competitive dialogue for many PPPs
in the majority of Member States, particularly the UK, and, considering the aim of
211 Rubach-Larsen (2005), fil.214, 71
219 Commission (2000), fil.l84, 2S
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competitive dialogue was to provide an effective procurement process for such projects,
such restricted availability would nullify its impact.
The Commission has sought to add clarity to the matter in its explanatory note:
• .. it is necessary to examine on a caseby case basis the nature of the market in question, taking
account of the capacity of the contracting authority concerned to verify whether «se of the
competitive dialogNe wasjNstifod. .• . [IJhe contracting aNthority has an obligation of diligence
- if it is in a position to define the technical resources necessary or establish the legal and financial
framework, the use of competitive dialogue is not possible. 220
Under the Commission interpretation the actual level and experience held by the authority
in question in relation to the type of contract being awarded will be taken into account;
however, authorities have an obligation of diligence, meaning that, if they are capable of
predefining the technical, financial and legal matters they will not be able to legitimately
use competitive dialogue. The Commission interpretation appears to fit with Brown's
recommendation that greater flexibility be allowed where an authority is awarding a
complex contract (e.g. a PFI) for the first time, but a stricter approach is required for
subsequent similar procurements (virtual reruns) by the authority. The OGC/HMT
guidance adheres to the Commission interpretation.f"
6.3.2.3 Technical complexity and financial/legal complexity
The two complexity grounds resemble the "no specifications" and "overall pricing"
grounds of the negotiated procedure (see chapter five). The relationship between
competitive dialogue and the negotiated procedure will be looked at below; however, it is
important to note when considering the availability of competitive dialogue that a reason
220 Commission (200S), fnol90, 201
221 OGCIHMT (2008), filo193, 30S
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behind the introduction of competitive dialogue was to provide flexibility and limit
recourse to the negotiated procedure. It follows that the intention behind technical and
legal/ financial complexity must have been for them to be broader than the no
specifications and overall pricing grounds (the scope of which are not clear); otherwise,
the impact of competitive dialogue would be minimal.
The complexity grounds could be read narrowly to encompass only situations where a
proposed project is so complex that it is impossible to draw up specifications in advance.
However, the circumstances in which this situation could occur would be rare, particularly
as specifications can be drawn up totally or partially in terms of functionality or
performance.222 Many, therefore, including the Comrnission.i" favour a wider reading to
encompass a situation where an authority is not able to determine from the outset which
of several solutions would be best suited to satisfying its needs. Support for this
interpretation comes from Art.29(3)/Reg.18(2), which provides that dialogue is to be used
to identify and define the means "best suited" to satisfying the authority's needs, plus the
fact that recita131 speaks of authorities needing to use competitive dialogue to assess
''what the market has to offer in the way of technical solutions'V" The Commission
illustrates this type of complexity with a "crossing the river" scenario; that is to say, an
authority requiring a connection between two shores may not know whether the best
solution is a bridge or tunnel even though it may be able to establish specifications for
both. According to the Commission, competitive dialogue is appropriate for such
situations.225 The OGC/HMT guidance adopts the same interpretation to that of the
Commission.P'
222 Commission (2005), fiI.I90, 2.2
223 Ibid, 2.2
224 Arrowsmith (2005), fiI.46, 10.5
m Commission (2005), fiI.I90, 2.2
226 OGCIHMT (2008), fiI.I90, 3.S
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In view of the often unavoidable uncertainty around financial and legal aspects at the
outset of any major PPP project (i.e. projects involving risk transfer and private finance)
the legal/financial complexity limb is potentially very wide. For instance, it is noted that
there may be uncertainty over such financial and legal matters as the structure of the
arrangement (e.g. whether it should be a joint venture or long term partnering contract),
the contract terms or conditions (e.g. including matters such as risk allocation, liability for
default and payment mechanisms) and funding arrangements.f" It is thus very difficult to
see from the wording of the Directive where one is to draw the line when determining
whether a contract is sufficiently complex. The Commission has clarified that issues of
financial/legal complexity "arise very, very often in connection with projects of Public
Private Parmerships'V" However, it is warned that naming a project a "PPP-project" will
not in itself entail legal or financial complexity.f" The Commission has also given a
number of examples of contracts it considers sufficiently legally/financially complex, all
of which involve private financing and are similar to the types of projects considered in
chapter two.230 Similarly, the OGC/HMT guidance gives typical PFI procurements as
examples of legal and financial complexity.231
6.3.3 Competitive dialogue and the negotiated procedure
In view of the background to competitive dialogue and previous UK PFI procurement
practice, in the UK the availability of competitive dialogue in relation to the availability of
the negotiated procedure is highly pertinent. OGC guidance in 2006 made clear that for
all but the most exceptionally complex projects the negotiated procedure was no longer
available (the London Underground PPP is given as an example of an exceptionally
complex contract).232The Partnerships for Schools guidance is drafted on the assumption
227 Brown (2004), 61.170, 170
221 Commission (2005), 1iI.190, 2.3
229 Ibid, 2.3
ZlO Ibid, 2.3
Zl1 OGCIHMT (2008), fn.193, 3.5
DZ OGC (2006), 1iI.l87, section 2
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that BSF procurements will be conducted under competitive dialogue and both
Partnerships for Schools and the OGC emphasise that legal advice must be sought where
a contracting authority is considering the use of the negotiated procedure.r" The OGC
also warns that the Commission is likely to be scrutinising any use of the negotiated
procedure.t'"
As previously highlighted, technical complexity and legal/ financial complexity closely
resemble the "overall pricing" and "no specifications" grounds for using the negotiated
procedure. As touched upon above, the CJEU has yet to interpret the negotiated
procedure and it is uncertain whether it is to be regarded as an exceptional or standard
procedure. The 2004 Directive failed to take the opportunity to clarify the point. The
lack of clarity over the scope of both competitive dialogue and the negotiated procedure
make it very difficult to say what the relationship is between the two procedures and
where an authority can choose to use the negotiated procedure over competitive
dialogue.i" OGC figures and a scan of negotiated procedure OJEU notices, suggest that,
although the negotiated procedure is still being used, its use has fallen steadily since the
introduction of competitive dialogue. It appears that, rather than complex PPP contracts,
the procurement of contracts for financial and intellectual services are the main use of the
negotiated procedure in recent years (e.g. insurance services).
The no specifications ground appears similar to "technical complexity". Under
Art.30(1)(c)/Reg.13, the negotiated procedure may be used:
in the case of senices, inter alia [financial senses], and intellectual senices such as sernces
involving the design of UJorks, insofar as the nature of the seruces to beprovided is such that
Z33 PfS (2006), fu.167, para.22; OOCIHMT (2008), fu.l93, 3.2; OOC (2006). fn.l87. section 2
234 OGCIHMT (2008) ibid; OGC (2006), ibid
2J5 Brown (2004). fn.170, 172
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contract specifications cannot be established with sufficient precision to permit the award of the
contract I?J selection of the best tender according to the rules governing open or restricted
procedures.
As with technical complexity, the above ground could conceivably be limited to the rare
circumstance in which it is not possible to draw up any specification at the outset, or it
could be construed more broadly to cover situations where a specification could be drawn
up but it is useful to allow wide scope for variations.236 In the past in the UK this ground
was often considered suitable for justifying use of the negotiated procedure for PFI
projects, as it is often the case that, although such arrangements may be definable in terms
of their general outputs, it is not dear from the outset what services could sensibly be
included to make the whole arrangement cost effective from the private sector's point of
view or optimum from the public sector's point ofview.237
The wording of the overall pricing ground potentially overlaps with either "technical
complexity" or "legal/financial complexity". Article 30(1)(b)/Regulation 13 provides that
authorities may use the negotiated procedure:
in exceptional cases, when the nature of the works, supplies, or services or the risks attaching
thereto do not permit overall pricing.
The overall pricing ground is expressly exceptional and so will most likely be interpreted
strictly, Nevertheless, before the addition of competitive dialogue, the most logical way of
interpreting the provision was so as to cover those situations where negotiations were
needed after the commencement of an award procedure to determine an overall price (i.e.
236 Arrowsmith (2005), fiI.46, 8.5
237 Trepte (2007), fiI.l66, 7.147
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in line with its purpose).238Thus, it is suggested that overall pricing refers to whether it is
possible at the outset to establish a single pricing structure (or payment mechanismj./"
The overall pricing ground applies in two situations. The first type of situation, the nature
of the works, supplies or services do not permit overall pricing, used to be thought to
cater for PPPs that rely on a combination of works, supplies and services (i.e. PFI
contracts), as it is only when the make-up of the project is more certain through
negotiations that an agreed overall pricing structure can be ascertained.t" The second
situation, the impossibility of overall pricing results from the risks attaching to the works,
supplies or services, again, was previously thought to best cater for complex PPP deals, as
a fundamental characteristic of PPPs is the transfer of risk to the private sector.
According to Trepte, " ... it is inconceivable that the risks could be allocated based on an
unalterable specification established by the purchaser at the outset".241The experience
with the UK's first PFI prison contracts is an example of thiS.242
In the UK High Court judgment R v. Rhondda Cynon Taff County BC Ex parte Kathro,z43
concerning a local authority PFI project, despite limited discussion on the matter, the
judge accepted the use of the negotiated procedure was justified. The case was taken as
implying that authorities have a considerable discretion in making the commercial
assessment of whether the conditions for using the procedure are met.244 Clearly, this view
does not accord with the Commission's position that the negotiated procedure is
exceptional.i"
238 Arrowsmith (2005), fn.46, 8.9
239lbid
240 Trepte (2007), fn.l66, 7.143
241 Ibid, 7.144
242 HM Prison Service and Private Finance Panel Executive, Report on the procurement of custodial services for the DeMF
prisons at Bridgend and Fazakerley, (1996, London)
243 Kathro, fn.178
244 Arrowsmith (2005), fn.46, 8.6 and 8.12
245 Pimlico Schools Opinion (2000), fn.179
93
The wording of the grounds for using the negotiated procedure was not changed in 2004;
likewise the interpretation of the grounds should not have changed. The fact that
competitive dialogue is now generally considered the most appropriate procedure for
most complex PPP arrangements does not necessarily imply that UK authorities were
legally in the wrong by using the negotiated procedure in the past. Authorities have
considerably more experience with complex PPPs and there has also been a high degree
of standardisation in most sectors. Thus, through this increasing familiarity the use of the
negotiated procedure may have become inappropriate over time.
Some expect the addition of competitive dialogue to impact upon the CJEU's
interpretation of the grounds for using the negotiated procedure, leading it to construe the
grounds more narrowly than it otherwise would.246 It is difficult to speculate on the
CJEU's approach to the relationship between the two procedures. It may be found that
there is some degree of complexity overlap between the two procedures; alternatively, the
CJEU may adopt a hierarchical approach whereby authorities will be expected to use
competitive dialogue over the negotiated procedure apart from in situations where it is
not suitable or even when competitive dialogue will not allow for the award of the
contract.
6.4 Concluding remarks
The chapter has highlighted some of the key legal grey areas concerning the availability of
competitive dialogue. These include, the discretion with which an authority may choose
to procure under competitive dialogue, the scope of technical and legal/ financial
complexity, and the relationship between competitive dialogue and the negotiated
procured. These uncertain areas were explored with interviewees in the empirical aspect
of the research, as will be explained later.
246 Arrowsmith (2005), fit.46, 8.14
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7 Competitive dialogue: procedural
requirements
7.1 Introduction
Chapter seven will look in depth at the procedural requirements of competitive dialogue.
The chapter is divided into three main sections: pre-dialogue; dialogue and post-dialogue.
The chapter will identify areas of uncertainty and areas in which the law may not be
entirely adequate. This will inform the design of the questions in the research interviews.
In addition to the rules, government guidance will be drawn upon as each stage of the
procedure is considered. The chapter, in order to provide some context, will consider
certain strategic choices that may be open to authorities under the legal framework where
there is discretion, as set out in academic, government and industry publications.
7.2 Pre-dialogue
7.2.1 Technical dialogue
From a legal perspective, the Directive/Regulations do not specifically concern
themselves with the pre-procurement stages of competitive dialogue. It is clear that
technical dialogue is permitted under the open and restricted procedures: "[b]efore
launching a procedure ... authorities may, using technical dialogue, seek or accept advice
which may be used in the preparation of the specifications ..." (RecitalS). However, as
the term "specifications" is not used with respect to the legal regulation of competitive
dialogue, the extent to which technical dialogue may take place prior to a competitive
dialogue is not clear. Indeed, it may have been presumed that there was no need for such
dialogue due to the explicit scope for wide-ranging dialogue once the procedure in
underway.i" Nevertheless, it is evident that technical dialogue can be helpful in
247 Arrowsmith (2005), fil.46, 10.22
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comp~titive dialogue procurement, and there is nothing to suggest that such dialogue is
not permitted pre-procurement.i"
In accordance with Case C-21 /03, Fabricom/49 the way in which technical dialogue is
carried out must be in line with general principles.i'" For instance, it is important that
particular suppliers engaging in technical dialogue (potential bidders) are not given an
unfair advantage (e.g. in time or information/51 over competitors. The most obvious
means of compliant technical dialogue would appear to be where it is open to all potential
bidders (e.g. advertised EU wide with a PIN). Despite the above, the possibility of
potentially more meaningful technical dialogue with a limited number of suppliers where
the invitation to take part in the dialogue has not been given to all is uncertain. This
practice would risk being seen as discriminatory; however, it may be argued that such
allegations can be refuted, for example, if dialogue is well documented and information is
made available to all potential bidders.
It is also unclear whether dialogue is permitted (and if so the extent of permitted dialogue)
after the publication of the contract notice but before the invitation to participate in
dialogue. There is similar uncertainty under the open and restricted procedures. The fact
that Recital 8 only refers to dialogue before the procedure has been initiated may be taken
as assuming that later dialogue before the dialogue stage is generally not permitted, but
this cannot be said with any certainty.252It seems that in practice at this stage in the UK a
l4I Ibid, 10.22
249 Fabricom, fu.73
250 See S.Treumer, "Technical dialogue and the principle of equal treatment. dealing with conflicts of interest after Fabricom"
(2007) 2 PPLR 99; S.Treumer, ''Towards an obligation to terminate contracts concluded in breach of the E.C. Public procurement
rules- the end of the status of concluded public contracts as sacred cows" 6 PPLR 371
251 Case T-34S/03, Evropal"ki Dynamiki • Proigmena Systimata Tilepikolnonlon Pliroforikis koi Tilematikls AE v. Commission of
the European Communities (2008) ECR 11-341
2S2 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 7.81
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conference involving qualifying bidders may be held by authorities. This will be used to
provide further information and to clarify areas of concem.f"
7.2.2 Planning and preparation
From a practical perspective, a considerable amount of government guidance and research
on UK practice/54 particularly later publications that are more informed by competitive
dialogue in practice, stress the importance of sufficient planning and preparation in the
lead up to the start of competitive dialogue procurement. The planning and preparatory
stages of competitive dialogue are considered necessary to minimise the time and costs of
procurement, and evidence of such work (from, for example, well prepared
documentation) is considered essential in terms of attracting sufficient competition.255
Despite this, there is evidence to suggest that preparation and planning is often neglected
in the UK, and this presented as a reason behind any dissatisfaction with the procedure.256
Prior to the formal start of a competitive dialogue procurement, following the
identification of the need for a major project, it is generally the case that a document
setting out the business case (the "outline business case'') for PPP or conventional
procurement (i.e, setting out the analyses and options appraisals that have been
undertaken) will be developed to gain procurement approval. For instance, under BSF an
outline business case needs to demonstrate affordability, value for money, market interest
and that the authority is sufficiendy resourced.i" A BSF outline business case must be
approved by Partnerships for Schools and the Department for Education.
m 4Ps (2006), fn.I64, 12
254 See, for example, CBI, CBI BRiEF: Actions speak louder than words: unlocking the foil potential of competitive dialogue,
(2008, London), 5; NAO (2007), fn.38, 3.10; HM Treasury (2010), fn.198, 3.2-3.9; OOCIHMT (2008), fn.193, section 5; Cabinet
Office (2010), fn.199, 27; Cabinet Office (2011), fn.l99, 4.4
m OOCIHMT (2008), fn.l83, 5.1.13; NAO (2007), fn.38, 2.10
256 HM Treasury (2010), fn.198, 3.3; Cabinet Office (2010), fn.I99, 27; Cabinet Office (2011), fn.I99, 7
217 PfS, Outline Business Case Guidance
(For approval to procure a LEP to deliver investment in the Secondary School Estate), (2007, London)
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7.2.3 The contract notice and descriptive documents
The procedure is officially started with the publication of an OJEU notice
(Art.29(2)/Reg.18(4)) (see chapter four). This document must set out the authority's
needs and requirements, with these needs and requirements being defined in the OJEU
notice and/or in a descriptive document (see below) (Art.29(2)/Reg.18(S)). There is no
requirement for technical specifications (Art.23/Reg.9) under competitive dialogue at any
point. The procedure is flexible, enabling an authority to set out its needs and
requirements in functional or output terms. There is no required form for the descriptive
document. The 2008 OGC/HMT guidance notes that in practice such documents as the
invitation to participate in dialogue and requests for solutions will function as descriptive
documents.f"
It is apparent that the drafting of the needs and requirements is not to be taken lightly,
and authorities must strike a difficult balance between flexibility over project scope and
the need for accuracr59 to ensure the most appropriate suppliers seek to participate in the
procurement.f" A project, as advertised, that changes materially (i.e. the changes would
result in different suppliers seeking to participate) over the course of a procurement may
under the legal rules need to be re-procured.i" For instance, in 2008 the Commission
brought infraction proceedings against the UK due to an authority not including in the
OJEU notice a reference to all services included in the final PFI contract.262 These
proceedings led to the publication in April 2009 of an OGC Policy Note263 advising
authorities to ensure that notices cover the totality of the likely requirement. According
258 OGCIHMT (2008), fn.193, 5.2.3
159 Case C423/07, Commission v Spain [20 I 0] ECR 00
260 Sec N.Maltby, "Chapter 3 - The PFI procurement process" in Lindrup & Godfrey (eds), Butterworths PFI Manual: Law,
Practice and Procedure Relating to the Private Finance Initiative and Public/Private Partnerships, (1998, LexisNexis
Butterworths), para.3063; see also Roe & Dickinson, "Issues for public procurements resulting from instability in global financial
markets" (2009) 3 PPLR NA9S, NA9S
261 Commission (2005), fn.1OO, 3.1; Case C454/06, pressetext Nachrichtenagentur GmbH v Repubtik (Jsterreich (Bund), AP A-
OTS Originaltext-Service GmbH and APA Austria Presse Agemur registrierte Genossenschoft mit beschrlinkter Haftung [2008]
ECR 14401, para.33
262 OGC, Procurement policy note - the need to ensure published contract notices are accurate and cover the complete
requirement. Action Note 0310908 April 2009 (2009, London)
263 Ibid
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to the policy note, "it is better to include ... potential requirements, with suitable caveats,
than it is to award a contract which covers material elements not specified in the contract .
notice. Where the specific details of the requirement are not certain at the time of the
contract notice, the contracting authority should provide a suitably broad or generic
description ...".264In addition, the credit crunch and problems this caused for PPPs
involving private finance led to 2009 HM Treasury guidance on the drafting of the OJEU
notice.26SThe document advises authorities to "draft the OJEU notice and other tender
documents as widely as possible to ensure that alternative financing solutions can be
accommodated'V" The note expired on 31 August 2010; however, according to HM
Treasury, the above principles remain relevant. 267
The OJEU notice must set out any qualification requirements (Art.44(2)/Reg.18(15)) and
selection criteria (Art.44(3)/Reg.18(12)), along with the minimum and (where appropriate)
maximum number of suppliers that the authority intends to invite to dialogue
(Art.44(3)/Reg.18(12)). It is noted that qualification and selection may be problematical
in relation to highly innovative projects, as an authority may have little knowledge about
how its needs might be met.268According to an early incarnation of competitive dialogue,
it was possible for an authority to require suppliers to submit, with the request to
participate, an outline solution, which could be assessed in accordance with the award
criteria.269The provision was not adopted due to fears that it would overly complicate the
legal rules and increase the risk of cherry picking (see below).27o
264 Ibid, para.8
265 HM Treasury, Application note - PPP projects in current market conditions, (2009, London)
266 Ibid, 2.3
267 See HM Treasury, Public Private Partnerships: Technical Update 2010, (2010, London), section A6
268 Rubach-Larsen (2005) fiI.214 73
20 t,
270 COM (2001) 275 final, Art.30(2)(b) and point 3.8 of the Explanatory Memorandum
COM (2002) 236 final, comments to amendment 137 of the Parliament
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As mentioned in chapter four, the criteria upon which the most economically
advantageous tender is to be identified must be stated in the contract notice or descriptive
document (Art.29(7)/Reg.18(27)). Award criteria weightings must also be set out in the
contract notice or descriptive document (see chapter four) (Art.S3(2)/Reg.30(3)). If, for
demonstratable reasons, weightings are not possible, the authority may set out the award
criteria in descending order of importance (Art.S3(2)/Reg.30(S)). It seems that the
complexity of a contract may be a sufficient justification for this (Recital 46), and,
according to the Commission, "[g]iven that recourse to competitive dialogue presupposes
that the contract is 'particularly complex', it seems almost tautological that the conditions
for not weighting the award criteria should ... be met when the contract is awarded by this
d d ,,271awar proce ure... .
The case law on award criteria disclosure was set out in chapter four. This case law was
made in relation to more straightforward procedures (i.e. the restricted procedure). As
competitive dialogue is an iterative process in which authorities need flexibility to achieve
value for money, it may be argued that the courts may be inclined to adopt a refined
approach in complex procurements under competitive dialogue. The degree to which
detailed award criteria (sub-criteria and sub-sub-criteria) must be disclosed at the outset
under competitive dialogue is thus unclear. For instance, it is argued that from a
commercial perspective ideally authorities would have freedom to set very general criteria
(e.g. just headline criteria) that can be applied to a wide variety of solutions that arise out
of dialogue, with it being possible to develop and disclose more specific criteria (under the
headline criteria) throughout the course of dialogue.m
271 Commission (2005), fit. I 90, 3.1
272 Rubach-Larsen (2005), fit.214, 75
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Some are critical of the requirement for authorities to be committed to award criteria at
the latest by the invitation to participate in dialogue when they may have limited
knowledge regarding potential solutions.i" The Commission has stressed that for reasons
of equal treatment advertised award criteria cannot be changed during the award
procedure.i" As discussed in chapter four, the extent to which advertised award criteria
may be varied is not clear. In proposed texts of competitive dialogue, authorities were
allowed to amend award criteria if they became inappropriate.i" The risks of
manipulation, however, were considered too great.
7.2.4 Qualification and selection
As discussed in chapter four, competitive dialogue is a two stage process, an authority
may select from qualifying suppliers a minimum of three to invite to dialogue (provided
there are three qualifying suppliers responding to the contract notice)
(Art.44(2)/Reg.18(12)); this does not mean that three suppliers should be invited as a
general rules, as the authority must try to ensure the number of bidders is sufficient to
ensure genuine competition (Art.44(2)/Reg.18(12)). It is recognised that authorities must
be wary of inviting too many suppliers to dialogue, as the increased competition will not
inevitably lead to more competitive bids; this is because the chances of success for
individual bidders are reduced the higher the bidder numbers; thus, bidders may be less
inclined to commit to a process with high bidder numbers and if costs mount up may
voluntarily withdraw from the process. Partnerships for Schools guidance recommends
that a maximum of eight bidders be selecred.i"
Consortium bidders (chapter two) are a common feature of competitive dialogue
procurement. However, consortium bidders do give rise to some legal uncertainty, in
m lbid,74 and 75
274 Commission (2005), lit. 190, 3.1
m Commission (2000), 1it.l84, Art.30(4)
276 PfS (2006), fn.l 08, para.l3
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particular where the composition of a consortium changes following the invitation to
participate in dialogue and where a firm is a member of multiple consortia. In relation to
the first issue, Arrowsmith argues that a change should not result in exclusion where it
would not have affected any decisions to take the bidder forward, as the bidder is still in
substance the same and any other interpretation would be unworkable in practice (i.e. in
view of the frequency of such changes in practice).277If this is not the case and the change
would impact upon previous decisions, there is a strong argument that such a change
would breach the principle of equal treatment. In relation to the second issue, which may
be relevant to rules on minimum bidder numbers and the rules on equal treatment, it may
be argued that the acceptability of a firm participating in multiple bidding consortia would
depend upon the role of the firm in the consortia (i.e, the nature and extent of the
duplicationj.i"
7.3 Dialogue
7.3.1 The invitation to participate In dialogue
The dialogue stage is initiated when the contracting authority sends out invitations to
participate in dialogue in writing simultaneously to selected suppliers
(Art.40(1)/Reg.18(6)). The invitation must be accompanied by the contract documents or
details of how these documents may be obtained, i.e. if through the internet or a third
party (ArtAO(2) and (3)/Reg.18(16)). The invitation must include the date specified for
commencement of dialogue, the address for replies, and the language/ s to be used; a
reference to the contract notice; a reference to any other information required in relation
to proof of financial or technical standing; the relative weighting of award criteria (or
award criteria listed in order of importance) (ArtAO(5)/Reg.18(18)).
217 Arrowsmith (2000), th.71, 728
278 Ibid, 729
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7.3.2 Dialogue
7.3.2.1 Introduction
The purpose of dialogue is to identify and define the means best suited to satisfying the
authority's needs (Art.29(3) /Reg.18(20)). The authority may discuss all aspects of the
contract with bidders (Art.29(3)/Reg.18(21)); thus, dialogue may cover, in addition to
technical aspects of the project, commercial aspects (e.g. prices, costs and revenues) and
legal aspects (e.g. distribution and limitation of risks, guarantees and the possible creation
of a special purpose vehicle).279The authority may continue dialogue until it can identify
one or more solutions, if necessary after comparing them, capable of meeting its needs
(Art.29(S)/Reg.18(24)).
7.3.2.2 Equal treatment
The general principle of equal treatment was explained in chapter four to underlie all the
Directive's procedures. Nevertheless, the legal rules specify that authorities must "ensure
equal treatment among all tenderers. In particular, they shall not provide information in a
discriminatory manner which may give some tenderers an advantage over others"
(Art.29(3)/Reg.18(21)(b). The provision would appear to be merely a restatement of the
general principle. The extent to which the operation of equal treatment under
competitive dialogue differs, if at all, from its operation under the negotiated procedure is
not clear.280The interviews will explore the impact, if any, of the express reference to
equal treatment.
279 Commission (2005), fh.190, 3.2
280 Arrowsmith (2005), fh.46, 10.8
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7.3.2.3 Confidentiality rules
7.3.2.3.1 The legal rules
According to Art.29(3)/Reg.18(21), "[c]ontracting authorities may not reveal to other
participants solutions proposed or other confidential information communicated by a
candidate participating in the dialogue without his/her agreement". There is no
comparable confidentiality provision for the negotiated procedure; it is expected,
however, that authorities are under an implied duty not to share bidder ideas under the
I . . I 281equa treatment prmop e.
The explicit reference to confidentiality and ban on "cherry picking" (i.e. authorities
unfairly benefiting from innovative aspects of a particular bidder's solution) is clearly
intended to encourage bidder investment and to encourage them to be forthcoming with
ideas.282Indeed, the addition of such protection was motivated by intense lobbying by the
private sector.283 The Commission had originally proposed to limit the prohibition on
cherry picking to the dialogue stage only so that after close of dialogue all bidders could
tender against a single bidder's solution or a solution combining aspects of multiple
bidders' proposals.i" It is argued that the ban on cherry picking obstructs the
development of serious discussions.i" According to Trepte, by restricting authorities from
combining bidder solutions, the rules stand in the way of the purpose of dialogue: to
identify and define the means best suited to satisfying the authority's needs.286 Also,
Brown comments that because of the confidentiality rules if the preferred solution comes
entirely from one bidder there is a risk that the final tender stage will serve little purpose
281 Brown (2004), fu.170, 173
m CBI (200S), fu.2S4, 10
m Brown (2004), fu.170, 173
284 Commission (2000), fu.IS4, Art.30(6)
28~ Boyle (2001), fu.l69, NA67
286 Trepte (2007), fu.166, 7.84
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as that bidder is almost guaranteed to be successful.i" Brown suggests that, to guard
against particular solutions being claimed as the exclusive idea of one bidder, it is
advisable for an authority to conduct thorough preparation in order to foresee as many
possible solutions as possible and makes bidders are of these solutions.i"
Despite the rules on confidentiality, there was clear bidder concern over the sharing of
confidential information, particularly prior to the introduction of competitive dialogue.i"
It is argued that it may be very tempting for authorities to disregard the confidentiality
rules.290For instance, the risk of legal challenge may be limited, as it may be difficult to
establish that a winning solution was down to cherry picking due to bidder confidentiality
restricting access to the solutions proposed by competing bidders.i"
7.3.2.3.2 The standard of confidentiality
It is not certain whether the confidentiality requirements refer to confidential information
under domestic law (see below) or whether it creates an independent EU law requirement
of confidentiality.i" Arrowsmith highlights a number of problems with the latter
interpretation.j" In particular, Arrowsmith highlights the considerable uncertainty over
the information to be regarded as confidential under the Directive that will exist until
judicial clarification. According to Arrowmith, it is not clear whether the CJEU will adopt
a strict approach, drawing upon the existing confidentiality laws of Member States to
fashion a common but narrow definition, or take a broader view of the ideas/information
worthy of protection.i" The Commission explanatory note and UK guidance generally are
not helpful in relation to this issue.
287 Brown (2004), fh.170, 173
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From the perspective of the law in England and Wales, it is not clear to what extent
confidentiality under the Directive extends (if at all) beyond domestic intellectual property
law, such as copyright and design law, patent law/95 and the common law action for
breach of confidence. Under the law of confidence, an objective test is used to determine
whether information is confidential; that is, would a reasonable person regard the subject
matter as confidential.i" In addition, under the Freedom of Information Act (chapter
four) there are exemptions from the duty to disclose requested information for
confidential information (i.e. where it would be protected under the above mentioned
common law) (S.41); legally privileged information (S.42), trade secrets (S.43(1)) and
information the disclosure of which would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests
of any person (S.43(2)). The type of information that can be withheld under these
sections may be relevant to confidentiality under the Directive. However, there is little
certainty over the information protected.i"
7.3.2.3.3 Agreement to share
There is an express exception to the ban on cherry picking where bidders agree that their
proposed solutions or confidential information can be revealed to other bidders. It is not
entirely clear, however, what amounts to an "agreement" in this context.i" This would
appear to cover a situation where, for example, in return for payment
(Art.29(8) /Reg.18(29)) a participant agrees to waive the cherry picking ban.299 However,
could bidder participation be made conditional upon agreement to share (i.e. if made clear
at the outset)?300The Commission accepts such practice as amounting to sufficient
295 See the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c.48
196 Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Limited [1968] FSR 41S
297 See Infonnation Commissioner's Office, Freedom of Information Act awareness guidance no.5: commercial interests, (2008)
291 Arrowsmith (2005), fil.46, 10.59
299lbid
lOO Treumer (2004), fil.206, 182
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agreemenr.t" but there are difficulties with this approach. Where a bidder refuses to agree
to the condition, the bidder's exclusion would amount to new qualification criteria not
listed in the Directive/Regulations (see chapter four).302To prevent an authority's
discretion to use different solutions being unduly constrained, according to Arrowsmith,
the objectives of the Directive are best achieved by an interpretation that simply ensures
that all bidders are aware of the exact possibilities of disclosure when they choose to
participate.f"
Regardless of whether such a condition can be used, from a practical perspective it is
suggested that in most situations it is not advisable, particularly if not accompanied by
adequate compensation, due to likely bidder hostility to such a course of action.304 As Roe
& Verschuur note, " ... it is doubtful how much time and money market participants
would be willing to invest in the development of a solution and how willing they would be
to share their know-how with the contracting authority if confidentiality is not guaranteed
" 305
7.3.2.4 Phased elimination o/particlpants
7.3.2.4.1 The legal rules
The commercial needs for bidder reduction after qualification and selection in complex
procurement were discussed in chapter five. As with the negotiated procedure
(Art.30(4)/Reg.17(22», there is express provision for authorities to break dialogue down
into "successive stages in order to reduce the number of solutions to be discussed". For
an authority to be able to do this it must be stated in the OJEU notice.
lOI Commission (2005), fu.190, footnote 21
302 Rubach-Larsen, fu.214, 77
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Although the Directive/Regulations talks only about the phased elimination of
"solutions", it appears widely accepted in UK guidance that this implicitly allows for the
elimination of bidders, for example where bidders are permitted only one solution and
that solution is phased out.306
Under the above rules, up until the close of dialogue authorities are free to adopt an
approach very similar to PFI procurement practice under the negotiated procedure, i.e. an
early outline proposals phase to quickly reduce bidder numbers to a manageable and cost
effective level, followed by negotiation leading up to a final bidding stage (sometimes
followed by further negotiation and a "best and final offer" stage).307The OGC/HMT
2008 guidance indicates that this appears to have occurred in practice, with an invitation
to submit outline solutions stage replacing the outline proposals stage under the
negotiated procedure, and an invitation to submit detailed solutions stage replacing the
invitation to negotiate.t"
7.3.2.4.2 Application of award criteria
The phased elimination of bidders during dialogue must be carried out by applying the
publicised award criteria (Art.29(4)/Reg.18(22)). However, it is not clear how much
information a contracting authority needs to have gathered from bidders before it can
legitimately dismiss them for not proposing the most economically advantageous offer.
Previous UK PP} procurement practice under the negotiated procedure is said to have
often involved an early reduction of bidder numbers following little, if any, negotiation on
the basis of outline proposals covering mainly technical aspects (e.g. without pricing
informationj.t"
306 See OGCfHMT (2008), fit.193, 5.2.17; PiS (2006), fit.108, para.17; 4Ps (2007), fit.197, para.67-68
307 Arrowsmith (2006), fit.84, 103
301 OGCfHMT (2008), fit.193, 5.2.22-5.2.23; 4Ps (2007), fit. 197, para.67-94
309 Arrowsmith (2005), fit.46, 8.39 and 10.26
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The extent to which past UK PFI procurement practice may continue under competitive
dialogue is legally grey, and will need to be the subject of specific questions in the research
interviews. There is clearly the potential for unfairness where bidders are dismissed on
the basis of limited information about solutions, as if all aspects of the solution were
considered it may be that the authority would reach a different decision. Nevertheless,
according to Arrowsmith, a flexible interpretation permitting such a practice is necessary
in view of commercial necessity (i.e. the commercial need for early bidder reduction in
complex procurementj.l'" The Commission notes that dialogue does not need to have
covered "all elements required and necessary for the performance of the project" before it
can eliminate bidders because "this requirement only applies to tenders that are submitted
in the final stage of competitive dialogue".311
In addition, if the practice of bidder de-selection on limited information is legally possible,
it is unclear whether an authority may vary publicised award criteria or weightings to suit
the aspect of the solution being assessed, for example not use financial award criteria at
the outline proposals stage when only technical aspects of solutions are being assessed.
There is no case law on this specific point; however, if such de-selection is possible it
would appear to follow that award criteria variations are also possible, as assessment
against irrelevant criteria would be meaningless and potentially unfair. The OGC/HMT
2008 guidance notes the continuation of past practice, with an outline solutions stage
usually taking place in the early stages of dialogue.m The guidance notes that even where
indicative costs are provided by bidders this will not normally be evaluated.
310 Ibid
311 Commission (2005), fu.l90, 3.2.1
312 OGCIHMT (2008), fu.193, S.2.22
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7.3.2.4.3 The bidding process
An authority could choose to simply engage in dialogue with bidders instead of
structuring the dialogue into a series of bidding phases. If an authority does not structure
dialogue into bidding phases, however, it is not clear whether bidder elimination is still
possible. This is a further grey area that will need to be explored in the research
interviews.
There may be an argument that to comply with equal treatment and transparency
principles bidder reduction can only be done through a formal bidding process; this way
all bidders are given an equal opportunity and objective review and comparison is
facilitated.313 In relation to discussion of similar uncertainty under the negotiated
procedure, Arrowsmith concludes that formal bids are not required for bidder reduction
due to the need for a reasonable balance between transparency and costs.i" It is argued
that otherwise authorities may invite fewer suppliers to participate, that a formal objective
comparison is often difficult in the early stages of bid development, and that a final bid
stage involving formal tenders is a sufficient safeguard against favouritism.i"
Nevertheless, these arguments may not apply to competitive dialogue, particularly if it is
accepted to be a standard procedure and not exceptional (see chapter six). It may also be
argued that the wording of Art.29( 4)/Reg.18(22), " ... to reduce the number of solutions to
be discussed during the dialogue stage ..." may indicate that reduction is something
separate from dialogue and thus must be done by formal bidding.!" On the other hand,
the express formal final tender stage may mean that formal comparison is not necessary
313Arrowsmith (2005), fh.46, 10.27
314Arrowsmith (2005), fh.46, 8.40
31'lbid
316Ibid, 10.27
110
during dialogue.317 The Commission does not express a clear position, merely stating that
the application of award criteria be based on written documenrs.!"
7.3.2.5 Time limits in dialogue
The time limits for competitive dialogue are set out in chapter four. The legal rules do
not specify a time limit for receipt of tenders, but an authority must take account of the
complexity of the contract (Art.38(1) /Reg.18(18)). The extent to which this rule applies
to bidding stages other than the final tender stage is not clear.319 According to
Arrowsmith, by an analogy the provision probably applies at all stages of the procedure,
and this was not stated explicitly due to the many different ways in which dialogue may be
structured.r"
7.3.2.6 Closeof dialogue
When an authority can identify the solution or solutions capable of meeting its needs it
must close the dialogue and inform bidders (Art.29(S)/Reg.18(24)). Given the limitations
placed on further dialogue once dialogue is closed, OGC/HMT guidance notes it as
important for contracting authorities to be convinced that there are no outstanding issues
not fully covered during dialogue.321 At the same time, however, it is recognised that
authorities are under pressure to close dialogue as quickly as possible to keep costs low.
According to OGC/HMT 2008 guidance, it may be advisable for a contracting authority
to request fully developed and priced draft final bids on an agreed contractual position
before ending the dialogue stage in order to avoid any nasty surprises when final tenders
are eventually sought 322
3I7lbid
31B Commission (2005), fu.190, 3.2.1
319 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.28
320 Ibid
321 OGCIHMT, fu.193, 5.3.15.5.3.19
322 Ibid, 5.2.27
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The close of dialogue in many PPP procurements will dovetail with the need for
preparation of an interim full/final business case or appointment business case, which is a
document that will need to be approved before a preferred bidder can be appointed.
7.4 Post-dialogue
7.4.1 Formal tenders
Having declared the dialogue closed and informed bidders, the contracting authority is
required to request remaining bidders to submit final tenders on the basis of any solution
presented and specified during dialogue (Art.29(6)/Reg.18(24)). The invitation to submit
a final tender must specify the deadline by which tenders are to be received, the address to
which tenders must be sent and the language/ s in which tenders must be drawn up
(Art.40(S)/Reg.18(2S)).
Variant bids were introduced in chapter four. It is not certain whether variant bids are
possible under competitive dialogue, as an authority does not need to prepare technical
specifications and may set out its needs and requirements in functional or output terms.
If the authority does so, there would appear to be scope for bidders to offer alternative
solutions, meaning there is little need for variants.323 This is reflected in the Commission's
explanatory note, where it is recognised that variants are only necessary where a standard
I·· 'b d 324so ution IS prescr! e .
7.4.2 Minimumnumber of tenderers
Article 44(3)/Regulation 18(13) requires that at least three firms must be invited to
participate in dialogue. In relation to "the final stage" of competitive dialogue, which is
presumably the final tender stage, Art.44(4)/Reg.18(23)) does not specify a minimum
m Nagelkerke et al., Competitive Dialogue: Abyss or Opportunity?, Paper Presented at the 3rd International Public Procurement
Conference Proceedings (2OOS,Amsterdam) available at www ippa.org (accessed 3 I II 0120I I), 2SS
324 Commission (2ooS), fu.190. footnote 14
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number, but merely states, "the number arrived at shall make for genuine competition
insofar as there are enough solutions or suitable candidates".
Itmay be that the requirement governing minimum numbers in dialogue also represents
the minimum number for final tenders (i.e. three). Alternatively it might be argued that
because a minimum number is not expressly stated for the final tender stage, coupled with
the fact that dialogue may be used to reduce the number of solutions (and by implication
bidders), in certain circumstances it may be possible for as few as two bidders to be
invited to submit final tenders.325
The same rules apply to the negotiated procedure. A minimum of three bidders must be
invited to negotiate, but in "the final stage" (presumably when the winner is identified)
there need only be enough suitable candidates to ensure genuine competition
(Art.44/Reg.17). In the Commission's London Underground decision no objections were
raised where only two bids had been solicited at the final bid stage in a negotiated
procedure.t" Arrowsmith points out that if the Commission has recognised that on some
occasions it is possible to have as few as two bidders in the final stage of a negotiated
procedure, there is even more reason for them to do so in relation to competitive dialogue
due to the need for complete final tenders and the higher bid costs this entails.327
It is noted that reducing to two bidders for the final tender stage may be necessary in view
of the practical realities of PPP. As Brown explains, because of the very high costs
involved in preparing detailed final bids, such an interpretation often promotes the most
effective competition by giving the two bidders selected a realistic prospect of success and
m S.Arrowsmith, "An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement" (2004) 41 Common Markel Law Review
1277, 1286; Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.33
326 European Commission, Slate aid No N 26412002 - Unued Kingdom
London Underground Public Private Partnership (2002, Brussels) (C(2002)3578fin); see also Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 8.41
327 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.33
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hence the greatest incentive to commit their resources to producing a comprehensive and
high-quality tender.328 The approach to bidder numbers at the final tender stage will need
to be considered in the research interviews; however, UK guidance accepts the possibility
for as few as two bidders being requested to submit final tenders.329
7.4.3 The requirement for flnal tenders containing all elements
Article 29(6)/Regulation 18(25) states that final "tenders shall contain all the elements
required and necessary for the performance for the project". This provision is recognised
in the eyes of most commentators as having the potential to impact heavily on UK PPP
procurement practice. As outlined in chapter five, before the introduction of competitive
dialogue, complex procurements under the negotiated procedure would often involve
substantial negotiations following the appointment of a preferred bidder.330 By leaving
certain matters to be discussed with just the preferred bidder, authorities were able to
ensure that extraneous costs were not imposed on all. On the face of it, the requirement
in Art.29(6)/Reg.18(25) would appear to be seeking to curb such practices; however, the
extent to which it does so, as will be discussed, is open to interpretation.
It is generally accepted that it is not practical in complex procurements for all contractual
issues to be finalised before the appointment of a preferred bidder.331 The high costs of
pulling together the details of a contract at risk (without preferred bidder status) may be
unacceptable for bidders. To a certain extent this concern is recognised in the degree of
flexibility afforded to contracting authorities in the post tender stages of competitive
dialogue. Article 29C1) /Regulation 18(28) provides that" ... the tenderer identified as
having submitted the most economically advantageous tender may be asked to clarify
328 Brown (2004), fit.170, 166 and 174
329 See OGCIHMT (2008), fit.193, S.4.4; PfS (2006), fit. I08, para.17
330 Arrowsmith (2000), fit.71, 732
331 Arrowsmith (200S), fit.46; Brown (2004), fit.170; C.Kennedy-Loest, "What can be done at the preferred bidder stage in
competitive dialogue?" (2006) 6 PPLR 316; Burnett & Oder, Competitive dialogue: a practical guide, (2009, Maastricht,
European Institute of Public Administration); M.Bumett, "Using competitive dialogue in EU public procurement - early trends
and future developments" (2009) 2 EIPASCOPE 17; M.Burnett, "Conducting competitive dialogue for PPP projects - towards an
optimal approach?"(2009) 4 EPPPL 190
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aspects of the tender or confirm commitments contained in the tender provided this does
not have the effect of modifying substantial aspect of the tender or the call for tender and
does not risk distorting competition or causing discrimination". Further discussion of the
scope of this provision is provided below in relation to the scope for changes to the
tender/ call for tender at the preferred bidder stage; however, it is clear that under
Art.29(7)/Reg.18(28) there is some limited possibility for finalising the detail of tenders
with the preferred bidder. The precise scope is not clear and it is hoped that the interview
data gathered will elucidate upon the impact (if any) the provision has had on UK practice
and what matters are perceived as generally suitable to be dealt with after a preferred
bidder has been identified.
The last sentence of Recital 31 is likely to have a bearing upon the interpretation of
Art.29(7)/Reg.18(28); it states that "[competitive dialogue] must not be used in such a way
as to restrict or distort competition, particularly by altering any fundamental aspects of the
offers, or by imposing substantial new requirements on the successful tenderer ...". In
light of the wording of Recital 31, the Commission has adopted a narrow approach to the
room for manoeuvre enjoyed by authorities after submission of tenders.332 The
Commission's view is that negotiations solely with a preferred bidder are not allowed
(scope for such negotiations were proposed and rejected during the legislative processj.l"
According to the Commission, the flexibility in Art.29(7) relates to something very
limited, specifically "clarification" or "confirmation" of undertakings already appearing in
the final tender itself.334
The OGC/HMT 2008 guidance refuses to give a concrete definition of the meaning of
"clarify aspects of the tender or confirm commitments" without legal precedents arising
m Commission (2005). fu.190, para.3.3
333 Ibid, para.3.3
134lbid
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from court rulings.335 However, the guidance accepts that this would appear to signal a
narrowing of the scope for any discussion between the contracting authority and
preferred bidder previously enjoyed by UK contracting authorities under the negotiated
procedure.F" In relation to the limited further work that may be undertaken after
identification of a preferred bidder, the guidance states, " ... it is clear that it is not
appropriate to leave issues unresolved beyond the closure of the dialogue because neither
the contracting authority nor the bidders have addressed the issue, or considered it
necessary to do so, without good cause".337The guidance adds:
[i]njudgjng whether issues are suitable to resolve after close of dialogue, contracting authorities
mCfYneed to consider whether it is practicallYpossible or cost effective to resolve the issue, either
whollY,partlY or at all, before closure of dialogue. Where the main elements of an issue have been
addressed in thefinal tender but providingfurther detail (to the level required for contractual
close) would be undulY burdensome, it mCfYbe valid for the detail to be developed onlYonce a
preferred bidder has been appointed.338
OGC/HMT guidance gives the following examples of issues that may in certain
circumstances need to be left to after the identification of the preferred bidder:
• detailed information on subcontractors;
• complete design detail;
• detailed planning applications; and
• lender financial swap rates.339
mOGCIHMT (2008), fu.193, 5.5.2
336 Ibid, 5.5.2
337 Ibid, box 5.8
331 Ibid, box 5.8
339lbid
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The Partnerships for Schools guidance, in the context of BSP procurement, adds the
following matters:
• detailed site surveys;
• investigation of legal tide;
• full technical lender due diligence and detailed negotiation on the term sheet for
financing;
• final calibration of the performance mechanism; and
• finalisation of the financial model,"?
The scope for leaving certain issues, lender due diligence, planning applications, and
detailed design, to be dealt with at the preferred bidder stage will be considered in more
detail below.
According to the Commission, the flexibility in Art.29(7) was provided in particular in
order to take account of the reluctance of financial institutions to subscribe to firm
undertakings before their client has the certainty of preferred bidder status.i" It is noted
that in UK private finance procurement it has in the past been common for funders not
to carry out and incur the costs of detailed due diligence until their client is identified as
the preferred bidder; only at this point are lenders prepared to confirm the terms on
which they have offered support.342
The consensus amongst commentators appears to be that due diligence activities with
funders can generally be carried out at this stage, qualifying as merely "confirming
340 PtS (2006), fn.l 08, para.3S
3-41 Commission (2005), fit.!90, footnote 35
3-42 Kennedy-Loest C (2006), fit.331, 319
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commitments'V'l In leaving lender due diligence to a late stage there is the obvious risk
that it will throw up issues, as seems to be invariably the case in such complex
transactions, that require the winning tender to be changed in certain ways or else the
funder will not proceed (see section below). It should be noted that in order to
avoid/minimise the scope for such problems UK guidance recommends for funders to
have representatives involved throughout the course of a competitive dialogue, so that
they may draw attention to any issues which may be of concern before it is potentially
legally problematic.
In many UK PPP procurements it is increasingly common (for example under NHS
LIFI) for a funding competition to be held after the preferred bidder has been identified.
Here, funders are selected on the basis of an open competition, which is intended to
ensure that funders lend on the best terms possible.i" Under draft HM Treasury
guidance, "Preferred Bidder Debt Funding Competitions" 345 are to be the default option
where private finance is being secured on projects. It is intended that funding
competitions will take place in every instance where a project's capital value is in excess of
£sOm (mandatory for projects over £500m). The guidance is only in draft form; however,
the Treasury has stated that it corresponds with best practice.
Although clearly not the view of HM Treasury, it might be argued that a competition at
the preferred bidder stage to secure funding for a bid stretches the meaning of
"clarification" or "confirming commitments". Nevertheless, as Kennedy-Loest
recognises, a funding competition would be held for whichever bid won and the terms on
which it will therefore be funded are whatever the market will support.?" Kennedy-Loest
343 Arrowsmith (2005), th.46, 10.34; Kennedy Loest (2006), th.331, 319
344 HM Treasury, Preferred Bidder Debt Funding Competitions: draft outline guidance for feedback (2006, London)
345 Ibid
346 Kennedy-Loest (2006), th.33 I, 321
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describes funding competitions as "competitively neutral" that will not distort
competition between bidders. However, it is difficult to see how the commercial terms of
a bid can be separated from its funding so that the two can be considered separately.
Kennedy-Loest questions whether it would be compatible with competitive dialogue (or
even in an authority's best interests) to consider the funding arrangements separately
where different bids would attract different funding terms which could affect the overall
evaluation of a project's cosr."" According to Kennedy-Loest, "if the two have to be
considered together then it would seem premature to select the most economically
advantageous tender before having carried out the funding competition".
HM Treasury appears satisfied that funding competitions can operate within the
restrictions imposed by competitive dialogue; however, some UK practitioners are not
convinced, expressing concern about it being presupposed that the winning funder will
accept all documentation as tabled.t"
In order to overcome many of the problems identified above with funding competitions,
shadow lenders will normally be appointed to oversee the procurement. Their role is to
act as an independent commentator on the likely bankability of a deal.349
Planning permission is another issue that is recognised as potentially needing to be
finalised after the appointment of a preferred bidder.350 It is sometimes possible for an
authority to obtain outline planning permission, which all bidders will base solutions
upon, with only the preferred bidder making a detailed planning application. This saves
time and costs, and also prevents the planning authority concerned from being inundated
341 Kennedy-Loest (2006), fn.331, 322
341 P.Dzakula, "Dialogue Coacb" (2007) 25 Bui/ding 56; Nabarro, Projects briefing: debtfunding competitions under the
competitive dialogue, (2007, London) available at www.nabarro.com (accessed 31 II 0/20 II)
349 KennedY-Loest (2006), fn.331, 322
350 PfS (2006), fn.1 08, para.35
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with planning applications for the same site.351 Again, it may be that such practices qualify
as "confirming commitments"; however, as with due diligence (above), there is the
potential for problems to arise where, for example, the planning authority imposes new
conditions at the preferred bidder stage requiring changes to the tender.
Requesting the level of design detail required at contract close at final tender stage is
noted by OGC/HMT guidance as unnecessary in many circumstances.P' Indeed, during
dialogue in a BSF procurement, bidders would not be required to work up the design for
all schools in an area's BSF programme, only "sample schemes'V" To do otherwise may
be seen as disproportionately costly. In relation to a PFI project involving the design and
build of a building, according to Arrowsmith, whilst an authority would need a sufficient
degree of detail on the building design to choose the best tenderer, it would be
disproportionate to require tenders to cover details, such as the exact layout of particular
rooms, that are likely to have no or minimal impact on COSt.354 In the opinion of
Arrowsmith, the finalisation of such details would seem to constitute a clarification of
design.355
In view of the above uncertainty over the scope for leaving matters to be finalised with a
preferred bidder, the research interviews will need to examine what types of issues and the
degree to which those issues are capable of being left to the preferred bidder stage, and
what issues and the degree to which those issues are left to be finalised at the preferred
bidder stage in practice.
351 Kennedy-Lcest (2006), fu.331, 323
m OGCIHMT (2008), fu.193, box 5.8
m See 4Ps and PfS, An introduction to building schools/or the future, (2008, London), 60
354 Arrowsmith (2005) fu.46, 10.35
355 Ibid
120
7.4.4 Amendments to tenders before identification of a preferred bidder
There are a number of legitimate reasons why bidders and/or a contracting authority may
want to allow changes to final tenders before the preferred bidder is identified, e.g. to
improve tenders, to correct misunderstandings or errors, and to get bidders to provide
further information or additional details.356 However, where the scope for such
amendments is not tightly controlled, there are clear risks to transparency and equal
treatment.
There is uncertainty in all award procedures over the extent to which changes to final
tenders are permitted. In relation to the open and restricted, and negotiated procedures
the Directive/Regulations is silent on the matter. It is expected that there is the least
amount of room for amendments (albeit some) in the open and restricted procedures;
these are standard procedures, where the rules envisage that contracts are awarded on the
basis of a formal and transparent tendering procedure.?"
There would appear to be more scope for amendments in the negotiated procedure,
where it is not even clear that a formal tendering stage to select a preferred bidder is even
strictly necessary. Where a tendering stage is held in a negotiated procedure, provided a
contracting authority adheres to the basic principles of transparency and equality, there is
arguably quite significant scope for amendments.i"
With respect to amendments to final tenders in competitive dialogue,
Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) states, "tenders may be clarified, specified and fine-tuned at the
request of the contracting authority. However, such clarification, specification, fine-
tuning or additional information may not involve changes to the basic features of the
356 Arrowsmith (1998), fu.107, 70; PiS (2006), fu.l08, para.32
357 Arrowsmith (1998), Ibid
3511bid, 72
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tender or the call for tender, variations in which are likely to distort competition or have a
discriminatory effect". Despite this guidance, the vague and abstract wording leaves the
extent to which final tenders may be changed in competitive dialogue very uncertain. It is
unclear to which types of amendments the concepts of clarification, specification and
fine-tuning actually refer.
A narrow interpretation adopted by the Commission.l" is that there is no more room for
amendments to tenders in competitive dialogue than there would be in an open or
restricted procedure. Indeed, in a competitive dialogue the authority and bidders have
had sufficient opportunity during dialogue to discuss all aspects of the contract, seemingly
making the need for any amendments to tenders later on very difficult to justify.360This
narrow view seems to stem from a Joint Statement of the Council and Commission
addressing the issue in relation to the open and restricted procedures under the 1993
Public Works Directive, which used similar wording to that of Art.29(6):361
... all negotiations with candidates or tenderer: on fundamental aspects of contracts, variations in
which are likelY to distort competition, and in particular on prices, shall be ruled out,' however,
discussions with candidates or tenderers may be held but onlYfor the pmposes of clarifying or
supplementing the content of their tenders of the requirements of the contracting authorities and
provided this does not involve discrimination.
The joint statement is not legally binding, although it was referred to with approval by
Advocate General Tesauro in the Storebaeltcase.362 The 2008 OGC/HMT guidance notes
the narrow interpretation of the Commission and concludes that "there is no scope for
]59 Commission (2005), fh.I90, 3.3
360 Arrowsmith (2005), fh.46, para. I0.44; and S.Verscbuur, "Competitive Dialogue and the Scope for Discussion after Tenders and
Before Selecting the Preferred Bidder-What is Fine-Tuning EtcT' (2006) IS PPLR 327, 330
361 Council and Commission, Statement concerning Article 7 (4) of Council Directive 931371EEC 0/ J4 June /993 concerning the
coordinationo/procedures/or the award o/public wolb contracts, (1994, Brussels) (OJ L111/114)
362 Storebaelt, fh.47
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the contracting authority to seek to change any of the final bids due to them being
unacceptable, or to respond to later changes in its requirements. Bidders cannot reopen
discussions with the contracting authority at this stage and non-compliant bids will not be
acceptable'Y"
An alternative interpretation to that of the Commission, presented by Arrowsmith, is that
Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) should be interpreted with the complex projects for which it was
designed in mind.364 According to this argument, Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) should be read
more flexibly so that competitive dialogue is able to adequately cater for complex
procurements, where errors, inconsistencies and ambiguities in tenders are more likely to
occur.365The Partnerships for Schools guidance endorses this view of the law.366
In relation to the scope for clarification under the open and restricted procedures, the
High Court of Northern Ireland judgment, Natural World Products v. ARC 21367addressed
the lawfulness of questions put to a tenderer after submission of tenders. The case
concerned the award of a contract for organic waste services (which included the
construction of waste compaction facilities). The claimant's tender was considered to lack
required levels of capacity. In order to establish this, after receiving tenders the defendant
authority had put various questions to the claimant that dealt, inter alia, with the question
of whether the claimant's approach could cope with demand at peak times (e.g. to clarify
the capacity of the plant and obtain details of the methodology behind certain calculations
in the bid). Itwas held that under the open and restricted procedures such questions were
lawful. According to Deeny J., "both fairness, and ... consistency, requires that the
authority takes into account matters in favour of the [claimant] that are learnt after the bid
363 OGCIHMT (2008), fu.193, 5.4.9
364 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.43; Arrowsmith (2004), fu.325, 1289
36' Ibid, Arrowsmith (2005),10.43
366 PfS (2006), fu.l 08, para.31
367 Natural World Products Ltd vARC 21 [2007] NIQB 17
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process as well as matters adverse to the [claimant]. It seems to me ... that, strictly
speaking, the authority could, subject to one point, take this information into account.
The qualification is that it constituted information which was clarification or
supplementary ... rather than a wholly new departure". 368
Article 29(6)/Regulation 18(26) clearly states that amendments can only be made when a
contracting authority requests them. However, it would seem unlikely that this means it is
only the authority who can take the initiative to have tenders amended.i" Rather, as
Arrowsmith explains, this phrase is probably intended to indicate that it is within the
discretion of the authority to permit clarification, specification and fine-tuning, and that
tenderers have no general right to make amendments. It follows that there is nothing to
stop an authority from requesting amendments where a tenderer has flagged up the
need.370
Both Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) and the Council and Commission joint statement allow
tenders to be clarified. According to Advocate General Lenz in the Wa/Ioon Buses case, " ...
the concept of 'clarifying' used in the joint statement by the Council and the Commission
must be understood as the communication of details which describe the object in
question more clearly or more precisely"."! "Supplementing" in the Council and
Commission joint statement arguably corresponds to the concept of specification. This
was understood "... to mean the addition of details previously not available".372In the
opinion of Advocate General Lenz common to both concepts, clarifying and
supplementing, "is the fact that they are not intended to replace information previously
given, but to render it more concrete in some way or other".
361 Ibid, para.39
369 Treumer (2004), fu.206, 184
370 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.49
37. Opi fM
372 imon 0 r Advocate General Lenz delivered on 12 September 1995, Walloon Buses, fu.60, para.37Ibid
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The concept of clarification would seem to allow for the possibility of amendments to
correct in~onsistencies, ambiguities and other errors where the true intention is obvious.l"
For example, where a decimal point or zero has been omitted and it is clear from
surrounding figures what the correction should be.374 In such cases it is argued there is
little opportunity for abuse or unfair advantage.i"
It is more difficult to say whether amendments would be permitted where it is not
obvious what the correction should be. An example might be where there are
inconsistencies in prices in a tender, and one of two figures could have been what was
intended.376 In such instances, there is scope for abuse, as the tenderer may have the
possibility of improving the original tender.
The Court of First Instance has held in Case T -19/95, Adia Interim SA tJ. Commissioffm that
a tenderer could not insist upon being allowed to make a numerical correction when the
nature of the error and intended figures were not clear. This was because contact
between the authority and the tenderer on this point involved a risk that the tender might
be adjusted, violating the equal treatment principle. The reasoning of the Court might be
taken as implying that adjustments should not be allowed even if an authority wishes to
permit it because this would give an opportunity to improve the tender. Alternatively,
Arrowsmith notes that the ruling may be interpreted more narrowly as merely precluding
a right to correct errors of this kind.378 In addition, Arrowsmith points out that it is not
clear whether the Court based its conclusion on the Directive or on a separate equal
treatment principle under different procurement rules applicable to the Commission.
m See Resource Management Services v. Westminster City Council [1999] 2 CMLR 849
374 Arrowsmith (2005). fu.46. 7.148
375lbid
376 Arrowsmith (2005). fu.46, 7.50
m Case T-19195. Adia Interim SAv Commission [1996] EeR 11-321
378 Arrowsmith (2005). fu.46, 7.151
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Arrowsmith's view is that it does not necessarily violate equal treatment to allow a
correction: a tenderer that has made a genuine error, for example, is in a different position
to one that has not.379 According to Arrowsmith, the opportunities for abuse, both by the
tenderer alone and through collusion between the tenderer and the contracting authority,
are quite limited, and some control over unilateral abuse by the tenderer is provided by
the fact that amendment is subject to the discretion of the contracting authority.
Arrowsmith opines that to eliminate every small possibility of abuse from the tendering
process is unrealistic, and to refuse any amendments that could give rise to this possibility
would be seriously detrimental to contracting authorities' interests, given that many
tenders include minor errors and omissions.P"
If "specification" does, as many commentators assume, correspond to supplement in the
Commission and Council joint statement it would appear that there is some scope for
authorities to allow bidders to provide additional or more detailed information after
submitting their tenders but before a preferred bidder is selected; for example, this may be
because information was omitted from the tender, not originally requested by the
authority, or because the tender is not sufficiently detailed.?" The extent to which this is
permitted, according to Arrowsmith, is probably a matter of degree taking into account
the overall context of the procedure, such as complexity of the contract.382 Arrowsmith
argues that as the contracts procured under competitive dialogue will invariably be
complex there should generally be significant flexibility in competitive dialogue in this
379 Ibid, 7.150
380 Ibid, 7.152
311 Ibid, 10.46
312 Ibid, 10.46
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respect. According to Brown, the ambiguous term "specification" may refer to scope for
confirming or adjusting the technical specifications.i"
After submitting its final tender a bidder may wish to make amendments that improve
upon it; for example, they may wish to make the tender more economically advantageous,
or may simply want to make the tender compliant. An authority may wish to allow such
amendments, as improved tenders enhance the authority's chances of getting the best
tender and hence value for money from the procurement. The Council and Commission
statement, with its ruling out of negotiations on "fundamental aspects of contracts,
variations inwhich are likely to distort competition, and in particular on price", would
appear to rule out in the context of the open and restricted procedures changes to
improve prices or other aspects of tenders that are referred to in the award criteria. The
Commission suggests that this is also the position in relation to competitive dialogue384;
however, the issue is not certain. The concept of "fine tuning", which appears in
Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26), is absent from the Council and Commission joint statement. This
has led some to suggest that there is more flexibility in competitive dialogue for
amendments to tenders than in open and restricted procedures, and that in order to give
effect to the concept of fine tuning there may be some scope for improving amendments
to tenders.?"
Nevertheless, it is accepted that the phrase "fine tuning" probably implies qualitative and
quantitative limitations on the nature of permitted changes that are separate from the
controls imposed in the final sentence of Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26).386 Arrowsmith notes that,
although the concept of "fine-tuning" may, for example, cover changes called for by an
313 Brown (2004), fu.170, 175
3114 Commission (2005), fu.l90, 3.3
3U Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.44
386lbid, 10.44
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authority to bring a non-compliant tender into compliance, it is very difficult to say how
far the concept permits an authority to request changes to features that are to be
compared in the evaluation (e.g. to seek improvements to price).387It must be emphasised
that even if qualifying as fine tuning, if improvements are to be allowed they will also need
to satisfy the safeguards in the final sentence of Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26), which disallow any
changes to the basic features of a tender that are likely to distort competition or have a
discriminatory effect.
There is an obvious risk of violation of the equal treatment principle where not all bidders
are given the same opportunity of making changes to their final tenders.388In the context
of an open procedure, the CJEU found this to be the case in Walloon Buses.389
It is unclear whether it would be permissible to seek amendments to final tenders from all
tenderers on an informal basis. However, this may be unlikely considering the " ... dangers
of discrimination in such a discretionary and non-transparent process, which violates the
transparency principle".390It may be that the only way to sufficiendy negate the risks of
distorting competition and of discrimination by allowing amendments to final tenders,
particularly if such amendments are improvements, is to hold a revised formal tendering
phase. This could be on all aspects of tenders or specific aspects only; however, as
Arrowsmith recognises, if only allowing revision of limited issues there is a risk that
matters may be specified to favour particular bidders.391
Formal resubmissions, as opposed to informal discussions, offer a transparent process
providing equal opportunities for revisions to all tenderers. However, there remain
3871bid, 7.151
388Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.44
389 Walloon Buses, fu.60
390 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 7.150
391 Arrowsmith (2004), fu.325, 1288
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opportunities for abuse. For example, the authority may call for revisions merely to
improve the position of a favoured bidder (even though it is difficult to ensure the
favoured bidder will succeed).392To prevent such risks it might be argued that "distortion
of competition" should be interpreted as referring to distortion of the final tender stage
itself; this would rule out any improving amendments after the submission of final tenders
that might affect the result, regardless of whether the authority were to warn tenderers of
the possibility in advance.?" Arrowsmith concludes that the better view is that as a
general rule authorities may not call for resubmissions after the final tendering stage:
[sJince the [authori!YJ has had opportunities through earlier dialogue and tenderingphases to
ensure that bids are adapted to its requirements, it is not problematic to identify in advance that
a particular stage will befinal with no roomfor further adjustments.394
Arrowsmith goes on to note, however, that there may be an exception to this general rule
where resubmissions are needed to adjust tenders for changes arising from external
circumstances that are within the limits of "fine_tuning".395In support of this argument,
Arrowsmith highlights that it would not be reasonable to require the whole competitive
dialogue to be started again from scratch (a possibility no less open to abuse), and that
formal resubmissions are more transparent than having the authority negotiate revisions
with a preferred bidder.396
7.4.5 Amendments to the call for tender
The contracting authority may wish to make changes to the "call for tender" (because of,
for example, changed circumstances). This was the case in the Commission's London
Underground decision where changes were made to take account of an increased terrorist
392 Arrowsmith (2005). fu.46. 7.153
393 Arrowsmith (2004). fu.325. 1288
394 Ibid, 1289
395 Ibid, 1289
396 Ibid, 1289
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threat following the September 11 2001 New York terrorist attacks.397It appears that
some changes are permitted. However, equal treatment requires that where an authority
makes a "material" change, a change likely to have impacted upon the identity of
participants, the authority must go back to the point in the procedure necessary to ensure
no one has been excluded that would otherwise have been included.I"
The possibility for changes to the call for tender after the deadline for tenders is not dear.
It is arguable that in competitive dialogue it is possible to do this, for example, with a
second round of tendering regardless of whether it is possible under the open and
restricted procedures. According to Arrowsmith, even if under the legal rules an authority
cannot hold a second tendering round in open and restricted procedures to take account
of changes, it may still be possible in competitive dialogue because this is consistent with
the procedure's flexibility, and, because the procedure concerns more complex projects
with contract awards happening over longer periods of time, there is much greater
potential for a need for change.399 Arrowsmith also suggests that there may be some
limited room for changes within the concept of "fine tuning".400
7.4.6 Identification ofa preferred bidder
Under Art.29(7)/Reg.18(27) authorities are to assess the tenders received on the basis of
award criteria laid down in the contract notice or descriptive document and must select
the most economically advantageous tender.
Following the identification of the preferred bidder when the parties are ready to
conclude the contract, PPP procurements in the UK (such as BSF procurement) will
generally require the contracting authority to prepare a final/ full business case, which will
397 London Underground, fn.326, 88
398 Arrowsmith (2005), fn.46, 10.51
399 Arrowsmith (2005), fn.46, 10.52
400 Ibid, 10.52
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need to be approved for the procurement to proceed to financial close. This document
will reference any changes to the project as set out in the outline business case.
7.4.7 Changes at the preferred bidder stage
Itwas mentioned above that under Art.29(7) /Reg.18(28) there is some possibility for
leaving certain details of a contract to be finalised after identification of a preferred bidder
when there is only one bidder left in the process. A related, but separate, issue concerns
the extent to which actual changes to a preferred bidder's tender or the call for tender can
be made under Art.29(7)/Reg.18(28). There are a number of reasons that the need for
changes may arise at a late stage in long, complex procurements. It is apparent that a
common reason for the need for changes to be made at the preferred bidder stage in
private finance procurement comes from the involvement of debt funders (e.g. banks)
following detailed due diligence.f" It is suggested that at this late stage in a process
funders can find themselves in a strong position, able to dictate revised terms upon which
they are prepared to lend. This is said to be because, having invested considerable
resources in the procurement to progress it to a point near to financial close, a contracting
authority is likely to want to avoid any further delay to the project, particularly if there is
the threat of having to restart the procurement (see below). There are reports that the
above difficulties have been exacerbated by the late-2000s global banking crisis.402 For
example, some UK authorities have found that very close to contract conclusion, the
sources of funding upon which the preferred bidder is reliant have disappeared or funders
have sought to substantially change the terms upon which funding was available (e.g.
funders may want to limit exposure to legal risk). As explained in chapter two, in view of
the banking crisis in March 2009 HM Treasury created the Treasury Infrastructure
Finance Unit, which could lend on the same terms as commercial funders in the event
that insufficient private funding was available.
401 Burnett (2009), fo.331, 195; Kennedy-Loest (2006), fo.331, 319
402 Burnett (2009), Ibid
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There is great uncertainty over the degree to which changes may occur at the preferred
bidder stage under the legal rules on competitive dialogue. Prior to the introduction of
competitive dialogue, from the reported practice of UK contracting authorities procuring
PPP contracts under the negotiated procedure there were not generally perceived to be
any great restrictions upon the changes to the contractual arrangements that could be
made with a preferred bidder. As it is expected that use of competitive dialogue will
replace the use of the negotiated procedure for many complex PPP projects, the
interpretation of Art.29C1)/Reg.18(28) is of critical significance for UK authorities which
will need to know how far they may persist with past practices. As will become evident
from the discussion below, in addition to exploring in the research interview how
interviewees interpret the law and how the law is applied in practice, the research
interviews will need to look into the factors behind contracting authority decision-making
at this critical stage of the process.
The legal uncertainty flows from the phrasing of Art.29C1)/Reg.18(28), which is not
consistent. Article 29C1)/Regulation18(28) restricts the work that can be done with the
preferred bidder to clarifying aspects of the tender or confirming commitments contained
in the tender provided this does not have the effect of modifying substantial aspects of
the tender or of the call for tender and does not risk distorting competition or causing
discrimination. As many suspect, it is likely that the inconsistent wording is a deliberate
fudge due to difficulties reaching agreement.f" Firstly, the provision limits any discussions
with a preferred bidder to clarifying and confirming commitments. On its own, this gives
the impression that there is very litde scope for changes to the tender or call for tender.
The second part, however, states that clarifications or confirmations must not have the
403 Arrowsmith (2004), tit.32S, 1290
132
effect of modifying substantial aspects. Logically, therefore, there is some scope for
clarifications or confirmations which have the effect of modifying non-substantial aspects
of tenders or call for tenders.404 The Directive/Regulations fails to elaborate upon what
might amount to a substantial modification.
The Commission adopts a narrow interpretation of the scope for change, concentrating
upon the words "clarify" and "confirm": "... this does not entail any negotiations solely
with this economic operator - amendments aimed at authorising such negotiations were
proposed and rejected by the [EU] legislative process. It relates to something much more
limited, specifically "clarification" or "confirmation" of undertakings already appearing in
the final tender itself. This provision should also be interpreted in the light of the last
sentence ofRecital31 ...".405
The 2008 OGC/HMT guidance states that it is not possible to define the meaning of
"clarify aspects of the tender or confirm commitments" without legal precedents arising
from court rulings.406 However, according to the 2008 guidance, "it seems clear that this
represents a further narrowing of the scope for a discussion between the contracting
authority and the preferred bidder".407The guidance goes on to note that a degree of
pragmatism is need in the application of the legal rules, recognising that the challenge for
contracting authorities is, " ... to balance the legal requirements with the need to achieve
contract signature while operating in a world where change can occur between the closure
of the dialogue phase and contract signature". 408
404 Ibid, 1290
405 Commission (2005), fit.1OO, 3.3
- OOCIHMT (2008), fit.193, 5.5.2
407 Ibid, 5.5.2
408 Ibid, 5.5.8
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Although, as the OGC/HMT 2008 guidance makes clear, there is unlikely to be the same
flexibility at the preferred bidder stage under competitive dialogue as there is at the
corresponding stage of the negotiated procedure, the scope for change at the preferred
stage under the negotiated procedure may provide some guidance on the approach to the
scope for change under competitive dialogue.f" Article 30/Regulation 17, which governs
the conduct of the negotiated procedure, is silent on the extent to which negotiations can
permissibly take place once a preferred bidder has been identified. However, in the
Commission's London Underground PPP decision, the Commission accepted significant
scope for changes to both the preferred bidder's tender and the call for tender (potentially
relating to all aspects of a project) at the preferred bidder stage of a negotiated procedure
regulated under the 1993 Utilities Directive.?" The London Underground decision
suggests that a lawful change is potentially one in which the preferred bidder remains the
bidder with the most economically advantageous tender; there may be some scope for
change even where the change/ s make the contract more valuable for the preferred
bidder; and changes must not result in the project being substantially different from that
advertised at the outset in the OJEU notice (it would not attract different bidders). The
London Underground PPP was a highly complex and lengthy procurement and the
Commission emphasised this fact in its decision. As Arrowsmith comments, the inherent
complexity of the contracts to be procured under competitive dialogue means that,
although the wording of Art.29(7)/Reg.18(28) suggests less flexibility than under the
negotiated procedure, there needs to be reasonable flexibility for competitive dialogue to
be of any use.411
409 Ibid, 5.5.2
410UmdonUnderground, fu.326
411 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.54; see also T.Kolonis, Taking stock: competitive dialogue four years on, (2010) available at
www·nortonrnse.com (accessed 31/10/20 II)
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In addition, guidance on the scope for change comes from the CJEU Case C-4S4/06,
Pressetext judgement,412which concerned changes to a concluded contract. Adopting a
more restrictive approach than that advocated by the Commission (above), the CJEU held
that there is a new contract that must be re-advertised where a contract is changed so that
it is "materially different in character". The CJEU gave the following examples of
potential "material" contractual amendments:
• an amendment that introduces conditions which, had they been part of the initial
award procedure, would have allowed for the admission of tenderers other than
those initially admitted or would have allowed for the acceptance of a tender other
than the one initially accepted;
• an amendment that extends the scope of the contract considerably to encompass
services not initially covered; or
• an amendment that changes the economic balance of the contract in favour of the
contractor in a manner which was not provided for in the terms of the initial
contract.413
There is little guidance as to the specific application of these principles or the extent to
which these principles apply to changes occurring whilst a procurement is ongoing.
The Commission took into account a number of considerations in accepting the
lawfulness of quite significant changes in the London Underground decision. It follows
from the decision that the justifications given for changes are likely to have a strong
412 pressetext, fn.261
413 Ibid, 34-37
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bearing on the Commission's view of whether or not they are acceptable.t" Likewise, UK
guidance (OGC/HMT 2008 guidance and Partnerships for Schools guidance) and
commentators consider the reasons for changes at preferred bidder stage to he important
under competitive dialogue.t" The OGC/HMT 2008 guidance distinguishes between
reasons for changes that are within the control of the authority and those outside the
control of the authoriry.?" With respect to the former, the guidance confirms that, "it is
inappropriate for a contracting authority to undertake any changes to bids received after
the closure of dialogue, if changes could have been anticipated and dealt with during the
dialogue stage. Any change of requirement or circumstance that was reasonably
predictable, or directly under the contracting authority's control, is unlikely to be a
satisfactory reason, from a legal perspective, to change bids during the post dialogue
phase"."? Where the reason for making changes is necessary for external reasons, which
the contracting authority could not have predicted or anticipated the position is not clear.
According to the OGC/HMT 2008 guidance, "provided that the contracting authority
and the preferred bidder could not have better managed things to avoid this situation, it
would not be in anyone's interests for the procurement to fail because of such an event.
So, for practical reasons, the contracting authority may decide to allow some
consequential change, provided the change results directly from such an event and is
limited to that which is needed to respond to the event".418The above approach
advocated by the 2008 OGC/HMT guidance is necessary to ensure that competitive
dialogue provides an adequate procedure for complex contracts, like complex PPP
contracts, where external reasons for varying the contract terms commonly arise in
practice .
• 14London Underground, m.326, 88
41l OGCIHMT (2008), m.193, 5.59; PfS (2006), fh.l 08, 38; Arrowsmith (2005), m.46, 10.54
.16 OGCIHMT (2008), ibid, 5.5.9
417 Ibid, 5.5.9
411 Ibid, 5.5.15
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A clear limitation on the scope for change is that changes must not be substantial.
According to Arrowsmith, this may imply an independent qualitative and quantitative
limit to allowable changes.419 This reasoning, for instance, would seemingly rule out a
major change to the size of a project, even if there would have been no effect on the
choice or preferred bidder and the change is for legitimate external reasons, such as
changed demand for service.420
In addition, it follows from London Underground and Pressetext that, following any
changes, in accordance with the principle of equal treatment, the preferred bidder must
remain the bidder with the most economically advantageous tender. Thus, a change
would be non-compliant with the legal rules, for example, where restrictions imposed
following a detailed planning application resulted in a feature of a building design, which
had given the preferred bidder the edge over its competition, being removed. This
principle will not just be relevant to the final tendering stage; an authority will need to
look back at all decisions made over the course of the whole procurement process (e.g.
qualification and selection decisions) and ensure that decisions would be unaffected by the
changes made with the preferred bidder. It may be that a formal evaluation to assess the
possible impact of changes on other bids may be advisable. The authorities in London
Underground carried out such an evaluation and the results were accepted by the
Cornmission.t" According to Arrowsmith, it is a useful exercise for authorities to
undertake, both to ensure value for money and to reduce the risk of successful legal
challenge.422
419 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.55; and Arrowsmith (2004), fu.32S, 1290
420 Arrowsmith (2005), ibid, 10.54
421 London Underground, fu.326, 85
422 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 8.44
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Regardless of the impact on award decisions, it is not clear whether it is possible under
Art.29(7) /Reg.18(28) to make changes that mean the project is more valuable to the
preferred bidder than it was when the preferred bidder was first identified. Following the
CJEU judgment in Pressetext that a material change is one that shifts the economic balance
of the contract in favour of the contractor it would seem likely that such changes are not
permitted in the preferred bidder stages of competitive dialogue; however, as noted
above, in London Underground, under the negotiated procedure, the Commission
appears to accept that such changes may be made to a contract.423 In the opinion of
Arrowsmith, changes making a contract more valuable to the preferred bidder should be
permitted under competitive dialogue, as, given that the legal rules expressly recognise
that some changes may be needed when there is no competition, the possibility may be
necessary so that it is possible for authorities to secure agreement in the event of
renegotiarion.l"
In accepting changes in London Underground, the Commission noted that the
modifications were not so substantial, individually or collectively, as to be likely to have
attracted prospective participants which did not consider participating following
publication of the original contract notice.m It follows that under competitive dialogue
where changes occur to the project itself at a minimum the authority concerned must
ensure the project is materially the same as that advertised in the OJEU (i.e. it would not
have attracted different bidders). As London Underground concerned the preferred
bidder stages of a negotiated procedure, it may be that in relation to competitive dialogue
the test is stricter426; thus, certain changes to a project may not be allowed under the legal
rules even if the changed project would not have attracted different potential bidders.
423 London Underground. fu.326. 103
424 Arrowsmith (2OOS). fu.46. 10.S4
425 London Underground. fn.326, 89
426 Kenne<ty-Loest (2006). fn.331, 321
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In a situation where substantial changes are needed at the preferred bidder stages of
competitive dialogue to proceed to contract close (e.g. a preferred bidder may not be
willing to agree to a contract without substantial changes), there are limited alternative
options available to contracting authorities. The safest option from a legal perspective is
for the authority to restart the procurement with a new contract notice; indeed, where a
change would result in a different set of potential bidders expressing an interest in the
project this may legally be the only option open to the contracting authority. However,
despite the minimised legal risk, to restart a competitive dialogue procurement having
reached the late stage of preferred bidder negotiation is an expensive option, in terms of
wasted time and money. A second option is for the contracting authority to go back in
the process and, for example, hold the final tendering stage again. It is noted, however,
that this option is not always practical for authorities, as previously rejected bidders may
no longer be prepared to take part. A further option potentially available is for a
contracting authority to formally initiate a new negotiated procedure without a contract
notice on grounds of extreme urgency brought about by unforeseeable events
(Art.31 (c)/Reg.14(a)(iv)). This will enable the authority concerned to proceed with the
preferred bidder's tender; however, the grounds for using the negotiated procedure
without a notice are narrow and the circumstances invoked to justify extreme urgency
must not be attributable to the authority. Therefore, this option will only be available
where the reasons for substantial modifications to the preferred bidder's tender are
completely outside the control of the authority and unforeseeable.
It appears to have been relatively common in the UK, particularly in PPI procurement,
for a contracting authority to keep a bidder in reserve ("the reserve bidder'') when it
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appoints a preferred bidder.427There is nothing in the Directive prohibiting such
practices, and therefore if a contract with a preferred bidder falls through it may be
possible for an authority to award the contract instead to the reserve bidder. In this
respect, 2006 aGe guidance draws attention to Recital31, which states that competition
should not be distorted or restricted by involving any tenderer other than the one selected
as the most economically advantageous tender. The guidance considers this to discourage
the practice of keeping a reserve bidder in play,428but, as Arrowsmith explains, it seems
more likely that Recital 31 is indicating that once negotiations begin with the reserve
bidder, even if those negotiations fail it is not possible to revert back to the original
preferred bidder.429Guidance issued by 4Ps recommends the appointment of a reserve
bidder ''wherever possible".430
In view of the disproportionate impact of restart and the problems being faced by UK
contracting authorities at the height of the late-2000s credit crunch, Arrowsmith
developed an argument based on the fundamental EU principle of proportionality, i.e. the
burdens imposed by regulation must be proportionate to the object in view.431 According
to Arrowsmith, under this principle in certain exceptional circumstances (such as where
private funders have disappeared very late on in a process) there should be some scope
for certain "substantial" changes to the preferred bidder's tender or the call for tender.
Arrowsmith argues that where the authority would need to start again with a new
procedure that involves significant time and costs for all involved and means a serious
delay, and this is cause by external events not within its control, then it is permitted to go
ahead and conclude the contract with the preferred bidder despite the impact of the
changes. As Arrowsmith explains, ''whilst transparency and undistorted competition is
427 Arrowsmith (2005), fu.46, 10.55
428 OGC (2006),10.1
429 Arrowsmith (2005), m.46, 10.55
430 4Ps (2006), fu.l64, 18
431 S.Arrowsmith, Achilles lecture, Using competitive dialogue II, 24 ApriJ2008, London
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important, these principles can only be followed to the extent that they do not involve
disproportionate costs. The need for proportionality in applying these principles is
reflected elsewhere in the directives e.g. in the possibility for using the negotiated
procedures without a contract notice in certain cases".432
The Commission's view of the proportionality argument is not clear; however, the
persisting financial crisis has meant the Commission has come under considerable
political pressure not to let strict application of the procurement rules to stand in the way
of efforts to kick start the economy. In December 2008 the Commission issued a press
release stating that the current economic situation was enough to justify contracting
authorities using the accelerated restricted procedure for procuring goods, works and
services "for all major public projects".433This relaxation of the rules is designed to speed
up the execution of major public projects and thus help member states through the EU-
wide economic downturn. Similarly, the Commission took a proactive approach in
relaxing the EU state aid rules to help member states support their banking sectors. With
this in mind, it may be that the Commission is and will take a lenient view of substantial
changes to contracts after identification of a preferred bidder under the legal rules on
competitive dialogue, where these are the result of external events flowing from the
current financial and economic crisis.
7.4.8 TheA/catel information and standstill requirements
The rules implementing the EU Alcatel information and standstill requirements into UK
law (Reg.32 and Reg.32A) were set out in chapter four. As explained in chapter four, as
soon as possible after the award decision a contracting authority must notify bidders of
the decision in writing by the most rapid means of communication practicable. The
432lbid
4ll Commission (2008), fn.I 09
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contracting authority must then refrain from entering into the contract until the expiry of
10 or 15 days (depending upon how the notice is sent).
In competitive dialogue there is some debate over when the award decision for the
purposes of Reg.32 can be said to have occurred.t" It can be seen from the above
discussion that in practice in the UK the bidder submitting the most economically
advantageous final tender is given the status of preferred bidder. This is the earliest point
at which the award decision could be said to have been made. It is questionable, however,
whether holding the standstill period at this point gives effect to the Alcatel judgement.
The purpose of the standstill period is to ensure that the remedies system is effective by
giving aggrieved bidders the opportunity to challenge award decisions before the contract
is concluded when the set aside remedy is still available. If the standstill period is held
only at this point then there is a risk that would-be complainants will struggle to find out
about subsequent violations of the procurement rules (e.g. substantial changes disallowed
by Art.29(7)/Reg.18(28», and so are be unable to challenge them before the contract is
concluded. In addition, it is pointed out that holding the standstill period at the point
when the preferred bidder is identified has the practical advantage of avoiding delay to the
procurement process, since the standstill period will be subsumed into the significantly
longer period during which due diligence and contract finalisation takes place with the
preferred bidder.435
Despite earlier inconsistent advice,436the OGC/HMT 2008 guidance states that, "under
competitive dialogue, the 10 day standstill period should happen when all matters that are
material to the decision to award the contract to the winning tenderer have been resolved
i.e. there will be no further changes that will modify the terms under which the contract
434 A.Brown. "Applying Alcatel in the context of competitive dialogue" (2006) 6 PPLR 332
43' Ibid, 335
436 DOC 2006, 1h.187,p.8
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will be concluded".437Because it is so common in complex procurements for certain
issues to be negotiated once a preferred bidder has been identified, in accordance with the
above guidance, UK contracting authorities may be holding the standstill period at a point
much closer to contract close; this could possibly be when the full/ final business case is
approved or when the authority's board has met formally to approve the transaction.l"
In view of the uncertainty surrounding the correct application of the Alcatel requirements
under competitive dialogue, it is important that the research interviews investigate this
uncertainty, looking at how practitioners interpret the legal rules, how they apply the legal
rules in practice, and the reasons for this.
7.5 Payment to participants
Article 29(8)/Regulation 18(29) states that authorities may specify prices or payments to
participants in competitive dialogue. It is suggested that this could be, for example, to
compensate a participant who has agreed to waive its confidentiality rights under
Art.29(3)/Reg.18(21), or it may be that a payment could be made simply to encourage
parricipation.t" There is no equivalent to Art.29(8)/Reg.18(29) for any of the other
procedures; however, this is not because such payments are not allowed in those
procedures.t"
It appears that, although not strictly necessary, the provision was included to signal that
payments may be particularly appropriate in competitive dialogue.t" which involve
complex contracts requiring lengthy procurements and engendering significant bid
costs.'? It is noted that another possible purpose of having such an express provision
437 OGCIHMT (2008), fh.193, 5.5.6
431 Brown (2006), fh.434, 334
439 Trepte (2007), fh.166, 7.199
440 Commission (2005), fh.190, footnote 26
441 Ibid, footnote 26
442 OGC (2006), fh.187, 12
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may be to prevent, in the specific case of competitive dialogue, Member States disallowing
payments by their own individual contracting authorities.t" Arrowsmith notes that
payments were not usually made by UK contracting authorities procuring PFI contracts
under the negotiated procedure.t" Government policy in the UK has consistently been
that bid costs as a general rule should not be reimbursed.l"
7.6 Concluding remarks
Chapter seven has reviewed the procedural rules governing competitive dialogue. The
chapter has highlighted numerous legal grey areas, for example concerning bidder
reduction during dialogue, the confidentiality rules, and, critically from a UK perspective,
the scope for amendments to tenders and negotiations following the close of dialogue.
The chapter has drawn upon the Commission's explanatory note and guidance on
competitive dialogue issued by UK government; however, as this guidance is of limited
legal value and also because in many circumstances it is itself not conclusive, the research
must go further to fully appreciate the law by exploring the application of the legal rules in
practice.
443 Arrowsmith (200S). fil.46. 10.60
444 Arrowsmith (2006). fil.84. 108
44l OGCIHMT (2008). fil.l93. box S.I
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8 Compliance with regulation
8.1 Introduction
Itwould be wrong for the drafters of the Directive to assume that compliance with the
new legal requirements would be an inevitable consequence of their coming into
existence.t" As Baldwin emphasises, "[i]n virtually all fields of regulation ... there are large
numbers of rules that are regularly ignored or disobeyed. In spite of statutes, regulations
and codes, rivers continue to be polluted, discrimination still takes place and many
workplaces remain unsafe".447These claims, which are substantiated by numerous
empirical studies.?" have led scholars to consider and develop ideas as to why in many
situations regulatory compliance is far from self-evident. In order to understand authority
behaviour under the legal rules, chapter eight will explore the literature on regulatory
compliance, relating it as far as possible to compliance with the EU procurement rules.
Much of the literature on compliance discusses it from the standpoint of individual
members of the public or private corporations. For the purposes of this thesis we are
concerned by what factors influence compliance by public authorities under the
Regulations. With this in mind, one must be cautious in relating the findings of studies
mostly concentrating on private sector compliance to the circumstances of public
446 T.Amodu, The determinants of compliance with laws and regulations with special reference to health and safety: a literature
review, (Research Report (RR638» (2008, London, Health and Safety Executive), p.v; Snellenberg & Peppel, "Perspectives on
compliance: non-compliance with environmental licences in the Netherlands" (2002) 12 European Environment 131, p.131
441 R.Baldwin, "Why rules don't work" (I990) 53(3) ModL.Rev. 321, p.32l
448 See, for instance, Edelman et al., "Legal ambiguity and the politics of compliance: affirmative action officers' dilemma" (1991 )
13(1) Law & Policy 74; Fairman & Yapp, "Enforced self-regulation, prescription, and conceptions of compliance within small
businesses: the impact of enforcement" (2005) 27(4) Law & Policy 491; Gray & Shadbegian, "When and why do plants comply?
Paper mills in the 19805" (200S) 27(2) Law & Policy 238; Kagan et al., "Explaining corporate environmental performance: how
does regulation matter?" (2003) 37(1) Law & Society Review 5 I; P.May, ''Compliance motivations: perspectives of farmers,
homebuilders, and marine facilities" (2005) 27(2) Law & Policy 317; Thomton et al., "General deterrence and corporate
environmental behaviour" (2005) 27(2) Law & Policy 262
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authorities who are not guided by the same profit seeking motives as private sector
corporationsf"; nevertheless, there remains a lot that can be learned and developed.
8.2 The classical deterrence approach
Traditionally, the dominant view of compliance has stemmed from "free market"
economic literature whereby regulatory compliance is seen as the result of a calculated
decision motivated by economic factors. Here, it is assumed that regulated corporations,
due to profit maximisation motives, will comply with regulation only to the extent that it
is in their rational self-interest to do SO.450 The main economic theories view compliance
as the result of a cost-benefit analysis, where the expected detriment to the corporation
from non-compliance and the likelihood of that detriment occurring (e.g. in the case of
contracting authorities this might include financial loss due to having to payout damages,
the costs involved in defending legal actions, delays to projects, and even negative
publicity) exceed the expected benefits deriving from violation (e.g this may be cost
savings or enhanced value for money from using the negotiated procedure over
competitive dialogue or from making substantial changes at the preferred bidder stage).451
Empirical research carried out by Braun in 2001 revealed that authorities in deciding
between procedural options will usually weigh the benefits and risks.452 This led Braun to
rely upon deterrence theories to understand UK contracting authority behaviour.453 For
example, Braun found authorities to be using the negotiated procedure even where it was
not clear that the derogations for its use were satisfied. According to Braun, this was
449 Note, however, A.Reich, "On procurement, protectionism and protests: a survey among Canadian procurement officers" (1994)
23( I) Canadian Business Law Journal 107j Gelderman et al., "Public procurement and EU tendering directives? Explaining non-
compliance" (2006) 19(7) International Journal 0/ Public Sector Management 702j Gelderman et al., "Explaining non-compliance
with European Union procurement directives: a multidisciplinary perspective" (20 I0) 48(2) Journalo/Common Market Studies
243
450 See Amodu (2008), fu.446, p.6; Parker & Braithwaite, "Regulation", in Cane & Tushnet (eds.) The Oxford handbook o/Iegal
studies (2003, OUP), 130; Snellenberg & Peppel (2002), fu.446, 133
451 G.Becker, "Crime and punishment: an economic approach" (1968) Journal 0/ Political Econamy 169; R.Posner, Economic
analysis 0/ Law (20 II, New York, Aspen); D.J .Pyle, The economics 0/ crime and law enforcement (1983, London, Macmillan);
G.Stigler, "The optimum enforcement oflaws" (1970) 78 Journal 0/ Political Economy 526
452 Braun (2003), fu.l72, 59S
453 Ibid, fn.l72, S9S
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because authorities reaped significant benefits from the procedure's greater flexibility
coupled with a widely held perception that there was very little threat of legal challenge.454
Braun concluded that, due to an inadequate enforcement regime, authorities assessing the
risks of procurement decisions could be confident that non-compliant/risky behaviour
would not be the subject of sanctions.
Research by Pachnou in 2003 into enforcement of procurement law in the UK
highlighted the reasons for the inadequacies.i'" These include high litigation costs; the
uncertainty of trail outcome and low chances of success; and characteristics specific to the
UK, not present in other Member States (e.g. a non-confrontational legal culture and a
generalised trust in the integrity of the public sector). More specific reasons for litigation
avoidance in the UK include bidders' commercial approach to winning contracts (to
accept losing some contracts as a natural commercial risk) and the fear of future reprisals.
Pachnou also found that many bidders were not sufficiently aware of their legal rights. In
addition, at EU level, the Commission could only justify enforcement action in cases of
systematic and severe breaches.
To remedy the above situation, a proponent of economic theories would say that in order
to secure greater compliance all that is required is to increase the probability of cases of
non-compliance being apprehended and punished and/or increase the severity of
punishments so that compliance with the Directive becomes the economically rational
response. It is arguable that since Braun's research in 2001 a change in circumstances may
have occurred impacting upon an authority's cost/benefit analysis. For example,
unsuccessful bidders may be more inclined to challenge under competitive dialogue
4S4 Ibid, fit.l72, 596
455 D.Pachnou, "Bidders remedies to enforce the EC procurement rules in England and Wales" (2003) 12(I) PPLR 35; D.Pachnou,
The effectiveness of bidder remedies for enforcing the EC public procurement rules: Q case study of the public works sector In the
United Kingdom and Greece (2003, Nottingham, University of Nottingham)
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because the procedure is more prescriptive than the negotiated procedure and
participation is potentially more expensive for them. There has also been a strengthening
of the system of procurement review and remedies.t" In addition, it is arguable that the
courts in the UK are demonstrating an increasingly robust attitude toward the availability
of remedies in procurement disputes.l" Also, over time, particularly following the
publicity the 2004 directives and remedies amendments attracted, suppliers may be more
familiar with the procurement rules and more aware of their rights, and there are signs of
a change in culture (for example public procurement cases reaching the courts have
increased in number year on year).
8.3 The shortcoming of deterrence approaches
There are difficulties with understandings of compliance based solely upon economic
deterrence models.l" This is primarily due to several assumptions upon which these
explanations tend to be based, which much empirical research indicates rarely hold true in
• 459pracoce.
First, economic deterrence models assume that those being regulated are fully-informed
rational utility maximisers. This free market economic conception is rarely encountered in
reality. A more realistic conception is provided by behavioural economics, which
emphasises the limited abilities of economic actors to achieve their desired goals,
recognising that they suffer from bounded rationality.460It is noted that those busy
individuals in charge of corporations (or authorities) "have neither the time, capability,
knowledge, nor information required to maximise corporate utility, but rather 'satisfice' by
456 Directive 2007/661EC, th.6
457 See, for example, Hannon, fn.l SO
458 J .Scholz, "Enforcement policy and corporate misconduct: the changing perspective of deterrence theory" (1997) 60 Law and
Contemp. Probs. 2S3, 2S4
459 See Gunningham & Kagan, "Regulation and business behavior" (200S) 27(2) Law & Policy 213, 216
460 See generally H.A.Simon, "Models of bounded rationality" (1982, Cambridge Mass, MIT Press)
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choosing familiar alternatives that are good enough for the current situation".461Thus, in
the words of Baldwin, rather than compliance being a deliberate financial choice, "[t]hose
who are reasonably well disposed to comply with rules tend not to follow them because
they do not know about them, because they are unwilling to find out about them or
because they cannot or will not process the information necessary for compliance'V"
A second assumption forming the basis of economic deterrence models is that legislation
unambiguously defines misbehaviour. However, unlike say criminal law, administrative
regulation tends to be associated with the management of activity as opposed to its
absolute prohibition, and this leads to an inherent flexibility in the application and
enforcement of regulation.t" This is a pertinent issue in relation to the topic of
competitive dialogue and will be looked at inmore detail in the next section.
A further assumption is that legal punishment provides the primary incentive for
regulatory compliance. Deterrence models though fail to account for findings of high
levels of compliance even when the threat of legal enforcement and sanctions appear
remote464 and also situations of over-compliance.t"
In view of these shortcomings, it is apparent that, whilst deterrence ideas are an important
part of the design of any regulatory system, on their own they do not adequately explain
compliance.t'"
461 Scholz (1997), fu.45S, 256
462 Baldwin (1990), fu.44 7, 329
463 Amodu (200S), fu.446, 1
464 Thornton et al. (2005), fu.44S, 264
~ Kagan et al. (2003), fu.44S, 52
466 See Amodu (200S),fu.446
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8.4 Regulatory design failure
The way in which regulations are designed can impact upon compliance levels.467EU
procurement regulation is roundly accepted as complex, uncertain and fast moving,
making it difficult for even experienced practitioners to ensure compliance: it is "difficult
to understand and apply, not least because of its complexity, because of the poor drafting
of [EU] legislation, and because of the creative role played by the Court of Justice, whose
decisions are not always accessible or easy to understand'Y" This situation raises the
possibility of unintentional non-compliance.
As is particularly relevant to the discussion of competitive dialogue where there are
numerous legal grey areas it is difficult to say whether the behaviour of contracting
authorities is compliant. Uncertainty can lead to accidental breaches of the law (e.g. due
to authorities not knowing what compliant behaviour is) and also deliberate breaches,
where actors interpret the rules so as to comply with the letter but not the spirit of the
rules (e.g. creative compliance).469It is further noted that lack of clarity can make effective
policing of the rules problematic.f" For example, aggrieved bidders considering legal
action have a similar uncertainty in relation to their chances of success. Also, aggrieved
bidders may appreciate the commercial importance of a flexible reading of the rules and
so not want to risk having the courts limit this flexibility, which could be of benefit to
them when competing for future contracts.?"
Legal certainty is not helped by the fact that the Regulations merely replicate the drafting
of the Directive. As a consequence, the ambiguous EU provisions have "become equally
467 See OECD. Assuring Environmental Compliance: A Toolkit for Building Beller Environmental Inspectors in Eastem
European. Caucasus and Central Asia, (2005) available at www.occd.orgldataoccdl61/62/344996Sl.pdf(accessed 31/10120II)
461 Arrowsmith (2006), fil.84, 88
469 See Edelman et al. (1991), fil.448
470 Gordon et al., ''The Economic bnpact of the European Union Regime on Public Procurement: Lessons for the WTO" (1998)
21(2) The World Economy 159,170
471 Braun (2003), fn.l 72, 596
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ambiguous national rules".472It is suggested that, in cases of ambiguous regulation, soft
law, is important for encouraging compliance. According to Gordon et al., "[w]hilst this
would not provide a conclusive interpretation, it would provide operators with a
framework to think in a constructive way about problems of interpretation and to make
intelligent judgments".473This may explain the key role Braun observed UK soft law to
play in the development of PFI procurement practice before 2004.474 Braun's empirical
study revealed that authorities procuring PFI projects came to regard non-binding
guidance from UK government as authoritative interpretations of the law.475 This was so
even where the guidance was not compatible with Commission interpretations'["; for
example, guidance encouraged the general practice of using the negotiated procedure.
Although in the past offering a more flexible interpretation of the EU procurement rules,
UK guidance in relation to PFI procurement is now much more in line with Commission
guidance. Thus, the qualitative interviews in the current study will be able to build upon
Braun's findings, providing a greater insight into the role of soft law.
It is noted that compliance rates are lower when regulation does not fit well with existing
market practices or is not supported by cultural norms and civic institutions.477
Competitive dialogue is said to correspond closely to the practices adopted by UK
contracting authorities for procuring complex projects under the negotiated procedure.478
To the extent that this is the case compliance should not be problematic. Compliance is
likely to be an issue, however, where changes are required to existing practices, particularly
where the commercial benefits of these changes are debateable. As was discussed in
472 Gordon et al. (1998), fn.470, 170
473 Ibid, 179
474 Braun (2003), fn.ln, 582
475 S Tee reasury Taskforce (1998), fn.171; Treasury Taskforce (1999), fn.175; Treasury Taskforce, Step by step guide 10 the PFI
procurement process (J999, London)
476 Pimlico, fn.l79
477 OECD (2005), fn.467, 28
471 OGC (2006), fn.187,1.2
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chapter seven, this may be relevant in relation to restrictions on the work that can be done
with the preferred bidder.
A 2005 report by the DEeD notes that " ... sometimes the whole point of introducing
regulation is to counter a market or cultural practice". It might be said that this was the
reason for introducing competitive dialogue. The report goes on to note, however, that
"if regulation cuts across existing cultures and fails to build support through education
[and] market incentives ... it is unlikely to be effective at eliciting compllance't.?" There is
little evidence of the benefits of competitive dialogue being promoted to the procurement
community, particularly bidders.
There may also be market incentives upon authorities to limit the exposure of themselves
and suppliers to the risk of legal challenge. Braun's interview data revealed that often
banks funding PFI deals would require warranties that all statutory obligations had been
complied with.480
Competing government policies may be a factor behind poor compliance.t" In relation to
the conduct of competitive dialogue, authorities must observe the rules, which promote
equal treatment, transparency and competition, but also ensure that they obtain value for
money, which they are under increasing pressure from government to achieve. A rigid
application of the rules may in certain circumstances conflict with an authority's goal of
running an efficient procurement process that maximises value for money. In these
situations it might be argued that there is the greatest risk of non-compliant/legally risky)
conduct.
479 OECD (2005), fil,467, 28
480 Braun (200 1), fil.l72, 326
481 OECD (2005), fu.467, 28
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8.5 Alternative and complimentary explanations
In seeking to provide a more complete picture of compliance, scholars have sought to
integrate economic models with ideas from the disciplines of psychology and sociology.t"
According to these theories, other factors such as moral and social values and opinions on
the legitimacy of regulations will playa part in compliance.
A regulated actor's normative values may lead to voluntary compliance with regulations,
irrespective of cost.483 The reason for this is that individuals make choices for a wide
variety of reasons, and not just because of the economic utility they derive: "they choose
to do things out of a sense of duty, altruism, or because they have been taught to do a job
in a particular way".484Thornton et al. similarly emphasise the importance of norms on
compliance, stating that" ... in democratic societies with a strong rule of law tradition,
most business managers have 'internalised' (or agree with) the social norms that under-
gird many regulatory rules".485
Tyler distinguished between two types of so called "internalised obligation" (i.e.
normative factors).486First, regulated actors may comply with the law because they view
the legal authority they are dealing with as having a legitimate right to dictate their
behaviour. There is an argument that legitimacy depends largely on the regulating
authority's ability to provide favourable outcornes.t" Sutinen & Kuperan state that
"people perceive as legitimate and obey the institutions that produce positive outcomes
412 See Amodu (2008), fn.446, 7-15; Kagan & Scholz, "The 'criminology of the corporation' and regulatory enforcement
strategies", in Hawkins & Thomas (eds.) Enforcing Regulation (1984, Boston, Kluwer-Nihotl); Sutinen & Kuperan, "A socio-
economic theory of regulatory compliance" (1999) 26( 1/2/3) Interno/ional Journal of Social Economics 174; T.Tyler, "Why
people obey the law", (1990, New Haven, Yale University Press); van SneUenberg & van de Peppel, "Perspectives on compliance:
non-compliance with environmental licences in the Netherlands" (2002) 12 European Environment 131
413 See P.Cartwright, Consumer protection and the criminal law: law, theory, and policy in the UK, (2001, Cambridge, CUP), 216
4114 See BJ.McCormick, Introducing economics, (1977, 2ndcd., London, Penguin), 176, cited by Cartwright (2001), ibid, 216
41$ Thornton et al. (2005), fn.448, 64
486 Tyler (1990), fn.482, 25
417 Sutinen & Kuperan, fn.482, 6
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for them".488A difficulty with respect to the EU procurement rules is that the benefits of
regulated procurement are predominantly macroeconomic in nature (i.e. the benefits of an
open market); the direct benefits for an authority on individual procurements from
observance of EU procurement rules may not be obvious.489
The second type of internalised obligation relates to the regulated actor's desire to behave
in accordance with personal moral standards. The greater the degree to which personal
moral values are interlined with the regulatory requirement, the greater the chance of
voluntary compliance. The difficulty for regulators in securing compliance with
administrative rules may in part be down to the fact that, unlike criminal law for example,
they have no basis in what is usually referred to as "unwritten law".49OAs Snellenberg &
Peppel explain: "[n]orms in administrative law were first established by the law itself.
Even worthy ideals and objectives must first become part of the legal consciousness
before compliance itself becomes natural".491Kagan & Scholz add that arbitrary or
unreasonable burdens imposed by regulation (such as excessive compliance costs) may
lead certain actors who are generally disposed to obey the law to adopt a strategy of
selective non-compliance.t"
As previous chapters have shown, in complex procurements there is often a need for
flexibility if procurement objectives, such as value for money, are to be achieved. It is in
these cases that a rigid EU requirement emphasising transparency and competition can
stand in the way of efficient procurement and prevent a contracting authority from
obtaining value for money for the benefit of taxpayers (whose support may be necessary
for the leaders of authorities to be re-elected). To the extent that competitive dialogue
-Ibid, 6
489 See Braun (2001), fn. I72, 325.326.
490 Snellenberg & Peppel (2002), fn.482, 131
491 Ibid, 131
492 Kagan & Scholz (I984), fn.482, 75
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matches best practice in the long run compliance should be high. Contracting authorities
will have no need to take on legal risk. However, where the legal requirements are
perceived by authorities as disproportionate or unfair compliant behaviour is less
guaranteed. In the context of competitive dialogue this situation may arise, for example,
where in the latter stages of the process a change to a preferred bidder's tender (which
may be completely out of the contracting authority's control) means the only perceived
legally compliant course of action is the disproportionate act of restarting the
procurement (see chapter seven).
Social environmental influences may also have an impact on the internalisation of
behavioural norms.493 For instance, the opinions of peers (other similar contracting
authorities) on the acceptability of legally risky practices are likely to influence behaviour.
According to Sutinen & Kuperan, the available evidence indicates that "a given individual
is more non-compliant the more his community and peer groups are non-compliant'Y"
It is noted further that the effectiveness of new regulation can also be down to
psychological factors. For example, one of these factors is a dislike of change, i.e. the
belief that familiar ways of operating are safe and new ways are risky.49SIt may be that this
is one of the factors behind any negativity towards competitive dialogue. If so, in time, as
authorities become more familiar with the process, it may found that any teething
problems iron themselves out. Also, it is highlighted that fear of change is closely related
to inertia. Many people are said to tend to naturally resist change because of the
perceived effort it will require.t"
493 See Sutinen & Kuperan (1999), fu.482, 4
494 Sutinen & Kuperan (1999), fu.482, 5, citing Geerken & Gove, "Deterrence: some theoretical considerations" (1975) 9 Law and
Society Review 495; J.Vogel, "Taxation and Public Opinion in Sweden: an interpretation of recent survey data" (1974) National!ax.~ouma_l499; Witte & Woodbury, "The effect of tax laws and tax administration on tax compliance: the case of the US
individual mcome tax" (1985) National TaxJournal I
m See OEeD (2005), fu.467, 31
496lbid, 31
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In seeking an explanation of compliance that reflects its multifaceted nature, Kagan &
Scholz discern three distinct "images" of the regulated corporarion.?" The first image is
that of the "amoral calculator", which corresponds to the economic deterrence theory
view of the motivations behind non-compliance. The next image sees the regulated
corporation as a "political citizen". This image is similar to the psychological and
sociological perspectives of compliance, where corporations are viewed as "ordinarily
inclined to comply with the law, partly because of a belief in the rule of law, partly as a
matter of long term self-interest". Under this image, "law breaking stems from principled
disagreement with regulations".498The final image is the "organisationally incompetent
entity" where rule breaking is down to organisational failure. Each of these different
forms of non-compliance calls for a different enforcement strategy. According to Kagan
& Scholz, indiscriminate reliance on any single theory of non-compliance is likely to be
wrong, and when translated into an enforcement strategy it is likely to be
d . 499counterpro ucnve.
In relation to EU public procurement law, in addition to enforcement, the above
discussion emphasises that other measures such as steps aimed at simplification (e.g.
standardisation and guidance) and education (e.g. knowledge sharing) are all needed for an
effective compliance strategy.
8.6 Concluding remarks
Itwould seem from the discussion in this chapter that different UK authorities are likely
to be influenced to differing degrees by a multitude of factors when it comes to their
approach to compliance (legal risk) with competitive dialogue. It is hoped that the
497 Kagan & Scholz (1984). fn.482
49I1bid, 75
499lbid, 85
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findings from the qualitative interviews in this study will build upon the findings of Braun
to provide an enhanced understanding of compliance with the public procurement rules.
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9 Methodology and method
9.1 Introduction
The aims of the research project are to examine the way in which competitive dialogue is
applied in the UK and perceptions of the legal framework. It has not been possible to
meet these research aims through the analysis of the legal rules on competitive dialogue
that has preceded chapter nine (chapters three-seven); this has served to highlight the
uncertainty of the law. In order to meet the research aims a robust empirical investigation
of competitive dialogue was necessary. Chapter nine will detail the empirical approach
adopted.
The research project involves the infusion of a socio-legal perspective on regulation into
an empirical study of the law in action. It will be seen that the research builds upon the
analysis of the legal rules (chapters three-seven) and the consideration of regulation theory
(chapter eight) with semi-structured interviews with individuals with experience of UK
competitive dialogue procurement practice, exploring the reality of competitive dialogue
in the UK The chapter will thus begin by explaining the reasons why a socio-legal
perspective was adopted. The chapter will next move on to consider empirical research
methods. It will be explained why qualitative interviews were considered the most
suitable method. The chapter will then discuss the details of the research interviews that
took place.
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9.2 The research design
9.2.1 The soclo-legal perspective
Historically, doctrinal scholarship has dominated research in law. It is therefore
appropriate to explain why the research project was conducted under the heading "socio-
legal" and not "doctrinal".
The doctrinal method is concerned with the discovery and/or development of legal
doctrines (systematic formulations of the law in particular contexts) through the analysis
of legal rules.500 The doctrinal method is commonly associated with the jurisprudential
approach of legal positivism. For this reason, doctrinal scholarship has tended to regard
the law as an autonomous discipline, distinct from other social sciences (e.g. sociology).sol
Doctrinal work is unlikely to venture much further than an analysis of primary sources of
law (i.e. constitutions, legislation and case law). This may be seen as a limitation upon the
types of research questions that can be effectively addressed by doctrinal scholarship.
The research project has involved an element of what might be termed doctrinal analysis,
whereby in the preceding chapters the EU procurement rules have been examined in
order to identify as far as possible what the law is. However, such an analysis fails to
provide a complete picture of competitive dialogue in the UK. Any discussion of
competitive dialogue in practice on the basis of solely legal texts is not possible other than
in a purely speculative way.
lOO C.McCrudden. "Legal research and social sciences" (2006) I22(Oct) LQR 632; P.Chynowetb. "Legal research" in Knight &
Rudd~k (eds.) Advanced research methods in the built environment. (2008. Chichester. Wiley-Blackwell)
SOl B.B1X .... LaW as an autonomous discipline" in Cane & Tushnet (eds.), Oxford handbook of legal studies (2003. OUP); R.Posner.
"The dechne oflaw as an autonomous discipline: 1962-1987" (1987) lOOHLR 761
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For several reasons, it is important that in the context of competitive dialogue a practical
perspective ("law in action'') is obtained.so2First, until the CJEU interpret the legal grey
areas, any discussion of how the legal requirements are to be applied in practice on the
basis of solely the legal texts is not possible. It is often the case that the way in which
legal rules are applied in practice, particularly legal grey areas, to some extent shapes what
the law is (in the sense of what the courts (or soft law) are likely to say about it).
According to Donald Black, " ... law is not what lawyers regard as binding or obligatory
precepts, but rather, for example, the observable dispositions of judges, policemen,
prosecutors, or administrative officials".so3
A second reason, as the chapter eight highlighted, is that legal rules prescribe how
individuals ought to behave; they do not define how individuals behave in reality. The
research project aims to ascertain the reality of UK practice under competitive dialogue.
The research seeks to understand human behaviour to explain decision-making under the
legal rules. It is unlikely that the information provided by a purely doctrinal analysis
would enable this type of investigation.
As previously mentioned, non-binding government guidance has been seen to playa
significant role in shaping UK procurement practice. A third reason for the lack of
suitability of a doctrinal approach is that a consideration of just the legal rules would
neglect the impact of this soft law. In order to obtain an accurate and complete picture of
competitive dialogue it is necessary, in addition to merely recognizing the existence of
guidance from government, to find out how much weight is attached to the guidance in
practice.
502 R.Pound, "Law in books and law in action" (1910)44 Am.L.RelI. 12
503 D.Black, ''The boundaries oflegal sociology" [1971·72] 81 Yale LawJourna/1086, 1091
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In contrast to the positivist assumptions underlying certain doctrinal scholarship, socio-
legal research is a form of interdisciplinary research that places considerably more stress
upon the social context.i" The approach opens up different types of questions that a
black letter law approach may struggle to answer. Socio-legal research is seen to be of
most benefit for two main types of study: "gap studies", which focus on the way in which
the law in action deviates from the law in books, and "impact studies", which aim to help
us understand more about the effects of particular interventions. 50S It will be apparent that
the research project to some extent falls within both types of study.
9.2.2 Empiricalresearch methods
Empirical research methods are considered the most suitable means of learning about
practical aspects of competitive dialogue. "Empiricism" is used to denote "a general
approach to reality that suggests that only knowledge gained through experience and the
senses is acceptable".506Empirical research in law involves the study, through direct
methods rather than secondary sources, of the operations and effects of the law.507 In
terms of the benefits provided by empirical legal research it has been stated that it "helps
to build our theoretical understanding of law as a social and political phenomenon and
contributes to the development of social theory ... empirical research helps us understand
the law better and an empirical understanding of the law in action helps us understand
society better".508Whilst some areas of law, such as criminal law, have been transformed
by empirical research, others, particularly commercial areas like public procurement which
can be technically intricate and so not as accessible to non-lawyers, have been
comparatively untouched by it.509
504 Banakar & Travers, "Theory and method in socio-Iegal research" (2005, Oxford, Hart)
505 See Black (1971), tn.S03, 1085-1086
506 A.Bryman, Social research methods, (2004, 2nd ed., Oxford, OUP), 7
507 Baldwin & Davis, "Empirical research in law" in Cane & Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford handbook of legal studies, (2003, Oxford,
OUP), Chapter 39, 880
508 Gcnn et al., Law In the real world: improving our understanding of how law works: final report and recommendations (2006,
London, Nuffield Foundation) available at www.uc!.AC.ukIlawstsocio-lepVempjrical (accessed 31/10120II), para.4
509 Baldwin & Davis (2003), tn.S07
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There are a range of different empirical research methods, the choice of which will likely
depend upon the nature of the research problem. It is common to distinguish between
quantitative and qualitative methods.i'" Quantitative research in the social sciences will
involve the testing of hypothesis/theory (deductive theory) through the collection and
measurement of objective, quantifiable and statistically valid data. The aim is to produce
scientifically valid and reliable findings that are generalisable. A quantitative approach,
being focused only upon externally observable social action (patterns of behaviour),
would, in the context of the research project, be best suited to research that wanted to
provide the perspective of an external observer of UK legal practice under competitive
dialogue, rather than the perspective of a participant. A qualitative study is usually of an
exploratory nature, i.e. hypothesis/theory generating (inductive theory), where researchers
seek in-depth description of social behavior (typically focusing on a modest number of
interactionsj.i" Qualitative researchers tend not to be interested in central tendencies (e.g.
some measure of what is typical or average) but in syntheses of understandings that come
about by combining a variety of perspectives.!" In the context of the research project, a
qualitative approach would seek an internal perspective of UK legal practice under
competitive dialogue, which means viewing practice in consideration of the
understandings of participants involved.l" The research project is in-depth exploratory
research into competitive dialogue. The type of data wanted is of a qualitative nature.
The project seeks to understand, describe and explain behaviour "from the inside" by
obtaining the internal perspectives of those involved in the practical application of
competitive dialogue (data not capable of being reduced to numbers).
510 B
ryman (2004). fil.S06; S.Sarantakos. Social research. (2005. New York. Palgrave Macmillan); J.Cresweli. Research design:
~ualitative & quantitative approaches (1994. Thousand Oaks. Sage)
II See Baldwin & Davis (2003). rn.S07
su Rubin and Rubin. Qualitative Interviewing: The art of hearing data. (2005. Thousand Oaks. Sage). 28
Braun (2001). rn.I72. 75
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9.2.3 Interviews
9.2.3.1 Introduction
There are numerous data collection methods.i" In deciding between data collection
methods it is suggested that a data collection method should be chosen based upon its
capacity to yield maximal access to the information sought, and to yield information of
maximal accuracy and relevance. However, practical considerations, such as the cost of
acquiring information, will also have a bearing on the choices. SIS
The research project employed interviews as the primary means of gathering data.
Interviews, "the favourite 'digging tool' of the sociologist'Y" are "a ... verbal interchange
in which one person, the interviewer attempts to elicit information or expressions of
opinions or belief from another person ...",517 The research project wants to obtain the
"inner perspectives" of actors with experience of the practical application of competitive
dialogue.i" Interviews with these actors are considered the ideal means of accessing the
data required by the research project, as it allows actors to directly contribute descriptions
of personal experiences, understandings, attitudes, values, and opinions, (things that
cannot be observed) enabling the author to gain a picture of the "living law" of
competitive dialogue.i"
In terms of accuracy, it is recognised that the author's identity, values and beliefs will play
a role in formulating interview questions and interpreting interview responses.f" With this
514 Bryman (2004), fn.S06, 26S
m Richardson et al., Interviewing: itsforms and/unctions (I96S, New York, Basic Books), 21-30
516 NK.Denzin, The research act: a theoretical introduction to soci%gical methods (1989, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall),
102
517 Maccoby & Maccoby, "The interview: a tool of social science" in Gardner (ed.), Handbook of social psy<:ho/ogy,vol.l (1954,
Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley), 449-487, quoted in Denzin (1989), ibid, 103
::: M.~atton, Qua/itative research and evaluation methods, (2002, Thousand Oaks, Calif, Sage)
520 D.Stlvennan,lnterpreting qualitative data: methods for analyzing talk, text, and interaction (2006, London, Sage), 109
M.Denscornbe, The good research guide:for small-scale social reseaTf:hprojects (2007, Maidenhead, Open University Press)
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in mind, itwas necessary for the author be on guard against preconceptions and to
suspend judgments on issues for the duration of the research.
The majority of the research interviews were carried out face-to-face. This was the
preferred format (over telephone interviews or written questionnaires), as, in terms of
accuracy, the author was present to witness non-verbal communication (e.g. facial
expressions) and to ensure the accuracy and relevance of responses by probing for more
specific answers and by repeating or explaining questions when there may have been a
misunderstanding. Also, the interviewer was able to record spontaneous answers, which
had not been prepared. In addition, face-to-face interviews are beneficial in terms of
building rapport and trust with interviewees. In situations where it was not possible to
arrange face-to-face interviews, interviews were conducted over the telephone (18
interviews were telephone interviews), which was deemed an acceptable substitute.
A recognised disadvantage of the face-to-face interview is that they can be very costly and
time consuming. 52! For the research project the time available for collection and analysis
of data was 19 months. The author was also generously funded by the Economic &
Social Research Council and Bevan Brittan LLP.
9.2.3.2 Structure
Interviews are often classified according to their degree of structure or standardisation.
These range from structured (schedule standardised) interviews at one end of the scale to
unstructured (non-standardised) interviews at the other, with semi structured (non-
schedule standardised) interviews falling somewhere between the two.
'21 K.Baiiey, Methods of Social Research (1978, New York, Free Press), 175; B.Gillingham, The rtsearch Inte",iew (2000,
London, Continuum), 9
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A structured interview format requires the interviewer not to deviate from the wording or
ordering of a predetermined set of questions. The problem with such interviews is that
they confine respondents to a discussion of what the interviewer considers important.
For this reason, such a format was wholly unsuitable for the research project. In
comparison to the interviewees, the author has little knowledge about competitive
dialogue in practice. It is important therefore that the interviews elicit data on the issues
interviewees consider to be of greatest importance to them in using competitive dialogue.
The unstructured interview involves no predetermined set of questions. This format was
not appropriate because, although the research wanted to approach public procurement
from the interviewee's perspective, there are certain specific topics and issues that need to
be covered, e.g. regarding the identified legal grey areas.
Semi-structured interviews are a combination of the above mentioned formats. Here,
interviewers will have reference to an interview guide, which lists topics that need to be
covered with each interviewee, but there is no set wording or ordering of questions and
interviewees are not restricted in the answers they may give. A semi-structured interview
format was used for the research project. The author was able to ensure that certain
topics were covered, and interviewees also had freedom to express themselves in their
own words, to assess the importance and relevance of questions asked to them, and to
raise issues and views which had not been foreseen.522
9.2.3.3 Interview questions
A general structure was followed in the interviews. There were three stages, an
introductory stage, the main body of the interview (where themes were developed), and a
concluding stage (which sought to gradually conclude the interview rather than end it with
522 S K
. vale,lnterviews; an introduction to qualitative research interviewing (1996, Thousand Oaks, Calif, Sage)
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an abrupt halt).523Keats suggests that the topics move from the more general to the more
particular, and begin with the least threatening aspect.524 Thus, following an introduction
to the research, the interviews started with general questions, such as on the interviewee's
experience with competitive dialogue (sectors, types of authority, for instance); the issues
that immediately sprang to mind when speaking about the practical application of
competitive dialogue; and whether or not the legal rules struck an appropriate balance
between transparency and the need for flexibility. The interviews would generally then go
through each stage of the competitive dialogue process concentrating upon issues raised
in the legal analysis. Following this, unless it had already been satisfactorily covered,
interviewees were asked questions pertaining to perceptions of legal risk. The interviews
concluded with general questions on how the legal rules or legal practice under
competitive dialogue might be improved and whether or not there were any issues that
the interview had not touched upon or not dealt with in sufficient depth that the
interviewee considered required further attention.
Although the precise wording of questions was not determined before each interview,
before going out into the field the author did need to consider how best to elicit the
information required from the research participants. It was felt that certain questions,
such as regarding the scope for negotiation post-dialogue, may be sensitive, e.g, if practice
did not match the legal requirements. In these questions there was a risk that interviewees
may be reluctant to divulge accurate information. For example, interviewees may distort
the truth because they are worried about the interviewer's personal opinion of them, they
want to protect their professional reputation, or it may also be that, if they (or clients) are
benefiting from a flexible reading of the procurement rules, they do not want to risk
drawing attention to it (e.g. Commission attention). Assurances as to anonymity were
m D.Keats, Interviewing: a practical guide for students and profess/onals (2000, Sydney, University of New South Wales Press),
so
sl4lbid, 49
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expected to go some way in making interviewees feel more comfortable about answering
questions freely. However, it was also necessary for the author to phrase questions so as
to avoid formalistic responses, i.e. where interviewees answer how something should be
done rather than how they actually do things.525Rubin & Rubin suggest that "[i]fwhat you
are asking about might involve violation of rules, laws, or norms, you should probably
work out an indirect way of approaching the matter".526This may involve asking for
stories on a topic and then analysing them for themes they contain, or another approach
would be to provide a concrete incident of the topic under discussion and ask for
comments about it.527 This method was employed in relation to post-dialogue flexibility
and confidentiality questions.
9.3 Ethical considerations
According to Fontana & Frey, "[b]ecause the objects of inquiry in interviewing are human
beings, researchers must take extreme care to avoid any harm to them".528Before
undertaking any aspect of the research that had the potential to raise ethical concerns, the
author sought ethical approval pursuant to the procedures established within the School
of Law, University of Nottingham.
The research interviews did not raise any ethical issues likely to cause harm (Physical,
emotional, or any other kind) to participants. Nevertheless, high importance was attached
to interviewee confidentiality. Interviews only took place where the informed consent of
participants had been obtained, i.e. the author received the consent of participants after
accurately informing them about the research.529At the start of each interview,
interviewees were asked if the interview could be recorded; all but four agreed to this.
52$ Rubin & Rubin (2005), m.512
5261bid, 74
527Ibid, 74-75
521Denzin & Lincoln, Handbook of qualitative research (1994, Thousand Oaks Sage) 88m~ , ,
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The interview data was securely stored in password protected files on the author's
computer and in a locked desk at the University of Nottingham. In accordance with the
terms of the School of Law's ethical approval of the project, the data will be destroyed
following seven years from completion of the PhD. The interview transcripts were
written up to ensure the identity of interviewees was protected. Great care was taken to
ensure that interviewees and specific experiences were not identifiable in any way.
9.4 The interview sample
9.4.1 Introduction
Section four will explain the type and number of cases selected to be interviewed. The
aim of the research project is to examine the way in which competitive dialogue is applied
in the UK, and perceptions of the legal framework. A "good informant" for the purposes
of the interviews is an individual with the necessary knowledge and practical UK
experience of competitive dialogue.r" Thus, for the purposes of the research project, the
population of cases that are of interest (the target population) is made up of those who
have played a key role in practice in the UK in the decision-making process on the
application of the legal rules on competitive dialogue.
The project could have aimed for complete coverage of the target population. However,
this was not practical (i.e. due to time and financial constraints), not always possible (e.g.
we may not be able to locate all potential interviewees), and also not necessary.i" It is
common therefore in empirical research for researchers to study only a sample of the
target population. Following an introduction to sampling in qualitative research, this
section will proceed to explain how the sample in the research project was selected.
534) See IM.Morse, "Designing funded qualitative research" in Denzin & Lincoln (cds.) Strategies of qualitative research (1998.
London, Sage). 73
531 See Mwphy et al., Qualitative research methods in health technology assessment: a review of the literature. (1998. Alton. Core
Research. on behalf of the NCCHTA). Chapter 14. 90
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9.4.2 Sampling strategy
A number of different sampling strategies have been developed for researchers to select
samples for study. The focus of quantitative empirical research tends to be upon ensuring
the sample represents statistically or in a statistically relevant way the target population
(e.g. probability sampling strategies are commonly used).532This approach was not suitable
for the research project, for instance, because the precise number of individuals with UK
experience of competitive dialogue could not be ascertained and hence not every unit of
the target population can be given an equal and known opportunity of being chosen for
the sample. As of December 31 2009, there were 1,380 UK O]EU notices specifying that
the procurement was to be conducted under competitive dialogue; however, it is not
possible, at least not without considerable expense (time and money) to ascertain all
individuals sufficiently involved in the application of the legal rules.
Many regard all sampling in qualitative research to be "purposive".533By "purposive" it is
meant that the sample units are chosen because they have particular features or
characteristics which enable in-depth exploration and understanding of the issues of
central importance to the purpose of the inquiry.534
9.4.3 The sample
9.4.3.1 Introduction
Subjects from the target population (see above) were purposefully selected in order to put
together a theoretically meaningful sample, in terms of developing full explanations and
understandings of UK procurement practice under competitive dialogue.
m See Ritchie et al., "Designing and selecting samples", Chapter Four in Ritchie & Lewis (eds.), Qualitative research practice: a
ff:ide for social science students and researchers, (2003, London, Sage), 77-7S; Sarantakos (200S). Ib.S IO. IS4-166.
33 Patton (2002). Ib.S IS. 230
534 Bryman (2004). Ib.S06. 334
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The practical application of competitive dialogue in the UK must be considered from as
many different angles as are feasible. The credibility of findings is enhanced when
qualitative explorations reflect a variety of perspectives.t''' No one view is entirely
accurate. As Rubin & Rubin explain, " ... reality is complex; to accurately portray that
complexity, you need to gather contradictory or overlapping perceptions and nuanced
understandings that different individuals hold".536
The full range of views and opinions on the practical application of competitive dialogue
were considered to be represented by the following groups:
(1) procurement officers and in-house legal advisors within UK contracting
authorities that have held competitive dialogue procurements;
(2) extemallegal advisors that have advised contracting authorities involved in UK
competitive dialogue procurements; and
(3) representatives from policymaking organisations in the UK responsible for
overseeing the application of competitive dialogue.
For the reasons outlined below, it is considered that these three viewpoints are of
sufficient variety to enable a comprehensive examination of the application of competitive
dialogue in the UK.
m Rubin & Rubin (2005). fil.SI2; Strauss & Corbin. Basics of Qualuative Research: Techniques and Procedures/or Developing
Grounded Theory (1998, Thousand Oaks, Sage); Glaser & Strauss, TheDiscovery o/Grounded Theory: Strategies/or Qualitative
Research (2008. New Brunswick. Aldine Transaction)
'36 Rubin & Rubin (2005). ibid
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The rules on competitive dialogue are primarily addressed to contracting authorities, so
interviews with group one, procurement officers and in-house legal advisors, may appear
to be of most relevance to the research objectives. However, because this group was not
considered to playa leading role in the application of the procurement rules, the views
and opinions of procurement officers and in-house lawyers did not feature in Braun's
similar qualitative investigation into UK PFI procurement practice.!" Braun's research
was concluded in 2001; at that time, UK authorities were seen as lacking the necessary in-
house expertise, and therefore assumed largely dependent on the advice of external
experts.538 Over a decade has passed since Braun went out into the field of study to
conduct his qualitative research. Authorities in the UK are now much more familiar with
EU public procurement regulation and complex arrangements, such as PFI. It is also the
case that steps have (are) being taken to raise public sector procurement skill levels.i"
The second group, legal advisors with experience and expertise in advising UK
contracting authorities on the conduct of competitive dialogue procurements, made up
the entirety of Braun's sample.540 In the opinion of Braun, PFI procurement practice was
predominantly influenced by legal practitioners. Braun states, "[ljegal advisors can be
perceived as key managers in the process of applying the law in books to real life
situations'V" It was observed that the role oflegal advisors was to acquaint authorities
with the procedural options open to them and to assess the risks associated with these
options. Although authorities have complete discretion in how they respond to legal
advice, Braun's interview data found that public sector clients generally followed legal
advice on procurement laW.542
m See Braun (200 I), fu.l72
538 Ibid, 88
539 See, for instance, HM Treasury, Transforming Government Procurement (2007, London)
540 Braun (2001), fu. I72, 87
541 Ibid, 87
542 Ibid, 88
171
It was considered important to assess whether Braun's assumptions in 2001 hold true
today, particularly as, if some authorities are attempting competitive dialogues without the
help of external lawyers, their input will be necessary to provide a full and accurate picture
of competitive dialogue procurement practice. A scoping survey was therefore carried out
between 26 October 2009 and 18 November 2009 in order to establish the extent of the
role of legal advisors in competitive dialogue procurement. The details of this study can
be found below.
A different perspective of the legal rules in practice will be provided by representatives
from UK policymaking organisations. These organisations and their roles was set out in
chapter two. Although, in this capacity as policymakers, these organisations are not
responsible for applying the legal rules in practice, they will commonly advise contracting
authorities and issue guidance on the conduct competitive dialogue. It has already been
highlighted on several occasions the extensive role that soft law has been found to play in
UK public procurement practice, and therefore it may be that these organisations provide
an interesting viewpoint. In addition, these organisations may be more aware of pressures
coming from the Commission.
9.4.3.2 The scoplng survey
It was decided that the most appropriate way to find out about the role, if any, played by
external legal advisors was to ask contracting authorities with experience of competitive
dialogue themselves. Asking extemallegal advisors would not have been a reliable
approach, as they were unlikely to know about authorities that had held competitive
dialogue procurements without extemallegal advice.
172
As of 18 November 2009, Tenders Electronic Daily543 displayed 1,331 OJEU notices for
UK contracts to be award by competitive dialogue (three in 2005, 277 in 2006, 367 in
2007,375 in 2008, and 309 in 2009). In view of the time constraints upon the study it was
not possible, nor was it strictly necessary for the study to cover all competitive dialogue
notices. Itwas therefore decided that only contracts advertised in 2008 would be included
in the scoping study; the busiest most recent full year of notices (2008) was considered
most likely to be sufficiently representative of the current approach.
A questionnaire was drawn up with questions on the role of external legal expertise on the
authorities' 2008 competitive dialogue procurement and future competitive dialogue
procurements. The option of surveying all authorities advertising in 2008, approximately
282 different authorities, was rejected; not only would this have been a considerably
laborious task, but it was felt that this approach would get a poor response rate and might
also lead to biased findings as a result of a self-selecting sample (i.e, the findings would be
accurate only in relation to responding authorities). It was decided that, for these reasons,
a more efficient way of getting the desired information would be to survey a limited
random selection by telephone.
There were 375 competitive dialogue notices in 2008 involving approximately 282
different contracting authorities. In order to gain a general impression about whether
external legal advice was the norm for authorities using competitive dialogue, it was
decided that 10% of the 282 authorities (28 rounded up to 30) would be a sufficient and
workable sample. To ensure that a sufficient variety of authorities were included in the
sample, the 282 authorities were divided into categories:
5043 bttp;//ted.CUI'lp.eutrEDlmajnIHomefa&e.do (accessed 31II 0/20 II)
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(i) health (61);
(ii) local government (106);
(iii) central government (25);
(iv) housing and regeneration (21);
(v) education (25);
(vi) emergency services (nine); and
(vii) miscellaneous (35).
The survey was conducted by telephone and took place took place between 02 November
2009 and 18 November 2009. In certain instances it was not possible to make contact
with individuals with sufficient knowledge of their authority's competitive dialogue
procurements, for example because those with responsibility for the procurement had left
the authority or were on leave. In these circumstances, the authority was replaced with an
authority randomly selected from its same category. The telephone survey was completed
by 30 authorities in total. The final sample included four health authorities, six local
government authorities, five central government authorities, three housing and
regeneration authorities, two education authorities, three emergency services authorities,
and seven miscellaneous authorities.
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21/30 authorities surveyed had obtained external legal expertise to advise for the conduct
of the 2008 competitive dialogue procurement. The names of 11 different law firms were
given, which informed the make-up of the main sample. 17/21 authorities that obtained
external legal help stated that they would do so again for future competitive dialogue
procurements. 4/21, however, stated that they were not sure whether or not external
legal advice would be obtained for future competitive dialogue procurements, for example
because the internal team had developed sufficient expertise. In line with Braun's
findings,0/21 authorities obtaining external legal expertise admitted to ever disregarding
clear unequivocal legal advice provided by external legal advisors; thus, for these 21 it
would seem that, in terms of gaining an in-depth understanding of UK competitive
dialogue practice, the external legal advisors would make the most worthwhile
interviewees.
9/30 authorities surveyed stated that they had not obtained external legal advice on the
conduct of the competitive dialogue procurement, relying on internal expertise. In
relation to future competitive dialogue procurements, 8/9 stated that it was possible they
may obtain external legal advice on the application of the legal rules, whilst only 1/9 could
not foresee needing external legal help.
The results from the scoping study make it clear that it would be wrong for the research
to proceed according to the assumption (based on Braun's 2001 findings) that only
external legal advisors are suitable interviewees. It is important for the research to
provide a thorough analysis of competitive dialogue in the UK that the interview sample
incorporates the views and opinions of procurement officers, in-house legal advisors, as
well as external legal advisors.
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9.4.3.3 The interview partidpants
At the outset it was projected that 60 qualitative interviews would provide for a
sufficiently robust examination of competitive dialogue procurement in the UK. The
figure was considered a realistic estimate in view of the time and funding available (see
above). Nonetheless, a flexible approach was taken to the interview sample. For
example, if incoming data revealed that further interviews within a particular group were
necessary, attempts would be made to cater for this. In addition, where incoming
interview data from particular groups became sufficiently repetitive it may be that a point
of saturation had been reached and further interviews within the group were not needed.
In total 58 qualitative interviews were carried out in the planned timeframe, as it was
decided that a point of saturation had been reached.
Specifically, the interview sample included 41 interviews with external legal advisors (54
requests for participation were sent out). In order to ensure that a full range of views and
opinions were represented this group was made up of:
1. 22 legal advisors from law firms operating throughout the UK;
u, 12legal advisors from smaller medium sized law firms based and operating
predominantly in England and Wales;
iii. seven legal advisors from smaller medium sized law firms based and operating
predominantly in Scotland and/or Northern Ireland.
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Law firms with sufficient expertise were mainly identified using Chambers & Partners UK
Guide to the Legal Profession.544 A list of 66 different law firms was compiled from the
Chambers & Partners law firm rankings for the practice areas "Public Procurement: UK-
wide", "Projects & Energy: PFI/PPP: London & UK-wide", "Projects & Energy:
PFI/PPP: Northern Ireland", "Projects & Energy: Projects: Scotland", "Local
Government: London & UK-wide", and "Local Government: Scotland" (law firms
identified by the scoping study were automatically included in the list).
The web sites of the listed law firms were accessed and specific legal advisors with the
necessary expertise and experience were identified. Interviewees in this group were
selected who had experience of complex procurement pre and post the introduction of
competitive dialogue to enable them to compare and contrast the two regimes. In
addition, individuals were selected to ensure the representation of a range of experiences
of procurement sectors (e.g. education, health, justice etc.) and also experience of
different types of complex contract (e.g. infrastructure and IC1).
In order to ensure a full representation of views on competitive dialogue procurement
practice and that the sample of legal advisor interviewees was not limited to firms
recommended by Chambers & Partners, further interviewees were identified using the
Law Society of England &Wales, Law Society of Scotland and Law Society of Northern
Ireland websites.t" and the internet search engine, Google546 (11 external legal advisors in
the interview sample were identified through this method). Decisions about whether or
not to include the law firms identified in this way were based on the information provided
on the firm's website and based upon the area in which the firm was located (i.e. attempts
were made to ensure representation of all UK regions).
544 See bttp;/lwww.chambersandpartners.cotp (accessed 31/1012011)
:: http;//www·!awsocietY.Q[K.uk/home.IaW;bttp:l1www.1awscot.Q[ukl; bttp;//www.Iawsoc-nj,om/ (accessed 31/10120II)
bttp;/lwww.Koogle.co.uk/(accessed31/1012011)
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The second group of interview subjects was made up of high level employees in
contracting authorities responsible for applying the legal rules on competitive dialogue.
This group of interviewees was predominantly made up of procurement officers and
intemallegal advisors at authorities that took part in the scoping survey where external
legal advice on the application of the legal rules was not sought or where external
expertise was not considered necessary in future procurements. In addition, five of the
contracting authorities in this group were included due to them being referenced in other
interviews. A further interview in this group was arranged with a procurement officer
who attended the Executive Public Procurement Programme run by the University of
Nottingham. The procurement officer conveniently had the necessary experience of
playing a key role in the application of the legal rules in practice.
As discussed above, individual representatives were approached from different UK
policymaking organisations. Five interviews were sought with policymaker interviewees;
however, despite repeated attempts, responses and interviews only occurred with three of
the main policymaking organisations. The most important policymaking organisations are
included in the research; thus the research is not hindered by the lack of interviewees in
this category. In fact, in view of the difficulties experienced by others, such as Eyo,547in
getting policymaker participation in PhD research, three is a successful outcome.
9.5 Data analysis
The interviews were conducted intermittently from January 2010 to March 2011. After
each interview or block of interviews (depending upon scheduling) the sound recording or
notes (in the case of four interviewees who did not want to be recorded) were transcribed
541 A.Eyo, The adequacy of the European Union rules on the use of electronic reverse auctions in regulated procurement, (2009,
University ofNottingbam)
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in a manner that ensured interviewee anonymity. In accordance with the method
described by Rubin and Rubin, the analysis of interviews was ongoing throughout the
interview process, i.e. after each interview the contents of the interview were reviewed and
questions were refined and modified (if necessary) to ensure all avenues were fully
explored.t" Using the computer software, NVivo, the interpretations, experiences and
perceptions of interviewees were repeatedly systematically labelled ("coded',) and
grouped. Having done this, the author was able to look for patterns and linkages in the
data in order to develop a descriptive narrative that met the research aims and
objectives.i"
9.6 Concluding remarks
Chapter nine has described the research approach and the reasons for the approach. The
analysis of the legal rules in the context of competitive dialogue could only take the
research so far. In order to understand the reality of the law, itwas necessary to
compliment the legal analysis with an exploration of the law in practice using empirical
research techniques, specifically qualitative semi-structure interviews with individuals with
experience of playing a lead role in the application of the legal rules in practice. In
addition, the research project wants to understand the decision-making process under the
legal rules; this would not be achievable in this context through a legal analysis alone.
sa Rubin & Rubin, fn.S 12
549 Ibid
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10 Findings: grounds for using
competitive dialogue
10.1lntroduction
Chapter 10 will present the findings of the qualitative interviews in relation to the
questions asked about the decision to use competitive dialogue. To begin with the
chapter will briefly touch upon findings for questions to external legal advisors regarding
the stage in the process that they are first called upon by authorities to give legal advice.
This was important because, if external legal advisors lacked experience of advising upon
the decision whether or not to use competitive dialogue, their responses would not carry
much weight in relation to this aspect of the research. As it turned out, the legal advisors
interviewed were in the main called upon to advise authorities on the application of the
EU procurement rules at this stage in the procurement process.
The chapter then moves on to present the interview findings on the availability of the
competitive dialogue, in particular responses to questions, such as, "how complex is a
'particularly complex contract>" and ''what is it about the contracts you have procured by
way of the competitive dialogue that you consider make them 'particularly complex'?". In
line with the format of the analysis of the grounds for using competitive dialogue in
chapter six, the chapter first considers whether interviewees regard competitive dialogue
to be a standard procedure or an exceptional procedure. After this, findings on when
under the legal rules competitive dialogue is to be used are set out. A number of issues
are considered: the meaning of "particularly complex contract", the practical meaning of
technical complexity, the practical meaning of legal and financial complexity, and the issue
of commoditised PPPs. Finally, the paper considers certain other factors which were
found to guide contracting authorities in choosing whether or not to use competitive
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dialogue. These factors are discussed under headings, such as, avoidance of competitive
dialogue, soft-law, and risk of challenge.
10.2 The provision of external legal advice
As explained in chapter nine, in the main external legal advisors playa key role in advising
on procedural decisions for competitive dialogue procurements. The external legal
advisors interviewed were all experienced in providing such advice. However, in order to
ensure that the external legal advisors were able to provide accurate and meaningful
information on pre-procurement issues, they were asked to clarify the stage at which their
services are generally first called upon. The vast majority of external legal advisors
responded that, although this was not necessarily the case with less significant
procurements under open and restricted procedures, it was usual in competitive dialogue
procurements for them to be brought in to provide legal advice pre-OJEU notice, prior to
the choice of procedure being made. It was explained that external legal advisors are
often brought in early because competitive dialogue procurements are not a common
occurrence for most authorities and the projects are often large scale and of great
importance to the authority concerned. Itwas also noted that for certain projects, notably
major projects like BSF (see chapter two), authorities are being strongly advised to get
external legal advisors on board at a suitably early stage by central organisations like
Partnerships for Schools and Local Partnerships.
It was generally accepted by external legal advisors, however, that the approach to legal
advice varies from authority to authority, depending upon the size of the authority (e.g.
internal resources available) and experience. Where a procurement was an authority's first
use of competitive dialogue, external legal advisors tended to playa much greater role,
"holding the authority's hand" guiding it through all aspects of the procedure. This was
I
the case with a contracting authority interviewed; they had heavily relied upon external
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legal advisors at all stages for its first competitive dialogue procurement with the hope
that over time they would acquire sufficient knowledge to conduct complex procurements
in-house. Other authorities (possibly with cost savings in mind) sought external legal
advice as and when needed (i.e. when they encountered difficulties, such as a complaint or
legal challenge). There were 14 accounts of authorities that had turned to their external
legal advisors after choosing an inappropriate procurement procedure, which led to
compliance issues later on.
All external legal advisors interviewed had advised on the decision whether or not to use
competitive dialogue. The additional views of procurement officer/internal legal advisor
interviewees are representative of situations where legal advisors did not perform a central
role in the procurement (see scoping survey in chapter nine at 9.4.3.2). Thus, responses
to questions on the availability of the procedure are considered to provide a reliable
picture of UK practice.
10.3The availability of competitive dialogue
Interestingly, when asked about the grounds for using the competitive dialogue, five
interviewees gave the impression that they had given this issue little thought. This is not
necessarily surprising, as the reaction was mainly found amongst legal advisers in London
law firms who tended to deal with higher end work (e.g. complicated defence
procurements) where perhaps complexity is more clearly apparent:
• .• people do not spend too milch time agonising over whether their project is sllfficientIYcomplexif
they think competitive dialoglle is slIitable. That may be an optical il/lIsion, however, becallse I
work for a very largefirm which does very big deals. On the whole, the threshold question is not
one I have paid milch attention to (Lawyer 5, UK).
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Interviewees were asked to comment upon whether in their opinion the competitive
dialogue was to be regarded as a standard procedure in line with the Directive's underlying
principles of equality and transparency, where the grounds for using the procedure are to
be interpreted broadly, or to be regarded as an exceptional procedure that derogates from
fundamental principles, necessitating a narrow reading of the competitive dialogue's
availability (see chapter six). 25/39 interviewees preferred to view competitive dialogue as
a standard procedure, to be interpreted broadly. Procurement officer 12 (NHS Trust)
went as far as saying that the authority had a free choice whether or not to use
competitive dialogue, but it was just that you would only want to use it to procure
complex contracts as it is these to which the procedure is best suited.
These 25/39 interviewees were not of the opinion that competitive dialogue was being
overused in the UK, as competitive dialogue was not simply introduced for PFI as a
substitute for the negotiated procedure, but also to provide a more flexible and suitable
procedure for certain contracts that might pre-2006 have been awkwardly procured under
a restricted procedure (some ICf projects, for example). Thus, competitive dialogue may
be seen as plugging a gap. In the words of Lawyer 1 (Scotland):
..• anything that you could have used the negotiated procedurefor, you can fairlY safelY use
competitive dialogue for, and I lVOuldgo evenfurther than that and say that Iwould even lump
more in under the competitive dialogue than under the negotiated procedure ...
It appears that this flexible reading of the grounds for using competitive dialogue is often
based on practical reasons (for example, the need to get the best deal possible). Lawyer
19 (UK) considered this in more detail than other interviewees:
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{tJhe Commission is saying that we should not take it as read that because it is a mtffor contract
it is a complex contract. Iam not sure that is valid. You need the flexibility to discuss with
bidders, to changeyour requirement if necessary, to adapt to the specifics of each case. The
Commission is speakingfrom a completelY legalistic non-real perspective. The reality is that
discussions are almost always productive, always leadingyou to improve the terms of the deal etc.,
and designing into the specificity of a case. My interpretation is considerablY more generous than
that of the Commission. A strict interpretation may leadyou to say that a lot of these contracts
are not complex in the way that the Commission understands it. Iwould say, 'so what?~ We
should interpret it more looselY.
14/39 interviewees (all legal advisors mostly based outside London) questioned the above
flexible reading of the legal rules, suggesting that the procedure was being greatly
overused by UK contracting authorities. According to Lawyer 18 (UK):
400 competitive dialogues per year, it can't be the case,' it wasn't supposed to be the procedure of
choice, it was supposed to be something specific. Iam sure it is being interpreted too widelY.
For these legal advisors, competitive dialogue is being used where the contract could and
should have been procured under the restricted procedure. These claims are supported
by recent research by HM Treasury550and the Cabinet Office.551For instance, from a
sample of 210 competitive dialogue procurements, Cabinet Office research identified 60
cases (29%) of potentially inappropriate use.SS2
Also, the author encountered the complaint amongst these interviewees that some
authorities are using bidders during dialogue essentially as unpaid consultants in order to
'50 HM Treasury 2010, fn.198, 2.34-2.37
m Cabinet Office (2010), fu.l99, 6; Cabinet Office (2011), fu.l99, 4.5
m Cabinet Office (2011), ibid, 12
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avoid incur expense pre-procurement. This may imply that a reasonable amount of
preparatory work into the solution is seen to be required of authorities to satisfy the
complexity threshold.
Itwas evident that interviewees' views on the breadth of the grounds for using
competitive dialogue quite often depended upon their interpretation of the flexibility of
the restricted procedure. That is to say, those who favoured a broad reading of availability
tended to see the scope for negotiation in a restricted procedure as very narrow, whereas
the opposite was the case for those that took a narrow view on availability. For instance,
Lawyer 37 (Scotland) stated, "competitive dialogue was chosen because they thought they
would not be able to speak to bidders in a restricted procedure... I think that is a
misunderstanding of the restricted procedure".
It is important to point out that an interviewee's general perceptions of competitive
dialogue tended to cloud interpretations of the procedure as standard or exceptional. For
example, if an interviewee viewed competitive dialogue in a negative light (e.g. due to
advising bidders who saw the procedure as too expensive), this would often influence
views on whether it should be used as standard/exceptional by authorities.
Although Lawyer 14 (England &Wales) argued there was no uncertainty surrounding the
availability of competitive dialogue, the remaining interviewees did not share this view.
The lack of clarity surrounding when competitive dialogue can and cannot be used gave
interviewees flexibility to interpret "particularly complex contract" narrowly or broadly
depending upon the needs of the procurement As Lawyer 20 (UK) stated, even where
the complexity of a project is not evident, "as legal advisors, if need be, it is our role to
find the necessary complexity".
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10.4 The grounds for using competitive dialogue
10.4.1 The use of the open or restricted procedure will not allow for the
award of the contract
Under the legal rules, according to UK soft law,553a contracting authority must first
consider whether or not the open and restricted procedures allow for the award of the
contract, and second, if they will not, whether the contract to be procured is a
"particularly complex contract". Three legal advisors (others not commenting) either
expressly stated or gave the impression that despite the introduction of competitive
dialogue there remained a procedural gap, i.e. the open and restricted procedures do not
allow for the award of the contract, but the contract is not sufficiently complex to amount
to a "particularly complex contract". For example, according to Lawyer 24 (England &
Wales):
I sometimes think there is a bit of a gap there .• .; there should be a restricted pius. Sometimes the
restricted procedure is too restrictive becauseyou need to discuss issues post-tender, but the contract
is not in the particularlY complex bracket There are aspects of competitive dialogue that would
be useful to applY but you can't use them in a competitive dialogue ifyou don't come within the
definition ofparticularlY complex contract.
Adopting an apparently more flexible approach to the availability of competitive dialogue
than those interviewees who concentrated upon the definition of particularly complex
contract, 13interviewees suggest that the key to deciding whether or not the competitive
dialogue is available is the question, "are the open and restricted procedures
appropriate?", not, "is this or is this not a particularly complex contract?". In the words
of Lawyer 23 (England &Wales), "[t]he part of the definition, that you couldn't get there
m PiS (2006), fu.l67
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with the open or restricted procedures ... that is the practical test". It seems, in
accordance with the statements of these interviewees, that where the freedom to dialogue
certain issues will, or may, lead to a better result for the authority, the open and restricted
procedures are not appropriate and so competitive dialogue is available.
10.4.2 A particularly complex contract
It was clear from 10 interviews (others not commenting) that a complex contract varied
from authority to authority depending upon the type of project and the personnel
involved in the procurement (i.e. depending upon expertise and experience). For
example, if for an ICT procurement, an authority obtains the services of an ICT specialist
then it may be more difficult to justify the complexity threshold being met (procurement
Officer 5, local government). Lawyer 37 (Scotland) gave the following example:
...if an authority's in-house procurement team is used to small contracts (like stationary
supplies), th'!J are more likelY to interpret the complexity grounds satisfied if they are presented
with a big contract (like a buildingJ. Where a procurement team encounters major contracts on a
regular basis, or has the resources to bring in external expertise, the same contract may be
procured under a restricted procedure. ... The complexity requirement comes down to someone's
interpretation of whether or not something is complex,' it depends on one's own personal
experience ... It can be a'l!,ued that there is a lot of subjectivity in the test.
Also, Procurement Officer 2 (body governed by public law) explained how, due to a loss
of internal ICT expertise, software contracts, which previously the authority would
procure under a restricted procedure, needed to be procured under competitive dialogue,
and Procurement officer 8 (body governed by public law) described how, where the
authority undertook a number of similar procurements, the first procurement was
conducted under competitive dialogue (a "pathfinder"), but the knowledge and experience
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gained meant that future procurements needed to be conducted under a restricted
procedure. These comments on complexity varying according to resources, experience
etc. are interesting considering they stand in contrast to the views of some commentators
(chapter six).
10.4.3 Technical complexity
In conformity with the Commission's explanatory note (see chapter six), interviewees
almost unanimously agreed that the competitive dialogue was available where an authority
has an output requirement but does not know how or how best to meet that requirement:
"it may have a good idea but it does not know which the best is" (Lawyer 21, UK). It
appears these uncertainties may relate to the whole solution or more specific aspects of
solutions.
According to Lawyer 41 (Scotland), if following dialogue all bidders come up with the
same result, this suggests that competitive dialogue was the wrong procedure to use. If on
the other hand bidders produce different answers, then Lawyer 41 (Scotland) argues the
only practical method of procurement is through competitive dialogue. Lawyer 41
(Scotland) gives the aesthetic design of a building as an example: "bidders will have their
own architects so logically all designs are going to be different. You could run a restricted
procedure where bidders put in different designs, but ... clients and bidders want comfort
that when these things come in through the door they are on the right lines. This fits
exactly with competitive dialogue, and rules out the use of the restricted procedure".
In relation to most PPP infrastructure contracts, three interviews suggested that technical
complexity was not always the most obvious justification. According to Procurement
Officer 3 (local government):
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normallY with most construction projects the client knows what thry want, two reception rooms, a
conference room and four toilets, for example. It is not quite so technicallY demanding, as it may
befinanciallY complicated.
The interviewee went on to add that complexity may be found due to the different
construction techniques available, however. Lawyer 33 (Scotland) put forward the
example of a building that was designed by the authority and to be built by the private
sector. Here, according to Lawyer 33, there was technical complexity due to issues
around buildability and translating drawings by architects and engineers to metal and
cement. With a major regeneration of a town, it may be easier to argue technical
complexity. For example, "although we know we need 350 housing units, we do not
know precisely what it should look like" (procurement Officer 4, local government).
The technical complexity ground, according to four interviewees, is most relevant in high
technology areas like ICT and waste. According to Lawyer 20 (UK), "with ICT projects
there is inevitably going to be a sufficient amount of be spoking, e.g. the need for
interfacing, interconnectivity with other complex systems".
10.4.4 Financial and legal complexity
In relation to fmancial/legal complexity, 23 interviewees explained how this ground was
quite easily satisfied where a contract was for a PPP. This fits in with the Commission's
statement that fmancial/legal complexity "arise very, very often in connection with
projects of [PPPS]".554Aspects of a PPP contract said to give rise to complexity include:
• funding models;
5st Commission (2005). fit.190, 2.3
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• risk allocation;
• high value;
• long contractual durations;
• multiple phases (e.g. DBFO);
• consortium bidders;
• sub-contracting issues (including finance packages with debt funders); and
• Transfer of Undertakings (protection of Employment) Regulations 2006555 issues.
In relation to non-PPP complexities, it was suggested by Procurement Officer 2 (body
governed by public law) that legal complexity may arise simply where you do not know
enough to have agreed contractual terms. It was argued that this situation should be dealt
with before formally commencing the procurement; that is to say, road testing
documentation in order to obtain comments and feedback from the market.
Lawyer 34 (England &Wales) set out why regeneration work of regional or sub-regional
significance may be complex:
it is self-evident that there are a number ofways for the authority to achieve its oijective ofgetting
investment into an area or getting obsolete or redundant land or assets back into economic
m SI 2006, No.246
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circulation. There could be different blends ojend user, different configurations of infrastructure,
different constructional techniques (all of which have their respectivepros and cons), different
contractual models, differentfunding models, and different commercial models. The possibilities
are numerous and that is what competitive dialogue was invented to deal with.
Procurement Officer 6 (central government) noted contractual complexities in relation to
a textiles supply contract: the need to have a robust supply chain with contingencies built
in and the need to ensure supplies are ethically and environmentally sound. These issues
do not relate to the product specification, but as noted by the interviewee, "there may be
wider issues that we want to investigate, and the restricted procedure is not always able to
do this, particularly if the authority is not up-to-date with best practices".
It was also explained how complexity may arise due to the lack of a central strategy and
performance targets:
[w]e starled a competitive dialoguefor a waste management contract on the basis that there was no
known national stratelP. Our approach was let's go and see what the market can do 10 make tbe
best cfwhal we have got. After /posl qualification questionnaires], Ihe Scottish Governmenl came
out with a central waste strategy with largels Ihat needed 10 be hit. Due 10 tbis, we could define
quite clearlYwhat theproblem was, meaning competitive dialogue was invalidated We cancelled
theprocedure and started again under a restrictedprocedure (Lawyer 40, Scotland).
It was also suggested by one interviewee that as the number of stakeholders in a project
increases so does the level of complexity, as, amongst other things, the needs of each one
must be catered for in the contractual documentation.
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10.4.5 Commoditised PPP procurements
Despite the above comments that the very nature of many PPP arrangements can lead to
an almost inevitable conclusion of legal/ financial complexity, 14 interviewees raised the
issue of, what was termed, commoditised PPPs, e.g. PPPs for schools (BSF) (see Chapter
two). Whilst these PPP procurements may have involved sufficient complexity to warrant
the use of competitive dialogue when the schemes were first brought in, could this still be
said now, several years later, considering the level of standardisation and the greater
familiarity of authorities? For instance, Lawyer 12 (UK) stated
...if someone tuas to do an entirelYstandardised PPI (we do not reallYdo NHS UFf anymore,
but something of that nature), I am not actuallYsureyou canjustify using competitive dialogue.
This is becauseyou are imposing onpeople entirelYstandard documents, entirelYstandard
contractforms, entirelYstandard commercial models, and,yes, it appears all big and complex but
actuallYit is all pre-set. In reality I think anything which has got a sort of PPP desaiptor gets
seen as something which should go through competitive dialogue.
Lawyer 2 (England &Wales) argued, that although s/he had once been concerned that
standardisation could destroy the grounds for using competitive dialogue, but, was now
convinced this could not happen:
on every large scale PPP you do something always seems to crop up that you could not have
planned for in advance. We thought XXX project would be a walk in thepark, bul itproved
to be a very complex and difficult procurement. I thinkfor any PPI/ PPP project,you have
always got grounds to say it is particularlY complex.
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Five other interviewees pointed out that, although legal and financial complexity was
becoming difficult to argue for commoditised PPPs, this did not remove other forms of
complexity, i.e. technical, upon which to justify competitive dialogue. Policymaker 2
suggested that due to mandated financial and legal structures, if the infrastructure element
of a PFI were to be designed in-house it may be the case, from a legal perspective, that
the restricted procedure would need to be used.
to.SOther factors relevant to the choice of procedure
10.S.1Introduction
The interviews revealed that interpretations of the substantive legal provisions on the
availability of competitive dialogue were often not central to the decision whether or not
to use the procedure. In many cases interviewees suggested that the choice of procedure
was driven by other factors. These factors will be presented in order of importance (i.e.
most mentioned to least mentioned).
10.5.2 Avoidance of the competitive dialogue procedure
Competitive dialogue may in many cases be the most appropriate procedure by which to
procure complex contracts; however, it is not obligatory for complex contracts to be
awarded under competitive dialogue. A total of 29 interviewees (including 25 external
legal advisors and four procurement officers) stated that for various reasons they or
certain clients would try to avoid using competitive dialogue wherever possible and award
what they considered to be complex contracts under the restricted procedure (26/29) or
the negotiated procedure (3/29). As put by Lawyer 21 (UK):
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[t]here is a tendenry to avoid competitive dialogue ifpossible, a tendenry to squeeze things in
under the restrictedprocedure ..• I can think of several examples where quite complicated PPP
arrangements went out under the restrictedprocedure in circumstances where I would stfYthey
would have been better going the competitive dialogue route because there wasn't sufficient
flexibility to do what thry wanted to do later on in the process. They werejust so keen to avoid
this perception of bureaucrary and reluctant bidders; it is dangerous ...
The findings here do not appear to relate to the larger more sophisticated contracting
authorities that may procure complex contracts on a frequent basis, for example central
government and local government inmajor UK cities.
A key reason for this was a "fear" of the unfamiliar competitive dialogue held by some
authorities derived from negative past experiences or from hearing of the negative
experiences of others (e.g. via the legal press). Itwas suggested that many perceived
competitive dialogue as overly complex, expensive and time consuming, and therefore
only to be used as a last resort. According to Lawyer 24 (England &Wales):
... there is still a lot offear and misunderstanding of competitive dialogue. I had one largeproject
where the authority was dead against it because thry had all these misconceptions. To have even
suggested running a project of such scale under the restrictedprocedure was quite suprising. If
there is a feeling that thry can do theprocurement under the restrictedprocedure, they u,;ll stick to
that because it is what thf!Yknow and it has not got the bad press along Mth it ...
Procurement Officer 1 (body governed by public law) was so dissatisfied with the one
competitive dialogue the authority had run that they were adamant the authority would
not go down this route again, even if this meant changing the nature of the contract to be
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procured. For example, rather than procuring the regeneration of a town, it was
suggested that the authority might conduct multiple smaller procurements. As accepted
by the interviewee, this would not be the most efficient means of procurement, but their
desire to avoid the rigours of competitive dialogue was so great that it was considered a
viable option.
Also, competitive dialogue is new and for many authorities complex procurements are not
encountered on a regular basis; for these reasons, it was suggested that some authorities
prefer the familiarity of the restricted procedure, even where the grounds for using
competitive dialogue are clearly satisfied. Lawyer 10 (Northern Ireland) stated that "some
clients just default into the restricted procedure; they do all their procurement with it.
Looking at smaller public sector bodies, they probably don't even consider the
competitive dialogue".
A further reason given for avoiding competitive dialogue related to the need to maximise
bidder participation. According to some, rather than taking steps to demonstrate to the
market that they are capable of running an efficient competitive dialogue that minimises
bid costs, certain authorities will simply procure under a different procedure. Itwas
suggested that in some cases, such as major regeneration projects where developers are
reluctant to commit to the high levels of resource and expense that is needed to agree a
development agreement whilst still in competition, the market dictates that the
competitive negotiated procedure is used (Lawyer 24, England &Wales; and Lawyer 13,
England &Wales).
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It was also mentioned (two interviewees) that, following the Court of Justice's judgements
in Case C-220/05, Roann/56 and Case C-451/08, Heimul Mulle~57 which gave rise to great
uncertainty over the application of the Directive to land development agreements (see
Chapter two), because of the poor suitability of competitive dialogue for such
procurements and a perceived lack of availability of the negotiated procedure, authorities
were, where possible, seeking to classify these contracts as concessions so as to give
themselves greater flexibility over the choice of procurement process.
10.5.3 Soft-law
Interviewees, particularly extemallegal advisors, in relation to most legal issues tended to
play down the importance and role of government guidance (see chapter 14). This was
not so, however, in relation to the decision to use competitive dialogue. In 19 interviews
soft-law (mainly the OGe 2006 guidance and OGC/HMT 2008 guidance) was cited as
being a key reason for the decision to use competitive dialogue over the negotiated
procedure. This was so even where the interviewee did not necessarily agree with the
interpretation of the law put forward by soft-law. According to Lawyer 7 (UK), since
2006 lawyers have simply been recycling the message from the OGC.
The strong OGC policy statement in 2006 appears to have played a key role in shaping
UK procurement practice away from the use of the negotiated procedure for PPP
procurement, such that interviewees stated that they "don't even look at it anymore" and
termed it "a redundant procedure". The example of the London Underground PPP was
recognised by legal advisors as a "stratosphericaily" complex contract, and hence few
could recall instances of use of the negotiated procedure for PPP projects outside the
utilities sectors since 2006. The policy steer from the Commission and government has
meant that in practice for complex PPP procurement competitive dialogue is being used
'56 Case C.220/0S. Roanne, fu.42
m Case C-4S1108.Helmut Muller. fu.42
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in place of the negotiated procedure. It was suggested that UK authorities had been
scared off using the negotiated procedure, such that even when Lawyer 20 (UK) advised
that a project was sufficiently complex to warrant use of the negotiated procedure the
authority refused to because they were worried about defending the decision and
concerned about the scrutiny such a decision would attract.
6/19 interviewees (extemallegal advisors) admitted that in 2006 they were "surprised at
the firmness of the OGC's message"; however, it was only recently that, in view of the
difficulties to complex procurement posed by the credit-crunch and recession, they have
begun to question whether they had abandoned the negotiated procedure too readily. In
the words of Lawyer 19 (UK):
raj1/ of us bought the Commission 1message that the negotiatedprocedure is exceptiona~ but if
you look at what the legislation st!)s there is an argument to say that some of the grounds can be
interpreted so that it is not exceptional. ... We should have queried the Commission 1message.
Although not stated explicitly, the author also got the clear impression from two
policymakers interviewed that there was a greater role for the negotiated procedure to play
and that perhaps steps would be taken in the future to soften the signal against its use.
The 2010 HM Treasury review states awareness of the implications of its strong policy
steer towards competitive dialogue, which, according to the review, "may have been
interpreted as an implied ban on everything but competitive dialogue".558The 2010 review
notes that to remedy the problem guidance is being produced on the availability of all
procedures.i"
551 HM Treasury (2010). fu.l98. 2.36
559 Ibid, 2.40
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In the case of PFI procurement (particularly for major investment programmes like BSF)
it was suggested by 10 interviewees that an authority will have little choice but to procure
under the competitive dialogue if it wants to keep its PFI credits and/or wants its outline
business case approved. In addition, standard BSF procurement documents are drafted
on the assumption that competitive dialogue will be used.560
10.5.4 Risk of challenge
Interviewees were asked how they perceived the risk of challenge from the Commission
or aggrieved bidders for using competitive dialogue on the basis that the conditions for
use were not met. Being a threshold test, there is obviously some legal risk for using the
competitive dialogue inappropriately; however, a significant 33 interviewees suggested that
the threat of challenge from an aggrieved bidder was not a major worry at this early stage.
These interviewees highlighted that any challenge to the choice of award procedure would
need to be made early, as the aggrieved supplier would be on notice from the time of
publication of the contract notice and would therefore have limited time to challenge (see
chapter four). As argued by the 33 interviewees, the risk of legal challenge grows as you
proceed through a procurement process and bidders incur greater costs. At the beginning
of a procurement process, bidders have not invested much time and money; so, not only
will it be difficult for them to establish that the choice of procurement procedure caused
them or risked causing them damage, but also at this stage in the process they are not
going to want to risk doing anything that upsets the procuring authority and are likely to
be unwilling to incur the expense and uncertainty of legal challenge. Although a technical
breach has occurred, as Lawyer 30 (England and Wales) stated, "challenging a
procurement procedure is not an academic exercise, it is a big commercial step. What
would you be expecting/hoping to get out of it?",
560 See, for instance, PfS, Standard form BSF contract notice. (2009) available at www.partnershipsforschools.ora.uk/ (accessed
31/10/2011)
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Although none of the interviewees could point to instances where they had needed to
consider legal challenge at this stage, it was suggested by four interviewees as a theoretical
possibility that if the inappropriate use of competitive dialogue acted as a bar to a supplier
taking part in the procurement then a challenge may be conceivable, for example where a
small supplier lacked the resources to participate (Lawyer 7, UK). A further theoretical
possibility might be where in a competitive dialogue the contracting authority has invited
the minimum of three bidders to dialogue, and a firm that has been de-selected seeks to
argue that had it been a restricted procedure it would have been one of the five invited to
tender for the contract (Lawyer 41, Scotland).
With the above in mind, it was stated by Lawyer 23 (England &Wales) that "realistically
[the decision to use competitive dialogue] is an open choice". Itwas mentioned by
Lawyer 13 (England & Wales) that a bidder's objection to the inappropriate use of the
competitive dialogue, regardless of whether or not the complexity threshold is met, will be
a commercial and not legal:
[a] bidder is not going to s'!Yto an authority, it is illegal that you are using the competitive
dialogue because this is not a complex contract, the bidder isgoing to S'!Y, I don't want to bid for
this because ifprocured under competitive dialogue it is going to be too expensive. It is not going
to ... challenge the decision.
The majority of interviewees were aware of the Pimlico Schools case,56!where the
Commission challenged use of a negotiated procedure for a PF} schools project; however,
in relation to the decision to use competitive dialogue, 36/40 (others disagreed)
interviewees did not perceive there to be a high risk of Commission challenge. According
'61 Pimlico. frt.179
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four external legal advisor interviewees, competitive dialogue is a transparent process and
as such the Commission is unlikely to challenge even if there is a question mark over
complexity. For these interviewees, the Commission tends to be worried about flagrant
breaches, such as direct awards, and, provided a robust and transparent competitive
dialogue is delivered, whether a contract fits within a procedure is not a sufficiently
senous.
In view of the perceived low risk of legal challenge for the decision to use competitive
dialogue, 19 interviewees (including all three policymakers) suggested that, being more
flexible that the restricted procedure, from a legal risk perspective the competitive
dialogue was often the procedure of choice even in cases where complexity was
questionable. This is because, if a restricted procedure was attempted in a situation that
subsequently turns out to be complex, there is a strong possibility that a need to dialogue
certain issues might arise and attract a comparably much higher risk of legal challenge. As
Lawyer 13 (England and Wales) commented:
what I st[J to clients is, 'ifyou are going to have to negotiate, lise [competitive dialoglle] because, if
YOIl negotiate in a restricted, it is very obvious and incrediblY risky ~ I can't be bothered going
into the definition of a particularlY complex contract with them because it isjlls/ not relevant in
practice ...
The same might be argued in relation to the negotiated procedure; that is to say, the risk
of an aggrieved bidder challenging under the negotiated procedure are less than the risks
around using competitive dialogue because again the negotiated procedure presents even
greater flexibility and the period for challenge for wrongly using the negotiated procedure
would expire at an early stage in the procurement. Who is going to challenge as they are
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likely to expect to benefit from lower bid costs? Here, however, a clear threat of
Commission challenge was felt by 11 interviewees (others not commenting). The 11
interviewees were concerned that the use of the negotiated procedure in the UK was
being closely scrutinised by the Commission, and therefore if it were to be used there
needed to be high certainty over the justification.
15/24 interviewees highlighted the need to document reasons justifying use of
competitive dialogue as being good procurement practice ("it is good procurement
practice to back up your decision making at all stages of the process" (Lawyer 15, UK).
However, 9/24 did not place such great emphasis on this practice: "[w]e don't do many
competitive dialogues; if itwas on the edge, we would definitely document the
justification for using it" (procurement Officer 9, local government).
10.5.5 Miscellaneous
Other factors raised in interviews noted as having been relevant to the decision whether
or not to use competitive dialogue include contract value (i.e, so that procurement costs
outweigh the value of the contract); wanting to or liking to dialogue regardless of need;
the "thrill" of a new procedure; limited resources and timescales; and to delay authority
decisions over the requirement. The frequency with which these factors were mentioned
was very low in comparison to the above categories.
10.6The relationship between the competitive dialogue and
other procedures
Interviewees disagreed about the impact made by competitive dialogue on projects that
pre-2006 would have been procured under the restricted procedure (see above).
However, despite the wording of the grounds for using the negotiated procedure not
changing, interviewees were virtually in unanimous agreement about the impact of
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competitive dialogue on the interpretation of the availability of the negotiated procedure.
For most, they had not used the procedure since January 2006 for complex PPP projects
and regarded it as "redundant" in this respect. The following are examples of phrases
used to describe the availability and role of the competitive negotiated procedure post-
2006:
• it is on the top shelf now (procurement Officer 8, body governed by public law);
• it has got to be really, really out of market, i.e. very unusual (procurement Officer
5, local government);
• it is deadin the water (Lawyer 26, UK);
• we completely ignore it (Lawyer 30, England&Wales);
• [a]s a rule of thumb, I don't even look at it (Lawyer 32, England& Wales); and
• although it is still there, it may as well not be.... We just don't touch it. We shy
away from using it (Lawyer 2, England &Wales).
For complex contracts it seems competitive dialogue is seen as the "default" procurement
procedure. According to eight interviewees, it was questioned why, bearing in mind the
fact that if you meet the conditions for using the negotiated procedure you almost
certainly meet the required level of complexity for using competitive dialogue, anyone
would want to use the negotiated procedure. For these interviewees, the legal rules on
competitive dialogue facilitate best practice. So, essentially, why conduct a procurement
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under a negotiated procedure when you would want to run it along the same lines as a
competitive dialogue anyway? Indeed, as was discussed in the legal analysis, it is not
entirely clear what can be done under a negotiated procedure that cannot be under
competitive dialogue, particularly regarding post-tender work with bidders.
In relation to PPP procurement, although several interviewees argued that for all practical
purposes the negotiated procedure may as well not be there, the procedure does still
remain. This leaves the question: in what situations can it lawfully be used? Many
interviewees failed to elaborate upon this point, as there is no clear criterion which can be
used to say from this level of complexity and above the negotiated procedure can be used.
Thus, the decision to use the negotiated procedure instead of competitive dialogue is
more likely to come down to commercial factors, such as whether its use is needed to
attract sufficient competition. As mentioned in chapter six, it appears anecdotally that in
practice the negotiated procedure is now mainly used for the procurement of intellectual
and financial services.562
Procurement Officer 11 (local government) speculated that where a procurement is "so
complicated and technical that you couldn't possibly get the answer through using
competitive dialogue" the negotiated procedure is to be used. Lawyer 21 (England &
Wales, London) disagreed: " ... the test is not that it is impossible to do the procurement
with competitive dialogue; it is something less than that".
Interviewees are in complete disagreement about pre-2006 whether the negotiated
procedure was to be regarded as an exceptional procedure, such that no clear pattern
emerges from the data. Post-2006, all now regard (or at least treat) it as exceptional. Two
562 See T.Kotsonis, Should the competitive negotiated procedure ever now be used and /fso when?, (2009) available at
www.whitepaperdocumcnts.co,uk (accessed 31/1012011)
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interviewees (others not commenting) spoke about how on first reading the legal rules this
was not the case, but it was the strong policy steer from government which influenced
behaviour (see above).
10.7Concluding remarks
Chapter 10 addressed legal issues raised by the legal analysis in chapter six. In its
presentation of the findings on availability of competitive dialogue the chapter highlighted
the legal uncertainty surrounding the decision to use competitive dialogue that exists. It
can be seen that in practice competitive dialogue has very much replaced use of the
negotiated procedure for PPP procurement, and has also been used by many where
previously they might have procured under the restricted procedure. A number of
practical considerations were found to have played a significant role in the choice of
procedure; key amongst them are the limited legal risk a decision to use competitive
dialogue is seen to attract and the clear policy statements from UK government. These
non-legal aspects are similar to the findings of Braun's 2001563 research into UK PFI
procurement practice in the context of the negotiated procedure (see chapter eight).
563 Braun (2001), fn.l72, 334
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11 Findings: contract notice to close of
dialogue
11.1 Introduction
Chapter 11will set out interview findings for the stages of competitive dialogue leading
up to the close of dialogue. Corresponding with the legal analysis in chapter seven,
chapter 11will present the findings in the sequence the legal rules to which they relate are
likely to be encountered in practice. However, issues relating to bidder confidentiality, a
general rule equally relevant at all stages of the process, will be presented on their own at
the outset in section two. Section three will look at interview findings relating to the pre-
dialogue stages of competitive dialogue. This includes the scope for technical dialogue,
issues relevant to the OJEU notice and descriptive documents, and also qualification and
selection issues. The main body of the chapter presents the interview findings for the
dialogue stage (section four). This part of chapter 11 is broken down into sub-sections
looking at the structure of the dialogue stage, the application of the equal treatment
principle, and bidder reduction. As with the rules on confidentiality, equal treatment
applies generally at all stages of the process; however, it is included at this stage due to its
particular relevance. In addition to this section, issues raising equal treatment concerns
will be flagged as and when they are encountered in different areas. As there were only
two comments on single bidder situations, chapter 11 concludes with a brief consideration
of this issue.
11.2 Confidentiality and cherry picking
11.2.1Introductlon
The rules on bidder confidentiality and the ban on cherry picking give rise to a number of
questions (chapter seven). For instance, the standard of confidentiality is not clear: do the
legal rules refer to domestic confidentiality law or do they create an independent EU law
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confidentiality requirement? Also, it is not clear what amounts to sufficient "agreement"
to share bidder solutions or confidential information. These issues, along with other
practical approaches and considerations, were explored with bidders; the findings are
presented below.
It was clear from interviews that confidentiality and cherry picking were a key issue,
particularly for bidders; however, for 28 interviewees (others not commenting), the high
level of concern pre-2006 over the difficulties competitive dialogue would present in
terms of maintaining confidentiality had not materialised to any serious degree: "[t]here is
an element of concern, but it has not been as big a deal as I thought it was going to be"
(Lawyer 38, England &Wales).
Itmay be that a key reason concerns over bidder confidentiality have not materialised in
the way many prior to the introduction of competitive dialogue feared they might is the
apparent way in which dialogue is most commonly conducted in the UK, particularly for
procurements under established PPP programmes, which have been influenced by past
UK practice under the negotiated procedure and central government guidance. That is to
say, during the dialogue stage bidders will generally meet with the contracting authority
separately and work up their own individual solution/so 26/27 interviewees described
conducting the dialogue stage in such a way (only 1/27 contrary view was expressed). It
seems that this practice is seen as the best way to encourage bidders to be forthcoming
with ideas, questions and issues, due to a concern that if meetings are conducted with
bidders altogether, bidders may be fearful of inadvertently helping competitors. This was
stated in five interviews. In the words of Procurement Officer 7 (central government),
"[w]hen they all meet they are very careful about what they say; no one will ask a question;
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they will not want to give away where they are coming from or look ignorant in front of
their competitors; there is silence unless you meet with them separately".
It is usually the case that, after the formal close of dialogue in the final tendering stage,
remaining bidders will be invited to tender against an outline specification which is of
sufficient scope to accommodate each bidder's different solution. This aspect of the
procedure will be looked at in greater depth in chapter 12; however, it is mentioned here
because, although this method presents risks in relation to breaches of the rules on
confidentiality and cherry picking, there is less scope for such violations than a situation
where the authority draws up a single detailed technical specification (a "best of breed"
solution (Lawyer 12, UK)). According to Procurement Officer 12 (NHS Trust):
we do not want to compromise confidentiality with a combined specification or mate something
that does not exist because it is cobbled together from various proposals. We try to be more
generic, offer it with an output based specification ..•
Comparing the UK approach to the approach thought to be taken in other EU Member
States, Lawyer 39 (UK) stated:
some people have very diffirent ideas about what competitive dialogue involves,· some people think
it is to work up a common solution that you then put back out to the market,· that is not how it
works in the UK • • . I do not think businesses would be interested in a model whereyou are
feeding together to work up some common specification,· that seems quite altruistic.
Lawyer 13 (England & Wales) expressed some criticism of the UK approach and the
reluctance to share aspects of solutions:
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[i]t is interesting because as an authority you would like to very much be able to cherrypick and
... develop one overall best solution. Bidders do not want that obviouslYand they want to keep
their information confidential; this means that as a contracting authorityyou are runningparallel
solutions instead of synthesising them,· that ... increasesyour bid costs and costs ofprocurement.
A general view flowing from 12 interviews appears to be that, particularly in highly
innovative fields (e.g. leT and waste), if cherry picking was an expected part of
procurement, bidder participation and/or investment would suffer.
Alternative approaches to the conduct of dialogue were suggested by a handful of
interviewees (three) in relation to non-PPP competitive dialogue procurements. This
suggests that outside of PPP authorities may feel greater freedom to experiment. For
instance, the seemingly quite rare approach of Procurement Officer 8 (body governed by
public law) was as follows:
• .. we would deal with [bidders] in isolation ... taking ideasfrom eachof them until we reached
the point [where we are takingfinal priced proposals]. Then we IIJiIlproduce ourselves a detailed
specification which we will present to all three bidders and sayprice and tender against this
requirement. On average each supplier will see 30% of their proposal in the specification,· some
will see more some will see very little. There is going to be a lot of common ground • .. A supplier
who has put forward 60% of the requirement, yes they have more ideas seen by competitors, but
the upside is it is their idea, theypriced it, they know how to actuallY deliver the solution,· in a
way thefinal specificationfavours them.
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This approach relies on bidders agreeing to share information. Here, such agreement was
a condition of participation (see below).
There appears to be an interesting relationship between the rules on confidentiality and
the rules on equal treatment, whereby, it seems, practitioners must strike a careful balance
between these two (sometimes conflicting) requirements. This will be addressed in the
discussion of the equal treatment rules below.
11.2.2 Approach to confidentiality
A common approach to confidential information was discernable from 20 interviews (no
alternative approaches were put forward). The descriptive documents will explain that
bidders must mark documents submitted during dialogue as confidential if they do not
want information to be shared with other bidders. It was remarked by 4/20 interviewees
(others not commenting) that a consequence of this is that bidders may mark everything
as confidential regardless of whether or not the information merits such a label: "one of
the problems you do have is that certain bidders assume that everything is a supremely
brilliant idea and confidential" (Lawyer 12, UK). Where a contracting authority disagrees
with a bidder about the confidentiality of information and wants to share the information,
the authority will warn the bidder. The two parties will try to reach agreement, but if this
is not possible the bidder is given the option of withdrawing the information. Lawyer 26
(UK) explained his/her experience of reaching agreement to share bidder information
where its confidential nature is disputed:
[wJe have ... asked bidders topropose efficienciesor discounts and one bidder has come up with a
fairlY novelwty... We have had to sty to them, ~o that we can evaluate on an equal footing »'e
have to divulge that methodology to both bidders'. They have beenprepared to hat't those sorts of
conversations.
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This, however, does not appear to be the prevalent experience, with most interviewees
describing how authorities are often highly respectful of bidder confidentiality claims: "I
take the view that anything I am told should remain with that side" (procurement Officer
3, local government).
Because disagreements over confidentiality tend to be resolved amicably, few interviewees
could speak in great depth about their understanding of the standard of confidentiality
under the Directive/Regulations. Indeed, five legal advisors commented that this would
be a matter for intellectual property experts:
[aJs a procurement 1a1l:'Jer,I do not know to be honest what is confidential and what is not. So,
where necessary we have spoken to ollr intellectual propertY g'!Ys and got them to give a bit of
advice on it (Lawyer 13, England &Wales).
For this reason, coupled with the findings presented below on the standard of
confidentiality in practice, it is very difficult to say with any certainty on what basis from a
legal perspective the standard against which confidentiality under the
Directive/Regulations must be assessed against; however, the application of these EU
rules in practice strongly indicate that more information is regarded as confidential than
would be under domestic UK law.
According to 18/30 interviewees, bidders are likely to view confidentiality in the
Directive/Regulations as being a higher standard than that of domestic law, and in
practice contracting authorities tend to take a similar outlook:
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[iJt ends up being wider than domestic law. Information isjust treated as confidentiaL There is
not normallYan assessment of the merits ofwhat is commerciallYconfidential (Lawyer 24,
England &Wales).
8/30 interviewees stated that in a situation of disagreement over confidentiality they
would rely on domestic rules, e.g. the law of confidence and confidentiality under the
Freedom of Information Act 2000. According to Lawyer 22 (UK):
[tJhere are a number of things going on, the common law of confidentiality, [contractual}
confidentiality restrictions, and then there is the Freedom of Information Act. I think within the
UK context probablY the narrowest of that is under the Freedom of Information Act,· so I think
the generallYacceptedviewfrom bidders is that very little is going to be regardedas confidential
from afreedom of information perspective. So, in terms ofwhat they are telling contracting
authorities, they regard most of it aspossiblY coming out.
4/30 interviewees spoke of the assessment of confidentiality coming down to a practical
judgment:
... there is ... a grry area ... At what point when somebody comes up with an individual solution
is it considered to be a proprietary solution that is commerciallYparticular to that company? • .•
[Or] is it something generic that can be shared? At either extreme it is clear that one is one and
the other is the other, but at what point doyou cross the line? There is noguidance, and because
of that it is down toprocurement professionals in the spirit of openness and jaimeS! to sellgotJem
that type of thing and I think in a practical sense that is necessary..... fIJt comes down to a
judgment call on a case by case basis (procurement Officer 6, central government).
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Seven interviewees (others not commenting) mentioned how the private sector often
insists upon the contracting authority and staff signing up to a confidentiality agreement.
According to Lawyer 32 (England &Wales), "lots of authorities are now entering into
quite complex confidentiality protocols... I think that the private sector will rely on
these". The enforceability of such agreements was, however, questioned in 2/7
interviews.
Despite the approach to maintaining confidentiality outlined above (e.g. separate bidder
meetings and bidders required to identify information as confidential upfront), there are
situations that arise where bidder confidentiality can be difficult to maintain. For
example, where dialogue meetings are conducted in front of an audience involving
individuals not involved in the procurement process on a day to day basis, it was noted by
three interviewees, that it can be problematic keeping, for instance, a school headmaster
from suggesting improvements to bids based on previous bids he/she had seen.
A further difficult situation mentioned by Procurement Officer 10 (local government) was
where a bidder was bidding on behalf of itself and also a consortium; here the authority
felt it right to disclose to bidders the names of all firms participating in the competitive
dialogue. There are also accidental breaches; for example, three interviewees recalled
cases where documents had been sent to the wrong bidder.
11.3Agreement to share
The approach taken to maintaining bidders' confidentiality during the dialogue stage
(described above) will often mean that, regardless of the confidential nature of the
information, information supplied will not be shared without a bidder's consent. The
Directive/Regulations (see chapter seven) allow a contracting authority to share
confidential information where it has obtained the agreement of the bidder concerned.
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However, few interviewees had experience of situations where such agreement had been
obtained where it was accepted that the information was of a confidential nature. 17/30
interviewees specifically stated that they had never needed to seek such agreement. This
suggests that this situation is a relatively rare occurrence in the UK. For example,
according to Procurement Officer 5 (local government), "[w]e have not been able to get
bidders to share; why would they?". Lawyer 20 (UK) explained that he/ she has "always
managed to win the argument that the particular piece of information is allowed to be
shared without any need for agreement" and Lawyer 6 (UK) stated that because of the
lack of clarity over what is and is not confidential the approach taken is to not discuss any
aspects of one bidders bid with other bidders.
A small number of interviewees (five), including one policymaker, questioned the levels of
innovation seen in PPP procurement and this may go some way to explain the lack of
agreements: "I do not think [confidentiality issues] have been too bad; to be entirely
cynical about it, you do not see anything that is that innovative despite all the hype ..."
(Lawyer 8, England &Wales). It may be that confidentiality is only likely to become an
issue in high technology areas, e.g. leT and waste, which was suggested by Lawyer 32
(England & Wales): "I think in terms of high technology stuff, like waste solutions,
confidentiality issues are probably more of a concern".
Nevertheless, 13 interviewees did have some experience of obtaining agreement to share
confidential information. 5/13 interviewees spoke about doing this through
straightforward negotiation with the bidder. For example, according to Lawyer 8
(England & Wales), " ... it ... depends on what you are trying to share, but it is usually a
question of demonstrating to the disclosing party that it is not going to harm them
commercially". 4/13 interviewees spoke about bidders sharing confidential information
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or intellectual property in exchange for payment. Also, in accordance with the suggestion
in the Commission's explanatory note, 2/13 interviewees had made the sharing of
confidential information a condition for participation: "they participate knowing that their
best ideas are likely to be shared" (procurement Officer 8, body governed by public law).
It should further be mentioned that 2/13 interviewees spoke about holding a public open
day where during the dialogue stage bidders' solutions were on public display alongside
each other. In both these situations the bidders were made aware of this requirement at
an early stage and did not object to it.
11.3.1 Risk of legal challenge
Although a number of interviewees argued that some seepage from one bidder's bid to
another was inevitable, in the main it appears that authorities are highly respectful of
bidder confidentiality. The key driver behind this, alluded to by five interviewees, appears
to be commercial, i.e. the need to encourage bidders to be as full as possible during
dialogue. The risk of legal challenge was not mentioned as a reason, and cherry picking
was in fact noted by two interviewees as low risk in certain circumstances:
crossfertilisation is inevitable and it is very difficult topolice. Ifyou are a bll.Jercharged with bll.Jing
the best thingyou can bll.J, inevitablYyou aregoing to take some of the best bits of diiforent bidders'
bids and introduce them into the dialogue. • .. Other than in very clear cut cases, it is very diiJicultfor
a'!)one to know what has gone on. It would be difficult for a complainant to get the evidence. So,
with those ... nilesyou wonder who is actuallYgoing to enforce them (Lawyer 39, UK).
11.4 Pre-dialogue
11.4.1 Technical dialogue
Only 24 interviewees spoke in detail about the scope for technical dialogue prior to
publication of the OJEU notice. The main reason for this was simply because the bulk of
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interviewees, external legal advisors, tended not to be involved in such early stages of
procurements. Nevertheless, no interviewees expressed any doubts about the legal
possibility for technical dialogue in competitive dialogue procurements. For instance,
according to Lawyer 29 (England &Wales):
[technical dialogue} is possible provided you maintain the principles of transparenry and equal
treatment andyou do not give an advantage in time or information to one specific bidder; it is
recommended. I think it is evenpossible to do this with oneprivate sectorfirm,· there is no rule
forbidding this. There is a slight risk, but ifmanaged properlY it should befine.
Although not all agreed about the legality of technical dialogue with just one supplier
(depending on the size of the market), the overwhelming view from interviewees was that
in most competitive dialogue procurements pre-OJEU notice technical dialogue is
worthwhile practice, i.e. in terms of warming up the market, finding out what the market
can offer, finding out about the ways and means of procuring a particular project etc.
(Lawyer 16, Northern Ireland).
Certain interviewees stressed the difficultly of conducting useful technical dialogue within
the rules. For instance, Lawyer 15 (UK) stated, "... it is a balance. In principal you want
participation to be reasonably open, but you do not want everyone involved because it is
just chaotic".
Due to the limited number of interviewees commenting upon technical dialogue one must
be cautious in drawing conclusions over any common patterns in the approach.
However, there appear to be two distinct methods: one is to dialogue with as wide a
segment of the potential market as is possible and the second is to dialogue with only a
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handful of potential suppliers. It seems that the route taken in a specific case will often
depend on a number of factors: the assessment of legal risk, the reason for engaging in
technical dialogue, the particular project being procured, the supplier market (e.g. size),
the time available etc.
8/24 suggested that they would commonly issue a Prior Information Notice (PIN) and
follow this up with meetings with those expressing an interest (or a selection of those
expressing interest) in the project, for example in the form of bidder open days.
According to interviewees a PIN is a way to "cast the net wide" (Lawyer 1, Scotland) to
involve firms who are likely to bid for a project and reduce the risk of being seen to
favour anyone firm. Lawyer 10 (Northern Ireland) commented:
...ifyou hold an open day in Northern Ireland the chances are that onlYpeople from Northern
Ireland aregoing to come. Do theyget any sort of advantage over anyone else outside the
jurisdiction? PossiblY,· theyget better accessto the purchaser; they might get a better insight as to
what is involved,· they might even have an opporlllnity to influence that. But, • .• I think legallY
as long asyou are advertising [the technical dialogue] on an EU wide basis and affording
everyone the opportunity to do that it should be okt!J.
7/24 signalled a preference for the conduct of technical dialogue with a limited selection
of private sector suppliers. According to Lawyer 8 (England &Wales):
in reality this happens because it is the most sensible way ofgoing about it. There is a risk of
lack of transparency, but the best way of doing it is to heavilYdocument theprocess and have the
information released made available to all.
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13/24, however, expressed doubts over this approach, highlighting the need for great
caution and the legal difficulties in conducting technical dialogue with a small selection of
potential suppliers. On the basis of these figures, it is not possible to saywith any degree
of certainty whether or not a common UK approach exists in relation to this issue.
Questions on the uncertainty surrounding the scope for dialogue post-OJEU notice pre-
dialogue highlighted in the analysis of the legal rules (see Chapter seven) were put to a
very limited number of interviewees. It became apparent very early on that, due to the
scope for dialogue in the dialogue phase, in practice this was not seen as an issue. No
interviewees commented in any meaningful wayan this; indeed, some appeared quite
surprised by the question. For this reason, with the need to maximise the time available
on what interviewees perceived to be the most pertinent issues, this question was dropped
for most interviews, with the hope being that if interviewees viewed it to be an issue they
would raise it themselves in response to the general opening and closing questions.
11.50,EU notice and descriptive documents
Few interviewees raised any particular legal concerns in relation to the OJEU notice and
descriptive documents. Five interviewees flagged up the difficult balance involved in
drafting the OJEU notice, which must be of a sufficiently wide scope to cater for a degree
of change later on in the process but also targeted in such a way that the most appropriate
firms for the contract seek to participate (see discussion in chapter seven).
Procurement Officer 13 (local government) described how she/he had learned the
importance of a well drafted OJEU notice:
[cJertain clients did not get on board with the process IIntil probablY a goodyear into it. Once we
had got buy-in from these clients, all of a slldden they weregoinlIJ 'we colild add this, we cOlildadd
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that, and do this and that'): So the specificationwas getting wider, but the scopeof the 0JE U
notice was onlYha!! ofwhat they wanted it to be. ... Ifyou have not specified the right CPV
codesandyou have not got the right wording in around the types of servicesorgoods or whatever
thenyou can reallYfall foul of the good intention of havingput that contract notice out in thefirst
place. It is important you get legal advice to run it past somebotfy ... Also, with contract values,
ifyou say it is in this range and it ends up being somethingpifflingly disappointing the market
mayfeelyou have lied to get them on board. You do not want it to be sofar above the range that
it is unadvertised spend that you have got to re-procure. I do not think procuring entities reallY
understand the importance ofOJEU notices.
Specific issues, such as the extent to which award criteria must be set out in the
descriptive documents, will also be looked at in greater depth below.
11.5.1 Qualification and selection
The only real issue that was raised in relation to qualification and selection relates to the
changes in circumstances that can occur in the potentially lengthy period from bidder
selection to contract award. For example, a bidder's financial standing may deteriorate (a
real risk in view of the 2008-2009 recession), there may be a change in the make-up of a
consortium (e.g. because a member becomes insolvent) that may impact upon, for
instance, financial standing or technical ability, or a bidder may be convicted of a criminal
offence. According to 18 interviewees (others not commenting) it is necessary to keep
the qualification and selection situation under review throughout the procedure; for
example, documentation issued at each stage of dialogue might require bidders to notify
the authority of any material changes in its circumstances.
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11.6Dialogue
11.6.1 Structure
From the descriptions of 31 interviewees, for PPP competitive dialogue, in particular, the
structure of the procedure most often resembles past UK procurement practice under the
negotiated procedure. It is apparent from certain interviewees that in this regard PPP
programmes (e.g. Building Schools for the Future) have played a significant role in
shaping practice. Typically in a PPP procurement a limited number of bidders (three-
seven) will be invited to participate in dialogue, and these numbers will be progressively
reduced throughout dialogue over the course of one or more formal bidding phases so
that only two or three bidders will be involved in detailed dialogue and submit final
tenders. For example, Procurement Officer 4 (local government) described the approach
taken in a waste management PFI procurement: "There were 15 qualifying firms; we
invited six to participate in dialogue. There were three rounds of bidding and so at final
call we only had three bidders submit tenders".
The interviews present no discernable general structure for complex contracts other than
those procured under PPP programmes. It seems that structure very much depends upon
the specifics of the procurement, e.g. market size, likelihood of bidders dropping out, cost
of bidding, complexity of dialogue, etc. For example, in two competitive dialogue
procurements conducted by Procurement Officer 6 (central government) one was
structured into four bidding stages due to a need for a series of design developments and
the other was structured into two bidding stages, which was said to be because of the
complicated nature of the subject matter: there needed to be "longer time for bidders to
digest and understand everything ...". Procurement Officer 8 (body governed by public
law) described how in a competitive dialogue for complex electronic equipment five firms
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were shortlisted (one dropped out); there were no bidding stages and all four remaining
bidders submitted final tenders.
It is also not possible to give a general figure for bidder numbers participating in non-PPP
dialogue, as in the experience of some interviewees this can be high in comparison with
the numbers discussed in relation to PPP procurements. For example, Procurement
Officer 8 (body governed by public law) ran a competitive dialogue where 13 bidders (31
qualifying firms) were invited to participate in dialogue. Following an early bidding stage,
the 13 bidders remaining were reduced to eight; one then voluntarily dropped out;
another bidding stage was held where the seven were reduced to four; a further bidder
dropped out and the remaining three were invited to submit final tenders. According to
this procurement officer, taking 13 bidders through was manageable because at those
early stages they were only issuing generic documentation; they were not meeting to
discuss specific ideas.
As outlined in the discussion above on the confidentiality rules, it is common for
dialogue, particularly in the later stages of dialogue when discussions are more detailed, to
be conducted with each bidder separately. In addition, it is usual for the dialogue
meetings with each bidder to be broken down into several streams of meetings (e.g. a
technical stream, a financial stream, and a legal stream). Procurement Officer 5 (local
government) explained the reasons for this:
there are too many people on each side and too many issues to get through to have one big meeting
with everybot{ythere,· the technical people wOllld not IInderstand or be interested in the legal side
and vice versa. The technical people may as well have been speaking Swahili,· I wOllld not have
added any vallie to the meetings.
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This practice, not a requirement of the legal rules but a commercially logical consequence,
can contribute to procedures being organisationally complicated and difficult to manage
(see chapter 13).
11.6.2 Equal treatment
The legal analysis (chapter seven) discussed the uncertainty surrounding the practical
implications of the explicit reference to equal treatment. There were no questions on the
specific provision, as it was anticipated that the practical relevance of the provision would
come through in answers to other related questions, such as general questions on the
conduct of dialogue, and on the whole this turned out to be the case. In 19 interviews it
was made clear that in terms of shaping UK practice the equal treatment provision has
played a considerable role. For instance, according to Lawyer 4 (England &Wales), "[t]he
issue on which I tend to advise most ... is to do with equal treatment".
It is apparent from 15 interviews that the emphasis upon equal treatment in the legal rules
on competitive dialogue has often been interpreted in such a way as to lead to some
running dialogue in a highly structured manner. For example, each bidder receives an
equal number of meetings, which are equal in length, and only involve discussion of pre-
identified issues: " ... meetings are extremely well structured; you go through a list of pre-
prepared questions with a set amount of time" (procurement Officer 7, central
government). According to 3/15 (others not commenting), this did not happen pre-2006
under the competitive negotiated procedure (or restricted procedures). Although it is
commonly accepted that the law would be the same regardless of the express equal
treatment statement, as this provision merely reflects the Directive's general principles of
non-discrimination, transparency and equal treatment, it is unclear to what extent such
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practices as those described in this paragraph would have developed had it not been for
the express statement.
8/15 interviewees were critical of the above structured approach, arguing that such
rigidity in the dialogue stage is ill suited to a procedure where bidders generally develop
different solutions during dialogue and can hamper efforts to achieve value for money.
For example, Lawyer 17 (England &Wales) stated:
... some of the ... processes I have been involved in have been over structured,. there is a fiar that
you cannotfavour one bidder over another and thereforeyou are asking all bidders the same
questions. But, on the other hand,you are trying to encouragethem toformulate innovative
propositions which might diffir from each other or diffir from the standard contract. It is a bit of
an odd wqy ofgoing about that. Some dialogueprocesses are so wellpoliced that you have a form
for each meetz'ng,you have to complete theform and th~ feed it back ...
Lawyer 39 (UK) spoke at some length about his/her concerns regarding the way in which
the equal treatment provision has been interpreted:
...you get the impression that it reallYis not dialogue: th~ are being overpedanti: or over
procedural... A lot of the tz'meit comes down to howyou interpret equal treatment,· somepeople
interpret it to mean everybocfyshould get the samefoce-toface time andyou have toput everything
out to everyonevia these E-portals. ... Ifyou had a normal commercial negotz'atz'onit would not
be like that at all The point about [competz'tz'vedialogue] was that you were supposed to have
these diffirent dialogues with different bidders which inevitablYwould mean that some would need
more working up than others;people do not seem tofielthat comfortable with thaI. Th~ have to
have a standardised process.
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Procurement Officer 1 (body governed by public law) also mentioned that adherence to
the equal treatment provision can result in unfairness, for example due a perceived need
for the authority to share the responses to a bidder's questions in relation to a
requirement amongst all bidders:
...you have to have the same meetings with all theparties and make sure they all get the same
information. You may have one developerspending a huge amount of time and money doing lots
of due diligenceand asking all the right questions, but the other three do [comparativelYvery
little] and can take benefit of all the work becauseyou have to notify the others of the information
you havegiven out.
Also mentioned in five interviews was the interplay between the rules on bidder
confidentiality and the rules on equal treatment. That is to say, contracting authorities are
careful to respect equal treatment and ensure that information given to one bidder is
given to all bidders, but at the same time need to respect the confidentiality of bidders'
solutions (Lawyer 1, Scotland). It may be that the way in which some contracting
authorities operate the rules is unhelpful to bidders in their attempts to develop an ideal
solution to meet the authority's requirements. For example, according to Procurement
Officer 4 (local government):
standard practice is Ihat if a question is asked you give tbe answer andyou give it 10 everybo4J
involved. We had to say 10 a bidder, 'ifyou ask that question andyou Ihink that that is a
confidential issue that could actuallYprejudiceyour bid or it is going to give an indication to
another bidder of whatyour line of thought is, then perhaps you ought not to ask that question '.
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There were a few of those conversations where we knew what thrY wanted to ask, but we could not
formallY respond.
Lawyer 26 (UK) explained his/her particular experience of this interplay between the
equal treatment rules and the rules on confidentiality:
[wJhat we have found is that asyou get into detailed dialogue about a particular solution quite
often ..• that throws up ... bidders saying we need amendments toyour specification tofacilitate
our solution. Clients say, 'what is the problem in having three different specifications tailored to
each of the three solutionsi"; the problem is what areyou scoring them against? You have got to
hold the line and have one common specification and have quite careful conversations with each
bidder about what you will permit them to suggest as a mark on ... and try and roll them out
across all three bidders without revealing the confidentiality of their solution; it is a reallY tricky
area. ... it is an area whereyou have tofall back on general principles and say well it is
discriminatory if one bidder has been allowed to heavilY mark up the specifications so effectivelY
thry are bidding on a different basis.
A small number of six interviewees considered the reasons why such inflexible practices
as those described above may have resulted from the equal treatment rule. It seems the
primary reason given for this restrictive interpretation is the need to avoid legal challenge.
As Lawyer 17 (England &Wales) explained, "I think they are just trying to protect
themselves, and I dare say it is their procurement advisors running riot (see chapter 14).
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11.6.3 Bidder reduction
11.6.3.11ntroductlon
It is common practice (57/58 interviewees) for bidder numbers to be reduced during the
dialogue stage. Indeed, it was suggested by three interviewees (others not commenting)
that even where a phased reduction is not envisaged at the outset of a procedure it is good
practice for a contracting authority to leave this option open when drawing up the
contract notice: " ... we always tick the box to be able to shortlist; we won't always reduce
the numbers but we like to give ourselves the option ..0" (procurement Officer 12, NHS
Trust). A significant minority of 1/58 (Lawyer 14, England &Wales) disputed the legal
acceptability of the standard UK practice of bidder reduction.
Regardless of legality, for 57/58 interviewees, the application of Lawyer 14's approach
(above) would not be acceptable due to commercial necessities. Indeed, 23 interviewees
spoke about the need to reduce the number of bidders participating in the dialogue stage
of a procedure quickly in order to reduce the costs of the procurement and to incentivise
remaining bidders:
.. 0 bidders want to know they stand at least a one in three chance of winning before they in&llr
significant expendifllre because when they start drawing Hp detailed solutions we are talking
significant sums ofmonry that areput at nile (£1OO,Ooos ..oj. Ifyou do not slim it douln earlY
enough,you willfind that although bidders mt!Ystill show an interest they mt!Ynot put the same
amount of effort in to give the authority good solutions,' that acfllalfy happens. ... I have had
personal experience where that has been the dis&llssionamongst the client team because they were
under pressure from bidders to that effect. This is especiallYso in the &IImnt marleet .. o because
the risles and expenses are evengreater (Lawyer 34, England &Wales).
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As explained in the analysis of the legal rules in chapter seven, there is also a strong legal
argument in favour of bidder reduction. This area was not explored with all interviewees,
as it was clearly apparent that, in the UK at least, the views of Lawyer 14 were not
prevalent; however, seven interviewees discussed this point, arguing against the opinion of
Lawyer 14. According to Lawyer 39, "it uses the wording 'solutions' to cater for the
possibility that one party could submit different solutions or a firm could be involved in
two bidding consortia".
11.6.3.2Is «formal bidding process required?
It may be recalled from the analysis of the legal rules (chapter seven) that it is not clear
whether or not bidder reduction must be made on the basis of formal bids. The interview
findings do not present a clear picture of the law. 15/27 interpreted the legal rules as
requiring formal bids for de-selection; 12/27 stated that a formal bidding process was not
necessary under the rules. Nevertheless, the interviews reveal that formal bids are most
common in practice.
15/27 interpreted the legal rules to mean that de-selection during dialogue must he done
on the basis of a formal process:
there ought to be a formal bidding stage on the basis that it is more transparenl and it is easier 10
mark a score than, for example, ifyou werejusl down selecting via negotiation (Lawyer 8,
England &Wales).
Lawyer 6 (UK) highlighted the fact the rules refer to "solutions": " ... if a solution has not
been submitted how can you fairly apply the award criteria (unless you have extremely
well documented dialogue meetings)?".
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2/15 interviewees (formal bids necessary) commented that, particularly in the early phases
of the dialogue stage, bidders may be down-selected on the basis of a formally assessed
dialogue meeting or presentation without the submission of documents (others did not
comment on this). Here, bidders would be made aware upfront that the meeting or
presentation was to be formally assessed.
12/27 interviewees stated that under the legal rules a formal bidding process was not
needed. According to Lawyer 5 (UK):
[fJormality is a matter of degreebut I think it can become clear in the course of a dialogue that
one bidder was lagging well behind another and was providing solutions that did not appeal to the
authority then thf!Ycould be rejectedon that basis.
8/12 (formal bidding process not necessary) stated that, although in their opinion a
formal bidding process was not necessarily required, in order to minimise legal risk they
would invariably only deselect on the basis of formal bids:
... in the course of a dialogue it can become apparent that someone mf!Ynot match requirements
even if it is not in theform of a formal bid,' I think you can deselect but it is riskier. Judging on
the submission of written documents which thf!Yknow are going to be assessedputs you in a much
safer place (Lawyer 19, UK).
Thus, it appears that, regardless of the precise meaning of the law, in the UK bidders are
in the main down selected following a formal bidding process.
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11.6.3.3Bldding phases
It is apparent from virtually all interviews that the standard approach in practice in the
UK is for dialogue to be broken down into a series of bidding phases, which authorities
will often use to reduce bidder numbers. As dialogue progresses, the level of detail in
which bidders' solutions are discussed increases. Hence, in a common early bidding
phase, bidders are invited to submit outline solutions (referred to as the ISOS (Invitation
to Submit Outline Solutions) stage). Here, following little (if any) dialogue meetings the
embryonic versions of bidders' proposed solutions for meeting the authority's
requirements will be assessed and bidder numbers will generally be reduced on the basis
of these early assessments. At a later phase in the dialogue stage bidders left in the
process may be asked to submit detailed solutions, which may be used to deselect further.
There may also be some later phases involving even more detailed proposals and, as will
be seen in section chapter 12, in some cases a dry run final tender stage will be held
immediately prior to the formal close of dialogue.
The phased approach is certainly the approach favoured under the main PPP
procurement programmes of recent years (schools, waste, hospitals etc.), and, as noted in
the analysis of the legal rules in chapter seven, this approach was commonly adopted for
PPP procurement under the negotiated procedure prior to the introduction of
competitive dialogue. Although not explicitly stated in any interview, it would appear that
the practice under the negotiated procedure has simply crossed over in most cases for
reasons of assumed commercial expediency. Policymaker 3 explained the reasons for an
early ISOS stage:
[iJt is ... a practical response I?Y the market. The person who is most aggrieved in terms of cost
and wasted time ... is theperson that has come second,.he has been in it a long time and hasjllst
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lost at the end. FrankIY,yollwollld always ratherYOII had been knocked 0111 earlYon beforeyoll
have incurred so milch cost 1505 is a practical way of redllcing the nllmber ofpeople in the
competition and thereby redllcing the overall cost.... YOIIjllst have to make sllreYOII do not
eradicate somebody who otherwise wOllldhave won.
It was seen in the analysis of the legal rules in chapter seven that, although commercially
desirable, the practice of ramping up detail over the course of the dialogue stage, coupled
with bidder reduction, has the potential to act in a discriminatory manner, and there is
uncertainty over the most appropriate way of conducting this staged approach to bidder
reduction. The interview findings in this respect are presented below. 34/48 interviewees
revealed that it was considered legally acceptable and was most common in practice for an
authority to look at different aspects of solutions at different stages of dialogue and vary
award criteria accordingly. 14/48 interviewees disagreed with this position.
The legal acceptability of not touching upon sufficient issues in the outline solutions
phase so as to enable assessment against the full set of headline award criteria to be used
to judge the final tender was doubted by 7/14 interviewees:
I think YOIIpotentiallY do need to have tOllchedIIpon all aspects of a bid at olltline sollltions.
The reason 1stfYthat is that the most economicallYadvantageolls tender assessment is all abollt
the balance between cost, risk and qllality (Lawyer 27, England &Wales);
1 have seen dialoglle documents talking abollt an olltline sollltion and certain documents not being
inclilded in the olltline sollltion.... IjYOII have not asked someone a qllestion andyoll tell them I
am going to ask this later, my argllment is that YOII have not properlY applied the award crilma,'
YOII cannot do that ... (Lawyer 37, Scotland).
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In answering questions on how much needs to be known about the make-up of each
bidders bid when deselecting, a different 7/14 interviewees explained that although they
will apply the full set of publicised headline criteria and weightings at all phases of the
dialogue, the award criteria below that level would be tailored to the level of detail in
which solutions are being considered at a particular dialogue stage:
[yJOIiask for different things. At IS0S yOllmay ask them to allocate risk and at detailed
sollition YOII may ask them to cost that risk. Provided YOII have got YOllr headline criteria and
YOII can sayYOII have got weightings, 1think YOII are oktfY to vary criteria IInder that at different
stages (Lawyer 38, England &Wales).
On the basis of 34/48 responses, it appears most common for the contracting authority
to look at different elements of the solution at different phases of the dialogue stage and
vary award criteria accordingly (apply a 0% weighting, automatically give full marks, or not
use the particular award criteria); the only example given was the avoidance of financial
issues during the early phases of the dialogue stage. It was explained by 10/34 that they
would specify weightings as a range (see chapter four) (e.g. 0%-70%)) in the descriptive
documents and then vary the weighting at different stages within that range, some setting
out upfront the precise weighting to be applied at each stage. The following are quotes
representing this practice:
the bestwtfY of doing it is to haveYOllr bag of award criteria ... and then for olltline sollitions it is
not possible to talk abollt financials,· soYOII have that scoring zero at that point and YOII do not
assess that bit. Say, if the weighting is 40% YOIIjllst do not score that40% and they are tested
on the 60% and then at the next stage the 40% comes into play. Last time 1spoke to the
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Commission their line was that it wo1l1dall have to be set Olltin advance. So, if there is
sllfficient transparenry, people knowYOIl are not doctoring it asYOIlgo along, then I think that
kind offlexibility is available (Lawyer 39, England &Wales, London);
I have actuallYseen that qeite a lot. In many respectsI think it ispotentiallY discriminatory to
Pllt a weighting onprice at the alitset becaese there is no integrity in the information. So, if I lost
Olltbecause I was honest with myprice, and then others' prices change later on, I wOllldbe
sllitabIYaggrieved... (Lawyer 10, Northern Ireland).
14/34 interviewees (others not commenting) commented that in order to limit the risk of
legal challenge the contracting authority should ensure a transparent approach and one
according to which the award criteria is varied equally for all bidders. So, it should
explain in the descriptive documents at the outset that, for example, financial aspects of
bids will not be looked at or assessed in the early stages of dialogue but will be during the
later stages. Not only might it be said that this approach is in keeping with the
requirements of the Directive, but, as three interviewees point out, this will start the
challenge time limit:
the key thing is that everybotfyknows what the criteria aregoing to be right the way throllgh.
YOII are back to the, ~re weplaying academic what the rilles are or are weplaying what is the
reality and who is going to challenge?~ Those time limits becomeimportant then becass« if
everyonehas known from day one that these are the rilles then they cannot challengeafter three
months (Lawyer 23, England &Wales).
Also, four interviewees expressed doubts over the appropriateness of an outline solutions
stage, specifically where they saw such phases as being used as extensions of qualification
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and selection. The main concern seems to be over situations where an ISOS reduction
takes place following very little or no "dialogue" with very little information about
solutions on the table:
I do not like 1505because1do not actuallYthink it is about anything,' it isjust ja/se comfort;
who can write a touchy,feelY, cuddlYdocument stuff... 1havegot an 1505stage because1have
basicallYfluffed mypre-qualification... In the waste sector thty actuallYqualify as many as 12
bidders and go down to ... three orjour .... just from afluify ISOS. The reason thty do it is
because they do not want to make a decision about technology... [WJhat is ityou are actuallY
testing? That thty can write an essay?... 1am a bit rynical here, but unlessyou bring money
into it then what areyou testing? 1am in a small minority. That is the way we havegone in the
UK Anything can come out of it,· anyone can win, but I am not sure how muchyou learnfrom
it ... (Lawyer 17, UK);
In two interviews with procurement officers the ISOS stage was described as taking place
prior to the formal commencement of dialogue.
11.6.3.4Appllcatlon oftne award criteria
11.6.3.4.1 Introduction
Throughout the course of data collection it became quite apparent that uncertainty
surrounding the law applicable to award criteria was a major concern. This was so
particularly in light of recent case law on the subject of award criteria, made in the context
of procedures other than competitive dialogue (see chapter four).
The application of the award criteria was perceived to be a high risk area, especially
considering the stream of case law emanating from EU and domestic courts on the
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subject in recent times: " ... it is an easy hook. There are lots of areas of challenge. With
the case law there is more certainty about what is wrong behaviour: a vicious cycle"
(Lawyer 18, UK). It was explained in nine interviews that award criteria can be difficult to
apply, for example because bids can become very difficult to differentiate; thus, the
slightest of technical breaches can have the potential to make all the difference between
de-selection and selection or winning and losing.
Six interviewees spoke about the difficult task of developing award criteria that can allow
for different solutions to be compared in a fair manner:
... the difficulty is whenyou are ... talking about dijferent technical; dijferentfinancia4 dijferent
commercial make-ups,· the ... authorities find it very hard comparing what they consider to be
apples and pears in a fair way and having award criteria that allow them to do that (Lawyer
28, England &Wales).
11.6.3.4.2 Disclosure of award criteria
As discussed in chapter four, there is a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the extent
and timing of award criteria disclosure. It will be seen that the interview findings do not
present a straightforward picture of UK practice on this issue; this is compounded by the
fact that interviewees tended to be quite vague in their responses in relation to the rules
on award criteria.
From a practical perspective, there appear to be two schools of thought. One is to
disclose as much as possible as early as possible; this way the authority avoids any
accusations of developing criteria to favour a particular bidder or an argument that, had it
been assessed against all criteria, a deselected bidder might have been awarded different
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marks. The other is to hold back some of the detail on evaluation and disclose on a per
stage basis as the dialogue progresses and discussions become more detailed.
The findings below relate to how interviewees tend to apply the law in practice, not what
they think the law is or should be. However, in terms of the law, 16 interviewees
emphasised its uncertainty in this area, with 5/16 calling for the courts to clarify the issue.
18/41 interviewees appeared to signal a strict approach, explaining that in practice
contracting authorities will set out extensively prior to the start of the dialogue stage the
award criteria and weightings developed for each phase of the dialogue stage. The
following are a selection of comments, which best represent this category:
.• • what transparenq has been translated into is a requirement for specificity at a very earlYstage
• .. So, for example, on the need to be able to specify award criteria right at the commencementof
the dialogue is quite tricJ:y in terms of lack of knowledge at that stage.... It would be useful to
have clarity over the extent to whichyou need to specify award criteria at the beginning of the
process • .. It would make sense to startoff with something that is reasonablYgeneral and then
make it more specific asyou move through, but I am not sureyou can at the moment (Lawyer
22, UK);
... they areputting the whole dialogueprocedure out. I have seen it at [Outline Business Case}.
So they have aireatIYgot how they aregoing to evaluate and there is a wholepackage ... This
mqy be a product of the climate of challenge and some of thejudicial interpretations on evaluation.
.• • I think the big issuefor us that we have grappled with is the extent to which we can identify
evaluation criteria on a per stage basis, as opposed to sqyingfrom dqy one these will be tbe
criteria, particularlY whenyou do not know whal the prqjeci is going to look like whenyou are
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starting alit, bllt I think we a~ increasingly of the view, and seeing markel practice, to try and sel
tbis alitfrom tbe aliiset. ... As earlY as possible. ... Competitive dialoglle is an iterative process
wbere things develop throllghollt, so the rationale should be that YOllr criteria can develop as well
(Lawyer 2, England &Wales).
23/41 interviewees expressed a more flexible approach, whereby there was viewed to be
some scope to disclose sub-criteria and sub-sub-criteria on a per-stage basis. Although
not falling within this category, Lawyer 12 (UK) commented that, if allowed, the sub-
criteria etc. would need to be entirely consistent with the award criteria already publicised.
According to Lawyer 28 (England &Wales), "[t]his is a nonsense with competitive
dialogue because you are not in a position to be prescriptive because if you could be and
the marketplace would be sympathetic to that you would be using the restricted
procedure".
11.6.3.4.3 Variations to publicised award criteria
As was discussed in chapter four, the extent to which changes can be made under the
procurement rules to publicised award criteria is unclear. Interviewees were specifically
asked about the scope for varying advertised headline award criteria, sub-criteria and
weightings in competitive dialogue. The findings are presented below and are not
conclusive on this point. As with most areas, it seems that out of necessity all manner of
award criteria variations take place in practice, with risk of challenge being a key factor
behind these decisions.
Seemingly in compliance with the Commission's explanatory note, 10/45 interviewees
argued that legally there was no scope for varying award criteria once publicised. These
responses, however, are lacking in detail and it may be that the interviewees were only
referring to headline award criteria only (clarification should have been sought on this).
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23/45 interviews accepted that there was some scope for variations in award criteria,
generally suggesting that whether or not the change was permitted would depend upon
the materiality of the change. 4/23 stated that there was some scope to vary weightings.
11 spoke about there being some scope to vary criteria under headline criteria; two of
these interviewees mentioned Case C-331/04, ATt64 in this regard:
[wJe would sqy at the outset that award criteria are indicative and we reservethe right to change
them,' but, if there were changes they would never be material ... (Lawyer 16, Northern
Ireland);
... it depends, sub-criteria and sub-sub-criteria, maybe. You have to look at theATI case,'that
is the classic case on that. How far shouldyou be able to do it? Again, it all depends on the
circumstances (Lawyer 15, UK).
7/45 interviewees were not clear about the precise scope for variations, with one
Procurement Officer 2 (body governed by public law) stating that she/he would need to
seek external legal advice on the issue. 5/45 interviewees also spoke about how the
decision would depend very much on practical considerations, such as the timing of the
change. According to Lawyer 1 (Scotland), the decision would ultimately come down to a
risk assessment:
...you would have to analYse any change in terms of-is this a material change? Would it hatlC
changed the outcome? Would it have changed the economic balance when wegot toprocurement?
I would sqyyou could do it but it would be very much on a risk assessment basis.
564 AT!, fh.124
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With this in mind, four interviewees argued that, provided the authority is transparent and
considering the rules on time limits for challenge, only major changes are likely to be at
any real risk of being challenged:
• ..you have three months to challenge and veryfew will challenge whilst they are still in the
competition. Provided everybo4J knows about the change, it is onlYwhen a change means a
significant change in direction that a challenge is more likelY, as that is when the costs mount up
(Lawyer 18, UK).
Furthermore, it was suggested by Procurement Officer 11 (local government) that to limit
legal risk the authority would be well advised to discuss the change with bidders. If the
alternative is restarting the procurement, they may be willing to accept the change and
give assurances that they will not challenge.
11.6.3.4.4 Selection and award criteria
The distinction between selection and award criteria was analysed in chapter four. 12 of
the legal advisors interviewed (others not commenting) commented upon a lack of
awareness amongst certain contracting authorities of the law in this area. These
comments were generally based upon experience from training staff within authorities or
through encountering situations in practice where authorities had used or had sought to
use what they perceived to be clear examples of award criteria to select firms or vice versa.
For example, according to Lawyer 23 (England &Wales), cc • • • they look shocked when you
tell them about the difference between selection and award criteria. This is a major part
of the training I do. It has been embedded in practice for so long".
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Lawyer 2 (England &Wales) explained how her/his interpretation of this aspect of
Lianakij65 can be difficult for those not involved in the procurement on a day to day basis
to accept:
[i] t has caused a verydifficult issue on this particular project where one of the bidders is
continuallYin thepress for non-petformance on a different contract... Our advice is that you
cannot ... take this into account because it is not the bid they areputtingforward. It is hardfor
the counaj to accept,particularlYfor people not dirutIY involved on theprocurement. Theyjust
see that you are taking this bidder through and they see on News at Ten' that they are
petforming reallYbadlYon another scheme.
Although an issue not specific to competitive dialogue, 26 interviewees set forth their
interpretation of Case C-199/07, Lianakis. 22/26 favoured what might be perceived to be
a more flexible reading of Lianakis; that is to say, criteria such as experience are capable of
being used at award stage provided they are forward looking, related to ability to perform
the specific contract being procured (not capability in general). 4/26 expressly disagreed
with this view, stating that they interpret Iianakis as ruling out any cross-over between
selection and award criteria, however commercially inappropriate.
This area of the law was, however, noted to be difficult and fast moving and that there
can be a fine line between what is and is not acceptable criteria at the separate stages. The
following comment exemplifies the perceived high threat of legal challenge for potential
non-compliance in this area:
sssCase C-199/07, Lianakis, fn.117
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... we are advising caution. A cumnt competitive dialogue involves award cntaia based on 4Ps
templates,' thry hadfinancial standing as award criteria. We went out with it, but after outline
solutions we moved the weighting to 0% in light of Uanakis so that we could not be criticisedfor
having selectioncriteria in the award part. The risks were toogreat (Lawyer 26, UK).
11.7 One bidder situations
In four interviews a situation was described where, usually due to bidder financial
troubles, only one bidder remains in the process prior to the close of dialogue. Here it
was clear that the decision whether or not to persevere with the one bidder often comes
down to an assessment of the risks involved. The approach adopted by Lawyer 38
(England &Wales), with the support of a policymaker, was to continue the process with
the remaining bidder competing against a shadow bidder. That is to say, "... the authority
has brought technical and financial consultants in to devise a solution and reference
project which will be priced on the best available information ... to provide a benchmark
to compare against to see whether what is submitted is value for money".
11.8Concluding remarks
The chapter has presented findings on legal and practical issues arising before the close of
dialogue. It can be seen that up to this stage the staged approach to bidder reduction is
very similar to past UK practice. In relation to the application of award criteria when
reducing bidder numbers during dialogue there is clearly great legal uncertainty resulting
in variations in practice in the UK.
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12 Findings: close of dialogue to contract
signature
12.1Introduction
Chapter 12 will present interview findings for the post-dialogue stages of competitive
dialogue. Following a similar structure as the legal analysis in chapter seven, chapter 12
will consider practical and legal issues in the same order they are encountered in practice.
The chapter will begin in section two by looking at issues arising in the run up to the final
tender stage. In section three the issues arising at the final tender stage will be presented;
these include issues such as the minimum number of tenderers permitted and the scope
for clarification, specification and fine-tuning of tenders. Section four concentrates on
the preferred bidder stage and the scope for changes to tenders or the call for tenders.
This section of chapter 12 also looks at the timing of the Alcatel standstill and information
requirements.
12.2 Formal close of dialogue
12.2.1 The requirement for complete final tenders
12.2.1.11ntroduction
The Directive/Regulations require final tenders to contain "all the elements required and
necessary for the performance of the project" (Art.29(6)/Reg.18(25)(b». Furthermore,
there are express limitations placed upon the work that can be done post-appointment of
a preferred bidder (Art.29(7) /Reg.18(28». As was discussed in the analysis of the legal
rules in chapter seven, in view of the genesis of the legal rules on competitive dialogue
these two provisions have the potential to heavily impact upon UK PPP procurement
practice, in particular if they are applied so that the early appointment of a preferred
bidder no longer takes place; however, as pointed out in chapter seven, the wording of
240
Art.29(7)/Reg.18(28) is not consistent and there is some scope for finalising matters post-
close of dialogue. In order to gain an understanding of interviewees' interpretations of
the law and their practical experiences in this important area, all interviewees were asked
about the extent to which final tenders were final and what, if any, matters might be left
to be resolved with the preferred bidder.
Although not always going into great detail, the majority of interviewees (22/35) set forth
a strict literal interpretation of the requirement for complete final tenders. These
interviewees suggested that final tenders are required to be at a very high stage of
development, for example, so that it is possible to conclude the contract immediately after
the selection of the most economically advantageous tender. In comparison, only 6/35
interviewees adopted what might be considered to be a more flexible interpretation of the
law at this stage. Under this more flexible approach, interviewees interpreted the law as
requiring final agreement on material points only. 7/35 interviewees expressed the view
that the law was not certain and hence could not say how much flexibility there was.
Regardless of their interpretation of the law, in relation to practice, most interviewees
(25/47) recognised that for whatever reason (explored below) when running competitive
dialogue procedures a strict literal approach was not followed. In contrast to this
experience, 17/47 interviewees adopted a strict approach in practice, and 8/25
interviewees (strict approach not possible), although not engaging in or advising upon
such practices themselves, stated an awareness of the existence of such strict approaches
in practice. In 5/47 interviews legal practice was said to vary, depending upon the nature
of the procurement It can be seen from this brief snapshot that, although the majority of
interviewees appear to take a literal interpretation of the law, this is not necessarily carried
through to the practical application of the legal rules. In terms of UK legal practice, it is
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very difficult to say, on the basis of the interview findings, to what extent final tenders are
complete.
12.2.1.2The law
22/35 interviewees interpreted the requirement for final tenders containing "all elements
required and necessary for performance of the project" literally:
• [aJII the Is needed to be dotted and the Ts neededto be crossed. We had to have absolutefyfinal
contracts in place. All bidders' amendments to documents had to be in place. This is where it
becomesvery difficult, but ...you havegot to resolveeverything regardlessof expense. This is
crucial because othenvise how areyou comparing apples with apples orpears with pears?
(procurement Officer 1, body governed by public law);
• [final tendersJ need to be capableof being signed.... The final BAFO [Best and Final Offer)
should be exeClitable (Lawyer 20, UK).
Those clearly adopting a flexible interpretation of the requirement for final tenders
containing "all elements" were in the minority (6/35). Here, interviewees tended to argue
that there was scope for leaving some matters the post-tender agreement of which were
unlikely to impact heavily on the preferred bidder's score:
• raj narrow intetpretation ... is countetproductive. You have complex contracts that need
discussio» and limiting people, front loading the whole rystem and asking bidders that do not
stand a chance to spend £mi/lions participating in a long dialogue ... Our perspective is different
to the Commission j-perspective. They sayjust follow the letter. Our view is concernedwith
discrimination and transparenry,·provided you respect transparenry and fairness you are okay
(Lawyer 19, UK);
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• UJor complianceyou would not want to leave anything to thefinal stage that could affect the order
of award (Lawyer 11, Scotland).
7/35 interviewees expressly stated that the law was uncertain and hence the matters to be
left to be finalised with a preferred bidder often came down to practical considerations
(such as risk of challenge, cost, time etc.). According to Lawyer 24 (UK), it is very
common that, where a contracting authority is told by legal advisors that it is appropriate
for them to close the dialogue and call for final tenders this is questioned internally: " ...
you get someone else from somewhere saying, 'no it is not; how do they know?'. Well, no
one knows ...".
12.2.1.3 Practice
A cautious interpretation of the law, such as those above, did not necessarily mean that a
cautious approach was adopted in practice. In contrast to interviewees' interpretations of
the law in which 22/35 adopted a strict literal interpretation of the rules, only 17/47
interviewees stated that in practice such an approach was adopted. The majority of
interviewees (25/47) explained that in practice a more flexible approach was taken, i.e.
whilst material points will be finalised, this is not the case in relation to all points of detail.
Interestingly, 9/22 interviewees stating a strict literal interpretation of the law explained
how this strict literal approach was not possible in practice. Lawyer 4 (UK) is one
example of an interviewee whose legal interpretation differed from his/her practical
experience:
• .. tenders shollld be ... completelYfinal ... bllt no one is going tofollY negotiate a filII legal
agreement and spend a hllge amount of time and money on Ia~ers'fees getting the agreement in a
form where they are ready to sign if they are not the prefemd bidder. So, it is all very well saying
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that onlY Iclarification' is allowed and that isfine for commercial principle, but actuallY in terms
of negotiating the legal documentation, getting all that done, there is still going to be some toing
and froing at preferred bidder stage. • .. [Ilt just does not make sensefor you to spend thousands
ofpounds on la1l:'Jers'ftes negotiating an agreementyou are never going to use.
17/47 interviewees stated that in practice they adopted a strict approach to final tenders in
which very few, if any, matters are left unresolved. Also, 8/25 (strict approach not
possible) interviewees indicated that, although not followed or advised upon by
themselves, they were aware of the existence of such strict methods in practice:
... people are askingfor a higher degree of certainty in terms of comments and documentation and
so on. Some la1l:'JerslVillwant you to havefinalised everything at bid submission. In the past
you might have had a sheet of main outstanding points and there would be a pragmatism around
what you could and could not do and to what extent you would involvejunders or subcontractors
or others in the detail ... (Lawyer 17, UK).
This indicates that a strict literal approach to the matters that must be resolved prior to
close of dialogue is reasonably prevalent in UK practice. Several reasons were put
forward to explain the cautious approach. Firstly, 11 interviewees cited the uncertainty
coupled with risk of legal challenge due to incomplete bids leading to unlawful post tender
negotiations. According to Lawyer 10 (Northern Ireland), cc • • • there is a drive to get to
commercial certainty when ... still in dialogue due to the uncertainty about what is and is
not permissible post-closure of dialogue". Also, Lawyer 13 (England &Wales) explained,
"[blecause there is uncertainty and because people are nervous they are tending to
interpret [the rules] very cautiously. That means you get this duplication and triplication
of bid costs". According to Procurement Officer 1 (body governed by public law), cc ...
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you are in this climate of fear". The risk of legal challenge and its impact on contracting
authority behaviour is looked at in greater detail in Chapter 14.
Five interviewees noted that authorities may view it as being in their interests to require a
high degree of bid development whilst bidders are still in competition: cc ... [authorities] are
... very rigid I think on the issue of clarification because it suits them commercially. It is a
good commercial stance ..." (Lawyer 15, UK).
Itwas also mentioned by two interviewees that, because of the nature of the contracts
they had experience of procuring under competitive dialogue, requiring a high degree of
bid development was not seen as problematic. For example, according to Lawyer 22
(UK):
.. this is an area where there is a differencebetween IT and non-IT, in that it is now wry rarefor
IT projects to be externallYfllnded. It is easierfor liS toget to completed contracts in IT
procurement as compared toprojects whereyou are trying toget external funders onboard who are
not interested, and things like planning permission, we do not haw that... We do not haw the
same sort ofpressure at preftrred bidder. Nowadays, th~ areprettY complete contracts.
This is not necessarily the case, however; two interviewees referred to leT procurement,
particularly unique leT procurement, as examples of projects where bid costs were often
high and it was often difficult to get complete final tenders.
Finally, nine interviewees explained how the requirement for highly developed bids prior
to close of dialogue was often a requirement or a result of requirements made by certain
government departments or bodies responsible for public investment schemes (such as
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Partnerships for Schools). For example, as explained by Policymaker 2, the Interim Final
Business Case/Appointment Business Case will dovetail with the close of dialogue. It
seems that a contracting authority will need the business case approved prior to the
formal close of dialogue in order to gain clearance for the scheme to go ahead. According
to Policymaker 2, the business case signoff for hospital PPP procurements is predicated
on there being a done deal by the close of dialogue. Lawyer 26 (UK) explained his/her
experience of this requirement:
[w]e had to go through an interim final business caseprocess with our sponsoring deparlment,· so,
as part of that, we had to get sign offfor all our derogationsfrom Local Partnerships. They run
through a similar process on BSF projects. I found that ... helpful because (aJ it forced ... issues
outfrom bidders and funders, and (bJ it gave us confidence that we were not going to be met with
a rejection of derogations after we had closed dialogue.... It ejJectiveIYacted as a dummy run of
thefinal tenders. They ranfinancial models as part of that process, which was helpful as it threw
up that at least one of the bidders was not affordable.
The procurement of hospitals appears to be one area where a particularly high degree of
bid development is required prior to close of dialogue. For example, Lawyer 3 (England
&Wales) described his/her experience of such procurements in some detail. The level of
design detail was, for the author, unexpectedly high:
[w]e required a high degree of design detail at final tender stage. ... [The plans that bidders were
required to draw up for the hospital] is scale 1:50,' it shows thefixtures and fittings in each
room,'You can see that there is a hand basin here, a soap dispenser here, and evenplug sockets.
So, it even tellsyou the number ofplug sockets that are in each room. You have to demand tbat
level of detail in order 10gel properlYpriced bids ...
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Lawyer 3 went on to explain how it was necessary, to the greatest extent possible, to
reduce the opportunity for bidders to introduce something new, which is material, once
selected as preferred bidder that has not been the subject of dialogue. For example,
he/ she advised how in the hospital procurement it was necessary to "test bidders'
assumptions", as some bidders will attempt to gloss over certain issues in order to offer a
lower priced tender. He/she described how a bidder got through to the latter stages of
dialogue, but hidden in various schedules of the bid were various assumptions, e.g. that
there will be no section 278 Highways Act 1980 works, that there was no Japanese
Knotweed (an invasive plant, which can damage buildings), and also that there were no
ecological risks (e.g. bats). If these assumptions were inaccurate there would likely be a
dramatic upward impact on the price of the bid. Hence, prior to close of dialogue in this
procurement bidders were asked to produce full financial models (i.e.where bidders price
everything): "it is costly for bidders, but really the only way that the procuring authority's
advisors could test the assumptions in the bids. We want to know, for example, that they
have priced for ground investigation and removal of any contamination".
linked to the cautious approach to the legal rules described in the paragraphs immediately
above and the need to avoid closing the dialogue stage too early and limiting exposure to
risk of legal challenge, 11 interviewees (others not commenting) described usual practice
as being to have a dry run final tender stage prior to close of dialogue:
[t}he one issue that people used to be worried about was verymuch the issue of saying well once
you have closeddialogueyou are not allowed to talk anymore,' what doyou do? I think the
widespread use of a sort of dummy MFO [Best and Final Offir] is pretryfairlY settled and
seems to work quite often ... (Lawyer 12, UK);
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The author has been informed anecdotally that ideally, where a draft final tenders stage is
held prior to close of dialogue, final tenders will consist of litde more than a short
reference to the draft tender. This fits with comments by Lawyer 6 (England &Wales,
London) that after formal close of dialogue "in some cases local authorities will only allow
you 48 hours to put in your final bids".
Although the above practice of holding a dry run final tenders stage was raised
spontaneously in 11 interviews and some interviewees referred to such a practice as being
"well established" and "widespread", on the basis of these figures it is difficult to saywith
any certainty how prevalent the practice is. Indeed, it may be that the situation is more
nuanced than indicated by the quotes in the above paragraphs. For example, according to
Lawyer 13 (England &Wales), whether a dry run final tenders stage is held prior to
formal close of dialogue will depend upon the nature of the contracting authority, with
this practice more common amongst risk-averse authorities because of the legal comfort
gained; more bullish contracting authorities may regard a dry run as unnecessary:
... it will verymuch depend upon the client's risk appetite. Ijyou get a neno»: client who wants
tofollow the letter of the law, they will want to have everything done during dialogue, and some of
them, I am sureyou will or have come across this, have ... a dummy run ..., so that they are
confident that the bids theyget back will contain all the elements necessary. Other clients are a
bit morefeisty and prepared to accepta bit moreflexibility at prifemd bidder stage and will not
be terriblYbothered about that. They will not have hammered down all points,· there will be quite
a lot of square brackets and things like that,· so, it will verymuch depend on a client's risk
appetite.
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Also, there is the potential for the effectiveness of a draft final tenders stage to be negated
by external factors, for example if sign-off of the interim final business easel appointment
business case takes a significant period of time. This was brought to the author's
attention through anecdotal sources (i.e. informal conversations with procurement
lawyers).
Most interviewees (25/47) accepted that, although they might strive for strict literal
compliance with the requirement for complete final tenders, in practice it was not
possible, for example because bidders would not be prepared to incur certain costs at risk,
because bidders may be being uncooperative, or because of time or (internal) cost
pressures necessitating a premature close of dialogue:
• ... the reality is that funders will not get involved until [prejemd bidder stage] ...I can see the
positives of competitive dialogue, but I think it is idealistic to think that competitive dialogue
overcomes the prefemd bidder problem because in complex projects so much does still has to be
back ended and things will happen ... (Lawyer 7, UK);
• ... [a]sI read if, it is quite narrow, but in practice there is a lot of negotiation partiClllarlY
around the legals,· that is driven by, in part, political pressure to conclude the dialogue. When to
close the dialogue is a question in itself. There comes a point where people realise they are
spending a lot ofmonry,' the pressure comespoliticallY (internallY) but alsofrom developers, Iwe
need to get this done, we need to draw it to a bead'. There is a pressure to close as earlYas
possible (Lawyer 34, England &Wales).
It was further noted by four interviewees that bidders can be under an incentive to hold
back information throughout the dialogue stage; for example, a bidder that fully marks up
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a contract may be at a disadvantage to other bidders that have held back their position in
relation to acceptable contract terms and conditions.
Although 2/25 who adopted a flexible approach to the requirement for complete final
tenders indicated that PPP practice had changed very little since the introduction of
competitive dialogue, i.e. there was still an early appointment of a preferred bidder and
significant negotiations with that preferred bidder ("[w]e have not seen much difference
maybe because people do what they are used to doing" (Lawyer 18, UK)), most (10/25)
indicated that, despite the practical obstacles to achieving fully complete final tenders,
final tenders are more final than they might have been for a PPP project procured under
the negotiated procedure pre-competitive dialogue (though not all interviewees agreed
with the Commission's characterisation of UK PPP procurement practice pre-competitive
dialogue): "[d]o not expect to close the dialogue and have six months of negotiations.
The substance of the tender must be there. You need to bring [the dialogue] to a fuller
conclusion than under the negotiated procedure, but there is a good room for
manoeuvre" (Lawyer 19, UK).
The category of 25 interviewees who adopted a reasonably flexible approach in practice
gave examples of matters that may be left to be finalised after the close of the dialogue
stage, and these generally corresponded with those matters listed in the Partnerships for
Schools guidance and the 2008 OGC/HMT guidance (detailed site surveys, investigation
of legal title, lender due diligence, detailed planning applications, etc.). It was, however,
highlighted, by 5/25 interviewees that it was not possible to generalise about the matters
that would be left to be resolved just with the preferred bidder, as this would vary
depending upon the nature of the procurement, e.g. the cost for bidders, the practicalities,
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and the extent to which any matters had the potential to have a material (could it effect
the award decision?) impact on price or the risk/reward balance.
In addition, the 2008 guidance on the requirement for complete tenders was noted as
helpful, and a number of interviewees stated that they gained comfort from the
acceptance in the guidance that in practice certain issues had to be left until close of
dialogue.
11/25 who adopted a reasonably flexible approach spoke about how, provided agreement
had been reached on points in broad terms, they preferred to delay some of the detailed
drafting of contractual documents until there is only one bidder left in the process:
...[I] here is a perception that you have to have nailed down every individual clause and agreed
that beforeyou can close dialogue. We think that is wrong. We think you can close dialogue
when you have got agreedpositions ... and you can actuallY do the finessing ... afterwards. But,
unfortunatelY that is not the wtfYprojects are being delivered, which is causing huge costs ...
[Yjo« should not be looking to close out every individual word during dialogue. For example, on
a project at the moment we are agreeingprinciples so that 95% of the contract is agreed, but we
are not spending £ 1,000s trying to nail the final points. If we had taken the view that we
needed to close down and draft everypoint with both bidders it would have taken months. ...
When you get la1l;Yersinvolved and you are looking at detail, it is no exaggeration but you are
doubJingyour costs becauseyou have got bidder A and bidder B. We need to postpone some of
the drafting ... (Lawyer 2, England & Wales).
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These interviewees were not clear on the precise amount of detail being finalised post-
tender; thus, it is hard to assess the magnitude of the work that may be taking place with
the preferred bidder.
3/25 interviewees spoke about the need in certain procurements to delay full design
development due to cost. For 2/3 (Lawyer 6, UK; and Lawyer 24, UK) this was in
relation to PPP housing developments:
• [aJt closeof dialogueyou onlYhave designsfor one or two sites out of ten. It 1VOuidnot bepossible
to do it any other way,'you would be in dialoguefor years andyou would neverget any houses
built. Our view is that as long as the authority is transparent about that approachfrom the
beginning of theprocess and clear on the parameters on which a bidder becomesthepreferred
bidder then it is going to be okay,·
• ..• we had an accommodation project with multiple sites,tJ different buildings. Are bidders
reallYsupposed to design allf3 before we callfor final tenders or can we not lei them bid on the
basis offour samples and work the rest up at preferred bidder stage? Of course, that would be
going bryond 'clarifying:·th~ have nothing to clarify, th~ are actuallYdesigning the other nine.
.• . The competitive dialogue does not work for these largeprojects .• .
12.2.2 Involvement of lenders prior to close of dialogue
30 interviewees noted the problems with private lenders (e.g. banks) being reluctant to
fully engage in the procurement process until their client had some guarantee of success
due to the costs involved. According to these interviewees, lenders due diligence post
dialogue invariably gave rise to changes to tenders/requirements, increasing the risk of
challenge.
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In view of the difficulty with lenders, 11/30 explained how they had attempted to address
the problem. These include, for example, getting lenders (or shadow lenders) to attend
dialogue meetings (Lawyer 3, England &Wales); getting bidders, as a condition for
submitting a final bid, to get a letter from their lender stating they wish to raise no
additional points on the contract (Lawyer 31, England & Wales); investigating the
expectations of lenders pre-procurement (Lawyer 34, England &Wales); and funding
competitions (policymaker 2). Despite the above, only 2/30 expressed the opinion that
the situation with respect to lender engagement in competitive dialogue procurement was
satisfactory. The reluctance to incur unnecessary cost and a lack of interest in the
procurement rules were cited as reasons for this.
Furthermore, 22 interviewees recognised that due to the volatile funding market caused by
the 2007 financial crisis even when banks do fully engage and give sufficient financial
terms to a bidder it is unlikely that a bank will be able to hold to those terms through to
fmancial close (potentially a year or more down the road).
2/22 interviewees described how, after a period of good behaviour, in recent years the
situation with funders was deteriorating:
• [i]n the good/ bad old days,you used to lie Hntilyou gotYOHrbank along. YOHrelied onyour
bank to say how it is. The bank wOHIdcome in at preferred bidder and say, 7 like theproject
bllt I cannot do this, this and tbis': After severalmeetings, a lot of shoHtin!J and a few tears, the
bank wOllldget its way. We havegone back to that situation. Ij the bank does not like it ...
[a] contracting aHthority canpoint to the rules, but the bank willjust say, 'tryou do not want
this money do not have the money~ What will the authority say then? It will say, 7would
rather have the money than stick to the rules~ Anyone who has actuallYcloseda project in the
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last twoyears has done a fantastic job, bHtfrom a procHrement law perspective, thf!Ywill have
had to CHta few corners (Lawyer 17, UK);
• it is increasingly the case that banks are getting back to the bad old days, coming in late and
getting up to old tricks (policy maker 1).
These were the only two interviewees to make such comments. Although no other
interviewees made statements conflicting with these views, due to the limited numbers
involved, it is difficult to say with any certainty how representative the views expressed in
this paragraph are.
12.2.3 Other issues
A further matter identified spontaneously by a limited number of interviewees (not
considered by chapter seven) as potentially problematic at this stage is where bidders'
solutions are at different levels of development. Although most interviews did not appear
to suggest this to be a significant practical issue, four interviewees (Lawyer 6, UK; Lawyer
12, UK; Lawyer 13, England &Wales; Lawyer 26, UK) discussed a situation where
solutions are being developed by bidders with the contracting authority in parallel sets of
discussions, but the solutions are at different levels of maturity. Lawyers 6, 12 and 26
spoke spontaneously on this issue from what appeared to be practical experience. Lawyer
13, however, responded to a direct question and spoke in hypothetical terms. Under the
legal rules, a contracting authority "shall continue ... dialogue until it can identify the
solution or solutions ... which are capable of meeting its needs" (Art.29(S)/Reg.18(24)).
According to these legal advisors, it is not clear whether the authority has some flexibility
to close dialogue as soon as one bidder's solution is up to the required level or whether
the authority must wait until all solutions being taken to the final tender stage are at a
similar level before closing dialogue. Itwas suggested that to be able to provide a fair
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evaluation the authority must delay the close of dialogue. Lawyer 26 described how a
central government body or department interfered in the conduct of the process at this
stage:
... we had one bidder who had put together a solution which clearlYmet each ojour council's needs
but ... a second bidder ... was probablYgoing to be unajJordable. We made thepoint that under
the Regulations we are allowed to closedialogue with one solution that meets our needs. We were
met with a response, 'we are not happy with that~'from the sponsoringpartner's point oj view
that did not show sufficient competition. ... If thry had have stuck to their guns, not allowed us
to closeuntil there were two acceptable solutions, how long doyou stqy in dialoguefor? Every
week in dialogue is costing£ 1,000s. Ifyou think thry are miles off, there is an a'Eument Jor
st!)ing that you are misleading that bidder by keeping them in a process... Having said that, the
second bidder, in theJour weekperiod we extended dialogue i?Y, got up there and thry ended up
being theprejemd bidder. Mqybe thry were right.
12.3 Final tenders
12.3.1 Numbers
The uncertainty surrounding the minimum number of bidders that may be invited to
submit final tenders was noted in chapter seven. It can be reasonably concluded from the
interviews that having only two bidders left in the process at final tender stage is not a
controversial issue. Indeed, virtually all interviewees accepted that the minimum number
of bidders permitted is two. Only one interviewee disagreed with this (procurement
Officer 5, local government), arguing that it was lawful for a contracting authority to
invite final tenders from only one bidder. Also, Lawyer 12 (UK) discussed the possibility
of taking just one bidder through to the final tenders stage to bid on multiple solutions:
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[wJhat in practice I have not seen is whileyou could end up in theory with potentiallY saying,
tlookyou are bidder A andyou hatJeidea one and two and I wantyou to take those two
forward,you are bidder Byou onlYhad one idea that I did not like soyou are not goingforward~
People are tending to come out of it and say, tbidderA goforward with one, Bidder B goforward
with one, Bidder ego forward with one. The way I read the law on it actuallYisyou might be
able to say bidder A goforward with one and two. People are not applYing the law like that, but
it would be logicalfor them to do so, but no, no. ...
It is difficult to give a precise average figure for the number of bidders invited to submit
final tenders, as this seemed to vary from procurement to procurement, depending, for
example, upon the authority, the nature of the procurement, and the bidders involved;
however, 47 interviewees described the final tender stage involving two-three bidders:
22/47 described how final tenders were invited from two bidders; 14/47 described how
three bidders were involved at this stage; and 11/47 explained how their experience had
varied between two and three bidders at final tenders stage. No interviewees described
this stage as involving a greater number than four bidders.
The number of bidders invited to submit final tenders tends to be based on practical
considerations; for example, the costs of requiring bidders to prepare final tenders at risk
will be a key consideration: "there is a mandate to get from three-two very early in the
dialogue ... nobody wants to be at risk with too many people in the game when things
start to get really expensive, which is round about the second stage of the dialogue. ...
[T]here is an understanding that there should be a very small group at that stage" (Lawyer
7, UK). Further, the more bidders at the final tender stage, the more expensive it is likely
to be for the authority: " ... authorities usually want to have a fairly short list because it is
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just time and money consuming to process four or five bids at once. ... [T]here is
somewhat of a practical pressure to keep numbers down" (Lawyer 5, UK).
A further consideration may be the number of bidders taking part in the process,
voluntarily dropping out of the process or the likelihood that bidders may drop out. For
example, due to a lack of interest, Lawyer 37 (Scotland) was not able to take three bidders
through to the final tender stage as planned: "The big procurement we are doing just has
two bidders in it and there is no step down; we did not get enough interest despite
offering to pay tender costs. The original intention was to take three all the way through
to the end".
12.3.2 The requirement
The legal analysis explained how, unlike the restricted or open procedures, at no stage
during a competitive dialogue is the authority required to draw up a detailed specification
for bidders to tender against (chapter seven). The responses of 19/26 interviewees reveal
that contracting authorities in the UK will tend to require bidders to tender against an
output-based specification that is drawn up broadly enough to allow for each bidder's
individual solution which they have worked up with the authority over the course of the
dialogue stage. It appears that other approaches are less common: 4/26 interviewees
explained how bidders tendered against a single detailed technical specification; and 3/26
interviewees described how bidders tendered against separate specifications. Although
the above is interesting in terms of the different approaches existing in practice, the
author is cautious to generalise on the basis of these findings. Responses were generally
brief and it may be that a combination of approaches are employed within each
procurement, e.g., for technical, legal, and financial and different aspects thereof. This
was not clearly stated in any interviews; however, on reflection the author feels it may
have inferred in certain interviews.
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As noted in the discussion of findings on confidentiality issues (see chapter 11), it is most
common for bidders to work up their individual solutions individually in parallel sets of
dialogue, with them submitting final tenders against a broad output specification (possibly
defining generic aspects of the solutions) (19/26 interviewees). Indeed, it was mentioned
by 2/19 interviewees that the requirement may not even be reissued prior to the final
tender stage: "[a]n outline specification has allowed the authority to put out the same
specification; it does not need to keep altering it because it is only an outline solution"
(Lawyer 24, UK). Because of this approach, the author was given the impression that the
occurrence of non-compliant tenders is quite rare and not such a practical issue as it might
be in a restricted or open procedure where tenders must be submitted in line with a
detailed technical specification; however this was not stated explicitly in any interviews
other than the following:
• .. the trouble is because a competitive dialogue kind of moves around quite a bit, if authorities
are not very clear in terms of what they want it can be harder to work out what a non-compliant
tender is because there is not an original tender document that says we want it is this form and
sometimes authorities are not as precise as they should be in terms of determining what they are
lookingforin terms offinal bids ... (Lawyer 9, England &Wales).
The approach outlined above (bidders tendering against output specifications) is not the
only approach, and it may be that the approach taken varies from procurement to
procurement. For example, it was explained by 4/26 interviewees how, perhaps for less
complex projects, the information gathered during the dialogue stage may allow the
contracting authority to draw up a single generic specification:
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• .. either we will get down to a generic specification that thry can all meet or ll'e will spec' it in
output terms. A generic specification is the result of a natural process: 'tbe» is onlYone way to
do this' and )ou can all do it' and tweare satisfied thegeneric specification is the best way~ • ..
[Y] ou are very clear exactlY on what the [solution] is,·you can specify the type of equipment, the
type of software, and it is generic enough that you arejust using a unique combination of
components to come up with a solution that can be met l?Y any number. ... Having said that,
... the process may help get the comfort that there is a solution out there, but it is such that we
would not want to specify it down to that degree. We would specifywhat we wanted in output
terms: 'as long as it can do this and that and that andyou can meet all that in this timescale, tell
us what you can do ... ' (procurement Officer 2, body governed by public law).
An alternative, but seemingly less common, approach (3/26 interviewees) is for the
authority to draw up individual specifications for each bidder. Lawyer 6 (UK) struggled to
reconcile this approach with the legal rules:
I have been asked by authorities whether I can set one specificationfor one bidder and another
specificationfor the other bidder and I always struggle with this one... You cannot point to
anything in the law that saysyou cannot, but I do think it reallYundermines your evaluation
process. I think it is very difficult to do a robust evaluation on that basis.
Lawyer 26 (UK) made similar comments. Itmay be that this approach is most
appropriate for contracts where there are several possible distinct solutions. For example,
this approach was employed by Lawyer 23 (England &Wales) in the waste sector, where
there are a number of possible waste disposal solutions: "you can bury it, burn it, you can
make petrol out of the residue, you can recycle the residue, and there are people that can
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run Tesco type facilities". Here, Lawyer 23 explained that because the solutions are
potentially so different you may need to consider issuing separate contracts.
There were no specific questions on the law and practice in relation to variant bids. Also,
the general opening and closing questions failed to elicit information of any worth on this
subject. It was clear from six interviewees, however, that variant bids are sometimes
expressly permitted by authorities.
12.3.3 Scope for amendments to tenders
12.3.3.11ntroduction
Interviewees were asked about the scope for and their experience of amendments to
tenders prior to identification of a preferred bidder, the uncertainty surrounding which
was highlighted in chapter seven. Interestingly, 16/38 interviewees explained
Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) to have only a minor role in practice due to the dialogue which had
taken place in the run up to the close of dialogue, particularly where there are draft final
tenders and where sign-off of an interim final business case is required for authorisation
for close of dialogue. This limited role may, however, only occur where circumstances are
ideal; 14/38 argued that from their practical experience this was not necessarily the case;
for example, practical considerations (such as financial and/or time constraints leading to
premature closure of dialogue) may mean it is not possible to ensure tenders are in the
condition desired. 26/47 adopted a narrow legal interpretation of Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26),
arguing that there is the same or less flexibility at this stage as there would be to amend
tenders in a restricted procedure, and attaching no particular significant to the term "fine-
tuning". 13/47 interviewees disagreed with the above narrow interpretation. Eight
interviewees highlighted the uncertainty of the scope of clarification specification and
260
fine-tuning, and the above findings very much confirm that uncertainty. A common
approach does not emerge from the interviews.
12.3.3.2 Signi/icance of 'clarify, specify orfine-tune' in practice
It was evident from 16/38 interviewees that Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) often plays only a
minor role in practice due to many issues being resolved during dialogue; this was
particularly so where a draft final tenders stage had preceded the formal close of dialogue.
Hence, many interviewees did not appear to have thought about the scope of this
provision in great detail. For example, Lawyer 16 (Northern Ireland) stated:
there has not been a huge amount of work on tenders at that stage; everyonewill know at that
stagepretry much what is coming through the doorfrom thepreliminary tenders... So, it has not
been engagedin hugelYbecause of the amount of dialogueprior to that stage.
Lawyer 10 (Northern Ireland) described how the uncertainty of the law had led him/her
to err on the side of caution:
... :fine-tuning' it does not appear in the Commission's 1989 statement, but I do not think the
analYsis takes place on that basis. You do not say, 'what is clarification, what is specification,
what isfine-tuning~'You just have to say let's try and resolveas much as we can during dialogue.
According to Lawyer 20 (UK), the narrow approach is down to the perceived risk of legal
challenge:
[iJn advising ... authorities upon the scopefor post-tender amendments we will take a strict line;
for example, we will not draw attention to thephrase :fine-tuning~' we tend tofind this
discouragesauthorities engaling in it too extensivelY. Pine-tuning' would lead some towardsfull
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scale renegotiation; no matter how attractive, there isjust too great a legal risk. It is a false
economy: ifyou are needing negotiations at this stage then you have closed dialogue too earlY.
14/38 suggested, contrary to the above, that in practice Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) was made
use of, for example where the dialogue stage is closed prematurely. According to Lawyer
9 (UK), Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) is abused in practice:
... it is something that is quite heavilY abused ... Sometimes authorities do seem to put a sort of
BAFO [Best and Final Offir] in at that ... stage. I am not sure BAFOs reallYfit ... because
BAFOs kind of implY retendering and sharpeningyour pencil... So, I think clarification,
specification and fine-tuning should not include repricing but it sometimes does and it is
sometimes because authorities find they need to save money ... or because the bidding organisation
finds that their bid has become unsustainable ... or perhaps the authority was not clear enough in
terms of its requirements... These should all ideallY be resolved in dialogue but the trouble is,
when you get an organisation with several diffirent departments, some departments are not always
involved and it suddenlY comes through for their approval and they come up with things that
require changes.
Five interviewees (others not commenting) spoke about how they felt more comfortable
making changes to tenders at this stage where there is still competitive tension than
making changes after a preferred bidder has been selected. For instance, "[b]ecause you
are still in a competitive situation, you have got a bit more flexibility" (Lawyer 32, England
&Wales).
The lack of clarity surrounding the provision was flagged in 8/38 interviews. It was
mentioned that the terminology and phrasing of Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) is unhelpful. For
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example, Lawyer 2 (England &Wales) complained, "1 mean 'fine-tuning' is not a helpful
term; it differentiates it from the restricted procedure, but it is not particularly helpful; it is
not even a proper word".
Because of the uncertainty, the above 8/38 interviewees explained how it was necessary to
look to fundamental procurement law principles and government guidance for help when
interpreting the law, and/or how legal practice often depends upon practical
considerations. For instance, Lawyer 5 (UK) stated:
I doubt there is a'!Ygreat significance in these words,' I mean, one can stare at them and their
precise boundaries are not going to become apparent through semantic scrutiny. It is going to be a
matter ofwhat a court thinks is reasonable ....
Similarly, Lawyer 20 (UK) explained that behaviour will vary from procurement to
procurement:
I would say that legallYit is restricted to the same sort of scope as there is in the restricted
procedure. In practice, though, people do not even do that with the restrictedprocedure. It is like
driving along the motorway,'You may be breaking the speed limit at 75mph, butyou are less
likelY to get into trouble at that speed than, say, ifyou are going at 120mph. It is all about a
question of degreeand that will be dictated by the nature of theprocurement, the value of it, and
also the identity of thoseparticipating in it.
2/8 interviewees explained how in practice authorities used this uncertainty to their
advantage adopting a narrow or broad reading of the provision depending on its particular
circumstances, as is clear in the following statement: "[i]t is made use of; sometimes
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interpreted broadly and sometimes narrowly; whatever works best for the authority in that
scenario bearing in mind what the potential risks are" (Lawyer 20, UK). This is a
noteworthy comment in view of the fact that similar statements have been made about
other areas of uncertainty (i.e. in relation to scope for preferred bidder negotiations).
12.3.3.3 The legal scope for clarification, specification and fine-tuning
26/47 interviewees adopted a narrow interpretation of the scope of Art29(6)/Reg.18(26),
in the sense that it offers the same or less flexibility than is available under the restricted
procedure. What this tells us may be quite limited, as certain interviewees seemed to
adopt quite flexible interpretations of the scope for negotiations under a restricted
procedure. However, these interviewees did not attach any added significance to the term
'fine-tuning'. The following are example comments from this category of responses:
• It is tight. I would say that generallYit is the same across all procedures: there is no more scope
in competitive dialogue than in a restricted procedure, not at that stage. ArguablY it should all be
done and dusted l?Y that stage, but it is generallYused where a supplier has been a bit vague
about something ... and there is ... a need to get that bolted down.... you cannotfundamentallY
change the suo/ect matter ofwhat has been offered. The supplier may allude to a piece of kit
having between six and 12outlets, we will need tofind out whether we arepayingfor six or 12
(procurement Officer 2, body governed by public law);
• [wJe do not use this reallYat all The more controversial one is after preferred bidder. This isfor
obvious things,' ifyou have left something blank or there is a typo or something clearfy wrong. It
is a clarification questionnaire initiated by the authority,' it wouldjust callfor yes or no answers.
It would not be shall we chat about this issue,' although, ... people do this under the restricted
procedure, and that is where the risk comes in ... (Lawyer 39, UK).
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In view of the conservative approach advised upon at this stage by the 2008 OGC/HMT
guidance and a perceived high risk of legal challenge at this stage, it is unsurprising that
most interviewees suggest only a minor clarificatory role (if any) for Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26).
Nevertheless, in a significant 13/47 interviews, interviewees spoke of the provision in
more flexible terms:
• [pJresumabIYa court will be inclined to allow something asfine-tuning or clarificationif actuallY
it does not make any difference to the outcome of the competition,·whereas}if actuallY the change
is so substantial that someone elsemight have won then it is going to be the wrong side of the line
(Lawyer 5, UK);
• [iJfyou had a problem with the offers}the most that provision could be usedfor would be some
sort of BAFO... At an extreme}Ican see a BAFO coming in... [I] he use of the word Jine-
tuning'does suggestmore latitude,' it sounds like a bit more than clarification, but it is not
wholesale negotiation. ClearlY, it is a problem ifyou are onlYengagingwith a limited amount of
the bidders (Lawyer 37, Scotland);
• ... we allow the greatestflexibiliry possible. We allow changesprovided th9 are not
discriminatory}give everyone the same opportuniry. Our perspective is different to the
Commission's perspective. Th9 s'!Yjust follow the letter. Our view is concernedwith
discrimination and transparency,'provided you respect transparency and fairness you are 0!e'!Y.
That is our startingpoint and our guiding light (Lawyer 19, UK).
Common to seven interviews (others not commenting) were statements that
Art.29(6)/Reg.18(26) is a right for contracting authorities to approach bidders and not the
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other way round. Interviewees spoke about the need to keep bidders at arm's length at
this stage, e.g. via an electronic system.
12.4 The preferred bidder stage
12.4.1 The legal scope for changes to the tender or call for tender
All interviewees were asked about the legal scope for change at the preferred bidder stage
(chapter seven); however, interviewees tended to emphasise the uncertainty of the law and
concentrate on practical considerations. Lawyer 6 (UK) explained that when a need for
change arises at this late stage the legal rules are only of minor significance: " ... whether or
not to allow a change does not normally come down to procurement risk; it is about the
commercial position. Procurement risk usually only comes into it if you want an added
reason to refuse a change". Also, two of the procurement officer interviewees
commented that this would be an area where they would need to obtain legal advice. One
legal advisor interviewee stated that his/her firm were seeking the opinion of legal counsel
on the legitimacy of change at the preferred bidder stage (Lawyer 2, England &Wales).
Due to the uncertainty, no one could give a definite answer as to the precise scope for
change. As observed in other areas of competitive dialogue where the legal rules are not
certain, in practice authorities may use this legal uncertainty to adopt whichever
interpretation is most favourable to them; for example 11/20 interviewees cited situations
where a narrow interpretation was adopted in order to resist a change that would mean a
worse deal for the authority:
[v}ery often the procurement rules are used as a sort offig leaf to cover the allthority j- commercial
position: it is easierfor someone to st!) we cannot do this for procurement law reasons rather than
jllst we do not want to do that (Lawyer 13, England &Wales).
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Nevertheless, 9/20 interviewees noted that a contracting authority will not always be in a
strong enough negotiating position to resist change, e.g. where some months have passed
since contract award and there may be deadlines to meet. As Lawyer 41 (Scotland)
explained:
it is a very different situation where two months post-appointment ofpreferred bidder when a
credit committee comes along with things thry want to change. The dynamics are totallY different,·
the bidder is in the dominant position. Do you want your project or not? There are timescales,
promises that a contract will be signed byX date.
According to Procurement Officer 6 (government department):
[t]he balance ofpower changes as soon asyou announce the preferred bidder; thry know thry are
in a good position: (1)you like their offering/ (2) everyone else will have gone lookingfor other
opportunities soprovided thry do not make a fuss thry are probablY in a field of one.
As will be seen in the quotes below, due to the uncertainty, interviewees tended to
respond to questions on the scope for change by outlining differing degrees of change
and the level of legal risk, or they would present their answer as an interpretation of the
law they would be or could become comfortable with in order to support an argument for
change. This is because, according to 21 interviewees, any change post appointment of
preferred bidder, however minor, will bring with it some degree of legal risk. In the
words of Lawyer 39 (UK), "... clients will be told that there is a legal risk attaching to any
change that you do; then it is just a question of how much risk the authority wants to
run".
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There are different degrees of change, some perceived as less of a risk than others. For
example, a small change that does not affect the award scoring is likely to be perceived as
low risk. Where there is a change (or an accumulation of minor changes) that affects the
award scoring, but does not change the award decision, the risk of challenge is raised.
The level of legal risk would be raised further if the changes impacted on scoring to the
disadvantage of the contracting authority, i.e. the changes did not improve the preferred
bidders score at contract award (4/42 interviewees). Itwas seen as very high risk to allow
changes that, had they been know about earlier on in the process, would have resulted in
different decisions or would have attracted different bidders at the outset. 25/42
indicated that legally the most they would be comfortable stretching the interpretation of
Art.29(7)/Reg.18(28) to cover would be where the change affects the preferred bidder's
score to the detriment of the contracting authority but would not impact on the award
decision. 13/42 interviewees viewed the law as narrower than this. In addition, most of
those interviewed echoed the words of OGC/HMT 2008 guidance that a strong
justification for change, such as the change being outside the authority's control, was
important.
There are two cases of particular relevance to the legal scope for change post-
appointment of a preferred bidder: Case C-454/06, Pressetexl66 and the London
Underground Decision'f" (chapter seven). 13 interviewees spoke of this case law as
helpful guidance.
The following are a selection of comments that illustrate some of the general points made
in the above paragraphs:
566 pressetext, fu.261
567 London Underground, fu.326
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• ifwhat you are tweaking is stuff that is manifestlY not changing anything which would count in
your evaluation that is something which at least in theoryyou areprobablY saft doing under
anyprocedure. If it would affect the decision, that is reallYdodgy. ... [WJ here ... the winner's
offer looks even better then arguablY that is better than one that makes the winner's offer look
worse. But, ... there is alwt!Ys a risk that the losing bidder wiil st!Y, 'while they have improved by
jive percent, hadyou given me the chanceIwould have improved mine by 10% and caught up ~
... [AJnything that changes evaluation marks at ail is to be inherentlY avoided; it is not that it is
illega~ it isjust risky. Then there is theproblem of changing a lot of stuff that does not change
evaluation individuallY, but when considered altogether there is a risk someone is going to argue
successfullYin court that it would have ... (Lawyer 12, UK);
• [tjhe first touchstone is whetherit would change the ranking. If it would ... clearlYthat is
absolutelYout of the question. Changes that would not have affected the score ... at all are
probablYfine. In nry view, that would be low risk. Changes that do not affect theprice, provided
they do not materiallY reduce what you aregetting are alsoprobablY okt!Y. It is diiJicult to
answer in the abstract (Lawyer 21, UK).
Despite the above approach, three interviewees feared that if the matter ever came before
a court a narrower view would be taken of the scope for change than that presented in the
paragraphs above: "... my assumption is that the [CJEU] will go narrower than London
Underground and Pressetext. I would like the flexibility to work within those parameters"
(Lawyer 41, Scotland).
Policymaker 3 spoke at some length about how the 2007 financial crisis highlighted the
problems of a narrow interpretation:
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• .. the recessionand the breakdown of the banking market posed real issues. In a way, it
suggested ... a strict application of these EU rules simplY was not going to work. A complex
procurement often takes twoyears or more and ifpart of the way through that period the market
crashes sometimes the onlYwayyou canget theproject away is by doing something that had not
necessarilYbeenforeseen in the original 0lEU. ... [OJ ne of the things that happened is the
public sector makingfinancial contributions toprojects • • . A technical interpretationof the rules
might have caused difficulty but actuallYabandoning the whole thing and starting again was not
of any practical benefit to anyone • .• You are still in the same market;you are still doing the
same thing; it isjust you have started again, but people have wasted • .. bid costs. ..• You try to
take a practical approach bearing in mind theprinciples offairness, equality and transparenry.
There were a number ofprojects where changes were made part way through the process, but there
was pref!Y much no alternative other than abandon theprocurement.
Five bidders spoke about how change, particularly change flowing from planning
approval, will be dealt with through contractual drafting:
• • .. with planningpermission we will usuallY draft the contract to cover that. People do not like
wastefacilities soplanning is often an issue ... This is often dealt with under contractual
drafting:you sign the contract, thenyou app!Jforplanningpermission and there is ajudicial
reviewprocedure and it is a condition precedent (Lawyer 23, England &Wales);
• • .. people deal with it practicallY, • • . let us get the contract signed up, let us get afirm contract
baseline sorted out, and we ... deal with changes through change control subsequentlY rather than
try to shoehorn it in in a very unstable situation. All ITcontracts have a change controlprocess
We do not see too many scopefor change issues at preftmd bidder stage. We do see it once
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contracts have been entered into, which actuallYI do not think alters the issues at all (Lawyer
22, UK).
12.4.2 The scope for change from a practical perspective
Interviewees were asked about the types of changes at the preferred bidder stage that they
had encountered in practice and how decisions had been made on how to proceed. The
data immediately below does not provide information on the frequency of different
situations giving rise to a need for change. There were no presumptions; interviewees
were asked generally what their experience had been at this stage, not whether or not they
had experience of specific situations.
Eight interviewees noted it as not uncommon for an authority's requirement/ s to change
over the length of time it takes to complete a competitive dialogue procurement; this
could be down to, for example, a political change within the authority itself, or, due to
government spending cuts, the project may have become unaffordable without a
reduction in scale.
The financial crisis and recession was said by 11 interviewees to have given rise to
numerous difficulties, for example consortium members going insolvent, and lenders
withdrawing funding. Lawyer 10 (Northern Ireland) spoke about a situation where as a
result of the financial crisis the preferred bidder's lender withdrew:
[gJetting a replacementfunder was the onlYcredible, applicable, appropriate option. It would
have been the samefor any bidder.... The other two bidders did not challenge.... We had a
discussion with them to say, 'look,you are going to tell us that you can stand overyour bid as it
is, but we know for a faa that your junder is not prepared to stand overyour terms'. I do not
wantyou to think it was a decision taken over night; it was a complicatedprocess involving some
271
of the highest levels ofgovernment. We looked at it and did an aJifullot of due diligencefrom a
financial perspective to see if it would bepossible tojust instead move to bidder number two for
example. It was not
Further, changes may be needed simply because bidders have made mistakes in their
tender, for example in relation to costings or because issues fully within the control of the
contracting authority were not sufficiently finalised during dialogue (15 interviewees).
Examples were also provided of situations where lender due diligence (22), detailed
planning applications (seven), site surveys (three), and sub-contracts (three) gave rise to
change. According to Lawyer 34 (England &Wales):
[iJt is too extreme to s'!Yprefemd bidders will try and renegotiate the deal It is more a question
of them hanging on in therefor last minute concessions, particularlY in a changing market (like
timing of commencements or teT71lsoffunding). They will alw'!Ys try to secure the best deal they
can. In a constantlY shiftingfinanciallandscape a developer will try to get last minute concessions
once he knows he has got thejob,' they will look for protection. It is a problem that is likelY to
crop up again and again. It is all a question of degree. It is a fact of commercial life the
procurement purists have tojust accept.
There are several options open to contracting authorities where a necessary change occurs
at the preferred bidder stage: the authority can adopt a flexible interpretation of the law,
conclude the contract with the preferred bidder, and hope losing bidders do not
challenge; the authority can partially rewind the process (e.g. re-run the final tender stage);
the authority can award the contract to the second placed bidder; the authority can
abandon and restart the process; or the authority can put the process on hold. Each
option has its respective advantages and disadvantage.
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The route taken will very much depend upon the specific circumstances of the
procurement; however, in view of its convenience, and practical and legal difficulties
associated with other options, according to 16 interviewees (others not commenting), in
most circumstances a contracting authority is most likely to go ahead with the change and
conclude the contract with the preferred bidder:
..• in practice, whatYOII have to say to clients is, )011 have got to accept [the change] or go back
and spend another six months~ So, most of them will s'!Y... 'we arejllst going to have to accept
it'. [Ibey] are incrediblYcalltiolls all the W'!Ythrollgh ... then right at the end areforced to accept
some sort of risk. In every competitive dialoglle we have been involved in, for a bidder or an
allthority, there is a bit of a wrinkle at thefinal stage ... (Lawyer 13, England &Wales).
For a competitive dialogue to get restarted having reached the late stage of preferred
bidder appointment would be very rare, as stated by 13 interviewees (others not
commenting). Indeed, no interviewees expressed experience of such an occurrence after
having appointed a preferred bidder.
27 Interviewees explained the different pressures contracting authorities operate under,
the minimisation of legal risk being just one of those pressures. The main pressures cited
can be grouped under the headings cost pressures and time pressures and these must be
carefully considered in deciding whether or not to proceed in spite of a potential unlawful
change. A number of factors will be taken into account, which include, inter alia, the
severity of the breach, the likelihood of challenge, the possibility of rewinding the process,
the legal risks associated with rewinding the process, the costs and delay of rewinding the
process, and the costs and delay of abandoning and restarting the process:
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• ... it is a caseof balancing the risks ofwhatYOIIdo and whatYOII do not do. Sometimes the risk
of not doing anything can sometimes olltweigh the risk of doing something. YOII can getYOllrself
in a siteation where there is no risk free solution ... YOIIjllst have to balance them
(policyrnaker 3);
• • .. whether to allow changes ..., will ..• come down to a common sense decision: a balance. YOII
have to be commercial ..• bllt alsoplay by the rules. • .. {IJt will be a caseofpragmatism verslls
technical correcmess;we will notjllst olltline a problem for the mnpteenth time. ..• YOII mllst
take a pragmatic approach depending IIpon whatYOII think YOII can get away with. We will not
advise IIpon a breach of the rules, bllt it is never as straightfonvard as that. Where the scopefor
change is enclear, we want to be helpfll/, not obstructive (Lawyer 30, England &Wales).
There are also other factors, such as subjective factors, that can potentially come into play,
e.g. personal relationships with bidder bid teams. These factors will be elaborated upon
below.
A high degree of legal risk is likely to restrain authority behaviour (see chapter 14).
According to interviewees, theoretically at least, the perceived risk of challenge is at its
highest at this late stage in the process because the losing bidder will have incurred
substantial costs. It was explained that the bigger the project and the greater the bid costs
incurred by losing bidders, the greater the risk of challenge:
[ilfyoll are talking abollt a reallYmajor PF!, e.g. in the £billions, bidders will have invested in
bid costs of anywhere betweenjive million and 15million pounds. That is an aujllllot at stake.
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The potential for challenge in these bid procurements, particularlY as there will not be another big
hospital PFljust around the corner, it is more likelY (Lawyer 27, England &Wales).
Risk of challenge, however, is not just measured in the abstract. 12 interviewees (others
not commenting) explained how, for an authority to rewind or restart, there would need
to be a real practical risk of challenge which would need to be assessed on a case by case
basis. For example, it would depend upon "how disgruntled the unsuccessful bidder was;
are they chomping at the bit and jumping up and down, or are they actually quite okay
with it?" (Lawyer 6, UK). According to Lawyer 27 (England &Wales), "you get to know
bidders as you are going through and can often gauge the real likelihood of challenge".
Furthermore, eight interviewees cited a number of factors likely to deter challenge at
preferred bidder stage: depending upon the size of the market, there may be a bidder
worry about a challenge spoiling its chances of future contracts or bidders may want to
concentrate resources on future contracts (4/8); it may be difficult to find out about
changes that occur with the preferred bidder (1/8); and the uncertainty of the rules may
deter legal challenge (3/8). From the limited amount of comments on factors deterring
challenge at preferred bidder stage; the practical significance of these factors is difficult to
gauge (see chapter 14).
If there is a necessary change at preferred bidder stage, and the authority is not legally
comfortable concluding the procurement, rewinding, i.e. rerunning the final tenders stage
or going back a stage further and reopening dialogue, is, from a cost perspective, the next
best option for the authority. Nine interviewees spoke about themselves having practical
experience of this, for example where the preferred bidder was not capable of delivering
its tender or where a challenge on strong grounds is expected:
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[wJould Iwing back? Yes, Iwould. We have done it recentlYon one. We reached a stage where
we thought, 'this is going nowhere~ We said to the bidder, !Jou either do whatyou havepromised
within the next six weeks or wejust go back a stage and we bring the others back in' (Lawyer
23, England &Wales).
However, as discussed by 15 interviewees, rewinding the process once a preferred bidder
has been appointed is not unproblematic from a legal and practical perspective. Firstly,
there are legal questions over how far back the process must be rewound and how many
bidders must be invited back. However undesirable, if the change is so great that the
contract would have attracted different bidders at the outset, legally the contracting
authority may have no choice but to restart the procurement. If rewinding to an earlier
stage, there are serious equal treatment issues to contend with, particularly if the losing
bidder has been debriefed. Also, it is not clear whether or not legally, once closed, the
dialogue stage can be reopened:
[t}here are big issues with equal treatment ifyou were to rewind ... [Tjbere is a real risk to
rewinding and Ido not think you can ever do it perfectlY. We got a procedure rewound ... and it
wasjust shodt!J reallY, the rewind. The person that complains gets more information than the
others. It depends howyou do it, doyou rewind and keep all offers at that point in time or do
you get everyone to resubmit offers? ... [Yjo« cannot ever do it neatlY, but authorities seem much
more amenable to rewinding than starting again. IfIwas a bidder, Iwould not want to bepart
of a rewind; inevitablY the complainer neverftels like thty get an equal shot because thty have
caused all the trouble (Lawyer 39, UK).
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There were also practical issues highlighted; for example, if the contracting authority has
been at preferred bidder stage for a long period of time (e.g. six months), the second
placed bidder may have lost interest in the contract and moved on to compete for other
contracts. It may simply be that the authority does not want to give the second placed
bidder a further opportunity because it prefers the preferred bidder's solution.
Interestingly, Lawyer 35 (Scodand) was in the process of advising an aggrieved bidder in a
damages action in which a competitive dialogue had been rewound to a point prior to
submission of final tenders and the original second placed bidder, which had received
feedback, went on to win. The original preferred bidder is claiming discriminatory
treatment.
Where a change occurs a further option is to abandon and restart. It is evident from 13
interviews that, although competitive dialogue procurements do get abandoned and
restarted (though not those that have reached preferred bidder stage) it is highly unlikely
at this late stage. Nevertheless, as stated by five interviewees, this option will be on the
table where the change is so significant that a different set of bidders would have sought
to participate in the procurement process had they known at the outset or where
rewinding short of restarting the process is considered not possible.
As discussed by 15 interviewees, there are a number of practical factors that dissuade
authorities from restarting. The most significant factor appears to be the often huge costs
involved for the authority and bidders, but timescales and political embarrassment for the
authority and professional embarrassment for individuals (plus the potential risk that the
preferred bidder may litigate to recover its costs for a restart) are also noted as potentially
coming into play:
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• {tJo restart a procedure would be a nightmare scenariogiven the lengthof competitive dialogues
generallYand the costs associated with it. Restarting would be a last resort entirefy. I think it is
more likelY that we wouldjust step back to whatever stagefilt comfortable, but I doubt we would
restart the dialogue entirefy (procurement Officer 4, Local Government, Scotland);
• [w]e will rarefy advise upon going back or restarting a procedure at this stage,just becauseof the
costs involved and also because theseprojects have to be delivered:people are expecting a new
hospital or a newfire station (Lawyer 24, England &Wales).
Due to the complicated nature of the decision at this stage, according to Lawyer 4 (UK)
only, it is not surprising that certain high value procurements have, rather than being
abandoned, been frozen, for example in the hope that the change becomes unnecessary
(e.g. the funding markets recover to enable the lender to keep to the terms originally
agreed) or to see if a challenge materialises. This option is only likely to appeal to an
authority where the timetable is not critical. An authority is most likely to freeze a
procurement where a change has occurred, the risk and likelihood of challenge is high
(e.g. there are signs that the losing bidder is considering legal action), but the authority
does not want to rewind or restart the procurement (procurement Officer 14, local
government).
Procurement Officer 14 (local government) described his/her predicament. Here, the
project, a development scheme, had been gready affected by the economic crisis. The
developer selected as the most economically advantageous tender had become unable to
deliver the scheme on the scale that had been advertised. At the time of the interview, the
authority had been at the preferred bidder stage for over 18 months. The authority was
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waiting whilst it decided how best to proceed: whether to conclude at a smaller scale or
wait for the preferred bidder to recover so that it could deliver the full scheme. Restarting
the procedure was stated as not being a serious consideration due to "costs, time and
resources that would have been wasted", and also because the authority was quite sure
that they could not get anything better than the preferred bidder's solution. At the same
time, however, the authority did not want to run the risk of challenge.
As was common PPP practice under the negotiated procedure, keeping a reserve bidder
may be one way to limit the risk of change at preferred bidder stage by maintaining an
element of competition. However, only five interviewees spoke of adopting this practice
(others not commenting). If preferred bidder negotiations broke down it was recognised
as unclear whether you could simply go to the second placed bidder without running the
final tenders stage again, and sending a reserve bidder letter our did not make this less of
an issue. Also mentioned were the same practical difficulties associated with rewinding a
process, for example the reserve bidder may not be prepared to be kept on hold and is
likely to concentrate its efforts on new competitions.
12.4.3 A'cate' Information and standstill requirements
The legal analysis in chapter seven highlighted the uncertainty surrounding the correct
timing of the Alcatel information and standstill requirements. Interviewees were asked
when these requirements must be observed in competitive dialogues and if this was the
case in practice. Some interviewees did not perceive there to be an issue here; this was
often because their experience of competitive dialogue predominantly involved lower
level complexity projects where the period between preferred bidder appointment and
contract signature may be relatively short.
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In relation to what interviewees interpreted the law to be and whether this translated to
procurement practice, there was a mix of responses. 19/38 interviewees argued that the
law required the standstill period to be held at the time of the decision to award the
contract, which was not on identification of the preferred bidder, but at a later point
closer to contract signature. That is to say, 6/19 interviewees said it was following
completion of an authority's internal governance processes; 5/19 said it was when all
substantive issues had been resolved; and 8/19 said it was when contract signature would
take place immediately following standstill. An alternative interpretation was put forward
by 13/38 interviewees who considered that under the law the standstill requirement was
to be applied immediately following identification of a preferred bidder. In addition, 2/38
interviewees, both legal advisors operating predominantly in Northern Ireland, stated that
two Alcatelinformation and standstill periods were required by the law. 4/38 interviewees
recognised the law as uncertain.
As regards practice, 20/50 interviewees described practice as generally being to notify
losing bidders at the time the preferred bidder is identified and to apply the standstill
period at this time only. 19/50 stated that Alcatelinformation and standstill occurred at a
later point in practice. 7/19 stated that it occurred following internal governance
processes; 7/19 stated that it occurred after all substantive issues had been resolved; and
5/19 stated that it occurred when parties were on the verge of contract signature. 9/50
interviewees described how in practice, although not necessarily holding two standstill
periods, two Alcatelletters would be sent out, one on identification of the preferred bidder
and one much closer to contract conclusion. In 2/50 interviews practice was said to vary
depending upon the circumstances.
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It can be seen in the paragraph above that the interpretations of the law did not
necessarily translate to procurement practice; for instance, as seen above, certain
interviewees, although not viewing it as a legal requirement, sent out two Alcatelletters at
different points. The apparent reason for this is to limit risk of challenge.
Although the above figures are far from conclusive, it may be that UK competitive
dialogue practice is slowly moving towards an approach involving two A/cate! type letters.
This may be the result of recent case law, such as Commission v. lrelond,568 which two
interviewees vaguely referenced, and the new remedies directive, which the UK was in the
process of transposing at the time interviews took place (raised by the same two
interviewees). The new remedies directive introduces a new remedy of ineffectiveness
(see chapter four), which is potentially available where a contracting authority fails to
comply with the Alcatel standstill requirement.
9/50 interviewees described how in practice two letters would be sent to losing bidders:
one upon identification of the preferred bidder and another at a point close to contract
close. The practice of having two Alcatelletters was, from a legal risk perspective, viewed
as the safest practice, described by one interviewee as "a belt and braces" approach
(Lawyer 24, England &Wales).
Certain interviewees preferred to seek to comply with .Alcatel early on identification of the
preferred bidder because of a desire to start the time limit for bringing a legal challenge by
ensuring bidders have sufficient knowledge of the contracting authorities actions up to
that point:
'68 [2008] I CMLR 34
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it is normallY at the point that the preferred bidder is chosen. I know in practice that contracts
do not get signed within the 10 days, but normallY I think there is a discipline that that is when
it tends to be done and of course that flushes out any challenges quite quicklY (Lawyer 9,
England &Wales).
According to Lawyer 24 (England &Wales), the practice of holding the Alcatelperiod as
soon as possible upon identification of a preferred bidder may also be the result of
lenders' requirements:
.• • it is normallY done when you appoint the preferred bidder. It is in the authority'sinterest; they
want to get it done so they can show they have done it; the standstill is out the way. Banks will
want them to confirm they have done their standstill and there have been no challenges before they
sign anything.
Interestingly, three interviewees holding the Alcatel period on identification of the
preferred bidder recognised that a more compliant approach may be to issue a second
Alcatelletter and standstill period:
the law is not settled, but we do it at the point of no return. ... We would normallY say the point
of no return is when you have selectedyour preferred bidder. When you have progressed
discussions so much in the preferred bidder stage that there m'!} have been changes, perhaps you
should have another Alcatel, but no one does 10 be honest (Lawyer 19, UK).
According to Legal Advisor 13 (England & Wales) the question about the timing of
.Alcate! compliance may be a non-issue:
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.. the aGe, at least at one stage, bizarrelYsaidyou should do it whenyou appoint thepreferred
bidder rather than just before conclusion. I think that is a bit strange becauseyou are clearlY
going to have to do it beforeyou can conclude the contract. ... I almost wonder whether it is a
non-issue becausewhenyou ... appoint a preferred bidder,you aregoing to have to say to the
losing one, %okyoll have not got preferred bidder status and here is wqy~ Under the new
R.eg.29A, the obligation to debrief,yoll aregoing to have to tell them something at that stage
anyway. SoYOIl aregoing to give themprettY milch an Aleatel... The standstill obligation is
irrelevant at that stage becallseyou are not going toget signed up within 10 days. What I have
tended to say is, )011 need to do an Alcate! letter at the end; ifyou want to do one at preferred
bidder stage that is up toyou, but I do not reallYsee the need becauseYOIl are doing afull formal
debrief anyway. I thollght the aGe guidance on that point was weird.
In apparent agreement with this view, two other interviewees described how losing
bidders were debriefed at preferred bidder stage but treated this separately to the .Alcatel
debrief held just before contract signature.
In addition, according to Lawyer 24 (UK), a second letter is worthless, as an authority is
unlikely to admit to legally risky changes that have occurred between Alcate/letters: " ...
commercially you are not about to say, 'oh by the way, these things have changed since
the last letter' .... [I]t is done almost as a matter of courtesy ...".
Also, two interviewees explained how a second Alcate/letter is often treated with
suspicion by losing bidders. According to Legal Advisor 7 (UK), ce • • •you get the
unsuccessful bidder saying, 'why have you sent me this again? What has gone on?', and
then you have to just say, 'well there is a slight difference of opinion within the legal
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profession as to what is the right time to send A/catel notices, so we are doing it both
times"'.
12.5 Concluding remarks
Chapter 12 has presented the findings for the closing stages of competitive dialogue. The
findings highlight that in these crucial stages there is great uncertainty over the correct
application of the rules and many signs that strict application of the rules, in particular
over the scope for preferred bidder negotiations, is not in line with the reality of complex
procurement.
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13 Findings: general issues
13.1Introduction
A number of interviewees identified certain general issues relating to UK competitive
dialogue practice. These include financial costs, procurement duration, uncertainty,
complexity, arid participation difficulties. Chapter 13 will explain the above issues and
explore the reasons behind them. In response to the practical challenges identified above,
interviewees discussed ways in which they have sought to improve the efficiency of
competitive dialogue procurement; this will also be looked at. Itwill be seen that many of
the findings in this chapter support those of the Treasury review569 and Cabinet Office
(Efficiency & Reform Group) review.f"
13.2 General issues
13.2.1Introduction
As opening questions, interviewees were asked to identify issues (if any) that came to
mind when talking about their experience of the practical application of competitive
dialogue in the UK. Also interviewees were asked about the compatibility of the legal
rules with the commercial reality of complex procurement. It was possible to group most
responses to these early questions under several general headings: cost (42 interviewees),
time (36), uncertainty (eight), complexity (14), and participation (19). The findings are
broadly in line with issues identified by the Treasury and Cabinet Office.S71
13.2.2 Cost
Recent HM Treasury research concludes that compared to alternative procurement
routes, competitive dialogue procurements are more costly to both the public and private
569 HM Treasury (20 I0). fu.l98
570 Cabinet Office (20 I0). th.I99; Cabinet Office (20 II). th.l99
571 HM Treasury (20 I0). fu.198; Cabinet Office (20 I0). ibid; Cabinet Office (20 II). ibid
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sectors.572 86% of respondents to a general web based survey believed that compared to
the negotiated procedure, competitive dialogue has increased bid costs. 55% of
contracting authorities surveyed were of the same opinion. According to HM Treasury,
for unsuccessful bidders costs have risen from 2-3% of contract size under the negotiated
procedure to 5-6% under competitive dialogue.i" Likewise, significant 42 interviewees
highlighted the financial expense of competitive dialogue as being an important practical
concern. This included all three policymakers interviewed. In view of the difficult
economic situation at the time the interviews were conducted, the costs associated with
competitive dialogue gave rise to some strong reactions. 38/42 spoke about high
participation costs for bidders in comparison with the negotiated procedure. 36/42
mentioned high bid costs for contracting authorities. 13/42 interviewees were not of the
opinion that the high bid costs of competitive dialogue were offset by enhanced
competition in comparison to the negotiated procedure. 24/42 considered competitive
dialogue to facilitate better value for money than the negotiated procedure. Other
interviewees were either not sure or stated that whether or not competitive dialogue
brings better value for money depends on the circumstances of the procurement.
38/42 spoke about high participation costs for bidders. Research by the UK government
notes similar findings. According to the Cabinet Office, monthly bidding costs on a
competitive dialogue procurement are on average £130,000 and total bids costs are on
average £2,500,000, compared with 00,000 and £900,000 for equivalent private sector
procurements.i" In the words of Lawyer 36 (UK):
... the private sector ... hate [competitive dialogue},·they can't stand it. [A reasonfor this is} they
do not get their bid costs coveredand these can be £millions. For a £300 million project,
m HM Treasury (2010), ibid,4.7
573 Ibid, 4.11
574 Cabinet Office (2010), fiI.l99, 14
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average bid costs would be ... four-eight million pounds. In a £multi-billion project ... bid costs
were in the regionof £20 million.
In accordance with the analysis in chapter seven, it is apparent that a key reason for
increased bidding costs is the perception that, in comparison to pre-2006 PFI practice,
bids must be developed in competition to a more mature point before a preferred bidder
may be selected. As Lawyer 13 (England &Wales) explained:
[authorities] are trying to cover everything during dialogue... In the old daysyou would get down
topreferred bidder and thrash it all out tben.: Bidders loved this becausethey did not incur
hea1!Jcosts until they werepretry comfortable that they weregoing to win. Also, ... authorities ...
did not incur hea1!Jcosts because they were onlYnegotiating very heavilYwith one bidder... Now
authorities are ... forad to heavilYnegotiate witb at leastfour bidders and tbis can mean double
bid costsfor unsuccessful bidders ...
All the policymakers interviewed expressed acute awareness of this issue. According to
Policymaker 1, "... the biggest issue is there is no coming second; it is winner takes all and
the loser gets stuffed - usually for a lot of money".
For 23 interviewees, expensive and time consuming dialogue meetings were seen as the
source of cost and time problems associated with competitive dialogue. In the words of
Policymaker 1, "the problem is you end up with big meetings with lots of expensive
people dealing with lots of detailed issues - not generally an efficient way of procuring".
These interviewees were critical of competitive dialogue procedures where there is
"meeting-itis" or which descend into "meeting mania" (Lawyer 2, England &Wales).
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In addition to the costs for unsuccessful bidders, it was also clear from interviewees that
many felt under competitive dialogue even a winning bidder's costs were likely to be
higher than they would have been had the contract been procured under a negotiated
procedure. The reasons for these increased costs tended to relate to difficulties operating
dialogue efficiently (i.e. not to the rules on themselves), and are looked at below.
36/42 interviewees pointed to an increase in costs or greater drain on resources for
contracting authorities running competitive dialogue procedures. Most interviewees put
the costs down to the resources needed to conduct detailed negotiations with more than
one bidder:
[a] major issue is the costfor an authority from running two or more full sets of negotiations for
what could be ... completelY different projects. ... This was a PFI contract; there is a lot ofmeat
in it to keep on top of; every time you are negotiating a point you are going through a hundred
page+ document and you go through umpteen iterations of that,· it's quite wearing - multiplY that
by two (Lawyer 30, England &Wales).
According to Lawyer 20 (UK), during a competitive dialogue "bidders know authorities
are stretched and ... take advantage of this".
Ideally, the increased procurement administration costs for authorities would be offset by
enhanced value for money derived from enhanced competition. 78% of those taking part
in the general survey in the HM Treasury review considered the introduction of
competitive dialogue to have improved procurement outcomes.!" In the present research
24/42 interviewees expressed a clear view that in general competitive dialogue facilitated
575 HM Treasury (20 I0), fu.198, 4.3
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value for money procurement in comparison to past procurement under the negotiated
procedure. For example, Lawyer 24 (England &Wales) stated, " ... it is definitely
preferable to the old scenario when you used to get to preferred bidder and then
everything used to land back on the negotiating table .... [Y]ou are driving out a better,
more competitive deal by keeping ... competition for longer". 13/42 interviewees,
however, expressly disagreed with such a contention: "I don't think we are getting
significantly better deals than we were. Best practice under the negotiated procedure led
to pretty good deals and ... probably cost less to procure" (Lawyer 17, UK).
Not all interviewees were of the opinion that increased costs were inevitable. It was noted
by some that the new legal rules were not themselves to blame for the excessive costs:
[mJy main gripe ... not with the legal ndes themselves.... When you read the Regulations there
is actuallY not a lot there. You have got quite a lot of leeway in terms of howyou conduct the
process. • .. {IJt is the way it has been interpreted, the way guidance is forcing authorities tofollow
quite a strict approach. ... [I]he process was brought in ... to provide jlexibiliry. It was meant
to be a front-ended negotiated procedure .... [I] hat actuallY has not happened in a lot of cases
(Lawyer 6, UK).
A number of interviewees discussed methods they employed to keep costs for bidders
and authorities under control. These will be looked at below.
13.2.3 Time
Research by UK government has found that in comparison to the private sector (10
months) on average public procurements under competitive dialogue takes 50% longer
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(14 months).S76The Government's current target is to reduce competitive dialogue
procurement timescales from 429-135 working days.s7736/58 interviewees noted the
length of competitive dialogue in comparison to procurement under the negotiated
procedure as a practical concern. According to Lawyer 20 (UK):
[w]ithin the firm it is ... said that competitive dialogue takes roughlY 30% longer than the
negotiated procedure would have done. Under competitive dialogue the requirements are much
more under discussion. In a negotiated procedure it was much easier to get started without the
work beingfrontloaded. Also, latryers arefinding they have to spend significant time with
bidders and authorities explaining the newprocess ...
There are only limited time requirements in the legal rules. As with the discussion above,
on this basis some felt that the legal rules could not be blamed entirely for protracted
procurements. In the words of Lawyer 5 (UK), "[s]o far as the law goes, there is room for
efficient and inefficient uses of the process". It was argued that the legal rules were not
the reason for long procurements:
the economic situation has made bidders complain about any Iongprocurement process.
[qompetitive dialogue gets a spectacularfy bad name when it is not inherentlY the fault of the
procedure. We are back to the fact that ifyou have a longprocurement process that loses its way
people hate it. It so happens that quite a lot of those have occurred under competitive dialogue.
In the old days ... they would have happened under another process (Lawyer 12, UK).
576 Cabinet Office (2010), fu.l99, 14
577lbid, 14
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Indeed, according to Lawyer 21 (UK), ''we are still doing negotiated procedures [that]
have been at preferred bidder stage for two years. It is not like these procurements are
quick under one procedure and slow under another; it is slow under both".
A number of interviewees highlighted that in comparison to the negotiated procedure,
despite the lengthier dialogue period, the time taken from appointment of preferred
bidder to contract close had generally been significantly truncated:
[the} amount of time being spent with thepreferred bidder is much less,'it took a lot of time jn the
past and it is now much quicker. We cannot say that it has reduced timescales overall, however,'
it hasjust reduced the end bit. The expensiveperiod, the dialoguephase, is longer (policy
Maker 3).
This was not necessarily so, however, in relation to procurement involving private
finance, where the poor economic situation in the UK was said to have caused problems
closing deals that had reached the preferred bidder stage (Lawyer 21 (UK))
13.2.4 Uncertainty
Nine interviewees raised the uncertainty of the legal rules on competitive dialogue as a
general issue. This does not include specific references to uncertain legal rules, which
were made during the course of interviews. For example, the ambiguous and inconsistent
wording of the Directive/Regulations was mentioned, plus the difficulty in discerning the
relevance of case law in the context of competitive dialogue. The problems caused by the
legal uncertainty are noted by HM Treasury research, particularly concerning post-
dialogue issues. In view of the key role played by legal advisors in complex procurements,
HM Treasury states that in seeking legal consensus on competitive dialogue it has engaged
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with the Procurement Lawyers Associadou'" and the PPP forum to encourage wide
debate on these issues.579
13.2.5 Complexity
14 argued that competitive dialogue procurement was complex. For example, due to the
need to manage numerous dialogue meetings with multiple bidder. 3/14 commented that
competitive dialogue was only complex due to the complex nature of the contracts it is
used to procure:
... everyone seems to think it is very complicated and quite mysteriolls becasse it is new, it reallY
isn't.: there is nothing difficult in itself abost going through competitive dialoglle. ... [Y] ou do come
across some fairlY complex legal and technical issues; these are not issues that arise becauseYOII are
dealing with competitive dialogue, thf!Yare issues that arise because of the nat lire of the contracts you
are going alit to the market with (procurement Officer 2, body governed by public law).
UK government research also highlights complexity as an issue; this is said to derive from
bureaucratic government approvals processes, duplication of public sector information
requests to bidders, and poor guidance within departments (i.e. not standardised, not
clear, not easily accessiblej.f"
13.2.6 Participation
19 interviewees commented upon a difficulty in attracting suppliers to take part in
competitive dialogue procedures or keeping bidders interested during the procedure so
that they fully engage with the procurement and do not voluntarily drop out:
571 www.procurementiawyers.or&/ (accessed 31II 0/20 II)
579 HM Treasury (2010). fn.198. Box 3.A
580 Cabinet Office (2011). fn.I99. 31.16.18
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• raj kf!Yissue is tbe willingnessof developers 10 engage in a process tbat couldpotentiallY cost well
over £ 100,000. The appetite is not there unlessyou are in ... London or the South East
(procurement Officer 1, Body Governed by Public Law);
• I have not seen any less interest, but certainlY there is more reticence to become engaged whenit is
going to cost a bidder so much and they may not get the project. People are realising the
implications more and more (Lawyer 4, UK).
Lawyer 21 (UK) argues that the participation problem is more nuanced: ''where there is a
very high value contract, bidders are prepared to undertake the kind of effort needed to
work up a tender. Where the process falls down is for the relatively low value (less than
£10 million), as the bid costs are ... notin proportion to the value of the contract". This
view was reflected in four interviews.
Policymaker 3 distinguished between the impact of competitive dialogue on big and
smaller contractors:
• .• smaller contractorsfind thf!Ycannot afford to bid. This is a realproblem, seeing as though the
object of the regulation is to open up the market and • .. get tbe bestpossible competition. II is one
of those laws of unintended consequences. Bigger contractors may befine with the procedure • • .
From a macroeconomicperspective, if there arefewer people wilh tbefinance able 10 complele these
projects and if they cost more and more to do then it is a bad thing. From a macroeconomic
perspective we have some concerns ...
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The argument that competitive dialogue may act as a barrier to entry for smaller and
medium sized suppliers was a finding of HM Treasury research.i" The argument was only
repeated by two other interviewees; however, there was no specific question on this.
Regarding participation difficulties, it was clear from seven interview responses that the
economic climate in the UK (2008-2009 recession) was a contributing factor, making
firms hesitant about undertaking the work needed to participate in a competitive dialogue
procedure.
13.3 Efficiency strategies
13.3.1 Introduction
In view of the above discussion, although one interviewee stated that it was not possible
to run the process in a more cost-effective manner (Lawyer 10, Northern Ireland), a
number of interviewees suggested ways in which they have sought to improve the
efficiency of competitive dialogue. These are presented below under the following
headings: planning and preparation, management of the dialogue stage, and interpretation
of the legal rules.
13.3.2 Planning and preparation
Due to the emphasis guidances82places upon pre-procurement planning and preparation,
the issue was discussed with all interviewees. All tended to reflect the views expressed in
the guidance and recent government research,s83i.e. that competitive dialogue requires
procurers to undertake a significant amount of work before OJEU notice publication. As
will be seen however, 20/58 interviewees noted, in agreement with government
'II HM Treasury (2010), fiI.198, 2.11
5Il OGCIHMT (2008), fu.193, S.U
51] HM Treasury (2010), fiI.198, 3.2·3.9; Cabinet Office (2010). fu.I99, 21
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research,584a problem of insufficient pre-procurement preparation and planning in
practice. In terms of the work to be carried out pre-procurement, 18 interviewees spoke
about the need to engage with the market, 13 mentioned the need for internal
organisational preparation, 22 spoke of the need to plan the procurement process, and 20
interviewees commented on the need for authorities to narrow down its requirement/ s.
Interviewees were not always in agreement about the extent of pre-procurement work.
For example, according to Lawyer 21 (UK):
... [planning and preparation] is important,· however, speaking as someone who used to be an in-
housepublic sector lan,yer, I think it is sell seroingfor profissional advisors... to sayyou need to
do loads ... ofpreparatory work,' it meansyou cangetyour fies upfront and who knows whether
the procurement is going to take place in six months time. [planning and preparation] is helpfu~
but the idea that everything needs to beplanned to the last detail strikes me as unnecessary.
In contrast, Lawyer 12 (UK) stated, "there is not enough [planning and preparation], there
is never enough; even when there is a lot, it is never enough. [planning and preparation] is
the key to a successful [competitive dialogue] ...".
According to interviewees, appropriate pre-procurement preparation and planning can
help to avoid legal challenge, and can lead to smoother more efficient procedures, and can
attract bidders to the process. In accordance with guidance,58513 interviewees talked
about how bidders will assess authorities at the outset to see if it is prepared and
organised and likely to run a cost-effective process. For example, according to one
Procurement Officer 10 (local government), "what we have got to do as a contracting
514 See HM Treasury (20 to), ibid, 3.3; Cabinet Office (20 II), fu.I99, 4.4; Cabinet Office (20 I0), ibid, 27
IIIOGCIHMT (2008), fu.193, S.I.7; NAO (2007), fu,38, 2.10
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authority is make our contracts as attractive as possible; if we look like a bag of spanners
then they are not going to want to be involved because the cost will be huge for them".
Despite the clear recognition of the importance of pre-procurement work, 20 discussed
how for a variety of reasons (e.g. resource and time pressures) sufficient amounts of such
work often fail to take place. For instance, one Procurement Officer 6 (central
government) argued that:
from a bestpractice ideal worldpoint of viewpublic sectorprocurement organisations wouid be
doing a lot of upfront work I?Y default, but the reality ... is there are oftenpolitical requirements
to do things to certain time scales and to meet certain milestones... I think it is afault ofpublic
sector organisations as a whole (notjust theprocurement side) that getting out the contract notice
is seen verymuch as a milestone, ... a flag that needs to be raised to demonstrate that you are
doing something... Doing three months or so of work beforeissuing the contract notice can look
like you are delaying orprevaricating ...
From a local government perspective Procurement Officer 4 (local government) stated
that "the issue all heads of procurement share is that nobody actually comes to speak to
us until they actually want what is delivered, which is a year too late".
Furthermore, the nature of the competitive dialogue procedure may encourage some
contracting authorities to postpone work that could be carried out pre-procurement and
require bidders to do this working during the dialogue stage. According to Lawyer 20
(England &Wales, London) "[when] [the competitive dialogue procedure] is commenced
at too early a stage, it is often due to laziness on the part of the contracting authority
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which wants to borrow the brain power of suppliers; this is not how a competitive
dialogue should be conducted".
The following are examples given of the type of work that needs to be done before
formally commencing the procurement (the relevance of these factors will likely vary from
project to project and sector to sector).
• Market sounding. 18 interviewees spoke about the need to engage with the
market pre-procurement. The need to gauge the level of market interest, learn
about the viability of a project, and raise awareness of major procurements was
considered particularly important in light of the above mentioned participation
difficulties.
• Internal organisational preparation. 13 interviewees spoke about the need for
organisational preparation within an authority.
• Planning the process. According to 22 interviewees, the process needs to be
thought through from start to finish. For instance, it is suggested that authorities
need to be clear at the outset about the structure of the process (whether there
will be a phased reduction and, if so, how many phases and how to run each
phase) and the timetable it will work to. Furthermore, it was recommended that
authorities plan for difficult issues (e.g. conduct ground surveys or obtain planning
permission where it would be too expensive for bidders to do this individually).
In view of participation troubles, two external legal advisor interviewees noted
that authorities should think about the timing of the OJEU notice.
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• Work on the authority's needs and requirements. A competitive dialogue where
dialogue is used as "an exploration" (Lawyer 37, Scotland) or where it is used to
obtain "consultancy services on the cheap" (Lawyer 2, England &Wales) was
strongly criticised by five interviewees for leading to wasted time and money. 20
interviewees spoke about the need for authorities to put work in pre-procurement
to develop the requirement/ s:
... all too oftenpeople end up going into the dialogue stage of a procurement without trulY
understanding what it is thry are after. I do not mean in micro detail but they have not
properfy worked through what their oijectives are, thry have not worked out what the
consequencesof taking certain actions might be and so on and soforth. Thry then end
up treating the dialogue sessions as discussion groups rather than a phased negotiation ...
(Lawyer 27, England &Wales).
6/20 interviewees who mentioned the need for pre-procurement work on the
requirement spoke about this in regard to the need to work up qualification,
selection and award criteria pre-procurement. According to Lawyer 12 (UK):
[t]o me logicallYwhatyou need to start off with doing is having a pretry good idea of
your spec[ificationJ and shape ... [this should] ... lead to award criteria, ... to detailed
evaluation model ... topre-qualification questions, ... to whatyou need toput inyour
OJEU notice in terms ofmandatory minimum standards. BifOreyou go to OJEU,
you should have worked out all these things. And with competitive dialogue, because
they are !ypicallYmore complex,you need to have done a lot more thinking.
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13.3.3 Streamlining
In this section some of the various methods employed by interviewees to streamline
competitive dialogue will be explored. These methods include limiting bidder numbers
(highlighted by 23 interviewees), standardisation (seven), targeted dialogue (14), and the
use of electronic procurement tools (two). These methods are generally in line with
recommendations flowing from government research. S86
HM Treasury research emphasises the need for early bidder down selection to minimise
costs and procurement timescales.l" The research notes that there may be a reluctance
amongst some local authorities to down select from 3-2 bidders, and 15% of survey
respondents had invited final bids from at least 6 bidders. In addition, according to
Cabinet Office research, bidders are staying in competitive dialogue processes too long
and would deselect themselves if there were better feedback on their chances of
success.f" 23 interviewees spoke about the need to limit the number of participants
invited to dialogue (subject to minimum requirements) or the need to reduce bidder
numbers during dialogue quickly in order to reduce costs:
... it is best to [reducenumbers] as quicklY aspossible, so as not to waste the money of bidders
who are not rightfor theproject Othemse,you can have inordinate amounts ofmeetings and ...
if starts getting quite expensive (procurement Officer 3, local government).
All policymakers interviewed argued that the standardisation had led to smoother
competitive dialogue procurements. The comments of Lawyer 39 (UK) reflect this view:
'86 See HM Treasury (2010). fn.198
'87 Ibid, 3.20
". Cabinet Office (2010). th.I99, 19
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BSF ... is a standardised process. There are enough deals that have gone through,'people are
familiar with it. There are alw'!)s some issues (often to do with land orplanning), but it helps
whenyou have a government department orQUANGO like Partnerships UK that
standardises it. The market gets to know it; they know where they have someflexibility, where
they Canpush things and where they cannot. Competitive dialogue is more challengingwhenyou
get out of that arena andyou are dealing with most likelY a botfygoverned bypublic law that does
not deal with these things very often ...
Nevertheless, 13 interviewees bemoaned an overly standardised approach (contracts and
procedures) in certain sectors, typically education (BSF), health (LIFI) and waste, and too
much interference from central bodies (e.g. Partnerships for Schools):
{iJn the schools sector it is very difficult becauseyou have another layer of bureaucrary:
Partnerships for Schools, standard documentation, standard procedures and standard processes.
This adds additional complexity that is not required in the legislation.... You find yourself
having arguments with people st!Jinl!; if we were in full control we 1VOJlldadvise the authority that
they are okt!J to closedialogue, but if thf!Yhave not got a tick in a boxfor X, Yand Z then they
will not let them (Lawyer 24, England &Wales).
Likewise, the recent Cabinet Office review highlights "endemic bureaucracy ... leading to
excessive levels of approvals and governance".589
The term "targeted dialogue" was used by Policymaker 3; it essentially refers to a situation
where the authority does not dialogue on all issues, but instead only on a limited set of
issues with the other issues being cast in stone and not open for dialogue. The 2010
589 Cabinet Office (20 II), fh. I99, p.S
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Treasury review expressly endorsed the approach subsequent to the interview.i'"
Policymaker 3 suggested two different approaches: (1) at the outset, specify the items that
are going to be the subject of dialogue and the items that are not going to be the subject
of dialogue and must be accepted by participants; (two) allow the early phases of dialogue
to be quite open enabling the "authority to get lots of ideas from the market" and then fix
certain issues (e.g. the contract) (i.e. "controlled dialogue").
Although not referring to it as targeted dialogue, 13 interviewees described how they had
adopted such an approach. For example, according to Lawyer 41 (Scotland), when
advising upon the procurement of a school, the only issues discussed in dialogue meetings
related to certain elements of the design. The contracting authority had ruled out dialogue
about the contract and the financials, which was "driven by the need to maximise market
interest". Lawyer 31 (England &Wales, outside London) described how his/her firm has:
... started topioneer with some ... projects adopting... aspects of the restrictedprocedure on the
contractual side... A first draft of the contract is prepared, typicallYaround the same time as the
OJEU notice ... and then amendments to that contract will be restrictedas the dialogue
progresses so that ... it does not descend into a legalfree for a/~ which has tended to happen over
thepast coupleofyears.
Three with experience of targeted competitive dialogue were critical of the approach, for
example, because the contracting authority refused to dialogue on matters that it was not
possible for bidders to sign up to (e.g. a required type of insurance is not available in the
UK) (Lawyer 36, UK). Lawyer 37 (Scotland) described his/her experience with
590 HM Treasury (2010), fh.198, 3.30-3.32
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competitive dialogue as "competitive monologue" because in a PFI procurement the
authority refused to negotiate the contract.
As a means of moving away from the idea of the necessity for expensive face-to-face
meetings, Policymaker 1 spoke about his/her efforts to promote greater use of electronic
procurement tools, particularly for early phases of dialogue where bidder numbers may be
high. This was mentioned by few other interviewees; however Lawyer 39 (UK) spoke at
some length about his/her experience of such methods:
[t]here have not been excessivemeetings in the recent competitive dialogue that I have been on.... My
main bugbear ... is ... it no longerflellike dialogue:you are talking to an e-ponal.: It does notfoe!
commercial. It flefs veryprocedural and very regulated.
13.3.4 Management
Interviews highlighted the strain running a dialogue places upon authorities, which can
run for several months; involve several different phases; involve several different streams
of meetings; involve several different bidders; and involve several different solutions. In
the context of efficiency, 31 interviewees emphasised the need for authorities to be
sufficiently resourced (staff, time, finance etc.), and to have strong management and
organisation: [w]e had seven bidders and different streams [of meetings] with each; it was
very difficult to manage and very resource intensive (procurement Officer 5, local
government).
In terms of management, it was argued that dialogue meetings must be tightly controlled.
For example, so that they are only held where they have a clear purpose (Lawyer 23 and
27 (England & Wales)). Also, a large public sector team must be effectively coordinated
together (procurement Officer 11, local government, and Lawyer 13, England & Wales).
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Although it was stated to vary from authority to authority, concerns over the capability of
authorities (particularly small local authorities and bodes governed by public law) were
expressed in 30/31 interviewees (all but one external legal advisor): cc ... competitive
dialogue requires a higher degree of ... skill than most authorities possess" (Lawyer 17,
UK). According to Policymaker 2, cc • • • external expertise is being skimped on". These
findings regarding authority capability are backed up by the similar findings of the
Treasury and Cabinet Office.591
13.3.5 Interpretation of the rules
Although interpretations of specific legal rules were looked at in chapters 11 and 12, when
discussing efficiency strategies it is pertinent to report that in general terms 34
interviewees spoke about the need for a more flexible reading of the law. Similarly to the
findings of the Cabinet Office, for many of these interviewees, the challenge climate and
soft-law (see chapter 14) had led to a generally very rigid application of the legal rules,
which was resulting in more time consuming and costly procurements. The following
areas were raised where a more flexible approach might lead to a more cost effective
procurement: the availability of the negotiated procedure, the rules on equal treatment and
transparency, and rules governing work after close of dialogue.
First, 8/34 questioned the way in which the negotiated procedure was considered no
longer available for PPP procurement. This issue has already been addressed in chapter
10, and is something discussed in both the HM Treasury and Cabinet Office research (see
chapter 10).
591 HM Treasury (2010), fn.l98, 2.9; Cabinet Office (2010), fn.199, 24
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Second, as regards the application of the equal treatment and transparency principles,
8/34 felt it has led to unnecessary meetings. Lawyer 22 (UK) stated:
it mt!Ybe something which comes out of thefeeling that you do have to specify theprocess very
clearlYupfront. So, you speczfyin advance all the areas whereyou think you might have things to
discuss. Soyou pre-specify the agenda right at the outset of the process and thenyou find that you
haveprobablY coveredmost of the topics during earlier meetings but you are not sure that you
reallYneed them. Because of transparency and equal treatment and all of these sorts of things,
you worry if it will be discriminatory to simplY cancel these meetings.
Further discussion on the application of these procedural rules can be found in chapter
11.
Third, 18/34 interviewees noted that to streamline dialogue it has been necessary to take
flexible reading of the work that can be undertaken once dialogue has been declared
closed; that is to say, excessive meetings are the result of finalising issues in the
competition when they could be finalised when there is only one bidder left in the
process:
... authorities, in wanting to keep the competitive tension going whilst bemoaning the cost and
expense, ... are also very rigid ... on the issue offine-tuning and clarification. So,you have quite
a few people not being verypragmatic ... (Lawyer lS,UK).
Policymaker 3 acknowledged the above view:
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... the market would question how developed the contract acltlal!y needs to be before closeof dialogue.
Certain bits of the market would pre.ftr to go back to the negotiatedprocedure, where there was
substantial detail to befinalised with thepre.ftrred bidder. The market would like a flexible reading
of the scopefor dialoguepost prejerred bidder, but it is tricky because the main reason w1!J the
competitive dialogue came in was becauseBrussels jelt there was too much scopefor skulduggery ...
(changing important bits of the contract ... in an unfair wqy).
HM Treasury research notes 49% of contracting authorities surveyed reported no
difficulties post close of dialogue, but 86% of respondents to a general web based survey
reported at least minor difficulties and 15% experienced considerable difficulties.592
According to the research, disproportionate amounts of bid costs are being incurred by
bidders prior to close of dialogue where an overly prudent approach is taken to the
interpretation of clarify, specify and fine-tune,
13.4Payments to bidders
Due to the complaints about high bid costs and participation difficulties, it is appropriate
to consider the possibility of authorities reimbursing unsuccessful bidders' costs (see
chapter seven). The express provision in the Directive/Regulations for authorities to
reimburse bidders' participation costs was discussed with interviewees. 45/58 stated that
this provision played no role in practice. The primary reason being the cost pressures
upon public sector authorities and an expectation that bid costs will be priced into
tenders.
3/58 interviewees described situations where they had been involved in competitive
dialogues where bid costs (or aspects of bid costs) were reimbursed:
592 HM Treasury (2010), fh.198, 3.37
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• ... we made a token gestureof £ 1,500: a drop of oil to make the wheelsgo round. Because of
the nature of the software application beingprocured, we thought suppliers would be a bit
reluctant to share ideas ... It did help • .• Although we have to be careful becausewe are living
away /pllblic} mom!y, • .. if as a result ... itfrees liPpeople's tonglles ..., I think it is a good thing
..• I have mentioned thepossibility in later • .. meetings and have immediatelY been told that we
will not be doing that (procurement Officer 2, body governed by public law);
• ..• we had a very specialproject where there was a parallel parliamentary process running;if this
was binned, bidders would have expended all this money and then through nofault of their own
theproject would have been cancelled. Also, it was a very complex, expensive procurement where
we anticipated a fairlY long dialogue. • .. The payment of tender costs was suo/ect to lots of
conditions (for example, it is onlYavailable where compliant bids are submitted). The payments
were in the relion of'fioe-t 0 million pounds. The authority is happy to do this on the basis that
the competition itgenerates ensures better valliefor money. For a £billion pIllSproject, fioe-t 0
million pounds is not very much .• .. We used it as a marketing tool(Lawyer 37, Scotland).
15 interviewees stated that although they had not advised upon reimbursement of bid
costs they thought it would be beneficial in certain circumstances. for example where very
high bid costs are expected and liable to discourage participation and when an authority
wants to secure intellectual property rights.
All Policymakers interviewed agreed that the reimbursement of bid costs should be the
exception. It may be an appropriate thing to do, for example. where the authority "asks
bidders to go to another stage ... for more detail than what is normally done in the market
to give the authority comfort over price and cost" (policymaker 1), or ''where schemes are
cancelled through no fault of the bidders" (policymaker 2). In view of the high bid costs
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commonly associated with competitive dialogue, HM Treasury research notes that,
although general government policy remains not to pay bid costs, in view of international
success when paying bid costs the issue is something that needs to be looked at further.593
13.5 Concluding remarks
Chapter 13 has explored general issues raised in the interviews, such as cost, time,
uncertainty, complexity and bidder participation difficulties. The findings very much
support the conclusions of the 2010 HM Treasury review and 2011 Cabinet Office
review.
59] HM Treasury (2010), ibid, Box4.A
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14 Findings: regulatory compliance
14.1Introduction
Chapter 14will present the findings from interviews on the factors impacting upon
approaches to interpretation in areas of legal uncertainty, specifically in relation to the
legal rules on competitive dialogue. The approach to the interpretation of the legal rules
on competitive dialogue, as identified in chapters 10, 11 and 12 appears to be generally
broadly in line with the economic theories of compliance considered in chapter eight.
According to these theories, the decision making of private companies under regulation is
the result of a cost benefit analysis, where the likelihood and the expected detriment from
non-compliance are weighed against the expected benefits of non-compliance.l" A
significant proportion of interviewees suggested that likewise contracting authorities
interpreting often uncertain areas of competitive dialogue will be strongly influenced by a
consideration of the theoretical and practical risk of legal challenge and the consequences
of legal challenge (e.g. procurement delay) weighed against other factors, such as benefits
to be derived from a particular course of action (e.g. cost savings or improved value for
money), internal or external pressures (e.g. time pressures and political pressures), and the
alternative options open to the contracting authority (e.g. to restart the procurement) and
the costs and benefits associated with the alternatives.
Chapter 14will consider specific factors impacting upon contracting authority decision
making in detail. As perceptions of the risk of legal challenge are often a key factor in
authority decision making (e.g. see discussion in chapter 12 on preferred bidder
negotiations), the chapter will begin with a consideration of interview responses to
questions on the theoretical and practical risk of challenge and what impact, if any, this is
594 Becker (1968), fu.4S 1
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having. Although, the new remedies directive had only just been introduced at the time
the interviews took place and interviewees had very little practical experience of the
changes to the remedies system, interviewees were asked to give their views on the
expected impact of the changes.
Braun's qualitative research into PFI procurement practice pre-competitive dialogue
found soft law to playa significant role in guiding contracting authorities in their
application of the legal rules.595 The impact of soft law on the decision whether or not to
use competitive dialogue over other procedures has already been discussed in chapter 11.
In section four the comments of interviewees in relation to the role played by soft law
generally and in interpreting specific aspects of competitive dialogue other than the
decision whether or not to use competitive dialogue will be considered. The chapter will
conclude by looking at factors other than those relating to a cost-benefit analysis
identified in interviews as impacting upon compliance. These include the procurement
proficiency of authorities and also the desire to obey the law irrespective of legal risk.
14.2Legal challenge
14.2.1 Introduction
Interviewees were questioned on their perceptions of legal risk, their experience of legal
challenges, and how such perceptions and experiences impact upon contracting authority
decision making under competitive dialogue. 19/25 interviewees did not view
Commission challenge as a major threat when conducting competitive dialogue
procurement. The main threat of legal challenge appears to be seen as coming from the
market, i.e. aggrieved bidders. 26/50 interviewees had experience of formal legal
challenge under competitive dialogue and stated the risk of challenge to be generally very
195 Braun (2001), fn.l72
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high. 24/50 had no such experience of legal challenge, but eight of these 24 still regarded
the risk of challenge to be generally high. Interestingly, 46/54 interviewees noted a rise in
bidder complaints, informal legal challenges and queries since the introduction of
competitive dialogue (though not necessarily due to the introduction of competitive
dialogue). In line with the theories of compliance discussed in chapter eight, 32/34 of the
interviewees who perceived there to be a high risk of challenge under competitive
dialogue spoke of this resulting in authorities becoming increasingly risk averse in their
decision making.
14.2.2 Commission Challenge
In general interviewees did not regard the threat of Commission challenge for non-
compliant conduct under competitive dialogue to be a major concern. There were no
interviewees with experience of such a challenge and only 6/25 interviewees cited
Commission challenge to be something they are wary about. For example, according to
Procurement Officer 7 (central government), "we feel that we are being watched very
carefully and being reviewed to see that the old ways under the negotiated procedure do
not come back". Likewise, Procurement Officer 4 (local government) stated, "we are
always worried about the Commission stepping in for not following the procedures
correctly; this guides what we do, particularly in relation to our larger tenders". 3/6
interviewees (wary of Commission challenge) suggested the scope for negotiation with the
preferred bidder under competitive dialogue to be an area the Commission may want to
address in the future in order to provide clarity and to prevent UK reverting to old
practices (i.e. extensive contractual negotiations with the preferred bidder) (other
interviewees did not comment on this point).
The other 19/25 responses focused solely on the threat of market challenge, disregarding
the risk of Commission challenge; for example, Lawyer 2 (England &Wales) stated "the
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risk of a private sector supplier bringing a challenge is very high; I had not really thought
about the Commission ...". According to Policymaker 2, Commission challenge is
"looked upon as being at the theoretical end of the spectrum". 2/19 interviewees noted,
however, that the possibility of Commission challenge may be something that is touched
upon in legal advice: "[t]he Commission will sometimes feature in advice, but there is a
perception that if you get picked up by the Commission you have been incredibly unlucky
because they do not have a lot of time and are pretty selective about the cases they take
on" (Lawyer 13, England &Wales).
According to interviewees, to attract Commission challenge the procurement would need
to be high profile (e.g. procurements by government departments and high profile non-
governmental organisations) (five interviewees) and/or concerning issues corresponding
with Commission policy objectives, such as areas of widespread non-compliance (eight).
For instance, Lawyer 8 (England &Wales) stated, "I do not think we are particularly
concerned about Commission challenge but that may just reflect the fact that we are in
[regional city] and not ... doing the mega stuff (relative to other things)".
In addition, several reasons were given for the perceived minimal threat of Commission
challenge. For example, the Commission's limited resources (two interviewees) and a
perception that there are other EU Member States more deserving of Commission
attention (one) were said to make Commission challenge unlikely. Also, two interviewees
stated that Commission challenge would not be a concern for individual authorities
because the challenge would be made against the state.
311
14.3Bidder challenges and complaints
14.3.1Introduction
Interviewees were asked about their experiences of formal legal challenges in the context
of competitive dialogue. 26/50 interviewees had encountered in practice in one way or
another (24 of the 26 were external legal advisers often with experience advising a variety
of clients, e.g. authorities, bidders, and funders) formal legal challenges in competitive
dialogue procurements, and were of the opinion that formal legal challenges were more
common than prior to 2006 and becoming increasingly so. 24/50 interviewees had no
experience of formal legal challenges under a competitive dialogue procedure; however,
8/24 stated that they were aware of an increase in legal challenges from press reports and
anecdotal sources (e.g. conferences).
Significantly, 46/54 interviewees noted a rise in bidder queries, complaints and informal
legal challenges, i.e. "sabre-rattling" (procurement Officer 10, local government; and
Lawyer 20, UK). Clearly, despite bidders finding potential flaws in competitive dialogue
processes, these disputes rarely find their way to the courts. The reasons for this will be
looked at below. The following is a selection of quotes from interviewees describing their
experience of bidder queries, complaints and informal legal challenges:
• fPleople are waking up to thefact that they are not able to .rpendhuge amounts of money on
coming second without knowing wf?ythey have come second. We are not seeing a flood of
litigation, but people are moreprepared 10 complain .• .(Lawyer 17, UK);
• ... there are loads of complaints. As 10 whether people havegot the money and will /0 go to court
that is a different matter. Lots ofpeople Mite initial letters of complaint (Lawyer 39, UK).
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20/46 interviewees that spoke about an increase in queries and complaints under
competitive dialogue specifically mentioned Freedom of Information requests as a tool
that aggrieved bidders will employ to put pressure on authorities. However, some of
those interviewees noted that such requests are rarely fruitful.
14.3.2 Reasons for high legal risk
A number of reasons were put forward for why theoretically the level of legal risk under
competitive dialogue is high in comparison to complex procurement under the negotiated
procedure: cuts in public spending, high bid costs, greater bidder familiarity with the
procurement rules, a more litigious culture, and increased prescriptiveness of procurement
regulation. These are broadly in line with the reasons suggested in chapter eight as having
the potential to impact on perceptions of legal risk. The reasons for the high level of legal
risk will be presented below; however, these reasons should be read in light of the
statements of 13 interviewees that it is impossible in complex procurements to run a risk
free procurement process: "[t]o be honest with you, with the best will in the world, with
all the discretion there is in the procurement process, I defy anybody to say what a perfect
procurement should look like; there isn't one. There is always going to be the potential
for challenge" (Lawyer 4, UK).
The main reason for the high theoretical risk of legal challenge relates to the UK's
struggling economy at the time the interviews were conducted. 25 interviewees (others
did not comment) stated that, due to the economic situation and ensuing cuts in public
sector spending, major capital projects were becoming less frequent, making such work
more valuable to private sector companies. This was said to make private companies,
particularly incumbent public sector suppliers, less inclined to accept failed bids in
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competitions for a major contract, as, for example, they may not get another opportunity
to compete for such work:
I have seen a greater desire and willingness to challenge. In thepast ... in the UK • ..you ... lost
a contract butyou are not going to make too muchfuss becausethere is another one coming up
andyou want to be in the good books of the authority. That is no longer the case. I have seen a
marked di.fference,even if not necessarilYlitigation Ihere is definilelYqueries of 'whal can we do,
can we stop tbis'. Losing bidders are much less likelY nollo accepl it. II is a loslopportunity for
them. If they think they can do something about it they will Opportunities are not so many, so
if they have lost something they are much more keen to challenge (Lawyer 19, UK).
A second factor contributing to increased risk under competitive dialogue was the high
costs of bidding. It was stated by 18 interviewees (others not commenting) that, because
of the significant investment generally expected in the preparation of bids under
competitive dialogue, there was a greater financial incentive for unsuccessful bidders to
challenge:
• [t}he stakes are a lot higher. Bid costs are higher; so,ifyou arefindingyourself losing at the last
leg andyou have spent £2million in bid costs ... areyou going to walk awayfteling happy or are
you going to be lookingfor reasons why that is tbe wrong decision (Lawyer 7, UK);
• ... it costs so milch to compete in a competitive dialogue. Ifyou have a board of directors s'!)'ing.
'hang on,you have spent £4million and we have not got a contract: there is a great pressure to
challenge (Lawyer 40, UK).
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As mentioned in chapter eight, heightened bidder awareness of rights and remedies under
EU procurement law was mentioned by 15 interviewees (others not commenting), for
example bidder knowledge that they cannot be blacklisted for future public contracts.
According to Lawyer 21 (UK), "there is an upward trend in challenges. It is difficult to
say why, but the degree of awareness of bidders of the law is increasing.... [There has
been] a gradual increase in awareness since ... the 2004 directives".
20 interviews (others not commenting) described how there had been a shift towards a
more litigious culture, for example because legal challenges themselves were fuelling
further legal challenges:
[the rise in the number of challenges] antedates the new remedies directive. It may be a self-
fuelling thing: if a few people do it then other people see that thf!Yare doing it and so it gets going
for that reason (Lawyer 5, UK).
A further reason for increased legal risk highlighted by 16 interviewees (others not
commenting) was the greater regulation (including case law on transparency and the
Freedom of Information Act) that has occurred since the introduction of competitive
dialogue:
UJreedomof information and case law, the Regulations as well Increasing levels of transparenry
requirements from case law, coupled with freedom of information, has enabledpeople in parallello
gel all the information. People now have milch more information and ammunition 10 decide
whelher or not something is unfair. In addition, there has been an increase in comple>.."ifY,·there
are more things to get wrong in procedures (Lawyer 41, Scotland),
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In addition, four interviewees stated (others not commenting) that the rise in procurement
challenges was down to the ease with which bidders were able to mount challenges. Of
these four. Lawyer 31 (England &Wales) noted that he/she had heard anecdotally that
bidders are now able to obtain commercial insurance covering the legal costs of challenge.
The author can find no evidence of such insurance. however.
Also. in response to questions on reasons for increased legal risk. four interviewees stated
that this was often down to authorities needlessly exposing themselves to risk, e.g. due to
insufficient work pre-procurement, a failure to seek timely legal advice, and/or a lack of
internal skill, experience and/or resources.
It was highlighted in chapter four that procurement disputes in Scotland, unlike England,
Wales and Northern Ireland, may potentially be brought before one of two courts: the
Sheriff Court or the Court of Session. Those interviewees operating predominantly in
Scotland were asked for their view on whether this impacted at all upon compliance levels
in Scotland; however. in the context of competitive dialogue procurement disputes, which
are invariably high value. all Scottish interviewees did not feel there was any impact,
particularly as only the Court of Session had the power to award injunctions.
14.3.3 Reasons limiting risk of legal challenge
Regardless of reasons for a high theoretical risk of challenge discussed above, many
interviewees explained that a high practical risk of challenge was not inevitable and this
would need to be considered on a case by case basis. For instance, had the aggrieved
bidder gone away to focus on different work or was the bidder still on the scene, asking
questions and seeking further information? If an aggrieved bidder is displaying signs that
it is looking for reasons to challenge then the level of practical risk is heightened.
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Although not asked any specific questions targeted on this aspect of competitive dialogue
practice, a limited number of interviewees discussed reasons limiting the risk of challenge.
Itwill be seen that some of the reasons (i.e. fear of being prejudiced in future contracts,
and the costs and time associated with litigation in the UK) mirror those found by
Pachnou's 2003 qualitative research into the UK's system of procurement remedies.!" It
should be pointed out that the present research is a study of perceptions from the
contracting authority perspective, and does not seek to determine the actual reasons
behind any bidder reluctance to bring legal challenges or see them through.
Six interviewees spoke about bidders being reluctant to bring challenges against
contracting authorities due to a concern that this may prejudice future chances of success
(other interviewees did not comment on this):
[t]here is still massivelYafiar of biting the hand that feeds,' it does happen and people doget
prejudiced You would not complain about certain things,' it would be sillY. lfyo« aregoing to
end up working with themyou will be with some of thepeopleYONcn'ticisedand people take
things verypersonallY. The London Borough [CoNncils] talk amongst themselves (Lawyer 39,
UK).
Similarly, one legal advisor stated that relationships between authorities and bidders may
reduce the risk or perception of risk of challenge. According to Lawyer 2 (England &
Wales), " .., there are some council members and procurers who believe that they have
strong enough relationships with the bidders not to have to worry about challenge, but I
think that is probably more in the minority now",
596 Pachnou (2003), fn.455
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Five interviewees spoke about how the costs and time needed to mount a legal challenge
act as a disincentive for challenge, particularly, according to Lawyer 18 (UK), for small
and medium sized businesses: "SMEs, they do not want to go to court; they may not have
the resources. ... The recession has had various implications: ... companies do not want to
waste time and resources litigating, so that has given authorities a bit a carte blanche to do
whatever they like".
The uncertainty of many areas of competitive dialogue and thus the uncertainty of
challenge outcome was said to exacerbate the time and cost disincentive. This was
highlighted as a disincentive in four interviews. As Lawyer 13 (England &Wales)
commented in regard to potentially unlawful negotiations post appointment of a
preferred:
we will put a letter in for a bidder s'!Ying to the authority that this looles like a quite substantial
change, but the fact is because the law is slightlY uncertain it actuallY decreases the risk of
challenge. Ifyou are a bidder, unless you are verygmmpy, you are not going to beprepared to go
to court and risk £ tOOk or thereabouts where the law is not very clear. Even ifyou do win, you
have onlY bought yourse!f a lottery ticket and the right to have another go in circumstances now
where the authority reallY hates you.
Linked to the cost deterrent to mounting a legal challenge, three interviewees cited the
requirement in the UK for the claimant applying for an interim injunction to provide a
cross undertaking in damages (chapter four) as often dissuading legal challenge: "[t]he
biggest impediment to litigation in the UK is the cross-undertaking in damages; if that
were ever to go there would be an explosion, basically" (Lawyer 21, UK).
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In addition, three interviewees questioned the high risk of challenge because these
processes are run in a legally robust and transparent manner. For example, Lawyer 1
(Scotland) stated:
... I think that on complexprojects ... the likelihood of a challenge isprobablY less likelY even
though there is more at stake in terms of bid costs simplY because... as legal advisors are there
along the way theprocessprobablY tends to be more robust than if councilsweregoing out to
procurement and doing it themselves and I would say that tJven the robustness of the process that
has been applied people might be more inclined to take a risk because thry know that thq can
defind what th~ have done. So, there may be a technical breach of the rules, butyou could argue
it is still asfair and transparent and the likelihood of a risk ifgoing to be less because of that
fairness and transparenq ...
Also, as mentioned in chapter 12 on interview findings for issues arising following the
close of dialogue, in relation to the possibility of a bidder bringing a challenge against
violations of the procurement rules occurring in the preferred bidder stages of the
procedure, the aggrieved bidder may have difficulty uncovering the necessary information
that provide grounds for challenge.
14.3.4 The impact of perceived high legal risk on behaviour
Most of those interviewees that perceived there to be a high risk of market challenge
under competitive dialogue were asked about how this impacted upon contracting
authority behaviour. In line with the economic theories on compliance discussed in
chapter eight, 32/38 interviewees stated that the greater risk of challenge under
competitive dialogue meant that greater emphasis was placed upon legal compliance in
decision making, i.e. authorities are generally showing greater caution when applying the
rules. 6/38 interviewees disagreed with this view, arguing that the perceived high risk of
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challenge had not impacted upon the way in which contracting authorities run complex
procurements.
The following are a selection of quotes from 32/38 interviewees that felt the high risk of
challenge under competitive dialogue was causing authorities to put greater emphasis on
their compliance objectives:
• ... the change in ... challenge culture over the last ftve-1 0years has made ... authorities very much
more well behaved in relation to theprocurement rules. I do not think thry take them lightlYand
I think thry work quite hard in getting it right (Lawyer 7, UK);
• ... in viewof the current climate where there is greater fear of challenge, where there was legalgrry
areas in thepast I think contracting authorities were happy to let it slide, now theyfeel they are
under a lot morepressure to make sure everything is documented properfy, everything is
transparent and they canjustify decisions (Lawyer 40, UK).
9/32 who described contracting authorities as more cautious when applying the legal rules
in recent years, spoke about how the risk of challenge had led to greater awareness of the
rules amongst authorities and more resources being devoted, for example, to education.
For instance, Lawyer 2 (England &Wales) stated:
... there is a lot more emphasis on training ... , making the procurement team more aware of
procurement issues. ... Take a careproject, for example,· in thepast ...you would not be drilling
down to thepeople who are evaluating the care as to how to do their job and what thI!J can do.
RecentlY, I set aside two t1t!Ysto discuss evaluation criteria and it is quite a bizarre e:xperience
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becauseyou have got, for example, careprofessionals sitting in the room looking atyou as if to
St!Y do we have to go into this.
12/32 describing authorities as more cautious spoke about contracting authorities' focus
on compliance obstructing the achievement of efficient procurement processes (for
example from inefficient dialogue due to a strict interpretation of equal treatment rules) or
the achievement of value for money (for example from not being able to negotiate with
the preferred bidder a strict interpretation of the application of the rules on award criteria,
or from devoting resources to compliance rather than value for money):
[the risk of challenge} makes [authorities] focus on compliance rather than getting the right result.
It is a bit of a tightrope. What you are trying to do is stop clients falling off one side (getting
sued), but falling of the other side means you do not get the bidsyou want ... (Lawyer 41,
Scotland).
Interestingly, of the total 38 discussing impact of risk of challenge on behaviour, seven
spoke about authorities that have been the focus of procurement law challenge becoming
highly compliance orientated in future procurements:
[mJy remit, number one, there will be no successfu/legal challenges. Everything else is subsidiary
to thaI. My position is down to the fact that we lost a court case • .. Since then the authonty has
been very conscious of its reputation.... It is incrediblY embarrassing... We are quite a
vulnerable buying authority, high profile enough that if someone wins a case against us it is going
to make the papers (procurement Officer 8, body governed by public law).
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In addition, a limited number of interviewees noted that competitive dialogue
procurement disputes may not be reaching the courts because contracting authorities can
be quite responsive to challenges and complaints, for example rewinding procedures. As
discussed in chapter 12, restarts and rewinds are often seen as a last resort when a
competitive dialogue has progressed to its latter stages; however, this does not appear to
be the case where the procurement is not so advanced. As Lawyer 11 (Scotland)
emphasised:
... the case reports of these things reachingcourts is no wtryindicative of the levelofproblems that
there actuallYare. [NAME OFLA WYER] has sofar got threeprocedures abandoned this
year where he has been actingfor aggrievedbidders. [He/She] has been winding up the authority
about non-compliance. In one of those it is a national project; they started theprocurement in
2008, after about ayear it got abandoned, they started all over again, made a different mistake,
and it has been abandoned again. That isjust natural. [He/She] has had three sofar thisyear;
multiplY that up over the courseof theyear, stry 10 or 12 over ayear and then multiplY again
becausethere are lots of otherfirms that are in this area. You just get an idea of the extent of
procedures that are actuallYfacing problems. ... They are not coming to the courts becausethey are
getting abandoned and started again or they are winding the clock back within theprocedure ...
14.3.5 The new remedies directive
28 interviewees spoke freely about what they perceived to be important in relation to the
introduction of the amendments to the remedies system. The Public Contracts
(Amendment) Regulations 2009 transposing the new remedies directive applies to
procurements commenced on or after 20 December 2009 (see chapter four). The
interviews were predominantly conducted in early 2010; thus, interviewees lacked practical
experience of the new remedies system.
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19/28 interviewees stated that they expected the introduction of the new remedies
directive to generally lead to a greater threat of formal legal challenge and more caution
from contracting authorities when applying the legal rules. 3/28 interviewees did not
anticipate there to be any changes following the introduction of the remedies
amendments, and 6/28 interviewees were unsure what, if any, impact there would be.
Six interviewees spoke about the provision for automatic suspension following legal
challenge as the significant development in relation to competitive dialogue procurement.
According to interviewees, it "[gives] bidders ... more encouragement to • .•take a pop at
the procuring authority" (Lawyer 3, England &Wales). As Lawyer 17 (UK) explained:
fpJeople are waking up to the fact that thry are not able to spend huge amounts ofmoney on
coming second without knowing why they have come second. We are not seeing a flood of
litigation, but people are prepared to complain. Reversing the burden from now on puts bidders
in a far stronger position,' on the back of that I think we will see a complete sea change. What is
there to lose now? An authority is more likelY to respond to a threat of legal challenge and say
okay we will go back to a previous stage or we will change this or do that. Given the eJfectof me
doing that,you will take me very seriousty. It will cause delays. We are goingfrom one extreme
to another.
It was suggested in three interviews that it was not clear whether or not the cross
undertaking in damages (highlighted above as a barrier to legal challenge) could still be
justified under the new remedies regime: "[t]he cross undertaking ... I do not think that is
what Europe intended. I think they intended to give people rights. I think the way the
UK legislation is drafted is quite friendly to the public sector • .. and there will be a
question over whether the Commission is happy with that" (Lawyer 39, UK). As
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discussed in chapter four, the case law seems to confirm that the same principles apply in
to a consideration of whether or not to lift a suspension as applied under old case law on
awarding injunctions.
4/8 interviewees noted ineffectiveness as likely to significantly impact upon competitive
dialogue procurement practice; however, four other interviewees disagreed with this view,
citing, for example, a reluctance shown by the UK courts' to find against contracting
authorities when requested to grant an injunction. As will be discussed in the section
immediately below, there were some additional comments on how ineffectiveness may
encourage bidders and funders to become even more concerned to ensure that the legal
rules are followed correctly.
14.3.6 Impact of risk of challenge on funders
In view of the introduction of the ineffectiveness remedy in particular (see chapter four),
nine interviewees considered that bidders and funders may become more concerned that
the legal rules are correctly observed; for instance, it was suggested by these nine
interviewees that the growing practice of insistence upon contracting authorities providing
indemnities for bidder/funders against successful challenge may become even more
common:
... the bank thinks that ... the contract might be ineffective ... it will make ... SlirBthat the rules
have been applied. ... [YJOII get people askingfor indemnities from the allthon!). I have
encountend cases when such indemnities wen given and I think tho areprobablY enforceable.
[IJt is a matter of'pressing the au/hon!) and its advisors qllite hard on how tho can provide
reassurance that they have complied with the procedlirB (Lawyer 5, UK).
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The example was given of amendments to tenders or the call for tender that are outside
the scope of the OJEU notice (i.e. may necessitate the restart of the procurement). Itwas
suggested that this could potentially give rise to the availability of ineffectiveness and,
thus, funders may be reluctant to accept such a risk without an indemnity. Some
interviewees felt that the ineffectiveness remedy may deter material changes that are
bidder or funder driven. Lawyer 7 (UK) stated:
[bJidders are often the beneficiaries of a process not being carried aNt correctfy,' so, that will be an
interesting 4Jnamic, ... particularfy if the bidder whose been preferred has since managed to
negotiate changes which are beneficial to it bNt might raise the concerns of its own financiers that
the project is at risk on Pressetext principles, needing to be re-advertised. I think we are sl111
trying to work aNt the extent to which the new remedies will impact on lateral changes and on
extensions by time of contracts, bNt there mNst bepotential therefor everybo4J to get more
concerned aboNt what has actualfy gone on in the process and whether a line has been crossed
where realfy the project shoNld have been re-advertised and we are in effect directfy awarding
something that was not advertised.
14.4Soft law
Chapter eight discussed the 2001 research of Braun, which found government guidance to
have played a key role in the development of PFI procurement practice under the
negotiated procedure.l" According to Braun, non-binding guidance from UK central
government were being regarded as authoritative interpretations of the law even where
these interpretations were not in line with the Commission's view. Since the introduction
of competitive dialogue, a range of guidance documents have been made available
(chapter seven). In their discussion of the role played by guidance, the vast majority of
m Braun (2001), fn.172
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interviewees concentrated on guidance from aGe (particularly 2008 guidancej'" because,
as mentioned by some interviewees, this is the most important guidance. The guidance
that Braun found to be influential in practice were clear statements of law (i.e. on use of
the negotiate procedure). Likewise, with respect to clear statements (i.e. the decision to
use competitive dialogue) the findings suggest guidance to have played a major role in
shaping UK practice (chapter 10). However, it will be seen that more generally due, in
particular, to the generic nature of the guidance its role is limited.
The 2006 and 2008 aGe guidance was seen by most interviewees (40/45) as having some
influence in broadly setting out a basic practical framework as to the way in which a
competitive dialogue procedure is to be conducted. The aGe guidance was commonly
referred to as a useful reference document or a helpful introductory text to best practice;
however, these interviewees did not see themselves constrained to conduct competitive
dialogue strictly in line with the best practice or legal interpretations as set out in guidance.
The 40/45 interviewees made clear that they would be prepared to depart from the
guidance where it conflicted with their view of the law or best practice; one example of
this that was given related to reserve bidders. According to Lawyer 32 (England &
Wales), the aGe guidance advises against keeping a reserve bidder, but he/she felt a
reserve bidder can be beneficial and advises in favour of their use. The following are
quotes from the category of 40 interviewees that expressed that no great emphasis was
placed on the role of aGe guidance:
• I refer to theaGeguidance but it is not binding. You make a note of it but ... do nol relY on it
heavilY.... It is useful background information; I would pUI it no higher than thaI. My primary
source is the Regulations and experience ... (procurement Officer 10, local government);
598 OGCIHMT (2008). fn.193
326
• [tJhe OGC stuff is okt!Y;you read it. Everyone read it to start with. These g'!)s have negotiated
in Europe so th(J know what th~ are trying to achieve, but I do not think I havegot the OGe
guidance outfor a couple ofyears now. I will not stick to it rigidlY(Lawyer 13, England &
Wales).
4/45 interviewees viewed OGe guidance as authoritative and sought to strictly follow
such guidance when conducting competitive dialogue procurements, and 1/45 was not
aware of any OGe guidance.
The predominant reason for the general minor role of guidance in competitive dialogue
was said to be the generic nature of the guidance. 26 interviewees criticised the guidance
for being too generic to be of any real practical use. For example, as stated by Lawyer 39
(UK):
a lot of the stuff ... that requires legal advicegoes b~ond the OGC guidance, stuff that is specific
to the deal: Government guidance is there so that the Commission knows that the Member State
is doing things by the book and it understands thegeneral approach, but on specificdeals ... the
deal is run as the lawfirm instructing thegovernment department thinks the deal should be run.
Generalfyprocedures are in line with the guidance but the guidance is necessarilYquite generic.
Oftenyou canpick up guidance and it will not address the specificquestionyou have.
13/26 that commented upon the generic nature of OGe guidance cited the failure of the
OGe guidance to adequately address controversial areas, such as the scope for
negotiation post close of dialogue and the application of the award criteria during
dialogue. In this respect, the guidance is generally not controversial enough to prevent
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authorities from doing what they would like to do for commercial reasons. The following
comments are examples of the above view:
• ... theaGe guidance does not help... There is no real clarity there by what is meant by fine-
tuning~ ... [fJhey need toget off thefence and effictiveIYsay, 'tbis is what it does mean' because
Ihave read [the guidance] a few times andyou think toJourself, Iwellwhat exactlYis it saying?'
and because of that JOU take the cautious route andyou waste money (Lawyer 2, UK);
• ... one areait would be reallYhelpful to haveguidance on it the one area they dodge:Uanaleis,
Lettings etc. It would be reallYhelpful if someone was to stick their head above theparapet and
actuallYgive us someguidance on it becauseI think evaluation is probablY the most difficult area
to get right in competitive dialogue ... [fJhe aGe and HM Treasury guidance, it ispitched at
too high a level It does not go into the detail that we need (Lawyer 26, UK).
Policymaker 3 noted the difficult balance that must be struck when giving guidance in
uncertain, controversial areas:
[i]t is tricky for us to comment on these things. There are areas whereyou would like togive a
lead to the market but it is a hard balance. Sometimes JOU would like to say more tban JOu
thinkyou can. Ijyou end upputting out a piece ofguidance that turns oul to be wrong it would
be a very tricA:Ysituation. What would be easier isfor the private sector • ..to themselves rome up
with what they see as guidance. They do not have the same relationship with Brussels.
Policymaker 3 explained that this was why the Procurement Lawyers Association (an
independent organisation ofEU procurement lawyers) had been asked by the UK
government to look at certain issues in relation to competitive dialogue. Nevertheless,
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Policymaker 3 did argue that there were still some practical areas where government
guidance could be beneficial, such as pre-procurement preparation and planning, targeted
dialogue, bidder numbers etc.
Also, eight interviewees criticised the quality of the OGe guidance. For example, Lawyer
19 (UK) stated:
[tJhat is theproblem with soft-law and wl?Jwe (the legal community) aregenerallYnot overlY
keen with aGeguidance. • .• Before they comeup with papers they should consult us because
small local authorities, people who do not have the luxury ofgoing to external legal advisors, are
just going to read the guidance and interpret it as law,· that will createproblems for thefuture.
In addition, in accordance with Braun's findings,s9920 interviewees (others not
commenting) stated that comfort was derived from the support of guidance, for example,
as stated by 2/20 interviewees, because such guidance might be taken into account if the
matter were to come before a domestic court:
It is all helpfu~ but a lot of itjust says what we aJl know. We had to advise on a single bidder
situation and the aGe guidance confirmed ourprevious advice• ... There are some helpful views
that could supportyou. There is an advantage in having aGe say these sorts of things. If the
aGe is taking the same view then it is unlikelY that someone is going to challengeon that basis.
The courts are likelY 10 be influenced l!J aGeguidance .• •(Lawyer 29, England &Wales).
Itwas suggested by some of the 20 interviewees that talked about gaining comfort from
the support of guidance that due to the uncertainty of many aspects of the legal rules and
599 Braun (200 I), rn.I72, 191
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the lack of case law, although most comfort was gained from the support of OGe, some
comfort was taken from any supporting sources.
In relation to guidance and standard documents issued by Partnerships for Schools and
the Department of Health, 10 interviewees (others not commenting) commented how
under these programmes the advice and guidance issued by these policymaking
organisations was mandatory and looked upon by contracting authorities as authoritative:
[ij/you are doing a project driven by Partnerships for Schoolsyou have to read their guidance
because they are such controlfreaks that ifyou step momentarilY out of line then they will haul
you over hot coals and they wz/I make more work than actualfy doing the competitive dialogue if
you are not careful (Lawyer 23, England &Wales).
14.5 Contracting authority skill, expertise and experience
A further matter impacting upon compliance that was apparent from 47 interviews was
the expertise, experience, resources and approach to legal advice of contracting
authorities. It was seen in chapter eight in the discussion of the compliance literature that
a lack of competence or lack of awareness of the legal rules can lead to non-compliance,
for instance inadvertent breaches of the law or even poorly calculated deliberate breaches
(e.g. due to not knowing the potential consequences of successful legal challenge). The
procurement proficiency of contracting authorities was said by most interviewees to vary
from contracting authority to contracting authority, depending, for example, on the size
of the authority, the resources available and the procurement experience of the authority
and its workforce.
Because the type of contracts procured under competitive dialogue tend to be high value
and complex, it is most common for extemallegal advisors to be brought in to advise the
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contracting authority (see chapter 10). For example, according to Procurement Officer 10
(local government):
... local authorities could beperceived not to have the resource ... , but that may not be the entire
reason why they would outsource it. In light of the fact that some of these projects are tens of
millions ofpounds if not hundreds of millions there is a risk profile that the infernal legal could
not accept. I cannot imagine any authority would run a PF[ procurement without any external
help; there is an inherent risk in doing that and getting it wrong would be bad.
However, the extent to which external legal advisors are utilised was explained by most
interviewees to depend on the procurement and the authority involved. For example, in
some procurements, e.g. the first time a contracting authority had procured a certain type
of project under competitive dialogue, the external lawyers may take on a significant lead
role akin to a project manager. In other procurements, for example where personnel
within the contracting authority are experienced in complex procurement under
competitive dialogue, the external lawyers may have more of a support role, providing
advice as and when needed.
The latter approach is not necessarily problematic from a compliance perspective, as
numerous examples were given of specific city councils with highly proficient internal
procurement departments. Nevertheless, the practice of obtaining external legal advice as
and when problems are encountered was noted to have led to difficult compliance
decisions. 14 interviewees cited situations where external legal advice was obtained at too
late a stage, such that it was not possible for the procurement to continue without
substantial costs being incurred or an increase in the challenge risk. In this regard,
interviewees highlighted as a problem the failure of some authorities to obtain needed
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external legal advice pre-procurement and in the drawing up of the contract notice. For
example, scenarios were cited where the contract notice had been drawn up without
external legal advice and was not sufficiently flexible to cater for any subsequent changes
in project scope.
Five interviewees stressed the importance of education over further guidance and
standardisation:
• ... the drive towards trying to standardise processes is not always good. This isjllst a personal
view, butyou should actuallYjllst be makingpeople better at theirjob and then standardisation
and guidance and things are more tools ... (Lawyer 12, UK);
• aGeshould not be issuingjlow charts etc.for theproverbial mon~ tofollow; they shollld be
conducting an education exercise ... (Lawyer 14, England &Wales).
14.6A desire to obey the law
As highlighted above, it is evident that in competitive dialogue a number of
considerations will impact upon authority decision making, particularly in areas of
uncertainty. However, the approach taken may depend upon the type of contracting
authority: a small number of interviewees (procurement officers at central government or
external legal advisors that predominantly advice central government) distinguished the
approach of local government, which was said to be quite commercial in their application
of the Regulations, and the approach of central government.
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It was spontaneously noted by four interviewees that central government, seeing itself as
the lawmaker, is less inclined to accept legal risk than local government and seeks to
observe the law simply because it is the law:
• ... there is also a desire to complYwith the law in any event in the caseofgovernment
departments. ... [GJovernment IallYers are on the whole less inclined to take a pragmatic
approach. • .• {IJt is notjllst an economic matter .• •If I said that I wOllld be misrepresenting it
because there would alsojllst be the desire to complYirrespective of economic observations
(Lawyer 5, UK);
• [aJt a localgovernment leve~myfoeling is that people are quite private sector in the sense of, 'if
we can get away with it then that is great'. For central government there is a consciollsnessoj
adversepllblici!) as well as a directfinancial problem and there are moreprocurement people
arollnd there who still foel that • .. government bodies alight to be doing the right thing regardlessoj
the risk ofbeing callght .• .(Lawyer 12, UK).
As a result of these comments, the observation that contracting authorities might be
motivated to comply with the law because it is the law was put to a small number of other
interviewees (local government advisors) but interviewees did not regard it as featuring at
all in decision making.
14.7 Concluding remarks
Chapter 14 has considered the findings on compliance. As has been explained, in terms
of the cost-benefit analysis and the role of soft law in contracting authority decision
making, the research very much backs up the findings of Braun in 2001.600 In addition,
600 Braun (200 I). rn.l72
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the findings highlight other factors relevant to compliance under the legal rules, in
particular the procurement proficiency of authorities.
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15 Conclusions
15.1Introduction
The PhD thesis has examined the operation of the legal rules on competitive dialogue in
the UK for PPP projects, and perceptions of the legal rules.
The research set out to identify perceived positive aspects of competitive dialogue in
facilitating best practice; perceived problems, including any legal uncertainty and
constraints on best practice; strategies to conduct the process within the constraints; and
the factors that influence compliance and approach to legal risk. It had two primary
objectives: (1) to provide information that will assist in policymaking on complex PPP
procurement procedures at both EU and national level; and (2) to enhance understanding
of the way in which regulated persons respond to legal rules that conflict with their
legitimate needs, and to uncertainties in the law, and the factors that influence this
response.
In order to comprehensibly satisfy the above aims and objectives, adopting a socio-legal
perspective on regulation, the author followed an analysis of the legal rules on competitive
dialogue (chapters six-seven) with an empirical study of the law in action (chapters 10-14).
The analysis of the EU rules identified and explored a number of legal grey areas. The
author then went out into the field of study intermittently from January 2010 to March
2011 to conduct 58 semi-structured interviews with individuals with experience of
interpreting and applying the legal rules in practice (see chapter nine).
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In this concluding chapter an overview will be provided of the legal rules on competitive
dialogue, the analysis provided of those legal rules, and the empirical findings on how
these rules are being interpreted, applied and perceived in practice in the UK
15.2 Findings
15.2.1 The decision to use competitive dialogue
Competitive dialogue may be used where a contracting authority wishes to award a
complex contract (Art.29(1)/Reg.18(2)) (chapter six). Chapter six identified a number of
legal questions surrounding the availability of competitive dialogue and the definition of a
complex contract. For instance, it is unclear whether or not competitive dialogue is to be
regarded as a standard procedure to be interpreted broadly or an exceptional procedure.
Although contrary to the Commission's view, in chapter six a strong argument was
presented for competitive dialogue to be viewed as a standard procedure (e.g. because of
the structure and transparency of the process). Further points of uncertainty relating to
the precise meaning of "particularly complex contract" include a lack of clarity over the
discretion an authority has to choose to procure under competitive dialogue and the scope
of the phrases technical complexity and legal and/or financial complexity.
In addition, chapter six highlighted uncertainty over the relationship between competitive
dialogue and the negotiated procedure, the procedure of choice for PPP procurement
prior to competitive dialogue. The grounds for using the negotiated procedure closely
correspond to the definition of "particularly complex contract"; thus, in cases of overlap
the availability of the negotiated procedure is not clear.
The above issues were examined in the qualitative interviews. In particular, the majority
of interviewees indicated that competitive dialogue was to be viewed as a standard
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procedure and was to be interpreted broadly. This is in line with the figures on the use of
the procedure, which show that there has been a heavy take-up in UK of competitive
dialogue in comparison to most other Member States (see chapter five).
In conformity with the Commission's explanatory note?" and the view of most
commentators (see chapter six), virtually all interviewees agreed that competitive dialogue
was to be interpreted as available, not only where the contracting authority has no idea
how its needs and requirements can be met, but also where the contracting authority is
aware of a possible solution/ s but is not sure how best to meet its output needs and
requirements.
A significant number of interviewees considered financial and/or legal complexity to be
the most obvious and a non-controversial ground for justification to use competitive
dialogue for the procurement of PPP projects.
According to most interviewees addressing the issue, the impact of competitive dialogue
on the availability of the negotiated procedure, the wording of the grounds for which had
not been varied by the Directive, was to render it essentially a redundant procedure in the
context of UK PPP procurement. Despite some limited comments, the interviews on the
whole failed to elucidate on the precise relationship between competitive dialogue and the
negotiated procedure. It is therefore clearly desirable that HM Treasury, in accordance
with statements made in its most recent research,602publish guidance on the availability of
the negotiated procedure.
601 Commission (200S), fit.I90, 2.2
602 HM Treasury (20 I0), fit.198, 2.40
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In addition to the examination of the pre-identified legal uncertainties, a key finding of the
research interviews was that, rather than the decision on choice of procedure being based
on an analysis of the wording of the legal text, the practical reality of decision making at
this stage entailed a consideration of various factors other than the binding law. For
example, the perceived low risk of legal challenge for an unlawful decision to procure
under competitive dialogue meant that many interviewees felt it was in reality a free
choice, despite the complexity threshold. It was suggested by interviewees as more
sensible to procure under the more flexible competitive dialogue than under the restricted
procedure. The HM Treasury 2010 review also notes risk aversion to be a reason why
competitive dialogue may be being seen "as the default process for all but the most
straightforward procurements". 603
It is also evident that clear policy statements from OGe have played a substantial role in
steering contracting authorities away from use of the negotiated procedure towards
competitive dialogue. The HM Treasury 2010 review recognises that the statements may
have been too strong, and have been "interpreted as an implied ban on everything but
competitive dialogue".604The findings of Braun's 2001 research likewise found the
standard use of the negotiated procedure for PFI to have been strongly influenced by
government guidance.
15.2.2 The procedure: OIEUnotice to close of dialogue
15.2.2.11ntroductlon
The discussion in chapter seven and 10 of the thesis covered the following topics: pre-
procurement technical dialogue; the drafting of the OJEU notice; qualification and
603 Ibid, 2.36
604 Ibid, 2.36
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selection to participate in dialogue; confidentiality and cherry picking; the structure of
dialogue; and the reduction of bidders and/or solutions during dialogue.
Although the interviews provided no major insights into the drawing up of the OJEU
notice and qualification and selection, in relation to other aspects of the process a number
of points of interest arose out of the interviews. These main points of interest will be
considered in the sections below.
15.2.2.2 Pre-procurement technical dialogue
The Directive/Regulations do not explicitly regulate the planning and preparatory stages
of the procurement process. The interviews were clear that in the same way as other
procedures pre-procurement technical dialogue was possible under competitive dialogue.
The interviews were not clear on the most appropriate way to conduct such technical
dialogue, with few interviewees discussing the point in any depth. However, the use of a
PIN to prepare the market was accepted as being relatively common practice by some
interviewees, as was the conduct of pre-procurement technical dialogue with a limited,
targeted number of bidders (i.e. rather than conducting such dialogue with all potential
bidders declaring an interest in the procurement).
15.2.2.3 Confidentiality and cherry picking
A standard approach to the treatment of confidential information was discernable: the
descriptive documents explain that bidders must label anything they regard to be
confidential and do not want to be shared amongst other bidders. If the contracting
authority disagrees with a bidder about the confidentiality of information and wants to
share the information with other bidders, the authority will warn the bidder of its
intention to share. The two parties will then try to come to an agreement, but if this is
not possible the bidder is likely to be given the option to withdraw the information. The
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above approach was cited by a significant number of interviewees and there were no
conflicting approaches put forward; therefore, this would appear to be a relatively
standard approach, particularly as the approach was broadly endorsed in BSF
documentation. 60S
The standard required for protection under the Regulation's confidentiality rules is not
clear; that is to say, it is not clear whether the confidentiality of information is to be
assessed in accordance with domestic rules (e.g. the law of confidence or confidentiality
under the Freedom of Information Act) or whether the Directive has created a new EU
requirement of confidentiality. Due to it being apparent that most disputes over
confidentiality are resolved amicably, the standard of confidentiality does not appear to be
a major issue. Nevertheless, most interviewees stated that, under the law and in practice,
more information is treated as confidential under the Directive/Regulations than would
be the case under other domestic rules on confidential information (i.e. contracting
authorities are highly/overly respectful of bidder confidentiality claims). As explained in
chapter 12, the primary reason driving this behaviour is commercial: a strict approach to
confidentiality is seen to encourage openness during the dialogue stage. It was also
mentioned spontaneously in some interviews that in addition to the confidentiality rules
contracting authorities will often sign up to confidentiality agreements with bidders (the
frequency of this practice is not clear from the interview data).
The sharing of confidential information is permitted provided bidder agreement has been
obtained. The majority of interviewees stated that they had never needed to seek such
agreement. This suggests a contracting authority seeking agreement to share confidential
information in practice is a relatively rare occurrence.
eIl5 PiS, BSF template: invitation to participate in dialogue ("IPD") (volume I • Instructions and guidance to bidders),(2008,
London), p.27, para.6
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15.2.2.4 Dialogue
The Directive/Regulations do not regulate dialogue in any great detail; thus, subject to the
principles of fairness and transparency, contracting authorities are essentially free to
operate dialogue as they see fit. For reasons of efficiency, and in keeping with pre-
competitive dialogue PFI procurement practice and guidance (see, for example,
OGC/HMT 2008 guidance and BSF documentation), dialogue will typically be conducted
with each bidder separately, be divided into different work streams (e.g. a technical work
stream, a legal work stream, and a financial work stream), and be broken down into a
series of bidding phases over the course of which bidder numbers are reduced and the
level of detail inwhich bids are considered is ramped up.
15 interviewees suggested that the reference to equal treatment is of real practical
importance (other interviewees did not comment on this matter). A strict approach to
equal treatment due to a perceived high risk of challenge has, according to the above
mentioned interviewees, resulted in highly/overly structured dialogue, e.g. equal sets of
meetings for all bidders regardless of need involving discussion of only pre-identified
issues. The strict application of the rules is not in line with best commercial practice (as
noted by 8/15 interviewees (others not commenting).
In view of high bid and administration costs associated with complex procurement, there
is a strong incentive for a quick reduction of bidder numbers during dialogue. As was
discussed in chapter seven, for some time (including complex procurement pre-
competitive dialogue) it has been standard UK practice for bidder numbers to be reduced
early on the basis of only outline solutions, and, according to all but one interviewee this
remains the case.
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Although commercially necessary, there is the potential for unfairness if outline bids are
evaluated against the full set of final award criteria, i.e. because a bidder's outline bid is
likely to be scored differently to the fully developed final bid. Thus, it is uncertain
whether sufficient aspects of solutions must be touched upon at this early stage to allow
full application of the headline award criteria. The vast majority of interviewees took an
approach in practice where different elements of solutions were considered at different
stages and the award criteria and weightings were varied accordingly; the example given
was the avoidance of financial issues in the early stages of dialogue.
The interviews revealed that the application of the legal rules on award criteria in
competitive dialogue to be a major cause for concern amongst practitioners. In particular,
there is uncertainty over the extent and timing of award criteria disclosure and also the
extent to which published award criteria may be subsequently varied. The interviews
suggest that legal practice is highly variable, and that this is an area where central guidance
would be greatly welcomed. Reflecting the fact that competitive dialogue is used where
contracting authorities lack knowledge/awareness of the best solution/ s, it may be argued
that it is necessary that authorities have sufficient flexibility to allow award criteria to
develop (within limits) as the authority learns about the potential solutions available in the
market. In line with this argument authorities should be encouraged to keep award
criteria at a high level in the early stages, and become more specific after early bidder
reductions.
Regarding uncertainty over the scope for changes to advertised award criteria, here the
majority position amongst interviewees was that there is some scope, e.g. for non-material
changes (chapter 11).
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15.2.3 The procedure: final tenders to contract signature
15.2.3.11ntroduction
The following section will present some of the key legal issues arising after the formal
close of dialogue and the interview findings on these points. The operation of the final
stages of competitive dialogue is of critical importance in the UK. A rigid approach to the
legal rules at this stage, such as the work that can be left to be finalised after identification
of the most economically advantageous tender, would result in a substantial
transformation of UK practice from that identified by Braun.606
15.2.3.2Bidder numbers
Although in the legal analysis some uncertainty was expressed over the minimum number
of bidders permitted at the final tender stage, it was clearly accepted in practice that a
minimum of two bidders could be invited to submit final tenders (provided there are
sufficient bidders left in the process). In the main in practice, two-three bidders were
considered an appropriate number at the final tender stage. This position is backed up by
guidance?" and stems from the financial necessity to minimise costs.
15.2.3.3How final are final tenders?
The Directive/Regulations provide that final tenders should contain all elements required
and necessary for the performance of the project. In addition, there are express
restrictions on the work that can be undertaken after identification of the most
economically advantageous tender. As discussed in the legal analysis (chapter seven), it is
not practical or reasonable to expect final tenders to comprehensively cover all matters of
detail; however, the precise extent to which issues must be resolved during dialogue is a
critical legal grey area.
606 Braun (200 I), fit.l72
fIJ7 OGCIHMT (2008), fil.193, S.4.4
343
Although the majority of interviewees adopted a narrow interpretation of the law (chapter
12), most interviewees (25) stated that a strict approach to the requirement for final
tenders was not adopted in practice (e.g. because of commercial pressures). 10/25
interviewees adopting a flexible approach in practice noted that under competitive
dialogue final tenders are more final than they would have been in the past under a
negotiated procedure.
Despite the approach adopted by the majority, the interview findings still suggest that a
strict literal approach to the requirement for final tenders is reasonably prevalent in the
UK. The following reasons were given for this: the high risk of legal challenge from
incomplete bids leading to post tender negotiation; the benefits for the contracting
authority (more certain and competitive bids); the nature of the contract being procured,
i.e. for less complex contracts it may be less problematic to require a higher degree of bid
development; and a policymaker requirement (e.g. for approval of the
appointment/interim final business case).
lS.2.3.4Amendments tofinal tenders
Despite extensive discussion in the legal analysis (chapter seven), for many interviewees in
practice the significance of the scope for amendments to tenders ("clarify, specify and
fine-tune") appears to be limited. This is because any issues that might have needed
clarification. specification. or fine-tuning have been adequately resolved during the
dialogue stage. Indeed, a significant 11 interviewees spontaneously noted it as common
for the contracting authority to hold a dry run final tender stage immediately prior to the
close of dialogue, thus giving the contracting authority greater flexibility to fine-tune than
would be the case had the dialogue stage been formally closed. The practice of dry-run
final tenders appears to be the result of a desire to minimise legal risk (i.e, in relation to
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legally risky negotiations post close of dialogue) and coincides with interim project
approval stages in certain PPP investment schemes.
15.2.3.5 Changes at the pre/erred bidder stage
In long, complex procurements a degree of change to a preferred bidder's tender or the
call for tender is often unavoidable. As explained in chapter seven, the legal rules
(Art.29(7)/Reg.18(28» are uncertain and inconsistent in this area. The Commission has
opined on the scope for changes to tenders in the context of the negotiated procedure
(the London Underground Decision)608and the CJEU has ruled upon the scope for
changes to concluded contracts (Pressetexf);609 however, the extent to which these decisions
are helpful to interpreting the scope for preferred bidder negotiations under competitive
dialogue is not clear.
According to interviewees the uncertainty of the law means there is a level of legal risk
attaching to any change at the preferred bidder stage. 25 interviewees stated that legally
the most they would be comfortable stretching the interpretation of Art.29(7) /Reg.18(28)
to cover would be where the change affects the preferred bidder's score to the detriment
of the contracting authority but would not impact on the award decision. 13 interviewees
viewed the law as narrower than this.
The discussion in chapter 12 on the approach to the uncertainty surrounding the scope
for changes after the appointment of a preferred bidder was enlightening in terms of
contracting authority decision making at this late stage in the procedure where significant
time and cost has been incurred by all parties. Here, it was observed that, regardless of
the law, decisions on whether or not to allow a potential unlawful change at the preferred
bidder stage will very often come down to an assessment of the real, practical risk of legal
608 London Underground, fu.326
609 pressetext, fn.26J
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challenge and the consequences oflegal challenge (successful or unsuccessful) (e.g.
procurement delay). This will be weighed against the necessity of the change and the
alternative options available, such as rewinding the process short of restarting and
abandoning the process and restarting.
Because of non-legal pressures (e.g. financial and time) and legal and practical difficulties
associated with alternative options, the interview data revealed that faced with the
decision whether or not to continue despite the occurrence of a potentially unlawful
change at preferred bidder stage in most cases the authority concerned would be inclined
to go ahead with the procurement. Itwas also apparent that the abandonment and restart
of a competitive dialogue procurement that has reached the preferred bidder stage would
be an extremely rare occurrence due to the high level of investment that would have been
put in to getting to that late stage; no interviewees had experience of such an event.
15.2.3.6 The Alcatel requirements
The interviews revealed three main approaches to the AlcaM standstill and information
requirements: to seek to comply with the requirements immediately on identification of
the preferred bidder only; to seek to comply with the requirements at a later point close to
contract signature; or to combine both approaches and seek to comply with the
requirements at both points (see chapter 13). A common practice is not apparent, with
interviews suggesting that interpretation of the law and practice is highly variable.
15.2.4 Competitive dialogue: general issues
As with other research in the area of complex procurement (Le. the 2008 CBI research.?"
2010 HM Treasury researcht" and 2010 Cabinet Office research).612it is evident from
research interviews that key non-legal issues are the time and cost (particularly bidder
610 CBI (2008), fn.2S4
61J HM Treasury (2010). fn.198.
612 Cabinet Office (2010). fu.199; Cabinet Office (2011). fu.199
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participation costs) of competitive dialogue. Complex projects (such as major PPP
projects) are by their nature costly and time consuming to procure; however, a number of
reasons were given as to why under competitive dialogue the cost and time of complex
procurement had increased, the critical reason being said to be the need to work up
multiple bids to a higher level of completion than was previously the case under the
negotiated procedure. Excessive meetings were also mentioned as a factor.
As with the findings of the recent HM Treasury research'" and Cabinet Office review.?"
in order to minimise the time and cost of competitive dialogue procurement, great
emphasis was placed in interviews upon the need for high levels of pre-procurement
planning and preparation, and also strong management of the process. Sufficient
planning and preparation should facilitate what HM Treasury now terms "targeted
dialogue" where the extent of costly and time consuming meetings is limited to only what
is necessary.
15.2.5 Regulatory Compliance
The examination of the literature on regulatory compliance highlighted a number of
explanations for legally compliant behaviour. For example, economic theories were
considered where compliance is said to result when any benefits expected to be derived
from non-compliance are outweighed by the likelihood and severity of sanction.
Braun relied upon the above mentioned economic theories in his qualitative study of PFI
procurement pre-competitive dialogue and the qualitative findings of the current thesis
are very similar in this respect. As was seen in chapter 14, where strict compliance with
regulation is in conflict with other procurement pressures (e.g. time pressures, cost saving
pressures and value for money pressures), contracting authorities will assess the likelihood
613 HM Treasury (2010). fn.198. 3.2-3.9
614 Cabinet Office (2010). fil.199. 10; Cabinet Office (2011). fn.l99. 4.4
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of challenge and the consequences of challenge, and weigh this against the other pressures
they may be faced with (e.g. an existing contract may be expiring and there may be strong
pressure to ensure a new contract is in place) in deciding how to proceed. For instance, it
was observed that no interviewees had experience of restarting a competitive dialogue
procurement that had reached the preferred bidder stage. In this situation, the cost and
time expended in getting the procurement to the final stages are often so great as to
nullify the deterrent of the threat of legal challenge.
An increase in legal risk was not yet evident for the time period covered by the study from
the number of disputes reaching the courts. A number of factors (such as high
participation costs), coupled with an increase in bidder complaints and queries, was said
by most interviewees to be resulting in authorities becoming more risk averse in their
decision making.
Also, despite the above, as explained by interviewees, legal risk is assessed on a case by
case basis and there remain a number of deterrents to formal legal challenge: a bidder fear
of getting a bad name, bidder relationships with contracting authorities, the cost and time
of mounting a legal challenge, and the uncertainty of the law.
In addition to economic theories of compliance, a number of interviews confirmed the
discussion in chapter eight that legally risky/non-compliant behaviour may also be down
to a contracting authorities' lack of proficiency or a lack of resources (i.e, what Kagan and
Scholz termed the "organisationally incompetent entity',).615For example, for some
complex procurements there is a concern that (costly) legal expertise that does not exist
in-house is not being sufficiently utilised (particularly early on in the process).
6U Kagan & Scholz (1984). fu.482
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As with Braun's findings, OGe and HM Treasury guidance was found to playa key role
in steering contracting authorities towards particular interpretations of the law. However,
this was only the case in relation to one specific issue where the OGe 2006 guidance is
clear and unequivocal in relation to the move away from the negotiated procedure to
competitive dialogue for the vast majority of complex PPP procuremenrs.t" For the most
part, guidance was observed to play only a limited role in practice because, for example, of
its generic nature. There are obvious reasons why the OGe and HM Treasury would not
want to threaten UK procurement practice by being too specific in controversial areas.
The OGe's use of alternative means to clarify the law and establish best practice, such as
through the work of the Procurement Lawyer's Association (awholly independent
organisation), may be more effective than traditional guidance.
15.3 Concluding remarks
Despite being available in the UK for over five years, the legal rules and practical
operation of competitive dialogue remain highly uncertain in many critical areas. When
the procedure was first introduced, leading commentators were keen to ensure that
competitive dialogue was viewed as facilitating wider adoption of what had become
recognised as best practice for PFI procurement under the negotiated procedure, and
discouraging any non-transparent, anti-competitive behaviour which was not in the
interests of procuring authorities. This meant the legal rules needed to be interpreted and
applied in a commercially sensible manner, consistent with the types of projects procured
under competitive dialogue."? As we have seen from the interviews, in many situations
this has been the case (see, for example, interview findings in relation to the level of
development of final tenders).
616 OGC (2006). fn.I 87. section 2
617 Arrowsmith (2004). fn.325; Arrowsmith (2005). fn.46; M.Burnett. "Conducting competitive dialogue for PPP projects -
towards an optimal approach?" (2009) 4 EPPPL 190
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However, the legal rules on competitive dialogue coupled with a great increase in
perceived levels of legal risk (which continue to grow) has meant that some have adopted
or are moving towards narrow interpretations of the legal grey areas, which in many cases
is standing in the way of efficiency and value for money. To tackle this problem UK
government should consider guidance in areas where it considers practitioners may need
support to apply the law in a manner suitable for the procurement of particularly complex
contracts.
350
Bibliography
4Ps, The competitive dialogueprocess (2007, London)
4Ps, A map of the PF] process: using competitive dialogue (2006, London)
4Ps, A new chapter in procuring large and complexprojects (2006, London)
4Ps and Partnerships for Schools, An introduction to building schoolsfor thefoture (2008,
London)
G.Allen. Private finance initiative (2001, London, House of Common Research Paper
01/117)
Allen & Overy, Globalguide topublic-private partnerships (2010, London, Allen & Overy)
T.Amodu, The determinants of compliance with laws and regulations with special riference to health and
safety: a literature review (Research Report (RR638)) (2008, London, Health and Safety
Executive)
S.Arrowsmith. Public procurement regulation: an introduction (2010, Nottingham) available at
WW\V.nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/asialinkmaterials/publicprocurementreg
ulationintroduction.pdf (accessed 31/10/2011)
S.Arrowsrnith, "Implementation of the new EC procurement directives and the Alcatel
ruling in England and Wales and Northern Ireland: a review of new legislation and
guidance" (2006) 3 Public Procurement Law Review 86
S.Arrowsrnith, ''The past and future evolution of BC procurement law: from framework
to common code?" (2005-06) 35 Public Contracts Law Journal337
S.Arrowsrnith, The law ofpublic and utilities procurement (2nd ed., 2005, London, Sweet &
Maxwell)
S.Arrowsrnith, "An assessment of the new legislative package on public procurement"
(2004) 41 Common Market Law Review 1277
S.Arrowsrnith, "Application of the UK Procurement Regulations to PFI contracts: new
case law" (2002) 11 PPLR NA84
S.Arrowsrnith, "EC procurement rules in the UK courts: an analysis of the Harmon case"
(2000) 9 PPLR 120
S.Arrowsrnith, "The European Commission's proposal for new directives on public and
utilities procurement" (2000) 9 PPLR NA125
S.Arrowsrnith, "Public private partnerships and the European procurement rules: EU
policies in conflict?" (2000) 37(3) Common Market Law Review 709
351
S. Arrowsmith, ''The problem of discussions with tenderers under the EC Procurement
Directives: the current law and the case for reform" (1998) 7 PPLR 65
S.Arrowsmith, "National and international perspectives on the regulation of public
procurement: harmony or conflict?" in Arrowsmith & Davies (eds.) Public procurement:
global revolution (1998, Kluwer Law International)
Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, Social and environmental policies in EC proCllrement law: new directives
and new directions (2009, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
Arthur Anderson and Enterprise LSE, Value for money drivers in the Private Finance Initiative
(2000, London)
P.Badcoe (ed.), Public private partnerships and PFI (2010, London, Sweet &Maxwell)
P.Badcoe, "Public private partnerships in local government the legal, financial and policy
framework" (1999) 8 PPLR 279
KBailey, Me/hods of social research (1978, New York, Free Press)
Bajari et al.,Auctions versus negotiations in proCllrement: an empirical analYsis (2003, Cambridge,
Mass, National Bureau of Economic Research)
R.Baldwin, ''Why rules don't work" (1990) 53(3) Modern Law Review 321
Baldwin & Davis, "Empirical research in law" in Cane & Tushnet (eds.), The Oxford
handbook of legal studies (2003, Oxford, OUP)
Banakar & Travers, Theory and method in socia-legalresearch (2005, Oxford, Hart)
G.Becker, "Crime and punishment: an economic approach" (1968) Journal of Political
Economy 169
B.Bix, "Law as an autonomous discipline" in Cane & Tushnet (eds.), Oxford handbook of
legal sf1ldies (2003, aUP)
D.Black, "The boundaries of legal sociology" [1971-72] 81 Yale LAw Journal 1086
R.Boyle, "Critique of the Commission's proposal for a new Directive on the Co-
ordination of Procedures for Public Contracts COM (2000) 275 Final, as updated by
discussions in the working group" (2001) 10 PPLR NA65
C.Bovis, "The competitive dialogue as a procurement process of public private
partnerships" (2006) 1 European Public Private Partnership Law Review 14
Broadbent & Laughlin, "Public private partnerships: an introduction" (2003) 16(3)
Accounting, Auditing &Accountability Journal 332
A.Brown, "Seeing through transparency: the requirement to advertise public contracts and
concessions under the EC Treaty" (2007) 16 PPLR 1
A.Brown, "Applying Alcatel in the context of competitive dialogue" (2006) 15 PPLR 332
352
A.Brown, "The impact of the new Procurement Directive on large public infrastructure
projects: competitive dialogue or better the devil you know?"(2004) 13 PPLR 160
M.Burnett, "Developing a complexity test for the use of competitive dialogue for PPP
Contracts" (2010) 4 EPPPL 215
M.Burnett, "Using competitive dialogue in EU public procurement - early trends and
future developments" (2009) 2 EIPA SCOPE 17
M.Burnett, "Conducting competitive dialogue for PPP projects - towards an optimal
approach?" (2009) 4 EPPPL 190
Burnett & Oder, Competitive dialogue: a practical guide (2009, Maastricht, European Institute
of Public Administration)
P.Braun, "Strict compliance versus commercial reality: the practical application of EC
procurement law to the UK's Private Finance Initiative" (2003) 9(5) European Law Journal
575
P.Braun, The practical impact ofEU public procurement law on PFr procurement practice in the United
Kingdom (2001, University of Nottingham) (phD thesis)
A.Bryman, Social researchmethods (2nd ed., 2004, Oxford, OUP)
Cabinet Office, Accelerating government procurement (2011, London)
Cabinet Office, Lean procurement project diagnosticfindings (2010, London)
P.Cartwright, Consumer protection and the criminal law: law, theory, and polifY in the UK (2001,
Cambridge, CUP)
Chong et al.,Auction versus negotiation in public procurement: lookingfor empirical evidenceOune
2009) available at htq>i!!hal.archiyes-ouvertes.fr/hal-00512813/enl (accessed
31/10/2011)
P.Chynoweth, "Legal research" in Knight & Ruddock (eds.) Advanced researchmethods in the
built environment (2008, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell)
Commission on Public-Private Partnerships, Building better partnerships: thefinal report of the
Commission on Public Priuate Partnerships (2002, London, Institute for Public Policy Research)
CBI, CBr BRIEF: Actions speak louder than words: unlocking thefull potential of competitive dialogue
(2008, London)
CBI, Goingglobal.· the world ofpublic private partnerships (2007, London)
CBI, Building on success: the wayforward for PFr (London, 2007)
S.Charveron, "Competitive dialogue threatens PFI" (2007) 18(7) Construction Law 29
353
Council and Commission, Statement concerningArticle 7 (4) of Council Directive 93/37/EEC of
14June 1993 concerning the coordination ofprocedures for the award ofpublic works contracts (1994,
Brussels) (OJ Lll1/114)
J.Creswell, Research design: qualitative & quantitative approaches (1994, Thousand Oaks, Sage)
Deloitte, Buildingflexibiltfy: new delivery models for public infrastructure projects (2006) available at
www.deloitte.com (accessed 31/10/2011)
A.Delsaux, "The role of the Commission in enforcing EC public procurement rules"
(2004) 13 PPLR 130
De Lemon et al., "From concessions to project finance and the private finance initiative"
(2000) Journal of Project Finance 19
De Mars & Craven, "An analysis of use of the competitive dialogue procedure in the EU"
in Arrowsmith & Treumer (eds.), Competitive dialogue in EU procurement (forthcoming, CUP)
M.Denscombe, The good researchguide: for small-scale social researchprojects (2007, Maidenhead,
Open University Press)
Denzin & Lincoln, Handbook of qualitative research (1994, Thousand Oaks, Sage)
NK.Denzin, The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociologicalmethods (1989, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall)
Department of Health, The private finance initiative: how to conduct a competitive dialogueprocedure
(consultation draft) (2006, London)
Domberger & Jenson, "Contracting out by the public sector: theory, evidence, prospects"
(1997) Vo1.13 (No.4) Oxford Review of Economic Poliq 67
P.Dzakula, "Dialogue coach" (2007) 2S Building S6
Edelman et al., "Legal ambiguity and the politics of compliance: affirmative action
officers' Dilemma" (1991) 13(1) Law & Poliq 74
European Commission, Green paper on the modernisation of E U public procurement poltry towards
a more e.fftcientEuropean procurement market (Brussels, 2011) (COM(2011) 1S final)
European Commission, Public procurement: Commission recognises needfor acceleratedprocurement
procedure (2008, Brussels) (IP /08/2040)
European Commission, Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to contract
awards not or not fullY suiject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives (2006, Brussels)
European Commission, Explanatory note - competitive dialogue _ classic directive (2005, Brussels)
(CC/2005/04_rev 1 of 5.10.2005)
European Commission, Green paper on public-private partnerships and Community law on public
contracts and concessions (2004, Brussels) (COM(2004) 327 final)
354
European Commission, State aid No N264/2002 - United Kingdom
London Underground Public Private Partnership (2002, Brussels) (C(2002)3S78fin)
European Commission, Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and oj the Council on
the coordination ojproceduresfor the award ojpublic supplY contracts,public servicecontracts and public
works contracts (2000, Brussels) (COM (2000) 275 Final)
European Commission, The rulesgoverning theprocedure in the award ojpublic procuf'flnent
contracts (2000, Brussels)
European Commission, Interpretative communication on concessionsunder Commllnity law (2000,
Brussels) (2000/C 121/02)
European Commission, Reasoned opinion: addressed to the United Kingdom pursllant to Article 226
of the EC Treaty, concerningfailllre tofulfil its obligations snder Directive 93/37/EEC, and in
particular Article 7(2)(c) thereof(2000, Brussels) (C20OO1972 Final)
European Commission, Communication from the Commission: public procllrement in the Ellropean
Union (1998, Brussels) (COM(1998) 143 Final)
European Commission, Green paper: pllblic procurement in the Esropea« Union: exploring the way
forward (Brussels, 1996) (COM(96) 583)
A.Eyo, The Adequary oj the Ellropean Union rules on the use ojelectronic reverseauaions in regulated
procurement (2009, University of Nottingham)
Fairman & Yapp, "Enforced self-regulation, prescription, and conceptions of compliance
within small businesses: the impact of enforcement" (2005) 27(4) Law & Policy 491
M.Finders, ''The politics of public-private partnerships" (2005) 7(2) British Journal of Politics
and International Relations 543
Freeman &Minow, Government by contract: outsourcing and American democracy (2009,
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press)
Geerken & Gove, "Deterrence: some theoretical considerations" (1975) 9 Law and Society
Review495
Gelderman et al., "Explaining non-compliance with European Union procurement
directives: a multidisciplinary perspective" (2010) 48(2) JOllrnal of Common Market Studies
243
Gelderman et al., "Public procurement and EU tendering directives? explaining non-
compliance" (2006) 19(7) International Journal ofPllblic Sector Management 702
Genn et al., Law in the real world: improving our IInderstanding of how law works:.ftnal report and
recommendations (2006, London, N uffield Foundation) available at .
www.ucl.ac.ukllawslsocio-Iegal/empirical (accessed 31/10/2011)
B.Gillingham, The research inteniew (2000, London, Continuum)
355
Glaser & Strauss, The discoveryofgrounded theory: strategiesfor qualitative research (2008, New
Brunswick, Aldine Transaction)
Gordon et al., "The economic impact of the European Union regime on public
procurement: lessons for the wro- (1998) 21(2) The World Economy 159
Gray & Shadbegian, "When and why do plants comply? Paper mills in the 1980s" (2005)
27(2) Law &Policy 238
Gunningham & Kagan, "Regulation and business behavior" (2005) 27(2) Law & Policy 213
D.Heald, ''Value for money tests and accounting treatment in PFI schemes" (2003) 16
Accounting, Auditing &Accountability Journal342
Heald & Georgiou, "The substance of accounting for public-private partnerships" (2011)
27 (2) Financial Accountability &Management 217
HM Prison Service and Private Finance Panel Executive, Report on theprocurement of custodial
senices for the DCMF prisons at Bridgend and Fazakerley, (1996, London)
HM Treasury, Public private partnerships- technical update 2010 (2010, London)
HM Treasury, HM Treasury reviewof competitive dialogue (2010, London)
HM Treasury, Application note - PPP projects in cumnt market conditions (2009, London)
HM Treasury, Treasury lending to PFI projects and the Treasury's Infrastructure Finance Unit
(Letter,S May 2009) (Charles Uoyd, Head of Public-Private Partnerships)
HM Treasury, Infrastructure procurement: delivering long-term value (2008, London)
HM Treasury, PFI: strengthening long-term values (2006, London)
HM Treasury, Pnferred bidder debtfunding competitions: draft outline guidancefor feedback (2006,
London)
HM Treasury, PFI: meeting the investment challenge (2003, London)
HM Treasury, Public-private partnerships: the government's approach (2000, London)
Hordijk & Meulenbelt, "A bridge too far: Why the European Commission's attempts to
construct an obligation to tender outside the scope of the public procurement directives
should be dismissed" (2005) 14 PPLR 123
House of Common Treasury Select Committee, Report: private finance initiatitlt, (2011)
available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1146/114602.
htm (accessed 01/10/2011)
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, Private finance projects and off-balance sheel debl,
(2010) 1st Report of Session 2009-10
356
Information Commissioner's Office, Freedom of Information Act awareness guidance No.5:
commercial interests, (2008)
Iossa & Martimort, The simple micro-economics ofpublic-private partnerships (2009, BruneI
University)
Kagan et al., "Explaining corporate environmental performance: How does regulation
matter?" (2003) 37(1) Law & Society RetJiew51
Kagan & Scholz, "The 'criminology of the corporation' and regulatory enforcement
strategies", in Hawkins & Thomas (eds.) Enforcing regulation (1984, Boston, Kluwer-Nihoff)
D.Keats, Interoiewing: a practical guide for students and professionals (2000, Sydney, University of
New South Wales Press)
C.Kennedy-Loest, "What can be done at the preferred bidder stage in competitive
dialogue?" (2006) 15 PPLR 316
T.Kotonis, Taking stock: competitive dialoguefour years on (2010) available at
www.nortonrose.com (accessed 31/10/2011)
T.Kotsonis, Should the competitive negotiatedprocedure ever now be used and if so when? (2009)
available at www.whitepaperdocuments.co.uk (accessed 31/10/2011)
T.Kotsonis, "The nature of award criteria and the subsequent stipulation of weightings
and sub-criteria: Lianakis v. Dimos Alexandroupolis (C-532/06)" (2008) 17 PPLR 128
K.Kriiger, "Ban-on-negotiations in tender procedures: undermining best value for
money?" (2004) 4(3) Journal of Public Procurement 397
K.Kriiger, "The scope for post-tender negotiations in international tendering procedures"
. in Arrowsmith & Davies (eds.) Public Procurement: Global RelJOlution(1998, Kluwer Law
International)
S.Kvale, Interviews: an introduction to qualitative research interviewing (1996, Thousand Oaks,
Calif, Sage)
P .Lee, "Implications of the Lianakis decision" (2010) 19 PPLR 47
Maccoby & Maccoby, "The interview: a tool of social science" in Gardner (ed.), Handbook
of socialpsychology, vol.1 (1954, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley)
N.Maltby, "Chapter 3 - The PFI procurement process" in Lindrup & Godfrey (eds),
Butterworths PFI manual: law, practice and procedure relating to the private finance initiative and
public/private partnerships, (1998, LexisNexis Butterworths)
P.May, "Compliance motivations: perspectives of farmers, homebuilders, and marine
facilities" (2005) 27(2) Law &Policy 317
B.) .McCormick, Introducing economics (2nd ed., 1977, London, Penguin)
357
C.McCrudden, "Legal research and social sciences" (2006) 122(Oct) Law QuarterlY fuview
632
D.McGowan, "Clarity at last? Low value contracts and transparency obligations" (2007)
16 PPLR274
JM.Morse, "Designing funded qualitative research" in Denzin & Lincoln (eds.) Strategies of
qualitative research (1998, London, Sage)
Murphy et al.,Qualitative researchmethods in health technologyassessment: a reviewof the literature
(1998, Alton, Core Research, on behalf of the NCCHTA)
Nabarro, Projects briefing: debtfunding competitions under the competitive dialogue (2007, London)
available at www.nabarro.com (accessed 31/10/2011)
Nagelkerke et al., Competitive dialogue: al?Jssor 0pporfllnity?, Paper Presented at the 3rd
International Public Procurement Conference Proceedings (2008, Amsterdam) available at
www ippa.org (accessed 31/10/2011)
National Audit Office, Improving the PFI tenderingprocess, (2007, London)
oECD, Assuring environmental compliance:A toolkit for building better environmental inspectors in
Eastern European, Caucasus and Central Asia, (2005) available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/62/34499651.pdf (accessed 31/10/2011)
OGC, Procurement poliry note - use of the acceleratedrestrictedprocedure in 2011 (Information
Note 01/11 4 January 2011) (2011, London)
OGC, Procurement poliry note - use of the acceleratedrestrictedprocedure (Information Note 1/09
14 January 2009)
OGC, Competitive dialogue case stu4J: a bidder's perspective (2009, London)
OGC, Competitive dialogue case stu4J: BBC digital switchover help scheme (2009, London)
OGC, Procurement poliry note - The need to ensurepublished contract notices are accurate and COt'" the
complete requirement. Action Note 03/09 08 Apn'l2009 (2009, London)
OGC, OlYmpic Delivery Authority: deliverypartner procurement using competitive dialogue: a lessons
learned stu4J (2007, London)
OGC, Competitive dialogueprocedure: OGC guidance on the competitive dialogueprocedure in the new
procurement regulations (2006, London)
OGC, Procurement poliry: information note 04/06 - 31 JulY 2006: practical guidance on the lise of
competitive dialogue (2006, London)
OGC and HM Treasury, Competitive dialogue in 2008: OGC/ HMT joint guidance on using the
procedure (2008, London)
D.Pachnou, "Bidders remedies to enforce the EC procurement rules in England and
Wales" (2003) 12 PPLR 35
358
D.Pachnou, The effectivenessof bidder remediesfor enforcing the EC public procurement T'llles:A case
study of thepublic works sector in the United Kingdom and Greece (2003, Nottingham, University
of Nottingham)
Parker & Braithwaite, "Regulation", in Cane & Tushnet (eds.) The Oxford handbook of legal
sflldies (2003, Oxford University Press)
PartnershipsUK, A guidance notefor public sector bodiesformingjoint venfllre companies with the
private sector (2001)
Partnerships for Schools, Standardform BSF contract notice, (2009, London)
Partnerships for Schools, BSF template: invitation toparticipate in dialogue ("IPD'~ (volume 1 •
inslrllctions and guidance to bidders) (2008, London)
Partnerships for Schools, Outline business caseguidance
(for approval toprocure a UP to deliver investment in the secondary school estate) (2007, London)
Partnerships for Schools, BSF guidance note on how to conduct a competitive dialogueprocedure
(2006, London)
Partnerships for Schools, Guidance note on classification of the contract and choiceofprocedure under
the EU procurement ralesfor the Building Schoolsfor the Future Programme (2006, London)
M.Patton,Qualitative researchand evaluation methods (2002, Thousand Oaks, Calif, Sage)
R.Posner, Economic analYsis of law (2011, New York, Aspen)
RPosner, ''The decline of law as an autonomous discipline: 1962-1987" (1987) 100
Haruard Law Review 761
R'Pound, "Law in books and law in action" (1910) 44American Law Review 12
PricewaterhouseCoopers, The value of PFI: hanging in the balance sheet? (public Sector
Research Centre, 2008)
Procurement Lawyers' Association, EU public proClirement and land development agreements 4ftr
the EC]'s judgment in Jean Auroux v Commune de Roanne (C-220/05), (August 2009) available
at www.procurementla\£y<:rs.OJ;g/
D.] .Pyle, The economicsof crime and law enforcement (1983, London, Macmillan)
].Quiggin, "Risk, PPPs and the public sector comparator" (2004) 14(2)Australian Socie!) of
Certified Practicing Accountants 51
A.Reich, "On procurement, protectionism and protests: a survey among Canadian
procurement officers" (1994) 23(1) Canadian Business Lrw journall07
Richardson et al., Interviewing: itsforms and junctions (1965, New York, Basic Books)
359
Ritchie et al., "Designing and selecting samples", Chapter Four in Ritchie & Lewis (eds.),
Qualitative researchpractice: a guide for social sciencestudents and researchers(2003, London, Sage)
P.Robinson, ''The private finance initiative: the real story" (2000) 10 Consumer Policy Review
82
Roe & Dickinson, "Issues for public procurements resulting from instability in global
financial markets" (2009) 18 PPLR NA9s
Roe & Verschuur, Briefing: competitive dialogue: the EU's newproCllrementprocedure, (2005,
London, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer) available at www.freshfields.com/(accessed
31/10/2011)
A.Rubach-Larsen, "Competitive dialogue" in Nielsen & Treumer (eds), The new EU public
procurement directives (2005, Djef, Copenhagen)
Rubin & Rubin, Qualitative interviewing: the art of hearing data, (2005, Thousand Oaks, Sage)
S.Sarantakos, Social research (2005, New York, Palgrave Macmillan)
M.Sawyer, ''The private finance initiative: the UK experience" (2005) Procurement and
Financing ofMotonvqys in Europe 231
J .Scholz, "Enforcement policy and corporate misconduct: the changing perspective of
deterrence Theory" (1997) 60 Law and Contemp. Probs. 253
De Schrijver &Van Acker, "New models of public procurement: e-auction and
competitive dialogue" in Lodder et al. (eds.), IT law - the global future: achievements,plans and
ambitions, (2006, Amsterdam, Elsevier)
D.Silverman, Interpreting qualitative data: methodsfor analY:dng talk, text, and interaction (2006,
London, Sage)
H.A.Simon, "Models of bounded rationality" (1982, Cambridge Mass, MIT Press)
Snellenberg & Peppel, "Perspectives on compliance: non-compliance with environmental
licences in the Netherlands" (2002) 12 European Environment 131
M.Spackman, "Public-private partnerships: lessons from the British approach" (2002) 26
Economic Systems 283
G.stigler, ''The optimum enforcement of Laws" (1970) 78 Journal of Political Economy 526
Strauss & Corbin, Basics of qualitative research:techniques and proceduresfor developinggrounded
theory (1998, Thousand Oaks, Sage)
Sutcliffe, "Contracting out public services: UK policy v EC law", (1995) Anglo American
Law Review 337
Sutinen & Kuperan, "A socio-economic theory of regulatory compliance" (1999)
26(1/2/3) International Journal ofSocial Economics 174
360
P.Telles, "Competitive dialogue in Portugal" (2010) 19 PPLR 1
Thornton et al., "General deterrence and corporate environmental behaviour" (2005)
27(2) Law & Poliry 262
Treasury Taskforce, Technical note no.4: how to appoint and work with a prefernd bidder, (1999,
London)
Treasury Taskforce, Step by stepguide to the PFI procurement process (1999, London)
Treasury Taskforce, Technical note no.2: how tofollow ECprocurement procedure and advertise in the
OJEC (1998, London)
S.Treumer, "The distinction between selection and award criteria inEC public
procurement law - a rule without exception?" (2009) 18 PPLR 103
S.Treumer, "Technical dialogue and the principle of equal treatment - dealing with
conflicts of interest after Fabricom" (2007) 16 PPLR 99
S.Treumer, "Towards an obligation to terminate contracts concluded in breach of the
E.C. Public procurement rules - the end of the status of concluded public contracts as
sacred cows" (2007) 16 PPLR 371
S.Treumer, "The discretionary powers of contracting entities - towards a flexible approach
in the recent case law of the court of justice?" (2006) 15 PPLR 71
S.Treumer, "The field of application of competitive dialogue" (2006) 15 PPLR 307, 313
S.Treumer, "Competitive dialogue" (2004) 13 PPLR 178
P.Trepte, "Transparency requirements" in Nielsen & Treumer (eds.), The new EU public
procurement directive, (2005, Dj0f)
P.Trepte, Public procurement in the EU: a practitioner's guide (2007, Oxford, Oxford University
Press)
CD.Tvarn0,CD (ed.), Public-private partnerships: an international analYsis - from a legal and
economicperspective (2010) available at
www.unpcdc.Qrg/media/142722/ppp%20bQQk%5B1 %5D,pdf (accessed 31/10/2011)
T.Tyler, Whpeople obry the law (1990, New Haven, Yale University Press)
T.VaIila, "HQWexpensive are cost savings? On the economics of public-private
partnerships" (2005) 10(1) European Investment Bank Papers 94
van Snellenberg & van de Peppel, "perspectives on compliance: non-compliance with
environmental licences in the Netherlands" (2002) 12 European Environment 131
S.Verschuur, "Competitive dialogue and the scope for discussion after tenders and before
selecting the preferred bidder-what is fine-tuning etc?" (2006) 15 PPLR 327
361
J.Vogel, "Taxation and public opinion in Sweden: an interpretation of recent survey data"
(1974) National Tax Journal499
Witte &Woodbury, "The effect of tax laws and tax administration on tax compliance: the
case of the US individual income tax" (1985) National Tax Journal1
362
